Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[GrayArea]

The eternal cycle is invalid since there is no beginning for it. Both the act of creation and the cyclic universe suffer from the same problem, infinite regress. Putting all these models, the creation of the universe, the cyclic universe, and the eternal universe, aside one can conclude that nothing to something must be possible.


I cannot follow you here.

Existence from nothing—as in, existence without an external cause—is possible, because existence itself is its own cause. This is possible only for "existence itself" and nothing else "within" existence, because the very meaning or definition of existence is to exist.

That's easy to say. In fact it is easy for anyone to say. But it does not really mean anything. prove anything or answer any questions.

It does mean something. In fact, it means everything. But as beings who exist by the virtue of existence, existence is so obvious to us that we confuse it as something that doesn't mean anything.

This is not just me stating "X is X" or else the sentence would not mean anything. This is different. This is me stating "X is X" because the very definition of X is it being able to create the fact that "X is X".

...And the fact that "Y is Y" or "Z is Z" and so on.

[Consul]

What do you mean by "empirically possible"?

There is no two words that have a more simple meaning.
I find your question puzzling.

The meaning of this phrase isn't obvious. Anyway, it's not obvious to me what you mean by it.

"I propose to call 'empirically possible' anything that does not contradict the laws of nature. …So 'empirical possibility' is to mean 'compatibility with natural laws'."

(Schlick, Moritz."Meaning and Verification." In: Moritz Schlick, Philosophical Papers, Vol. II (1925–1936), 456-481. Edited by Henk L. Mulder and Barbara F. B. Van De Velde-Schlick. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979. p. 463)

So one meaning of "empirically possible" is "nomically/nomologically possible". Another meaning is "compatible with our empirical knowledge", in which case empirical possibility is a kind of epistemic/epistemological possibility.

[Consul]

So one meaning of "empirically possible" is "nomically/nomologically possible".

What is nomologically possible is logically possible, and what is logically impossible is nomologically impossible.

[GE Morton]

The "infinite future" is not a particular place or time one might "reach." Someone who lived forever would reach every point on an infinite timeline eventually (of which there are infinitely many).

I am afraid that that is not true given the definition of infinity.

What definition are you using? What falsifies it?

Let me put it this way: Suppose there is a timeline T. For any point T1 on T, a traveler beginning at a point T2 earlier that T1 will reach T2, given infinite time, for any length of T.

[GE Morton]

The "infinite future" is not a particular place or time one might "reach." Someone who lived forever would reach every point on an infinite timeline eventually (of which there are infinitely many).

I am afraid that that is not true given the definition of infinity.

What definition are you using? What falsifies it?

Let me put it this way: Suppose there is a timeline T. For any point T1 on T, a traveler beginning at a point T2 earlier that T1 will reach T2, given infinite time, for any length of T.

" . . . earlier THAN T1," not "that T1."

[Consul]

What I would say is that, due to special and general relativity, most namely the relativity of simultaneity, I believe change is incompatible with determinism, if--and the word if here is a key word--we assume there is nothing transcendental to the 4D block universe.

Most specifically, I generally mean causal determinism, but I would conjecture that logically it applies to any reasonable definition of or form of determinism one could propose. To me, it seems almost like basic grammar in a sense, simply because of the way the words fit together: If the future and/or past can change, then they aren't determined, ipso facto.

There is change in a "4D block universe" if and only if it is not the case that all of its temporal parts are qualitatively identical, i.e. if and only if it has at least two temporal parts which aren't duplicates of one another. Change thus defined (i.e. as qualitative non-identity or variety of temporal parts) can certainly occur in a deterministic 4D block universe.

"I shall say that two possible worlds diverge iff they are not duplicates but they do have duplicate initial temporal segments. Thus our world and another might match perfectly up through the year 1945, and go their separate ways thereafter. …
First, a system of laws of nature is Deterministic iff no two divergent worlds both conform perfectly to the laws of that system. Second, a world is Deterministic iff its laws comprise a Deterministic system. Third, Determinism is the thesis that our world is Deterministic."

(Lewis, David. "New Work for a Theory of Universals." 1983. Reprinted in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 8-55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. 31+32)

That is, determinism is true in a 4D block universe U if and only if there is no possible alternative universe U* with the same laws of nature whose temporal part ending with the end of 2022 is a duplicate of U's temporal part ending with the end of 2022, but whose temporal part beginning with the beginning of 2023 is not a duplicate of U's temporal part beginning with the beginning of 2023.

[Consul]

My first premise is evident: Any act requires time. That means that God needs time in order to create. There was no time before the act of creation though. That means that God needed time for the creation of time. This obviously leads to an infinite regress.

There is a dispute among theologians as to whether God exists in time or not, whether his existence is temporal or atemporal. If God existed temporally prior to Creation, then his act of creation didn't include the creation of time, but only of space, matter, and energy.
However, this presupposes the obsolete Newtonian distinction between mutually independent absolute space and absolute time, which is incompatible with Einsteinian physics, according to which space and time are unified into one spacetime and not independent of one another.

"Western theists agree that God is eternal; the task is to formulate and assess conceptions of what this eternality might amount to.
Broadly speaking, there have been two rival views of what God’s eternality consists in. On the first, God is timeless (divine timelessness); on the second, God is in time (divine temporality)."

Eternity in Christian Thought: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eternity/

Note that there is also a mixed view:

"William Lane Craig’s view is that God is timeless without creation, and temporal with creation (Craig 2000). God exists timelessly “without” creation rather than before creation, because there isn’t literally a before. And so it can’t literally be the case that God becomes temporal, since becoming anything involves being first one thing and then the other. Nonetheless, God is “timeless without creation and temporal subsequent to creation ”, God “enters time at the moment of creation” (Craig 2000: 33). God exists changelessly and timelessly, but by creating, God undergoes an extrinsic change “which draws Him into time” (Craig 2000: 29)."

[Consul]

There is a dispute among theologians as to whether God exists in time or not, whether his existence is temporal or atemporal. If God existed temporally prior to Creation, then his act of creation didn't include the creation of time, but only of space, matter, and energy.
However, this presupposes the obsolete Newtonian distinction between mutually independent absolute space and absolute time, which is incompatible with Einsteinian physics, according to which space and time are unified into one spacetime and not independent of one another.

There is no disagreement among theologians as to whether God exists in space or not, because they all believe that God has no spatial location. However, again, if space and time are inseparable from one another, then existence in time entails existence in space. That's a big problem for the temporalists about God's existence!

[Consul]

If the universe does not have a beginning then it means that the universe existed in the infinite past. It however takes an infinite amount of time to reach from any arbitrary point in the infinite past to now. This is logically impossible given the definition of infinity since infinity is unreachable by definition.

The temporal interval between any time-point (instant) in the infinite past and now is always finite. So it is not the case that it "takes an infinite amount of time to reach from any arbitrary point in the infinite past to now." Of course, -∞ is not a time-point (instant) in the past; so there is no possible travelling from -∞ to now.

[Consul]

Existence from nothing—as in, existence without an external cause—is possible, because existence itself is its own cause. This is possible only for "existence itself" and nothing else "within" existence, because the very meaning or definition of existence is to exist.

Self-causation (self-creation) is impossible in principle, no matter whether we're talking about some existent or existence qua totality of all existents.

[GE Morton]

There is no disagreement among theologians as to whether God exists in space or not, because they all believe that God has no spatial location. However, again, if space and time are inseparable from one another, then existence in time entails existence in space. That's a big problem for the temporalists about God's existence!

If he has no spatial location he cannot exist "in space." I believe the dogma holds that he is "omnipresent," i.e., occupies all spatial locations.

If he is both atemporal and aspatial (does not exist in either time or space) then he does not exist at all; no sense can be given to a "being" which has no spatiotemporal location.

[GE Morton]

The "infinite future" is not a particular place or time one might "reach." Someone who lived forever would reach every point on an infinite timeline eventually (of which there are infinitely many).

I am afraid that that is not true given the definition of infinity.

What definition are you using? What falsifies it?

Let me put it this way: Suppose there is a timeline T. For any point T1 on T, a traveler beginning at a point T2 earlier that T1 will reach T2, given infinite time, for any length of T.

" . . . a traveler beginning at a point T2 earlier that T1 will reach T1, given infinite time, for any length of T."

Sorry.

[Consul]

There is no disagreement among theologians as to whether God exists in space or not, because they all believe that God has no spatial location. However, again, if space and time are inseparable from one another, then existence in time entails existence in space. That's a big problem for the temporalists about God's existence!

If he has no spatial location he cannot exist "in space." I believe the dogma holds that he is "omnipresent," i.e., occupies all spatial locations.

Being immaterial and thus spatially unextended, God could be immanent in space only by being present at one point of space at the same time; and that certainly wouldn't be omnipresence qua simultaneous presence at all points of space. I think the only consistent theological interpretation of the doctrine of divine omnipresence is this one:

"According to Thomas Aquinas, God’s presence is to be understood in terms of God’s power, knowledge and essence. (In this view he followed a formula put forth by Peter Lombard (late 11th C.–1160) in his Sentences, I, xxxvii, 1.) He writes, “God is in all things by his power, inasmuch as all things are subject to his power; he is by his presence in all things, inasmuch as all things are bare and open to his eyes; he is in all things by his essence, inasmuch as he is present to all as the cause of their being” (Summa Theologica I, 8, 3).
…
Perhaps there is a sense in which a king is present wherever his power extends. In any event, Aquinas seems to think so."

Omnipresence: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/omnipresence/

If he is both atemporal and aspatial (does not exist in either time or space) then he does not exist at all; no sense can be given to a "being" which has no spatiotemporal location.

According to theism, God is a bodiless person (i.e. a pure soul/spirit). The very idea of an immaterial person seems nonsensical to me; and the very idea of a "transcendent" immaterial person, i.e. one lacking any spatiotemporal location, existing nowhere and nowhen, seems even more nonsensical to me.

[Consul]

According to theism, God is a bodiless person (i.e. a pure soul/spirit). The very idea of an immaterial person seems nonsensical to me; and the very idea of a "transcendent" immaterial person, i.e. one lacking any spatiotemporal location, existing nowhere and nowhen, seems even more nonsensical to me.

Persons, their lives and their (conscious) minds are time-involving, dynamic entities. All contents of consciousness (sensations, emotions, cogitations, or imaginations) are temporal occurrences (events, acts, processes).

[Sculptor1]

So one meaning of "empirically possible" is "nomically/nomologically possible".

What is nomologically possible is logically possible, and what is logically impossible is nomologically impossible.

No that is not so. It might be so, but there is a reason we might use nomological or logical adjectivally.

Logic is not about the laws of nature, though it might be.