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[GE Morton]

Sorry, first unquoted para should been inside the quote box.

[GE Morton]

This discussion is going nowhere.

You're right there. No debate carried on with ad populum arguments can possibly go anywhere.

If you don't think that Napoleon's troops fought the battle of Borodino despite the fact that all historians say he did, I can't help you.

If I believe that, it will be because historical records support that claim, not because some historian says so.

We must either accept the historical ad populum verdict or not.

Still don't understand what an ad populum argument is, I see. A consensus that a certain proposition is true is not evidence that it is true, and the fact that there is a consensus is not an argument for its truth. But I suspect those distinctions will remain beyond your grasp.

As far as what comprises our "duties", your ideas are no more objective than anyone elses, including mine. Personally, I think it is my duty to always be kind, and never dishonorable.

Nothing wrong with that. You're free to assume any duties you wish. But if you propose to impose them on others you need some sort of rational moral argument. Ad populum and ad baculum arguments ("might makes right") don't qualify.

But it's reasonable for me to assign such duties, and your notion that I have a "duty" to supply a rational moral argument in its support contradicts your own theories about duty. So there.

The duty to supply evidence or a sound argument for a duty (or any belief) you assert is an intellectual one, not a moral one. You take on that duty by asserting the belief. There is no penalty for shirking that duty, of course, but if you shirk it your assertion will probably be dismissed as spurious.

[Ecurb]

If you don't think that Napoleon's troops fought the battle of Borodino despite the fact that all historians say he did, I can't help you.

If I believe that, it will be because historical records support that claim, not because some historian says so.

We must either accept the historical ad populum verdict or not.

Still don't understand what an ad populum argument is, I see. A consensus that a certain proposition is true is not evidence that it is true, and the fact that there is a consensus is not an argument for its truth. But I suspect those distinctions will remain beyond your grasp.

You are falling victim to fallacious ad populum argumentation, GE. Because internet philoophers love to rail on about fallacies, you accept that near universal belief in some fact is "not evidence that it is true". This is ridiculous. It is correct to state that ad populum arguments are not PROOF. The fallacy is a LOGICAL FALLACY. Nonetheless, neither you nor I know what "historical records support that claim (that Napoleon's troops fought the Battle of Borodino)." Instead, we accept the universal verdict of propfessional historians (possibly because we believe they have dilligently perused the historical records). The same is true for much of what we believe.

Of course it is correct that the near universal opinions of our peers are sometimes wrong. In the religious ages of the past, belief in God was nearly universal. But that's irrelevant to my point. Time was once thought to be a constant. Wrong again. The ad populum fallacy and the argument from authority fallacy are similar. Both are logical fallacies -- but it's incorrect to say that the statemetns of authorities, or the near-universal beliefs of some group are not evidence. We ignore such evidence at our intellectual peril, and we wouldn't know much about anything if we had to examine all the more direct evidence ourselves. Barry Bonds hit 762 Major League, regular season home runs. How do I know? The populous tells me, and the authorities tell me. I can't be bothered to look back at videos of all his games and discover the direct evidence for myself. I just accept the second hand evidence as fact, and it is not unreasonable to do so.

[GE Morton]

You are falling victim to fallacious ad populum argumentation, GE. Because internet philoophers love to rail on about fallacies, you accept that near universal belief in some fact is "not evidence that it is true".

That is correct. It is not evidence. I suggested previously that you don't understand what constitutes evidence. I gave you a link discussing that subject. Apparently you've ignored or dismissed that explanation. I doubt that I can say anything more convincing than the example given concerning Mercury's orbit providing evidence for the theory of relativity. The evidence for that theory is not Einstein's beliefs, or the beliefs of the astronomers who computed Mercury's orbit, but the facts they reported.

Are you perhaps confusing a reported observation that P with someone's belief that P? Those are quite different things. We do, of course, routinely, even constantly, accept facts reported by others --- if my co-worker, looking out a window, says, "It's raining outside," I take his word for it. Exchanging information is, after all, the primary purpose of language. The evidence for his claim, however, is not his belief that it is raining, but the phenomenon he is reporting. I'll take his word for it until/unless I have some reason to doubt it (perhaps I'd looked out 5 minutes ago and it was not raining).

Nonetheless, neither you nor I know what "historical records support that claim (that Napoleon's troops fought the Battle of Borodino)." Instead, we accept the universal verdict of propfessional historians (possibly because we believe they have dilligently perused the historical records).

Well, there are very few "universal verdicts" among historians. But your paranthetical clause there answers the question. We accept what they say, not because they say it or believe it, but because we assume they can produce some evidence for that claim. When that assumption is not warranted their beliefs count for nothing.

This discussion began, you may recall, with your denial of my claim that persons have no a priori duties, such as a duty to meet others' needs. You claimed there is such a duty, deriving from the Golden Rule, which must be sound because "It's been the foundation of Western morality for 2000 years."

That is an ad populum argument. It hasn't, but even if it had been, that fact supplies no evidence or argument for its soundness. Until its adherents can supply those, belief in neither the GR nor that duty is warranted. Nor does the Golden Rule entail that duty (many people would not force others to meet their medical needs, and hence, per the GR, have no duty to meet others' similar needs).

[Ecurb]

Wrong again. I did not claim that my position "must be sound". Had I done so, I would indeed be guilty of ad populum. Instead, I suggested that tradition adds credence to my claim. That's similar to the near universal acceptance that in 1812 the Russians fought the French at Borodino adding credence to that claim.

As I've tried to explain, the ad populum fallacy correctly states that popular belief doesn't prove anything.

[Pattern-chaser]

All I hear in your replies is a reminder I didn't need: that being members of a group doesn't take away the individuality of those members. A group can usefully be viewed as an entity in itself.

For some purposes, yes. Describing a group is a shorthand way of describing the members of the group. Other than statistical properties, groups have no properties not reducible to properties of their members. E.g., we can say, "Utah is a Mormon state." Or, "Utah has a population of 3.3 million." Only the latter is a property of the group; the former is a shorthand for a property of some (large) fraction of its members.

We have to keep that in mind when we speak of "the good" for a group: whatever that "good" is, it will only be a good for some members of that group, if any, but not likely all. It will also likely be a "bad" for other members of the group. If so, and you ignore that fact, you do indeed "take way the individuality" of those members.

A group has properties that its members do not share. They can't; how could they? The group properties relate to the nature of the group itself, and no individual is (in this sense) a group, so that's why the members do not share these properties. In the grossest and most black-and-white example I can think of, crowds of people flowing through (say) a shopping centre [Am: mall] can be usefully modelled using the equations of fluid dynamics. They flow through the centre like a liquid. This property is not reflected in the members of the crowd; it is a parent-only property, that its 'children' do not share.

Please don't respond to tell me that these properties would and could not be present without the individual members. That is obvious and accepted. But there is more to these things than your tunnel-vision Individualist perspective. Yours is a useful perspective, but it is only one of many. Your refusal to explore the rest of the "many" is a constraint you place upon yourself, from which others do not suffer. Your move, your choice.

...But when we begin speaking of "the good" for a group, we're no longer speaking of the group as a whole, but of its members, and usually, only some of them.

When we speak of "the good of the group", we are clearly and obviously "speaking of the group as a whole". That is, in your world, the good of most of the group's members.

I repeat: Not necessarily of the good of *all* the membership, but the good of most of them.

This is valid, reasonable, and useful.

Your difficulties stem purely from your religious and emotional ties to Libertarian Individualism, your One and Only Truth.

Perhaps it's time you widened your outlook?

[GE Morton]

When we speak of "the good of the group", we are clearly and obviously "speaking of the group as a whole". That is, in your world, the good of most of the group's members.

I'm amazed that you don't see that your statement above is self-contradictory. "Most" is not the "whole."

I repeat: Not necessarily of the good of *all* the membership, but the good of most of them.

This is valid, reasonable, and useful.

In some cases, it is. But if the alleged good is only for "most" of the group, then there are others in the group for whom it is not a good. And that is where the moral issues arise: may the interests and welfare of that minority be sacrificed for the good of the majority? If your moral theory includes an "equal agency" postulate, that is not permissible.

Your difficulties stem purely from your religious and emotional ties to Libertarian Individualism, your One and Only Truth.

Perhaps it's time you widened your outlook?

Oh, my . . . now you're resorting to ad hominems?

That (modern, civilized) societies are comprised of distinct individuals, each with easily distinguishable physical properties and distinct and variable strengths, talents, interests, values, etc., is not a religious or emotionally-driven claim --- it is an empirical one, and indeed self-evident. Social theories that ignore that fact are flawed at their root.

[Pattern-chaser]

When we speak of "the good of the group", we are clearly and obviously "speaking of the group as a whole". That is, in your world, the good of most of the group's members.

I'm amazed that you don't see that your statement above is self-contradictory. "Most" is not the "whole."

We refer to "the group as a whole", even though the effects we are discussing affect most but not all of its members. We do this because, at that time, we aren't discussing the *%##! members! It is the group that has our attention. And it is the group, as a whole, as a holistic entity, that we choose to discuss.

Groups are not people. You know this well. When we discuss groups, we necessarily use approximations, averages, and the like. If we only discussed matters that influenced every member in the same way, to the same extent, there would be nothing we could ever say about any group. And this is inconvenient, so we ignore people like you, and carry on doing what we've always done, happy in the knowledge that our mode of thought has value because we find it useful.

[GE Morton]

When we speak of "the good of the group", we are clearly and obviously "speaking of the group as a whole". That is, in your world, the good of most of the group's members.

I'm amazed that you don't see that your statement above is self-contradictory. "Most" is not the "whole."

We refer to "the group as a whole", even though the effects we are discussing affect most but not all of its members. We do this because, at that time, we aren't discussing the *%##! members!

Yes, we are, whether we intend to or realize it or not --- because the group is nothing but its members. Whatever you may say about the group, whatever property you predicate to it, other than some statistical claim ("Texas is 50.1% female"), you will be speaking of its members.

[Ecurb]

When we speak of "the good of the group", we are clearly and obviously "speaking of the group as a whole". That is, in your world, the good of most of the group's members.

I'm amazed that you don't see that your statement above is self-contradictory. "Most" is not the "whole."

We refer to "the group as a whole", even though the effects we are discussing affect most but not all of its members. We do this because, at that time, we aren't discussing the *%##! members!

Yes, we are, whether we intend to or realize it or not --- because the group is nothing but its members. Whatever you may say about the group, whatever property you predicate to it, other than some statistical claim ("Texas is 50.1% female"), you will be speaking of its members.

This seems a very modernist approach. The modernist, scientific view suggests the whole is best explicable by examining the parts. However, this is not always the case. I admit that consciousness is the result of neurons firing off in the brain. But the neurons don't explain consciousness. Indeed, they add little to our understanding of it.

Individuals are collections (groups) of cells, which are groups of molecules, which are groups of atoms. But this indubitable reality adds little to our understanding of moral philosophy or individual psycyhology. If, from a moral point of view, individual humans are NOT reducible to their parts, why is it necessarily the case that groups are? Perhaps some groups -- like humans -- are more than a sum of their parts; at least it is possible that for the purpose of analysis, seeing groups this way adds to our understanding and our predictive abilities.

(I'm a Johnny-come-lately to this discussion, and haven't read it all. Sorry if I'm repeating things.)

[GE Morton]

Individuals are collections (groups) of cells, which are groups of molecules, which are groups of atoms. But this indubitable reality adds little to our understanding of moral philosophy or individual psycyhology. If, from a moral point of view, individual humans are NOT reducible to their parts, why is it necessarily the case that groups are? Perhaps some groups -- like humans -- are more than a sum of their parts; at least it is possible that for the purpose of analysis, seeing groups this way adds to our understanding and our predictive abilities.

The term "group" has a very broad scope, and what I said about groups doesn't apply to them all; it only applies to groups of humans, particularly human social groups (the groups on interest in that discussion).

It doesn't, however, apply to organisms, which can also be described as groups of parts (or cells). Organisms are groups of parts (or cells) constructed and assembled pursuant to a design, the completion of which yields a structure having properties different from any of its parts. E.g., your Ford sedan may have a fuel efficiency of 25 mpg, but the alternator or headlights in the car don't have fuel efficiencies of 25 mpg (or any fuel efficiency).

Like the automobile, biological organisms also follow a pre-existing design, given in its DNA. It is an assemblage of specially constructed cells having different functions, all designed and constructed to serve the purpose of the organism as a whole.

The "organic fallacy" is the mistake of conceiving human societies as organisms, with purposes distinct from and "transcending" those of the individuals comprising it.

[Ecurb]

Individuals are collections (groups) of cells, which are groups of molecules, which are groups of atoms. But this indubitable reality adds little to our understanding of moral philosophy or individual psycyhology. If, from a moral point of view, individual humans are NOT reducible to their parts, why is it necessarily the case that groups are? Perhaps some groups -- like humans -- are more than a sum of their parts; at least it is possible that for the purpose of analysis, seeing groups this way adds to our understanding and our predictive abilities.

The term "group" has a very broad scope, and what I said about groups doesn't apply to them all; it only applies to groups of humans, particularly human social groups (the groups on interest in that discussion).

It doesn't, however, apply to organisms, which can also be described as groups of parts (or cells). Organisms are groups of parts (or cells) constructed and assembled pursuant to a design, the completion of which yields a structure having properties different from any of its parts. E.g., your Ford sedan may have a fuel efficiency of 25 mpg, but the alternator or headlights in the car don't have fuel efficiencies of 25 mpg (or any fuel efficiency).

Like the automobile, biological organisms also follow a pre-existing design, given in its DNA. It is an assemblage of specially constructed cells having different functions, all designed and constructed to serve the purpose of the organism as a whole.

The "organic fallacy" is the mistake of conceiving human societies as organisms, with purposes distinct from and "transcending" those of the individuals comprising it.

We sometimes conceive of coral reefs, or ant colonies, or soccer teams as having "purposes" that transcend those of the indivuduals constituting them. Obviously, the word "purposes" when used to mean "intentions" can only apply to individuals. Groups cannot have intentions, except metaphorically. Nonetheless, if the metaphor helps us understand group behavior, what's wrong with it?

The metaphorical purpose of a team playing a game against another team is victory. The purposes of the individual players may vary: one may want to score a lot of points; another may want to cement his reputation as a tenacious defender. But the success of the team is predicated on victory, and the whole is sometimes more than the sum of the parts. The individual members have certain skills, and the team benefits when those skills mesh is such a way that the result is victory. True: when we speak of the purpose of the team as victory we are speaking metaphorically. But perhaps by viewing teams in this way, the coach can better figure out how to facilitate not only individual skills, but the connection between those individual skills that produces team results.

Great musicians not only play the correct notes, as written by the composer, but also transition between the notes to create an expression that is not attained by lesser musicians who play the same notes. Perhaps teams' (and other groups') success cannot be explained by looking only at individuals, just as the musicians' success cannot be explained by looking at the notes. The metaphorical "purpose" of the notes is to produce an emotional response from the listener. This purpose is best attained when the connection between the notes is arranged beautifully. Perhaps human groups are sometimes similar. The connection between the individuals is as important as the individual motives, and we understand it when we think of group purposes (metaphorically, of course).

[Pattern-chaser]

When we speak of "the good of the group", we are clearly and obviously "speaking of the group as a whole". That is, in your world, the good of most of the group's members.

I'm amazed that you don't see that your statement above is self-contradictory. "Most" is not the "whole."

We refer to "the group as a whole", even though the effects we are discussing affect most but not all of its members. We do this because, at that time, we aren't discussing the *%##! members!

Yes, we are, whether we intend to or realize it or not --- because the group is nothing but its members. Whatever you may say about the group, whatever property you predicate to it, other than some statistical claim ("Texas is 50.1% female"), you will be speaking of its members.

Yes and no. What you say is literally true, of course. But it is equally correct to observe that 'you' are not writing the above posts, and that everything that 'you' do is actually done by your cells.

When we speak of a group, we take a different —collective — view that offers different insights from your tunnel-vision Individualist perspective. Open your eyes and your mind; there is more out there than you can currently see. What you already see is useful and valid, but there is more, much more, and you're missing out.

I will make no further contributions to this sub-thread.

[GE Morton]

Yes and no. What you say is literally true, of course. But it is equally correct to observe that 'you' are not writing the above posts, and that everything that 'you' do is actually done by your cells.

Well, no, that is not "equally correct." Organisms have many properties not possessed by their component parts. The cells of your body, as individuals, cannot walk, or run, or sing, or play the piano, or write poetry, or carry on philosophical debates with other cells. Nor can they "change careers;" a heart cell cannot quit its current job and become a nerve cell, or leave its current body and join up with a walrus. Members of humans groups can do all of those things, and the group "as a whole" can be said to do them only if its individual members can do them.

When we speak of a group, we take a different —collective — view that offers different insights from your tunnel-vision Individualist perspective.

Ah. What "insights" are those? The thesis is that groups have no properties (other than statistical ones) not reducible to those of their members. That is a specific, concrete, testable claim. Your "insights" are vague and evasive. Most human groups are not collectives, and taking a collective view of them --- treating the group as a moral agent in its own right --- is a conceptual error, one defended in order to rationalize violating the real rights of real moral agents, all of whom are individuals.

[Good_Egg]

We sometimes conceive of coral reefs, or ant colonies, or soccer teams as having "purposes" that transcend those of the indivuduals constituting them...

...Nonetheless, if the metaphor helps us understand group behavior, what's wrong with it?

Nothing. Understanding is good.

The problem comes when - as an error in moral philosophy - you start trading-off the real rights and duties of individuals against metaphorical rights and duties of groups, who you've conceived of as quasi- persons in order to understand emergent behaviour.