Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Pattern-chaser]

We sometimes conceive of coral reefs, or ant colonies, or soccer teams as having "purposes" that transcend those of the indivuduals constituting them...

...Nonetheless, if the metaphor helps us understand group behavior, what's wrong with it?

Nothing. Understanding is good.

The problem comes when - as an error in moral philosophy - you start trading-off the real rights and duties of individuals against metaphorical rights and duties of groups, who you've conceived of as quasi- persons in order to understand emergent behaviour.

I think the misunderstanding here is that if we acknowledge groups, we are somehow devaluing individuals. It isn't either/or, it's both, and our ability to see and deal with both, simultaneously, gives us a wider and better view of what's going on.

[Ecurb]

We sometimes conceive of coral reefs, or ant colonies, or soccer teams as having "purposes" that transcend those of the indivuduals constituting them...

...Nonetheless, if the metaphor helps us understand group behavior, what's wrong with it?

Nothing. Understanding is good.

The problem comes when - as an error in moral philosophy - you start trading-off the real rights and duties of individuals against metaphorical rights and duties of groups, who you've conceived of as quasi- persons in order to understand emergent behaviour.

Let's look at one group that is sometimes thought to have "rights and duties". Trade Unions are said to have a right to negotiate on behalf of the members, the right to organize the members, the duty to support its members who have been ill-treated by management, etc. Of course trade unions comprise people. But by thinking about the rights and duties of unions we simplify our ethical computations and theories. If we start thinking about the individual moral duties of each union member, or each management person who deals with the union, the computations become unwieldly.

[GE Morton]

I think the misunderstanding here is that if we acknowledge groups, we are somehow devaluing individuals.

Nope. That is not the misunderstanding. No one denies groups, or fails to "acknowledge" them. The error comes from conceiving a group as a moral agent in its own right, with properties and interests distinct from (and usually which override) those of its members.

[GE Morton]

Let's look at one group that is sometimes thought to have "rights and duties". Trade Unions are said to have a right to negotiate on behalf of the members, the right to organize the members, the duty to support its members who have been ill-treated by management, etc. Of course trade unions comprise people. But by thinking about the rights and duties of unions we simplify our ethical computations and theories. If we start thinking about the individual moral duties of each union member, or each management person who deals with the union, the computations become unwieldly.

It is often linguistically convenient to speak of the rights and duties of groups, and there is nothing wrong with that all the members of the group have consented to abide by the decisions of a majority (or any other number or process they choose).

One can become a member of a group in two ways --- by enlistment, or by definition. I can become a member of the Sierra Club by paying an enrollment fee and dues and agreeing to abide by the organization's by-laws. But I became a member of the group "Americans" only by definition: "All persons born in the United States are citizens thereof . . ." (14th Amendment). No consent or agreement by me was sought or obtained.

It is reasonable to suppose that all members of the Sierra Club share its stated goals and interests, and even if some disagree with some particular, they've agreed to abide by the majority's decisions. Thus no problems arise with speaking of the interests of the group "as a whole." That supposition is not reasonable, however, for groups whose members have merely been defined into them, and claims regarding the interests of such a group "as a whole" will usually be false and hostile to some portion of those members.

[Good_Egg]

We sometimes conceive of coral reefs, or ant colonies, or soccer teams as having "purposes" that transcend those of the indivuduals constituting them...

...Nonetheless, if the metaphor helps us understand group behavior, what's wrong with it?

Nothing. Understanding is good.

The problem comes when - as an error in moral philosophy - you start trading-off the real rights and duties of individuals against metaphorical rights and duties of groups, who you've conceived of as quasi- persons in order to understand emergent behaviour.

Let's look at one group that is sometimes thought to have "rights and duties". Trade Unions are said to have a right to negotiate on behalf of the members, the right to organize the members, the duty to support its members who have been ill-treated by management, etc. Of course trade unions comprise people. But by thinking about the rights and duties of unions we simplify our ethical computations and theories. If we start thinking about the individual moral duties of each union member, or each management person who deals with the union, the computations become unwieldly.

Imagine that the government decides that some public service or national security function is too important to be allowed to become inoperative due to strike action. And therefore proposes to abolish union rights for the workers involved and to compensate them for this loss by a significant improvement in wages and/or terms and conditions.

The point is that - given sufficiently generous compensation - such action benefits all the individuals involved but is death to the group as a group.

Is the government in that example treating the union fairly ?

I'd say that depends on how you conceive of the relation between the union and its members. If the union just is the members, if all talk of the union is nothing but shorthand for (possibly unwieldy) statements about the members, then the union benefits from such a deal (because all the members do).

But if you conceive of the union as having some separate existence, that existence is being terminated. Like an AI when you switch the computer off. Or a creature whose cells turn cancerous all at once.

[Ecurb]

Imagine that the government decides that some public service or national security function is too important to be allowed to become inoperative due to strike action. And therefore proposes to abolish union rights for the workers involved and to compensate them for this loss by a significant improvement in wages and/or terms and conditions.

The point is that - given sufficiently generous compensation - such action benefits all the individuals involved but is death to the group as a group.

Is the government in that example treating the union fairly ?

I'd say that depends on how you conceive of the relation between the union and its members. If the union just is the members, if all talk of the union is nothing but shorthand for (possibly unwieldy) statements about the members, then the union benefits from such a deal (because all the members do).

But if you conceive of the union as having some separate existence, that existence is being terminated. Like an AI when you switch the computer off. Or a creature whose cells turn cancerous all at once.

Good example, but the issues are complicated. Of course if the union is dissolved because the members vote to dissolve it in order to get better pay, the specific "group" called the "union" will no longer exist (other groups may form).

However, the impact of the union on its members may be overlooked in their greed for more money. In addition to negotiating for pay and benefits, the union facillitaties comraderie among the workers. Votes, union meetings, etc. give members a sense of both power and belonging. Of course these can be seen as individual benefits -- but since they are abstract, they are often ignored, even by those who are benefiting. The short-term financial benefits of the government deal may evaporate, and the workers may long for group membership once more. Any social relationship can be seen as a "group relationship" (even if the group comprises only 2 people). The groups consists of "moral agents" -- but is also defined by the relationship between those agents. The soldier who doesn't follow orders faces the firing squad, because of the group dynamics of the regiment.

In groups with many members, it's difficult to assess all the relationships, which are complex and interpersonal. Sometimes, however, theories about how groups work provide better understanding than trying to look at the individuals and their relationships. The parts may "determine" or "explain" the whole (per modernist science), but often they don't do it very well given our limited knowledge. Studying neurons firing in the brain is fine -- but often of little use in understanding human psychology. Maybe some day.

This is the problem with modernist reductionism in general. The predictions and explanations it offers are often simplistic-- expecially when attempting to explain complicated human behaviors. Sometimes generalizing -- looking to theories of culture, or society -- offers explanations that are more enlightening, and more predictive.

[Good_Egg]

In groups with many members, it's difficult to assess all the relationships, which are complex and interpersonal. Sometimes, however, theories about how groups work provide better understanding than trying to look at the individuals and their relationships. The parts may "determine" or "explain" the whole (per modernist science), but often they don't do it very well given our limited knowledge. Studying neurons firing in the brain is fine -- but often of little use in understanding human psychology. Maybe some day.

You've gone back to talking about understanding. I don't think there's any disagreement there. I think we share an underlying worldview in which chemistry determines biology, biology determines psychology, and psychology determines sociology, but at each level there are "emergent behaviours" which are most efficiently understood without reference to lower levels.

So where is the disagreement?

When we think of members of a group (be it soldiers in a regiment, Christians within a church, or states within the EU), there is a distinction that any adequate philosophy should recognise.

The members have multiple interests. They have collective interests as members, they have individual interests, and they have an intermediate category - individual interests that are common.

Some people have a strange idea that collective interests are somehow morally superior. For example, you use the word "greedy" when talking of union members seeking to increase wages or improve T&Cs by agreeing to waive their union rights. But not, I suspect, when talking of union members seeking by collective action to increase wages or improve T&Cs in exchange for nothing at all.

Seems to me that collective self-interest is no more or less moral than individual self-interest.

And then some people wrongly identify collective interests as being the interests of the relevant set of people. Any advocacy group for left-handers, for example, is by its nature concerned only with the collective interests and shared interests of left handed people as left-handers. Which interests may not actually be very important to the majority of such people - their individual or private interests that the advocates ignore may be more important to them.

The EU institutions may represent the collective interests of member states as members....

[Ecurb]

I think we're in basic agreement. I used "greedy" to suggest that the abolition of the union might have resulted from short-term "greed", which was actually not in the self-interest of the union members.

One problem with the "economic man" theories (in which man always pursues his self-interests) is the assumption of rationality. People aren't always rational in the pursuit of self-interest. (You and I are, of course.) The heroin addict thinks he is acting in his self-interest by robbing a convenience store to get a fix. But many of us think he is actually harming hismelf. The extent to which (and whether) he should be forcibly prevented from harming himsef is a separate conversation.

Returning to omniscience and omnibenevolence, perhaps the omniscient and omnibenevolent being WOULD forcibly prevent the heroin addict from getting a fix. I'm not sure. He might know (being omniscient) that such forcible prevention is beneficial in the long run. Similarly, the omni-being might prevent the union from dissolving, even though the members think it's in their self-interest. The members might be wrong.

The mistake (I think) that those who think an omni-God would prevent anything harmful from happening is that they think THEY know what's good and what's bad. The religious person thinks, "If it's God's will, ir must be good (by virtue of His omni-qualities)". The supposed contradictions are thus eliminated.

[Leontiskos]

You say they couldn’t understand God but I don’t understand why not, where is the contradiction?

Can a finite creature know/comprehend an infinite being?

Your usage of "omniscience" seems to imply that there is some stopping point of knowledge, such that science could eventually just come to know everything by stacking up fact after fact. But is that really so?

Do you suppose that for any possible proposition there is to know, an omnipotent being could make other beings that know them (especially if minds are more than emergences of brains)?...

Just because they wouldn’t be omnipotent doesn’t mean they couldn’t have understanding. I can’t make a black hole but understand an appreciable amount about them. I feel like an omnipotent being could zoop into my mind (especially if I have a “soul” or something more than emergences of my brain) knowledge of all true propositions about black holes, and then more. Why would there be a limit? Why would there be something God knows about black holes that I couldn’t, if God zooped me into knowing it?

Could a finite mind have perfect knowledge of all finite realities? I guarantee the Medievals argued about this question, and it would be fun to dig it up, but at present I don’t have the time. Personally I don’t accept the idea that knowledge is exhausted by propositions. Practical knowledge and intellection of essences are both non-propositional forms of knowledge. But this is not altogether to the point, for God can infuse practical knowledge and knowledge of essences. So generally speaking I am willing to grant your point that a finite mind could have perfect knowledge of all finite realities. Or perhaps it is better to say that a human mind could have the maximum amount of knowledge commensurate with its manner of knowing. But the sort of “omniscience” you are referring to is more commonly ascribed to angels than humans, and the angels act as a mediatory reality between God and lower creation, just as man mediates divine and angelic knowledge to the lower animals and inert matter.

(Theologians refer to “zooping” as infused knowledge )

Well, that was a bit sloppy. I meant to say that the only created beings who are guaranteed to be incapable of evil are unfree beings. Free beings can become incapable of evil by means of their free will, but there is no guarantee.

Part of my argument came from a debate about the Fall. Someone said Adam and Eve were created perfectly and without the desire to do sin. This came from a question about whether people will sin in heaven, and they said no, because people will be “made perfect” and perfectly choose never to sin.

So I asked, well then how did Adam and Eve sin?

I was told, because they were deceived.

I asked, well, then how is that their fault or anyone else’s fault other than God’s and the deceiver’s? Is God not culpable for making those circumstances possible (and, per omniscience, *knowing* it?)

Adam and Eve were not in Heaven. If they were created as indefectible beings in Heaven then I would surely be incorrect in claiming that “one cannot be created morally good,” but this would be contrary to Christian tradition and it would also result in the absurdities you raise.