Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[JackDaydream]

I see the idea of determinism, especially in its hardest forms of determinism, especially materialistic determinism, as implying a lack of moral autonomy. I wonder to what extent it is possible to hold onto a philosophy of determinism and maintain a position of moral autonomy. In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this of this is unclear. In some religious cosmologiss so much was determined by 'God', but this may be viewed so differently in the scope of scientific explanations.

I am aware that there is a thread on determinism, but the author is not wishing to explore the issue of fres will. This may separate the issues of causal aspects and chains in aspects of thinking, including ideas of materialism. I also wonder about this in relation to ideas of consciousness, including the perspective of the hard problem of consciousnes, which may come down to neuroscience.

Having started my thread on the basis of questioning determinism, but with a regard to moral autonomy I am interested in generating discussion on the idea of determinism and free will. Personally, I see it as being essential to the human condition, agency

[JackDaydream]

I see the idea of determinism, especially in its hardest forms of determinism, especially materialistic determinism, as implying a lack of moral autonomy. I wonder to what extent it is possible to hold onto a philosophy of determinism and maintain a position of moral autonomy. In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this of this is unclear. In some religious cosmologiss so much was determined by 'God', but this may be viewed so differently in the scope of scientific explanations.

I am aware that there is a thread on determinism, but the author is not wishing to explore the issue of fres will. This may separate the issues of causal aspects and chains in aspects of thinking, including ideas of materialism. I also wonder about this in relation to ideas of consciousness, including the perspective of the hard problem of consciousnes, which may come down to neuroscience.

Having started my thread on the basis of questioning determinism, but with a regard to moral autonomy I am interested in generating discussion on the idea of determinism and free will. Personally, I see it as being essential to the human condition, agency

I am.glad to see that my thread did not get lost ad it got got off as I was writing..The issue which I am raising is about consciousness, determinism and moral autonomy If determinism Is seen as true it may come down to the philosophy of this in itself, and the nature of causality To what extent is the process of causation physical? It may raise issues, such as the concept of 'mind' and consciousness as aspects of understanding. I am interested in knowing your ideas, thos of others on the si
sire. In particular, how may the aspects of subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity be fierce within the widest aspects of understanding philosophy?

[Stoppelmann]

I see the idea of determinism, especially in its hardest forms of determinism, especially materialistic determinism, as implying a lack of moral autonomy. I wonder to what extent it is possible to hold onto a philosophy of determinism and maintain a position of moral autonomy. In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this of this is unclear. In some religious cosmologiss so much was determined by 'God', but this may be viewed so differently in the scope of scientific explanations.

I am aware that there is a thread on determinism, but the author is not wishing to explore the issue of fres will. This may separate the issues of causal aspects and chains in aspects of thinking, including ideas of materialism. I also wonder about this in relation to ideas of consciousness, including the perspective of the hard problem of consciousnes, which may come down to neuroscience.

Having started my thread on the basis of questioning determinism, but with a regard to moral autonomy I am interested in generating discussion on the idea of determinism and free will. Personally, I see it as being essential to the human condition, agency

I am.glad to see that my thread did not get lost ad it got got off as I was writing..The issue which I am raising is about consciousness, determinism and moral autonomy If determinism Is seen as true it may come down to the philosophy of this in itself, and the nature of causality To what extent is the process of causation physical? It may raise issues, such as the concept of 'mind' and consciousness as aspects of understanding. I am interested in knowing your ideas, thos of others on the si
sire. In particular, how may the aspects of subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity be fierce within the widest aspects of understanding philosophy?

You seem to be having difficulty with your keyboard.

I have said elsewhere that science often attempts to be completely rational, and disregards much of what it means to be a sentient and sensitive human being, which is the basis of morality in my view, an ability to empathise with other living creatures, and sense that their awareness is related. This is a limit to doing what we can when the moral question arises, whether we should. For hard determinists, you get the feeling that this gets in the way.

[Leontiskos]

In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this of this is unclear.

Here is a formal argument adapted from E. J. Lowe's A Survey of Metaphysics which starts on page 201:

1. Determinism is true {premise}
2. There are some free actions {premise}
3. My typing into the computer is a free action {premise}
4. All causation is event causation {From 1}
5. All events have causes {From 1}
6. My typing into the computer has an event cause, e1 {From 4, 5}
7. e1 has an event cause, e0 {From 4, 5, 6}
8. e0 has an event cause... {From 4, 5, 7}
9. e-50 is an event cause prior to my birth {Temporal reduction}
10. e-50 is outside of my control {From 9}
11. If x is outside of my control, and x causes y, then y is outside of my control
12. If x is outside of my control, then I do not cause it freely
13. Contradiction; 1, 2, or 3 must be false

Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible.

[Pattern-chaser]

I see the idea of determinism, especially in its hardest forms of determinism, especially materialistic determinism, as implying a lack of moral autonomy. I wonder to what extent it is possible to hold onto a philosophy of determinism and maintain a position of moral autonomy. In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this is unclear. In some religious cosmologies, so much was determined by 'God', but this may be viewed so differently in the scope of scientific explanations.

I am aware that there is a thread on determinism, but the author is not wishing to explore the issue of free will. This may separate the issues of causal aspects and chains in aspects of thinking, including ideas of materialism. I also wonder about this in relation to ideas of consciousness, including the perspective of the hard problem of consciousness, which may come down to neuroscience.

Having started my thread on the basis of questioning determinism, but with a regard to moral autonomy, I am interested in generating discussion on the idea of determinism and free will. Personally, I see it as being essential to the human condition, agency

I think determinism, in its most extreme manifestations, makes us nothing but puppets, acting out a pre-written script. The whole thing could be automated, and save us all the trouble. So yes, I agree that moral autonomy appears difficult or impossible in a determinist environment.

[JackDaydream]

I see the idea of determinism, especially in its hardest forms of determinism, especially materialistic determinism, as implying a lack of moral autonomy. I wonder to what extent it is possible to hold onto a philosophy of determinism and maintain a position of moral autonomy. In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this is unclear. In some religious cosmologies, so much was determined by 'God', but this may be viewed so differently in the scope of scientific explanations.

I am aware that there is a thread on determinism, but the author is not wishing to explore the issue of free will. This may separate the issues of causal aspects and chains in aspects of thinking, including ideas of materialism. I also wonder about this in relation to ideas of consciousness, including the perspective of the hard problem of consciousness, which may come down to neuroscience.

Having started my thread on the basis of questioning determinism, but with a regard to moral autonomy, I am interested in generating discussion on the idea of determinism and free will. Personally, I see it as being essential to the human condition, agency

I think determinism, in its most extreme manifestations, makes us nothing but puppets, acting out a pre-written script. The whole thing could be automated, and save us all the trouble. So yes, I agree that moral autonomy appears difficult or impossible in a determinist environment.

I find the topic of free will as a difficult one and I having to think carefully before answering the post previous to this one. It seems that so many people accept determinism and I see this as being connected to materialism as being the dominant paradigm. I do not rule out the role of causation but part of the issue I see is that it seems to role out autonomy, and moral choices. Of course, there are learned patterns of behaviour and there is also the question as to what extent can people change? It may not be easy but reflection on choices is part of this, although acting on such intention is difficult and to break patterns in such a way is part of the art of self-mastery.

[JackDaydream]

In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this of this is unclear.

Here is a formal argument adapted from E. J. Lowe's A Survey of Metaphysics which starts on page 201:

1. Determinism is true {premise}
2. There are some free actions {premise}
3. My typing into the computer is a free action {premise}
4. All causation is event causation {From 1}
5. All events have causes {From 1}
6. My typing into the computer has an event cause, e1 {From 4, 5}
7. e1 has an event cause, e0 {From 4, 5, 6}
8. e0 has an event cause... {From 4, 5, 7}
9. e-50 is an event cause prior to my birth {Temporal reduction}
10. e-50 is outside of my control {From 9}
11. If x is outside of my control, and x causes y, then y is outside of my control
12. If x is outside of my control, then I do not cause it freely
13. Contradiction; 1, 2, or 3 must be false

Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible.

I have read through the premises of the argument and it is broken down into useful stages. After thinking it through I think that the premise which is unhelpful is the typing into my computer because it is generalised rather than specific enough as to the underlying intention. What I mean is that I type on this site most days but the intention is bound up with the act of communication and the message conveyed. For example, it may involve a pleasant agreement, disagreement and even anger. I am usually aware of my own motives and that is through reflection. On a couple of occasions, I have stopped myself in the act of writing a post, or emails when I was working, because I was able to think about my own psychological motives or the potential consequences of an act.

I do think that some acts are more free than others because they have involved more conscious choice than others which may have been done with less conscious deliberation. It may about breaking away from the robotic level of function, especially through articulation through language.

So, I see free will as a spectrum with some acts being more conscious choices than others. However, I do think that determinism and free will are compatible as well because acts are within chains of events rather than in isolation from one another. It can be circular to break up the many chains because everything has causal outcomes. The whole aspect of free choice in such processes is that choice is not passive and human beings, through conscious choice, can have an active role within pathways of causation.

[Leontiskos]

In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this of this is unclear.

Here is a formal argument adapted from E. J. Lowe's A Survey of Metaphysics which starts on page 201:

1. Determinism is true {premise}
2. There are some free actions {premise}
3. My typing into the computer is a free action {premise}
4. All causation is event causation {From 1}
5. All events have causes {From 1}
6. My typing into the computer has an event cause, e1 {From 4, 5}
7. e1 has an event cause, e0 {From 4, 5, 6}
8. e0 has an event cause... {From 4, 5, 7}
9. e-50 is an event cause prior to my birth {Temporal reduction}
10. e-50 is outside of my control {From 9}
11. If x is outside of my control, and x causes y, then y is outside of my control
12. If x is outside of my control, then I do not cause it freely
13. Contradiction; 1, 2, or 3 must be false

Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible.

I have read through the premises of the argument and it is broken down into useful stages. After thinking it through I think that the premise which is unhelpful is the typing into my computer because it is generalised rather than specific enough as to the underlying intention. What I mean is that I type on this site most days but the intention is bound up with the act of communication and the message conveyed. For example, it may involve a pleasant agreement, disagreement and even anger. I am usually aware of my own motives and that is through reflection. On a couple of occasions, I have stopped myself in the act of writing a post, or emails when I was working, because I was able to think about my own psychological motives or the potential consequences of an act.

I do think that some acts are more free than others because they have involved more conscious choice than others which may have been done with less conscious deliberation. It may about breaking away from the robotic level of function, especially through articulation through language.

That is the most uncontroversial premise of them all. As I said, "Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible." If you believe a free act exists, then place it into (3) and you will have a demonstration that free will and determinism are incompatible. If you don't believe there exists any free act to place into (3) then you are already an incompatabilist determinist.

[JackDaydream]

I see the idea of determinism, especially in its hardest forms of determinism, especially materialistic determinism, as implying a lack of moral autonomy. I wonder to what extent it is possible to hold onto a philosophy of determinism and maintain a position of moral autonomy. In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this of this is unclear. In some religious cosmologiss so much was determined by 'God', but this may be viewed so differently in the scope of scientific explanations.

I am aware that there is a thread on determinism, but the author is not wishing to explore the issue of fres will. This may separate the issues of causal aspects and chains in aspects of thinking, including ideas of materialism. I also wonder about this in relation to ideas of consciousness, including the perspective of the hard problem of consciousnes, which may come down to neuroscience.

Having started my thread on the basis of questioning determinism, but with a regard to moral autonomy I am interested in generating discussion on the idea of determinism and free will. Personally, I see it as being essential to the human condition, agency

I am.glad to see that my thread did not get lost ad it got got off as I was writing..The issue which I am raising is about consciousness, determinism and moral autonomy If determinism Is seen as true it may come down to the philosophy of this in itself, and the nature of causality To what extent is the process of causation physical? It may raise issues, such as the concept of 'mind' and consciousness as aspects of understanding. I am interested in knowing your ideas, thos of others on the si
sire. In particular, how may the aspects of subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity be fierce within the widest aspects of understanding philosophy?

You seem to be having difficulty with your keyboard.

I have said elsewhere that science often attempts to be completely rational, and disregards much of what it means to be a sentient and sensitive human being, which is the basis of morality in my view, an ability to empathise with other living creatures, and sense that their awareness is related. This is a limit to doing what we can when the moral question arises, whether we should. For hard determinists, you get the feeling that this gets in the way.

It does seem that human beings are often seen as being like machines, especially following behaviorism, especially the outlook of BF Skinner. Compassion in relation to this is complicated because on one hand if people have no free will it does resolve them of any potential moral responsibility. For example, a criminal may be the way he is on account of genes, nurture, poor socioeconomic conditions or a mixture of these. I would certainly not rule out such an influences and do see these as important factors requiring compassion. However, compassion in itself is an attitude and it may be that those who have experienced difficulties may be more inclined towards compassion but, of course, it doesn't always follow because the nature of awareness is an ongoing constructive journey.

As far as the current trend of materialistic determinism it may be also connected with ideologies of control. To say that people don't have control discourages autonomy and free thinking. it may be a tool for a zombie disempowered form of neo-totalitarianism.

[JackDaydream]

In the extremes, a belief in determinism may lead to the idea of fatalism, although the basis of this of this is unclear.

Here is a formal argument adapted from E. J. Lowe's A Survey of Metaphysics which starts on page 201:

1. Determinism is true {premise}
2. There are some free actions {premise}
3. My typing into the computer is a free action {premise}
4. All causation is event causation {From 1}
5. All events have causes {From 1}
6. My typing into the computer has an event cause, e1 {From 4, 5}
7. e1 has an event cause, e0 {From 4, 5, 6}
8. e0 has an event cause... {From 4, 5, 7}
9. e-50 is an event cause prior to my birth {Temporal reduction}
10. e-50 is outside of my control {From 9}
11. If x is outside of my control, and x causes y, then y is outside of my control
12. If x is outside of my control, then I do not cause it freely
13. Contradiction; 1, 2, or 3 must be false

Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible.

I have read through the premises of the argument and it is broken down into useful stages. After thinking it through I think that the premise which is unhelpful is the typing into my computer because it is generalised rather than specific enough as to the underlying intention. What I mean is that I type on this site most days but the intention is bound up with the act of communication and the message conveyed. For example, it may involve a pleasant agreement, disagreement and even anger. I am usually aware of my own motives and that is through reflection. On a couple of occasions, I have stopped myself in the act of writing a post, or emails when I was working, because I was able to think about my own psychological motives or the potential consequences of an act.

I do think that some acts are more free than others because they have involved more conscious choice than others which may have been done with less conscious deliberation. It may about breaking away from the robotic level of function, especially through articulation through language.

That is the most uncontroversial premise of them all. As I said, "Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible." If you believe a free act exists, then place it into (3) and you will have a demonstration that free will and determinism are incompatible. If you don't believe there exists any free act to place into (3) then you are already an incompatabilist determinist.

You seem to be trying to see the matter of free will and determinism in a rather all or nothing way. Take a more critical act such as murder. There is a big recognition of the act as being premeditated or an act of momentary anger. Of course, there may be so many contributory factors, including genetics and hormones. However, in all circumstances reflection in action are key factors. That is why people are often encouraged to work on anger management.

Of course, the example of murder is one of the most extreme. Another example could be addictive behaviours. A person may have got into a pattern of drinking or taking drugs and there may be factors which fuel such behaviour but the reflective awareness of the nature of the 'problem' is the starting point for conscious choice of change.

[Leontiskos]

Here is a formal argument adapted from E. J. Lowe's A Survey of Metaphysics which starts on page 201:

1. Determinism is true {premise}
2. There are some free actions {premise}
3. My typing into the computer is a free action {premise}
4. All causation is event causation {From 1}
5. All events have causes {From 1}
6. My typing into the computer has an event cause, e1 {From 4, 5}
7. e1 has an event cause, e0 {From 4, 5, 6}
8. e0 has an event cause... {From 4, 5, 7}
9. e-50 is an event cause prior to my birth {Temporal reduction}
10. e-50 is outside of my control {From 9}
11. If x is outside of my control, and x causes y, then y is outside of my control
12. If x is outside of my control, then I do not cause it freely
13. Contradiction; 1, 2, or 3 must be false

Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible.

I have read through the premises of the argument and it is broken down into useful stages. After thinking it through I think that the premise which is unhelpful is the typing into my computer because it is generalised rather than specific enough as to the underlying intention. What I mean is that I type on this site most days but the intention is bound up with the act of communication and the message conveyed. For example, it may involve a pleasant agreement, disagreement and even anger. I am usually aware of my own motives and that is through reflection. On a couple of occasions, I have stopped myself in the act of writing a post, or emails when I was working, because I was able to think about my own psychological motives or the potential consequences of an act.

I do think that some acts are more free than others because they have involved more conscious choice than others which may have been done with less conscious deliberation. It may about breaking away from the robotic level of function, especially through articulation through language.

That is the most uncontroversial premise of them all. As I said, "Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible." If you believe a free act exists, then place it into (3) and you will have a demonstration that free will and determinism are incompatible. If you don't believe there exists any free act to place into (3) then you are already an incompatibilist determinist.

You seem to be trying to see the matter of free will and determinism in a rather all or nothing way.

Free will and determinism are incompatible. It's very simple. I provided you with a formal proof. Feel free to address that proof. Saying, "Typing into a computer isn't a free act, so the proof fails," is simply a failure to understand the proof. If a free act exists, then it can be substituted into (3) to prove incompatibilism. If no such free act can exist then you have already accepted the conclusion of the proof, incompatibilism (along with determinism and fatalism). Either way compatibilism fails.

However, I do think that determinism and free will are compatible as well because acts are within chains of events rather than in isolation from one another.

The libertarian obviously does not deny causality. The libertarian rejects (4) and therefore (1). Event causality is not the only kind of causality. Agent causality also exists.

[Leontiskos]

...Philosophical novices often labor under the impression that causality is bound up with determinism, and that if we deny determinism then we must abandon causality. This is apparently what is happening here, but it is a very strange mistake. Determinism does not mean "causes exist;" determinism means, "all causes are event causes," or, "all events are determined by antecedent causes." This mistake is simply a misunderstanding of what determinism means.

[LuckyR]

...Philosophical novices often labor under the impression that causality is bound up with determinism, and that if we deny determinism then we must abandon causality. This is apparently what is happening here, but it is a very strange mistake. Determinism does not mean "causes exist;" determinism means, "all causes are event causes," or, "all events are determined by antecedent causes." This mistake is simply a misunderstanding of what determinism means.

Exactly. Thus why I prefer putting the question thusly:

A) Does antecedent state 1 always lead to resultant state 2 or

B) Can antecedent state 1 lead to multiple resultant states? Say, 2 or 3?

As an aside, in the realm of human decision making, the entirety of human experience, both subjectively and objectively is consistent with B, though A is possible despite no experience of that being the case.

[Leontiskos]

...Philosophical novices often labor under the impression that causality is bound up with determinism, and that if we deny determinism then we must abandon causality. This is apparently what is happening here, but it is a very strange mistake. Determinism does not mean "causes exist;" determinism means, "all causes are event causes," or, "all events are determined by antecedent causes." This mistake is simply a misunderstanding of what determinism means.

Exactly. Thus why I prefer putting the question thusly:

A) Does antecedent state 1 always lead to resultant state 2 or

B) Can antecedent state 1 lead to multiple resultant states? Say, 2 or 3?

Indeed. I didn't realize this was such a common problem until, soon after joining, I encountered it in Steve3007's claims about determinism and predictability (link).

Probably the confusion has something to do with quantum hypotheses about randomness, which leads folks to think that determinism means that all events are caused and no events are random/uncaused, and that non-determinism means that some events are random/uncaused. Also when I was new here, CIN explicitly premised his argument against free will on this strange dichotomy between events which are event-determined and events which are random (link).

The third option should be obvious: events which are agent-determined. Agents are real causes. An agent can cause his thumb to move or cause himself to think a certain thought, and these are really caused by the agent himself. The deterministic account which denies any causal power to the agent will fail to understand what is really occurring in these situations.

As an aside, in the realm of human decision making, the entirety of human experience, both subjectively and objectively is consistent with B, though A is possible despite no experience of that being the case.

Yes, and I think it is important to resist the rejoinder which says that we also have no experience of (B). We do have experience of (B). Loads of it. Every time we think a thought or make a decision or perform an action we are having an experience of (B). Granted, if we define "experience" to be third person scientific event verification, then of course we will not have experience of (B). But this just begs the question, because agents are not events. Counterfactual freedom obviously cannot be scientifically observed, although it can be inferred, such as by the fact that the scientific enterprise depends upon it.

[JackDaydream]

I have read through the premises of the argument and it is broken down into useful stages. After thinking it through I think that the premise which is unhelpful is the typing into my computer because it is generalised rather than specific enough as to the underlying intention. What I mean is that I type on this site most days but the intention is bound up with the act of communication and the message conveyed. For example, it may involve a pleasant agreement, disagreement and even anger. I am usually aware of my own motives and that is through reflection. On a couple of occasions, I have stopped myself in the act of writing a post, or emails when I was working, because I was able to think about my own psychological motives or the potential consequences of an act.

I do think that some acts are more free than others because they have involved more conscious choice than others which may have been done with less conscious deliberation. It may about breaking away from the robotic level of function, especially through articulation through language.

That is the most uncontroversial premise of them all. As I said, "Since we could replace (3) with any purportedly free act, determinism and free will are incompatible." If you believe a free act exists, then place it into (3) and you will have a demonstration that free will and determinism are incompatible. If you don't believe there exists any free act to place into (3) then you are already an incompatibilist determinist.

You seem to be trying to see the matter of free will and determinism in a rather all or nothing way.

Free will and determinism are incompatible. It's very simple. I provided you with a formal proof. Feel free to address that proof. Saying, "Typing into a computer isn't a free act, so the proof fails," is simply a failure to understand the proof. If a free act exists, then it can be substituted into (3) to prove incompatibilism. If no such free act can exist then you have already accepted the conclusion of the proof, incompatibilism (along with determinism and fatalism). Either way compatibilism fails.

However, I do think that determinism and free will are compatible as well because acts are within chains of events rather than in isolation from one another.

The libertarian obviously does not deny causality. The libertarian rejects (4) and therefore (1). Event causality is not the only kind of causality. Agent causality also exists.

I am still thinking about your reply post, and for that reason only replying to one point at this stage. That is your remark that 'Agent causality also exists.' Surely, this would imply the existence of some kind of free will. I am aware that there are interactive relationships between all aspects of life and the world, but with different kinds of causation. For example, the weather has a large impact on human beings and other aspects of nature. All aspects have a role in relationship to everything else. Viruses have a large impact as we know so well in the last few years.

There may be certain hierarchical aspects, such as the role of human beings as agents. Some thinkers have even believed in celestial beings beyond the human realm. Of course, this is speculation but as far as the role of human beings they have more a greater amount of agency than animals and other sentient forms on account of the evolution of consciousness.