Leontiskos wrote: ↑April 7th, 2023, 8:25 pm
Sculptor and Calvin believe that an act can be determined/necessitated and at the same time free, because it comes "from within." (The first confusion to get out of the way it something I recently highlighted <here> regarding the definition of determinism.)
The problem with this account is that it makes a distinction without a difference, for there is no relevant difference between an act "from within" and an act "from without" vis-a-vis determinism. My proof <here> may help illustrate such a point, since it shows that on determinism so-called "internal acts" are reducible to external events.
Libertarians obviously affirm agent causation, and this is the basis of the internal/external distinction. The short answer is this: acts which are truly attributed to agents are neither necessitated nor determined. When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time.
Determinism is simply the theory that <all events are determined by antecedent causes>, and determinism is incompatible with free will. Again, see <the proof I posted>.
It seems to me that the debate hinges on the meanings of "cause", "determine" and "necessitate". Also, on the meaning of "free" and "will", and "option". You are probably more familiar with the philosophical jargon surrounding these words than I am; I'm just using them in plain, unaffected English.
First, I wonder if an omniscient God who knows the future "necessitates", "causes", or "determines"the future. (It need not be an omniscient God, by the way, this could be anyone who sees the future.) I suppose an accurate knowledge of the past could be referred to as "determining" the past (figuring it out). But we would hardly call knowledge of the past "necessitating" or "causing" the past.
"Cause" generally refers to either a willful act of a conscious agent (f you shoot someone, you "cause" his death), or a handle one can manipulate. The car crash was "caused" by taking the turn too fast (to the driver), insufficient tire cohesion (to the tire manufacturer), or lack of banking in the curve (to the road engineer). This definition is also used by experimental scientists manipulating a variable. To the empiricist, a cause is a conjunction, all X are folowed by Y, but that's not the normal use of the word.
Does knowledge of the future "cause" the future? I think not. Knowledge of the past doesn't "cause" the past, although it may "determine" it. If some being knows our future, she (or He) doesn't "cause" it, I'd suggest. Any being outside of the time/space continuum might know the future, just as we know the past. I don't see how this is relevant to whether we have "freedom" of will. We are free to choose if our choice is unconstrained, even if, like Maritn Luther, we can do no other.
In your proof, you use "cause" not as I suggest is normal usage, but to mean "necessitate". The proof falls apart if "cause" is used as I suggest above.
Also, I agree with Calvin (not with his burning Catholics at the stake, but with his notion that an act can be both "free", and "optional" and "determined"). My previous example of the past tense is relevant. Also, if, on the toss of a coin, someone always calls "heads", is "determined" to always call heads, and is pig headed about it, he nonetheless has an option to call "tails". He just doesn't do so. He is constrained not by any outside force, but by his own determination, and thus is freely "opting" to call heads.