Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[Samana Johann]

That is determinedly free, unless someone is holding a gun at our heads telling us what to chose.

An unfree person, with many faults, fearing reasonable death, has of course no real choice then.

They prefer to talk about morality "causing"to make a choice.

Not sure what is referred by "they", but it's of course a matter of past merits in regard of virtue, that makes choice more and more possible.

Virtue is not only cause of happiness, but also wealth as well as liberty, till highest degree, good householder.

[Sculptor1]

Yes I am also determined to do what I want too.

But my question is something else. Whilst you feel you have free will, the question is how you cause that to happen. How do you take an option?

The more indebted, the more unfree. Addicted, opinions are small. The more avoiding contact with certain food, abstain from taking on it, the more freedom will be gained, good householder.
Driven by desires, beings are bond. Now, not attentive, they think that stilling desires is freedom, but it's because of this ignorance, that their are bond, incapable to move anywhere.

To take on the opinion requires to see the burden suffering in taking on, holding on. It's suffering that gives rise to surrender, letting go.

Never mind.

How could one give another freedom of choice else than just wishing him to find the exit himself, real happiness, for himself with ease.
Giving freedom, one gains freedom and release.

Please refer to the post I made above.

[Samana Johann]

The more indebted, the more unfree. Addicted, opinions are small. The more avoiding contact with certain food, abstain from taking on it, the more freedom will be gained, good householder.
Driven by desires, beings are bond. Now, not attentive, they think that stilling desires is freedom, but it's because of this ignorance, that their are bond, incapable to move anywhere.

To take on the opinion requires to see the burden suffering in taking on, holding on. It's suffering that gives rise to surrender, letting go.

Never mind.

How could one give another freedom of choice else than just wishing him to find the exit himself, real happiness, for himself with ease.
Giving freedom, one gains freedom and release.

Please refer to the post I made above.

Giving freedom to follow up or not might be hindered by understanding anothers wishes, good householder. So just space for choice in do so or not. All freedom in given sphere.

[Sculptor1]

Never mind.

How could one give another freedom of choice else than just wishing him to find the exit himself, real happiness, for himself with ease.
Giving freedom, one gains freedom and release.

Please refer to the post I made above.

Giving freedom to follow up or not might be hindered by understanding anothers wishes, good householder. So just space for choice in do so or not. All freedom in given sphere.

Please refer to the post I made above.

[Samana Johann]

How could one give another freedom of choice else than just wishing him to find the exit himself, real happiness, for himself with ease.
Giving freedom, one gains freedom and release.

Please refer to the post I made above.

Giving freedom to follow up or not might be hindered by understanding anothers wishes, good householder. So just space for choice in do so or not. All freedom in given sphere.

Please refer to the post I made above.

Again: above are many posts, and quoted, refered as well. So what exactly would be good householders wish, as it seems to get a deterministic situation (holding on desired stand, maintaining it)

[Sculptor1]

Please refer to the post I made above.

Giving freedom to follow up or not might be hindered by understanding anothers wishes, good householder. So just space for choice in do so or not. All freedom in given sphere.

Please refer to the post I made above.

Again: above are many posts, and quoted, refered as well. So what exactly would be good householders wish, as it seems to get a deterministic situation (holding on desired stand, maintaining it)

DO not know and do not care.
I like to stay on thread

[Samana Johann]

Giving freedom to follow up or not might be hindered by understanding anothers wishes, good householder. So just space for choice in do so or not. All freedom in given sphere.

Please refer to the post I made above.

Again: above are many posts, and quoted, refered as well. So what exactly would be good householders wish, as it seems to get a deterministic situation (holding on desired stand, maintaining it)

DO not know and do not care.
I like to stay on thread

Then why not staying on it? Just because wishing things to be determined according to what's fit to one? If gone in wrong direction, good householder, it's hard that one is willing to change his determination, as one usualy isn't willing to surrender.

So gain: the more fallen into wrong ways, the more determined one's destiny. Yet it's possible, for wise with some past merits done, to chance the way, direction, of wandering on, since nothing is inherent to one, just chosen, again and again, out of ignorance (that it could be made, is, own, a refuge).

[Leontiskos]

Calvin thought man's acts were free albeit determined because choice is "moving of its own accord." Sculptor thinks that man's acts are free albeit determined because decisions are "determined by us alone." Both are silly positions, of course. No amount of quibbling will undo the fact that necessitated acts are not free.

Much as I hate agreeing with Sculptor about anything. I don't get it. The villain (along with Calvin) in the piece, Martin Luther, allegedly said, "Here I stand and I can do no other." Was this -- somehow - not a "free choice" on his part? He "could do no other" because his conscience forbade it. Of course there are "cuases" for all our choices -- but that doesn't mean they aren't "free."

It depends what we mean be "free" and "choice". I commented earlier in the thread (which you may have missed) that, "I opted to go to the store yesterday" is both a reasonable and meaningful statement. Yet no other option exists. We make free choices if they are unconstrained by outside forces. Is an omniscient God's knowedge of the future an"outside force"? I think not. He knows what we are going to choose, but doesn't force us to choose it. That, I think, is not a contradiction. If it were, the past tense of "opt" or "choice" would be either silly or meaningless. But it isn't.

Calvin thought man's acts were free albeit determined because choice is "moving of its own accord." Sculptor thinks that man's acts are free albeit determined because decisions are "determined by us alone." Both are silly positions, of course. No amount of quibbling will undo the fact that necessitated acts are not free.

What's silly about it ?

Having freewill or agency means that the decisions you make are not determined by factors outside yourself.

Sculptor and Calvin believe that an act can be determined/necessitated and at the same time free, because it comes "from within." (The first confusion to get out of the way it something I recently highlighted <here> regarding the definition of determinism.)

The problem with this account is that it makes a distinction without a difference, for there is no relevant difference between an act "from within" and an act "from without" vis-a-vis determinism. My proof <here> may help illustrate such a point, since it shows that on determinism so-called "internal acts" are reducible to external events.

Libertarians obviously affirm agent causation, and this is the basis of the internal/external distinction. The short answer is this: acts which are truly attributed to agents are neither necessitated nor determined. When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time.

The distinction is between
- a crude determinism where external factors dictate the decision, which is opposed to freewill (a prisoner is not free to walk out, because of constraints external to themselves)
- a philosophical theory of determinism, where free decisions are determined by the operations of the mind which are themselves ultimately determined.

Determinism is simply the theory that <all events are determined by antecedent causes>, and determinism is incompatible with free will. Again, see <the proof I posted>.

[Sculptor1]

Please refer to the post I made above.

Again: above are many posts, and quoted, refered as well. So what exactly would be good householders wish, as it seems to get a deterministic situation (holding on desired stand, maintaining it)

DO not know and do not care.
I like to stay on thread

Then why not staying on it?

More's the point why do you not take this irrelevant thought to another thread?

[Ecurb]

Sculptor and Calvin believe that an act can be determined/necessitated and at the same time free, because it comes "from within." (The first confusion to get out of the way it something I recently highlighted <here> regarding the definition of determinism.)

The problem with this account is that it makes a distinction without a difference, for there is no relevant difference between an act "from within" and an act "from without" vis-a-vis determinism. My proof <here> may help illustrate such a point, since it shows that on determinism so-called "internal acts" are reducible to external events.

Libertarians obviously affirm agent causation, and this is the basis of the internal/external distinction. The short answer is this: acts which are truly attributed to agents are neither necessitated nor determined. When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time.


Determinism is simply the theory that <all events are determined by antecedent causes>, and determinism is incompatible with free will. Again, see <the proof I posted>.

It seems to me that the debate hinges on the meanings of "cause", "determine" and "necessitate". Also, on the meaning of "free" and "will", and "option". You are probably more familiar with the philosophical jargon surrounding these words than I am; I'm just using them in plain, unaffected English.

First, I wonder if an omniscient God who knows the future "necessitates", "causes", or "determines"the future. (It need not be an omniscient God, by the way, this could be anyone who sees the future.) I suppose an accurate knowledge of the past could be referred to as "determining" the past (figuring it out). But we would hardly call knowledge of the past "necessitating" or "causing" the past.

"Cause" generally refers to either a willful act of a conscious agent (f you shoot someone, you "cause" his death), or a handle one can manipulate. The car crash was "caused" by taking the turn too fast (to the driver), insufficient tire cohesion (to the tire manufacturer), or lack of banking in the curve (to the road engineer). This definition is also used by experimental scientists manipulating a variable. To the empiricist, a cause is a conjunction, all X are folowed by Y, but that's not the normal use of the word.

Does knowledge of the future "cause" the future? I think not. Knowledge of the past doesn't "cause" the past, although it may "determine" it. If some being knows our future, she (or He) doesn't "cause" it, I'd suggest. Any being outside of the time/space continuum might know the future, just as we know the past. I don't see how this is relevant to whether we have "freedom" of will. We are free to choose if our choice is unconstrained, even if, like Maritn Luther, we can do no other.

In your proof, you use "cause" not as I suggest is normal usage, but to mean "necessitate". The proof falls apart if "cause" is used as I suggest above.

Also, I agree with Calvin (not with his burning Catholics at the stake, but with his notion that an act can be both "free", and "optional" and "determined"). My previous example of the past tense is relevant. Also, if, on the toss of a coin, someone always calls "heads", is "determined" to always call heads, and is pig headed about it, he nonetheless has an option to call "tails". He just doesn't do so. He is constrained not by any outside force, but by his own determination, and thus is freely "opting" to call heads.

[Samana Johann]

Again: above are many posts, and quoted, refered as well. So what exactly would be good householders wish, as it seems to get a deterministic situation (holding on desired stand, maintaining it)

DO not know and do not care.
I like to stay on thread

Then why not staying on it?

More's the point why do you not take this irrelevant thought to another thread?

Good householder feels better when my person's leaving to maintain his stand. Please, feel freed.

[Sculptor1]

DO not know and do not care.
I like to stay on thread

Then why not staying on it?

More's the point why do you not take this irrelevant thought to another thread?

Good householder feels better when my person's leaving to maintain his stand. Please, feel freed.

Gosh! So how could there be options in a deterministic world?

[Leontiskos]

Sculptor and Calvin believe that an act can be determined/necessitated and at the same time free, because it comes "from within." (The first confusion to get out of the way it something I recently highlighted <here> regarding the definition of determinism.)

The problem with this account is that it makes a distinction without a difference, for there is no relevant difference between an act "from within" and an act "from without" vis-a-vis determinism. My proof <here> may help illustrate such a point, since it shows that on determinism so-called "internal acts" are reducible to external events.

Libertarians obviously affirm agent causation, and this is the basis of the internal/external distinction. The short answer is this: acts which are truly attributed to agents are neither necessitated nor determined. When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time.


Determinism is simply the theory that <all events are determined by antecedent causes>, and determinism is incompatible with free will. Again, see <the proof I posted>.

It seems to me that the debate hinges on the meanings of "cause", "determine" and "necessitate". Also, on the meaning of "free" and "will", and "option". You are probably more familiar with the philosophical jargon surrounding these words than I am; I'm just using them in plain, unaffected English.

This is true, but it doesn't seem to me that the meanings are complicated.

First, I wonder if an omniscient God who knows the future "necessitates", "causes", or "determines"the future. (It need not be an omniscient God, by the way, this could be anyone who sees the future.) I suppose an accurate knowledge of the past could be referred to as "determining" the past (figuring it out). But we would hardly call knowledge of the past "necessitating" or "causing" the past.

This is a controverted question,* but I take a very commonsensical approach to these questions. If God's foreknowledge yields necessitated events then the events cannot be free. Apart from Calvinists, these debates hinge on the question of whether foreknowledge yields necessitation, not whether necessitation is incompatible with freedom. The vast, vast majority of theists acknowledge that necessitation is incompatible with freedom.

"Cause" generally refers to either a willful act of a conscious agent (f you shoot someone, you "cause" his death), or a handle one can manipulate. The car crash was "caused" by taking the turn too fast (to the driver), insufficient tire cohesion (to the tire manufacturer), or lack of banking in the curve (to the road engineer). This definition is also used by experimental scientists manipulating a variable. To the empiricist, a cause is a conjunction, all X are folowed by Y, but that's not the normal use of the word.

Does knowledge of the future "cause" the future? I think not. Knowledge of the past doesn't "cause" the past, although it may "determine" it. If some being knows our future, she (or He) doesn't "cause" it, I'd suggest. Any being outside of the time/space continuum might know the future, just as we know the past. I don't see how this is relevant to whether we have "freedom" of will. We are free to choose if our choice is unconstrained, even if, like Maritn Luther, we can do no other.

In your proof, you use "cause" not as I suggest is normal usage, but to mean "necessitate". The proof falls apart if "cause" is used as I suggest above.

Rather, you are denying (4) in attributing causal power to agents. This is a denial of determinism. The implicit premise in question is this: <If Determinism is true, then all causation is event causation>. But only theistic determinists would dispute such a premise, and Sculptor is not one of those.

Also, I agree with Calvin (not with his burning Catholics at the stake, but with his notion that an act can be both "free", and "optional" and "determined"). My previous example of the past tense is relevant. Also, if, on the toss of a coin, someone always calls "heads", is "determined" to always call heads, and is pig headed about it, he nonetheless has an option to call "tails". He just doesn't do so. He is constrained not by any outside force, but by his own determination, and thus is freely "opting" to call heads.

As I said in my last post:

• "When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time."

You are saying that he calls "heads" because of his free choice, not because of antecedent conditions/causes/events. This is not only not Determinism, it contradicts Determinism.

What is your definition of Determinism?


* The forum is preventing me from posting a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If you do a web search for, "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Foreknowledge and Free Will," you will find the web page.

[LuckyR]

Sculptor and Calvin believe that an act can be determined/necessitated and at the same time free, because it comes "from within." (The first confusion to get out of the way it something I recently highlighted <here> regarding the definition of determinism.)

The problem with this account is that it makes a distinction without a difference, for there is no relevant difference between an act "from within" and an act "from without" vis-a-vis determinism. My proof <here> may help illustrate such a point, since it shows that on determinism so-called "internal acts" are reducible to external events.

Libertarians obviously affirm agent causation, and this is the basis of the internal/external distinction. The short answer is this: acts which are truly attributed to agents are neither necessitated nor determined. When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time.


Determinism is simply the theory that <all events are determined by antecedent causes>, and determinism is incompatible with free will. Again, see <the proof I posted>.

It seems to me that the debate hinges on the meanings of "cause", "determine" and "necessitate". Also, on the meaning of "free" and "will", and "option". You are probably more familiar with the philosophical jargon surrounding these words than I am; I'm just using them in plain, unaffected English.

This is true, but it doesn't seem to me that the meanings are complicated.

First, I wonder if an omniscient God who knows the future "necessitates", "causes", or "determines"the future. (It need not be an omniscient God, by the way, this could be anyone who sees the future.) I suppose an accurate knowledge of the past could be referred to as "determining" the past (figuring it out). But we would hardly call knowledge of the past "necessitating" or "causing" the past.

This is a controverted question,* but I take a very commonsensical approach to these questions. If God's foreknowledge yields necessitated events then the events cannot be free. Apart from Calvinists, these debates hinge on the question of whether foreknowledge yields necessitation, not whether necessitation is incompatible with freedom. The vast, vast majority of theists acknowledge that necessitation is incompatible with freedom.

"Cause" generally refers to either a willful act of a conscious agent (f you shoot someone, you "cause" his death), or a handle one can manipulate. The car crash was "caused" by taking the turn too fast (to the driver), insufficient tire cohesion (to the tire manufacturer), or lack of banking in the curve (to the road engineer). This definition is also used by experimental scientists manipulating a variable. To the empiricist, a cause is a conjunction, all X are folowed by Y, but that's not the normal use of the word.

Does knowledge of the future "cause" the future? I think not. Knowledge of the past doesn't "cause" the past, although it may "determine" it. If some being knows our future, she (or He) doesn't "cause" it, I'd suggest. Any being outside of the time/space continuum might know the future, just as we know the past. I don't see how this is relevant to whether we have "freedom" of will. We are free to choose if our choice is unconstrained, even if, like Maritn Luther, we can do no other.

In your proof, you use "cause" not as I suggest is normal usage, but to mean "necessitate". The proof falls apart if "cause" is used as I suggest above.

Rather, you are denying (4) in attributing causal power to agents. This is a denial of determinism. The implicit premise in question is this: <If Determinism is true, then all causation is event causation>. But only theistic determinists would dispute such a premise, and Sculptor is not one of those.

Also, I agree with Calvin (not with his burning Catholics at the stake, but with his notion that an act can be both "free", and "optional" and "determined"). My previous example of the past tense is relevant. Also, if, on the toss of a coin, someone always calls "heads", is "determined" to always call heads, and is pig headed about it, he nonetheless has an option to call "tails". He just doesn't do so. He is constrained not by any outside force, but by his own determination, and thus is freely "opting" to call heads.

As I said in my last post:

• "When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time."

You are saying that he calls "heads" because of his free choice, not because of antecedent conditions/causes/events. This is not only not Determinism, it contradicts Determinism.

What is your definition of Determinism?


* The forum is preventing me from posting a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If you do a web search for, "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Foreknowledge and Free Will," you will find the web page.

My definition of Determinism is that antecedent state 1 always leads to resultant state 2, never 3. And Free Will I define as antecedent state 1 can lead to multiple possible resultant states, say 2 and 3 (and likely others).

Thus Determinism cannot coincide with Free Will.

[Leontiskos]

As I said in my last post:

• "When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time."

You are saying that he calls "heads" because of his free choice, not because of antecedent conditions/causes/events. This is not only not Determinism, it contradicts Determinism.

What is your definition of Determinism?

My definition of Determinism is that antecedent state 1 always leads to resultant state 2, never 3. And Free Will I define as antecedent state 1 can lead to multiple possible resultant states, say 2 and 3 (and likely others).

Thus Determinism cannot coincide with Free Will.

Yes, I think this is exactly right. Note that given Free Will the antecedent state is not sufficient to determine the resultant state, and therefore in order to account for the resultant state we must appeal to something other than the antecedent state. The additional thing we appeal to is the free choice of the agent (agent causation).