Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[Ecurb]

This is a controverted question,* but I take a very commonsensical approach to these questions. If God's foreknowledge yields necessitated events then the events cannot be free. Apart from Calvinists, these debates hinge on the question of whether foreknowledge yields necessitation, not whether necessitation is incompatible with freedom. The vast, vast majority of theists acknowledge that necessitation is incompatible with freedom.


Rather, you are denying (4) in attributing causal power to agents. This is a denial of determinism. The implicit premise in question is this: <If Determinism is true, then all causation is event causation>. But only theistic determinists would dispute such a premise, and Sculptor is not one of those.

......

As I said in my last post:

• "When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time."

You are saying that he calls "heads" because of his free choice, not because of antecedent conditions/causes/events. This is not only not Determinism, it contradicts Determinism.

What is your definition of Determinism?


* The forum is preventing me from posting a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If you do a web search for, "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Foreknowledge and Free Will," you will find the web page.

Let's use Lucky's definition:

My definition of Determinism is that antecedent state 1 always leads to resultant state 2, never 3. And Free Will I define as antecedent state 1 can lead to multiple possible resultant states, say 2 and 3 (and likely others).

Thus Determinism cannot coincide with Free Will.

Antecedent state 1 always does lead to resultant state 2. That's obvious. It's just that we don't know what the resultant state is until it occurs. (An exception might be some sort of multiverse.)

Since there is always an antecedent state, and always a resultant state; one leads to the other. Whether one "determines" or "causes" the other is problematic, which is why we are having this discussion. Free will is obviously irrelevant to whether state 1 is followed by state 2. If we define state 2 as the resultant state it will always occur, because whatever does occur will be state 2.

Once state 2 has occurred, it was inevitable.

Nonetheless, why does this negate the possibility of free will? Perhaps the resultant state is the result of someone's freely decided option.

Think of a card came. The deck is shuffled. The player has to guess what card will be dealt next. However, a kibitzer can see the other side of the cards and he knows that the King of Hearts is on the top of the deck. Would it be normal usage to say that the kibitzer has "caused" the King of Hearts to be the next card dealt? Or did the shuffle "cause" the order of the cards, and the kibitzer has a special king of knowledge. Couldn't the same be true about knowing the future? We are like the player. We can't see the future. So we freely opt to do something. Once we opt, we can (like Martun Luther) "do no other". Of course the person (being?) who can see the future knows what we will choose (just as the kibitzer knows which card is next), but he doesn't force us to choose as we do. He just knows (or intuits) what choice we will make.

P.s. Lucky's conclusion is illogical. State i cannot lead to "multible (possible) resultant states" unless we believe in a multiverse. It can lead to (not cause) only one, and that one was once infinitely unlikely.

[Leontiskos]

This is a controverted question,* but I take a very commonsensical approach to these questions. If God's foreknowledge yields necessitated events then the events cannot be free. Apart from Calvinists, these debates hinge on the question of whether foreknowledge yields necessitation, not whether necessitation is incompatible with freedom. The vast, vast majority of theists acknowledge that necessitation is incompatible with freedom.


Rather, you are denying (4) in attributing causal power to agents. This is a denial of determinism. The implicit premise in question is this: <If Determinism is true, then all causation is event causation>. But only theistic determinists would dispute such a premise, and Sculptor is not one of those.

......

As I said in my last post:

• "When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time."

You are saying that he calls "heads" because of his free choice, not because of antecedent conditions/causes/events. This is not only not Determinism, it contradicts Determinism.

What is your definition of Determinism?


* The forum is preventing me from posting a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If you do a web search for, "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Foreknowledge and Free Will," you will find the web page.

Let's use Lucky's definition:

Okay.

My definition of Determinism is that antecedent state 1 always leads to resultant state 2, never 3. And Free Will I define as antecedent state 1 can lead to multiple possible resultant states, say 2 and 3 (and likely others).

Thus Determinism cannot coincide with Free Will.

Antecedent state 1 always does lead to resultant state 2. That's obvious. It's just that we don't know what the resultant state is until it occurs. (An exception might be some sort of multiverse.)

Actually on Lucky's definition it's not obvious unless we are presupposing determinism. He explicitly said that state 3 is possible on Free Will.

Since there is always an antecedent state, and always a resultant state; one leads to the other.

This is simply not true. You are begging the question in favor of determinism. In Lucky's definition of Free Will he is clearly saying that there could be resultant states which do not necessarily follow from antecedent states.

Whether one "determines" or "causes" the other is problematic, which is why we are having this discussion. Free will is obviously irrelevant to whether state 1 is followed by state 2. If we define state 2 as the resultant state it will always occur, because whatever does occur will be state 2.

Yes, if we define "the state which results" as "state 2" then it will always occur by tautology, but Lucky's definitions do not support this definition.

Once state 2 has occurred, it was inevitable.

Not on Lucky's definitions. Indeed on Lucky's definition if state 2 occurs with Free Will then it was not inevitable.

Nonetheless, why does this negate the possibility of free will? Perhaps the resultant state is the result of someone's freely decided option.

Think of a card came. The deck is shuffled. The player has to guess what card will be dealt next. However, a kibitzer can see the other side of the cards and he knows that the King of Hearts is on the top of the deck. Would it be normal usage to say that the kibitzer has "caused" the King of Hearts to be the next card dealt? Or did the shuffle "cause" the order of the cards, and the kibitzer has a special king of knowledge. Couldn't the same be true about knowing the future? We are like the player. We can't see the future. So we freely opt to do something. Once we opt, we can (like Martun Luther) "do no other". Of course the person (being?) who can see the future knows what we will choose (just as the kibitzer knows which card is next), but he doesn't force us to choose as we do. He just knows (or intuits) what choice we will make.

As I said in my last, "...these debates hinge on the question of whether foreknowledge yields necessitation, not whether necessitation is incompatible with freedom."

Once we opt, we can (like Martun Luther) "do no other".

Right, but this is not an argument for determinism. The determinist must instead say that before we opt we can do no other. That our decision was a foregone conclusion long before we made it.

[LuckyR]

This is a controverted question,* but I take a very commonsensical approach to these questions. If God's foreknowledge yields necessitated events then the events cannot be free. Apart from Calvinists, these debates hinge on the question of whether foreknowledge yields necessitation, not whether necessitation is incompatible with freedom. The vast, vast majority of theists acknowledge that necessitation is incompatible with freedom.


Rather, you are denying (4) in attributing causal power to agents. This is a denial of determinism. The implicit premise in question is this: <If Determinism is true, then all causation is event causation>. But only theistic determinists would dispute such a premise, and Sculptor is not one of those.

......

As I said in my last post:

• "When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time."

You are saying that he calls "heads" because of his free choice, not because of antecedent conditions/causes/events. This is not only not Determinism, it contradicts Determinism.

What is your definition of Determinism?


* The forum is preventing me from posting a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If you do a web search for, "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Foreknowledge and Free Will," you will find the web page.

Let's use Lucky's definition:

My definition of Determinism is that antecedent state 1 always leads to resultant state 2, never 3. And Free Will I define as antecedent state 1 can lead to multiple possible resultant states, say 2 and 3 (and likely others).

Thus Determinism cannot coincide with Free Will.

Antecedent state 1 always does lead to resultant state 2. That's obvious. It's just that we don't know what the resultant state is until it occurs. (An exception might be some sort of multiverse.)

Since there is always an antecedent state, and always a resultant state; one leads to the other. Whether one "determines" or "causes" the other is problematic, which is why we are having this discussion. Free will is obviously irrelevant to whether state 1 is followed by state 2. If we define state 2 as the resultant state it will always occur, because whatever does occur will be state 2.

Once state 2 has occurred, it was inevitable.

Nonetheless, why does this negate the possibility of free will? Perhaps the resultant state is the result of someone's freely decided option.

Think of a card came. The deck is shuffled. The player has to guess what card will be dealt next. However, a kibitzer can see the other side of the cards and he knows that the King of Hearts is on the top of the deck. Would it be normal usage to say that the kibitzer has "caused" the King of Hearts to be the next card dealt? Or did the shuffle "cause" the order of the cards, and the kibitzer has a special king of knowledge. Couldn't the same be true about knowing the future? We are like the player. We can't see the future. So we freely opt to do something. Once we opt, we can (like Martun Luther) "do no other". Of course the person (being?) who can see the future knows what we will choose (just as the kibitzer knows which card is next), but he doesn't force us to choose as we do. He just knows (or intuits) what choice we will make.

P.s. Lucky's conclusion is illogical. State i cannot lead to "multible (possible) resultant states" unless we believe in a multiverse. It can lead to (not cause) only one, and that one was once infinitely unlikely.

Well what is our experience? In physical systems one can create many examples of antecedent state 1 (say on a billiard table) and can demonstrate that they always lead to resultant state 2. Whereas in neurological systems we can create what to human perception appear to be multiple examples of antecedent state 1 yet we observe multiple and different (often very different) resultant states. Now since we are limited in our evaluation of the multiple antecedent states by our technology and perception, Determinists declare that the reason why different resultant states occur is because of subtle differences in the antecedent states such that they are not identical ie antecedent state 1, 1' and 1" instead of three examples of antecedent state 1. I agree that is possible and is logical. However we have to acknowledge that physical systems also have nano differences and still behave identically. Do you really suppose that the nano differences between examples of neurologic systems account for the radically different resultant states? I don't because it doesn't square with my experience with physical systems. I understand others disagree.

[Good_Egg]

Sculptor and Calvin believe that an act can be determined/necessitated and at the same time free, because it comes "from within." (The first confusion to get out of the way it something I recently highlighted <here> regarding the definition of determinism.)

The problem with this account is that it makes a distinction without a difference, for there is no relevant difference between an act "from within" and an act "from without" vis-a-vis determinism. My proof <here> may help illustrate such a point, since it shows that on determinism so-called "internal acts" are reducible to external events.

Libertarians obviously affirm agent causation, and this is the basis of the internal/external distinction. The short answer is this: acts which are truly attributed to agents are neither necessitated nor determined.

Thanks - that's helpful. I think you're identifying determinism as the belief that every event is caused by previous events in a long chain of causation that stretches back into a necessarily-infinite past (?what caused the Big Bang?).

(Perhaps "web" rather than "chain", on the basis that events can have multiple consequences, and can be caused by a combination of previous events ?)

We can make the distinction between a chain of causation that passes through the mind and the will of the agent,, or one that does not. One that does not is external to the agent - he/she experiences it as a cause outside themselves.

To say that the chain (or one thread of the web) of causation that resulted in Alfie going to Afghanistan includes events in Alfie's will is a determinist's way of saying that he opted to go. Which for Alfie is a significant difference from being taken against his will.

I'm suggesting that the everyday plain-language meaning of "free" refers to this distinction between internal and external causation. We can acknowledge that this is something different from "free will" in the technical philosophical sense you're using it.

Do determinists have ethics ? Do they believe it is just to punish people for events in their mind and will that are fully caused by external factors ?

My understanding is that Calvin did...

That a deterministic philosophy can be held alongside a jurisprudence that punishes murder more severely than manslaughter, for example, further suggests that there are senses of "free will" other than the anti-deterministic sense.

The determinist believes that the killer who fully intended his crime is just as controlled by external factors as the killer who was out of his mind on drugs...

[Ecurb]

My definition of Determinism is that antecedent state 1 always leads to resultant state 2, never 3. And Free Will I define as antecedent state 1 can lead to multiple possible resultant states, say 2 and 3 (and likely others).

Thus Determinism cannot coincide with Free Will.

Antecedent state 1 always does lead to resultant state 2. That's obvious. It's just that we don't know what the resultant state is until it occurs. (An exception might be some sort of multiverse.)

Actually on Lucky's definition it's not obvious unless we are presupposing determinism. He explicitly said that state 3 is possible on Free Will.

Since there is always an antecedent state, and always a resultant state; one leads to the other.

This is simply not true. You are begging the question in favor of determinism. In Lucky's definition of Free Will he is clearly saying that there could be resultant states which do not necessarily follow from antecedent states.

Whether one "determines" or "causes" the other is problematic, which is why we are having this discussion. Free will is obviously irrelevant to whether state 1 is followed by state 2. If we define state 2 as the resultant state it will always occur, because whatever does occur will be state 2.

Yes, if we define "the state which results" as "state 2" then it will always occur by tautology, but Lucky's definitions do not support this definition.

Once state 2 has occurred, it was inevitable.

Not on Lucky's definitions. Indeed on Lucky's definition if state 2 occurs with Free Will then it was not inevitable.

My only point was that one and only one "resultant state" will occur. You are right that, by tautology, if we call this "state 2", state 2 must follow state 1. What "causes" state 2 is problematic. It might be free will; it might be something else. Even looking back at the state 2 that has actually occurred (and is now "inevitable" if we assume there is no multiverse) we cannot know what "caused" it to occur. The factors are infinite.

I am not arguing for determinism. Instead, I'm suggesting that if foreknowledge is a form of determinism, it is not incompatible with free will. The "possible states" in Lucky's definition are no longer possible once one (and only one) of them has happened. Whether they were once possible is a question that cannot be resolved. From our perspective (which is the only perspective we have) they were once possible, and therefore we have "options" and "free will".

[Leontiskos]

Sculptor and Calvin believe that an act can be determined/necessitated and at the same time free, because it comes "from within." (The first confusion to get out of the way it something I recently highlighted <here> regarding the definition of determinism.)

The problem with this account is that it makes a distinction without a difference, for there is no relevant difference between an act "from within" and an act "from without" vis-a-vis determinism. My proof <here> may help illustrate such a point, since it shows that on determinism so-called "internal acts" are reducible to external events.

Libertarians obviously affirm agent causation, and this is the basis of the internal/external distinction. The short answer is this: acts which are truly attributed to agents are neither necessitated nor determined.

Thanks - that's helpful. I think you're identifying determinism as the belief that every event is caused by previous events in a long chain of causation that stretches back into a necessarily-infinite past (?what caused the Big Bang?).

(Perhaps "web" rather than "chain", on the basis that events can have multiple consequences, and can be caused by a combination of previous events ?)

We can make the distinction between a chain of causation that passes through the mind and the will of the agent,, or one that does not. One that does not is external to the agent - he/she experiences it as a cause outside themselves.

To say that the chain (or one thread of the web) of causation that resulted in Alfie going to Afghanistan includes events in Alfie's will is a determinist's way of saying that he opted to go. Which for Alfie is a significant difference from being taken against his will.

I'm suggesting that the everyday plain-language meaning of "free" refers to this distinction between internal and external causation. We can acknowledge that this is something different from "free will" in the technical philosophical sense you're using it.

Do determinists have ethics ? Do they believe it is just to punish people for events in their mind and will that are fully caused by external factors ?

My understanding is that Calvin did...

That a deterministic philosophy can be held alongside a jurisprudence that punishes murder more severely than manslaughter, for example, further suggests that there are senses of "free will" other than the anti-deterministic sense.

The determinist believes that the killer who fully intended his crime is just as controlled by external factors as the killer who was out of his mind on drugs...

The libertarian will almost always hold that determinism is incompatible with punishment and jurisprudence. In fact this is probably the most basic and obvious problem with determinism. Just because someone claims to hold two positions does not mean that the two positions are logically compatible. I'm not sure what your argument is here.

For example, <this entire thread> is premised on the commonsensical intuition that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. There are many determinists who even bite the bullet and admit that jurisprudence is irrational insofar as it is based on the notion that the offender might have done otherwise.

[Leontiskos]

My definition of Determinism is that antecedent state 1 always leads to resultant state 2, never 3. And Free Will I define as antecedent state 1 can lead to multiple possible resultant states, say 2 and 3 (and likely others).

Thus Determinism cannot coincide with Free Will.

Antecedent state 1 always does lead to resultant state 2. That's obvious. It's just that we don't know what the resultant state is until it occurs. (An exception might be some sort of multiverse.)

Actually on Lucky's definition it's not obvious unless we are presupposing determinism. He explicitly said that state 3 is possible on Free Will.

Since there is always an antecedent state, and always a resultant state; one leads to the other.

This is simply not true. You are begging the question in favor of determinism. In Lucky's definition of Free Will he is clearly saying that there could be resultant states which do not necessarily follow from antecedent states.

Whether one "determines" or "causes" the other is problematic, which is why we are having this discussion. Free will is obviously irrelevant to whether state 1 is followed by state 2. If we define state 2 as the resultant state it will always occur, because whatever does occur will be state 2.

Yes, if we define "the state which results" as "state 2" then it will always occur by tautology, but Lucky's definitions do not support this definition.

Once state 2 has occurred, it was inevitable.

Not on Lucky's definitions. Indeed on Lucky's definition if state 2 occurs with Free Will then it was not inevitable.

My only point was that one and only one "resultant state" will occur. You are right that, by tautology, if we call this "state 2", state 2 must follow state 1. What "causes" state 2 is problematic. It might be free will; it might be something else. Even looking back at the state 2 that has actually occurred (and is now "inevitable" if we assume there is no multiverse) we cannot know what "caused" it to occur. The factors are infinite.

I am not arguing for determinism. Instead, I'm suggesting that if foreknowledge is a form of determinism, it is not incompatible with free will. The "possible states" in Lucky's definition are no longer possible once one (and only one) of them has happened. Whether they were once possible is a question that cannot be resolved. From our perspective (which is the only perspective we have) they were once possible, and therefore we have "options" and "free will".

Either the resultant state was necessary or it was not necessary. If it was necessary then we do not have free will. If determinism is true then the resultant state was necessary. Thus determinism is incompatible with free will.

You seem to want to claim that we can never know whether the resultant state was necessary. That's fine, but it doesn't affect the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism.

[Ecurb]

Either the resultant state was necessary or it was not necessary. If it was necessary then we do not have free will. If determinism is true then the resultant state was necessary. Thus determinism is incompatible with free will.

You seem to want to claim that we can never know whether the resultant state was necessary. That's fine, but it doesn't affect the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism.

I grant that yours is the standard position, and mine the idiosyncratic one. Nonetheless, if we can talk coherently about having had options in the past (clearly we chose one and only one of the options, and cannot now do otherwise) then we can talk coherently about having options in the present even if some being knows what our choice will be. We opt or choose from our perspective. If we don't know the future, it makes no difference to us if it is known by someone else. From our perspective, we still freely choose.

[Leontiskos]

Either the resultant state was necessary or it was not necessary. If it was necessary then we do not have free will. If determinism is true then the resultant state was necessary. Thus determinism is incompatible with free will.

You seem to want to claim that we can never know whether the resultant state was necessary. That's fine, but it doesn't affect the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism.

I grant that yours is the standard position, and mine the idiosyncratic one. Nonetheless, if we can talk coherently about having had options in the past (clearly we chose one and only one of the options, and cannot now do otherwise) then we can talk coherently about having options in the present even if some being knows what our choice will be. We opt or choose from our perspective. If we don't know the future, it makes no difference to us if it is known by someone else. From our perspective, we still freely choose.

Regarding this problem of foreknowledge, if the foreknowledge is based on a necessary future then our acts are not free, and our perception that they are free is mistaken. But if the foreknowledge is not based on a necessary future then our acts could be free, and the perspective you speak about could be true rather than false.

You are continually attempting to circumvent the ontological question by averting to epistemology, but the difficulty is that Determinism is an ontological position, not merely an epistemological position. Thus if the Determinist is correct then "our perspective" is mistaken and we do not freely choose, and this is precisely what many Determinists actually say.

[Ecurb]

Regarding this problem of foreknowledge, if the foreknowledge is based on a necessary future then our acts are not free, and our perception that they are free is mistaken. But if the foreknowledge is not based on a necessary future then our acts could be free, and the perspective you speak about could be true rather than false.

You are continually attempting to circumvent the ontological question by averting to epistemology, but the difficulty is that Determinism is an ontological position, not merely an epistemological position. Thus if the Determinist is correct then "our perspective" is mistaken and we do not freely choose, and this is precisely what many Determinists actually say.

Option: a thing that is or may be chosen.

choice
noun
an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities.

Doesn't "faced with" suggest an epistemological approach? What else can it mean? I'll agree that from an ontological perspective determinism and free will are in conflict. But I don't think that's how we normally use words like: "option", "choice", "free" and "will".

[Leontiskos]

Regarding this problem of foreknowledge, if the foreknowledge is based on a necessary future then our acts are not free, and our perception that they are free is mistaken. But if the foreknowledge is not based on a necessary future then our acts could be free, and the perspective you speak about could be true rather than false.

You are continually attempting to circumvent the ontological question by averting to epistemology, but the difficulty is that Determinism is an ontological position, not merely an epistemological position. Thus if the Determinist is correct then "our perspective" is mistaken and we do not freely choose, and this is precisely what many Determinists actually say.

Option: a thing that is or may be chosen.

choice
noun
an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities.

Doesn't "faced with" suggest an epistemological approach? What else can it mean? I'll agree that from an ontological perspective determinism and free will are in conflict. But I don't think that's how we normally use words like: "option", "choice", "free" and "will".

Determinists and Libertarians will agree that we are met with the perception that we make choices, but only the Libertarians are able to support this perception with an underlying ontological account. Incompatibilist Determinists will simply claim that the perception is a sophisticated illusion.

But it seems to me that this definition of "choice" which you have presented proves my point, because if Determinism is true then there is never more than one possibility, and therefore choices do not exist. Of course you could parse "faced with" in a sort of "phenomenal" way, but in fact all parties agree that we confront the phenomenon of making choices; they just disagree on whether that phenomenon is illusory. (Replace "phenomenon" with "perception" if you are unfamiliar with Kant.)

(I am giving short shrift to Compatibilism, but if there are Compatibilists about they will need to actually make some arguments since their position is prima facie absurd.)

[Good_Egg]

The libertarian will almost always hold that determinism is incompatible with punishment and jurisprudence. In fact this is probably the most basic and obvious problem with determinism. Just because someone claims to hold two positions does not mean that the two positions are logically compatible. I'm not sure what your argument is here.

I guess I'm arguing the possibility of free will as an emergent phenomenon.

Most of us have a deterministic understanding of physics. But a psychology that includes a meaningful notion of punishment. You're suggesting that such a view is logically inconsistent.

We have a layered understanding of the universe, where chemistry is built on physics, biology on chemistry, psychology on biology, and sociology on psychology. At each higher level, there is no new fundamental building block; rather the complex products of the lower level combine and interact in particular ways so that higher-level patterns emerge.

Somewhere along the way, mind emerges from brain, in a way we don't understand.

Why then is it silly to suggest that free will emerges in a way we don't understand ?

Rather, what is silly is to apply at one level the concepts appropriate to another. Someone who tries to communicate with sub-atomic particles, and someone who treats people as simple robots who are entirely programmed, are making that same mistake.

The argument against the combination of determinism in physics and free will in psychology is not that it is logically impossible, it is that we don't understand how it is possible.

Free will is not an illusion; it is as real as anything else at the level of psychology. Recognising that does not require us to explain how it can emerge, any more than treating other people as having minds requires us to explain how mind emerges from brain.

[Barkun]

We have no choice in being in the universe if we are to continue existing and not pursue suicide. To wake up and see the image of this life is a burden we must hold.

Therefore, our daily activities are highly predictable, especially in course of the previous night; it's likely that you won't try hard to break the mould and escape this predictable fate, being as being in the universe.

When we try to move to a location, the act is often an subconscious complex movement of the body that is not directly the action we want, but helps us to achieve that.

In my opinion all bodily movements are predetermined, it's mind of matter that is not. There's no escaping what I'll probably do, and for that reason I believe I am simply on a path that has a very mental-biased difference from what was originally intended. This is because the universe is not a sense I choose, and bodies are part of the universe. If the universe had any perception of me, it could easily determine all my actions up to a decade from now. However, mental functions seem to be free, like I'm recipient of a datastream - all my reactions are original.

[Leontiskos]

The libertarian will almost always hold that determinism is incompatible with punishment and jurisprudence. In fact this is probably the most basic and obvious problem with determinism. Just because someone claims to hold two positions does not mean that the two positions are logically compatible. I'm not sure what your argument is here.

I guess I'm arguing the possibility of free will as an emergent phenomenon.

...To believe in non-deterministic realities or random realities is to reject Determinism. It doesn't matter if the non-deterministic realities "emerge" or if the random realities exist at the quantum level, etc.

[Good_Egg]

I guess I'm arguing the possibility of free will as an emergent phenomenon.

...To believe in non-deterministic realities or random realities is to reject Determinism. It doesn't matter if the non-deterministic realities "emerge" or if the random realities exist at the quantum level, etc.

I see three models - determinism, randomness, and choice. Three ways of conceiving how something operates - as controllable, as uncontrollable, or as an agent, a mind that is influencable but which ultimately decides for itself.

When you play backgammon, or any other game involving dice, you treat the outcome of the die roll as random.

Unless you're the sort of (?childish?) player who talks to the dice saying "please be a 6", in which case you're treating it as an agent.

But as an adult you can believe in deterministic physics - that the die roll is determined entirely by whiich way up it starts and the linear and angular velocity that you impart to it by throwing it. (And whether the table is polished,
and the air currents in the room, etc) Whilst still applying probabilities (assuming randomness) in your play.

Ontologically determined but practically random...

In the same way one can treat people as (practically) making choices; can apply the model of agency. Even whilst suspecting that deterministic physics controls brain function which controls mind. So that people's acts are believed to be ontologically determined but treated practically as a freely willed choice.

Do not most of us do this most of the time ?

There is no requirement of logical consistency that insists that we have to postulate quantum randomness before we can play dice, or postulate ghost-in-the-machine indeterminacy before we can have theory of mind.

It is enough to say that unknowable reality is best described by one model at the subatomic level and a different model at the everyday level.