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[Gertie]

Interesting post GA. It's intriguing to me that neurons appear to be much like each other, whether they're part of the optical subsystem, hearing, pain or anything else. Which suggests the patterns of interactions (or their patterned effects) have a bearing on the 'flavour' of experience, and perhaps those patterns replicated in any substrate would have similar results. On the other hand, cells interact in all sorts of complex ways in our body, so what is it about brains specifically which manifest correlates of consciousnes which are 'globally' manifested as a specific, discrete self?

And there remains the issue of the explanatory gap between the physical processes which are apparently physically fully causally explained, and this extra 'what it is like' experiential state. The Mary's Room thought experiment points out that the most detailed physical explanation doesn't capture 'what it is like' to see red for example -

The thought experiment was originally proposed by Frank Jackson as follows:

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like "red", "blue", and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence "The sky is blue". ... What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not?[1]

In other words, Jackson's Mary is a scientist who knows everything there is to know about the science of color, but has never experienced color. The question that Jackson raises is: once she experiences color, does she learn anything new? Jackson claims that she does.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_argument

The subjective (Sense of Self and Qualia) cannot be explained objectively through observed facts, and the objective (observed neural activities) cannot be explained subjectively. They are simply two different things. However, the very boundary that separates the subjective from the objective should be able to encompass both the subjective AND the objective—just because it separates them into two.

It is my belief that the said boundary can be known once one embraces the fact that subjectivity is possible due to objectivity creating the object, and that objectivity is possible because subjectivity creates the object.

So what we could do in order to explain subjectivity objectively is to embrace this inherent boundary between the subjectivity of our self and the objectivity of the brain. We simply do this by embracing our own subjective and objective existence (and also describing our objective existence because it is describable)—because that is the very act that “creates” the said boundary of our subjective existences.

The boundaries of an object are created by the object itself, while the object itself is also created by its boundaries. Both of these events happen at the same time for the existence of the object to happen, as one cannot happen yet without the other.

Think of it this way. When an object exists, it is both the object as perceived from the object’s perspective, and the object as perceived from outside of the object, that allows for the object’s physical existence to be possible. And what does it mean for the object to see itself from its perspective? It means the same thing as the brain seeing itself from its perspective a.k.a self-awareness.

From your post -

It is my belief that the said boundary can be known once one embraces the fact that subjectivity is possible due to objectivity creating the object, and that objectivity is possible because subjectivity creates the object.

I don't understand what you actually mean by this?  Can you spell it out?  Then the rest of your post might make sense to me.

Sorry if my words didn't do the idea justice. Forgive me if I cannot explain it in a more comprehensive way but first of all, to explain the context behind that sentence, what I am saying is that in order to describe the subjective using objective descriptive methods, we will have to simply let our subjective existence describe its own subjectivity, and let our objective existence describe its own objectivity (while our subjective existence perceives that description through words that we “objectively write” and such).

But since we are both subjective and objective beings(Any object can be both considered as ITSELF or as a PART OF THE WORLD)—as all objects are, then by doing so, the boundary between the two which both unifies and separates them will automatically belong to our own existence (thus us automatically "embracing" that boundary as a part of our existence) while doing its own job of describing the combination of both—so that we may have successfully unified the subjective and the objective description of the external world and its aspects such as lightwaves or sound.

Thanks GrayArea.

I'm with you that we describe subjects' conscious experience in radically different ways which we struggle to reconcile with the physicalist way we describe objects, hence the seemingly intractable mind-body issue. Subjective experience is private, has a specific first person point of view, is qualiative (has a 'what is like' nature). Where-as objects have properties which are physical - publically/third person 'objectively' observable and measurable. 

And we human beings are both, mind and body, subject and object, and a thing in itself as well as part of the word.

The next part I think you're saying that by describing subjects in both subjective/experiential and objective/physical terms, we capture the boundary between subjective and objective, mind and body. Yep I can see that.

So if I've got you right, you then go on to say -

So what we could do in order to explain subjectivity objectively is to embrace this inherent boundary between the subjectivity of our self and the objectivity of the brain. We simply do this by embracing our own subjective and objective existence (and also describing our objective existence because it is describable)—because that is the very act that “creates” the said boundary of our subjective existences.

OK, so you're saying we recognise there's some kind of boundary between mind and body. But we create the boundary between them by using different types of descriptions of objective/physical stuff, and subjective experience? It's the description itself which creates the boundary which marks difference betwween mind and body? Rather than there being an actual ontological difference between mind and body? 

I'm struggling with that - there's either two different types of stuff/properties which our descriptions point to, or there's one type of stuff/properties which we misperceive as two (which I think you're saying)?

The boundaries of an object are created by the object itself, while the object itself is also created by its boundaries. Both of these events happen at the same time for the existence of the object to happen, as one cannot happen yet without the other.

Think of it this way. When an object exists, it is both the object as perceived from the object’s perspective, and the object as perceived from outside of the object, that allows for the object’s physical existence to be possible. And what does it mean for the object to see itself from its perspective? It means the same thing as the brain seeing itself from its perspective a.k.a self-awareness.

Here's where I think there's a leap? To say a physical object like a rock, neuron or particle can see itself from its own perspective implies it has subjective experience, is a subject. It works for humans because we know humans have a mind (subjective experience) as well as a body (physical object). So are you saying all physical stuff, all objects, have subjective experience, a pov, a 'what it is like' experience of being this rock, neuron or particle? 

I can envision that as a form of panpsychism. Or that matter and experience are fundamentally the same stuff, which in some/all configurations has this subjective experiential first person pov. Hence your earlier description of neurons subjectively responding to each other. Maybe analogous to Block's China Brain thought experiment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

But the idea that descriptions key to what create boundaries I don't get, because descriptions aren't things in themselves with causal power. There are different ways we describe experiential and physical properties because we eg note the dfferences between stuff which is third person observable and experience which isn't. A rock is observable to both of us, but we can't observe each other's thoughts. That difference is a fact of the matter surely, not just description. And I can assume the physical properties of the rock continue to exist even when not observed, because change apparently happens outside of observation. Rocks erode, my tomato plants grow in predictable ways without beings observed, the cosmos apparently existed prior to humans or other experiencing subjects coming along. So it seems like there's a lot of explanatory work to do to support your position, as I (hopefully!) understand it/ Please put me right if I'm off track.

[Gertie]

I think you're getting so far ahead of our current knowledge that this might be difficult or impossible. We don't know how the brain produces the mind — if it does? — never mind how to influence a particular attribute by adjusting the connectivity of a brain!

Maybe.  But if we could eventually map out and copy the human connectome and identify the bits which add up to aspects of altruism (neurological bonding mechanisms, mirror neurons, whatever) there's no in principle prob I see to bumping up those bits via programming. 

...

Connectivity as a process (eg brains/matter in motion) looks to be at least a part of it, because dead brains don't display recognisable signs of experience.  But some panpsychists might say experience is woven into the substance of matter and might still be there as something we don't recognise in dead brains.  Likewise rocks, particles, everything.  Patterns of connectivity might be what creates the particulars of  ''what it is like-ness'' of experience, and we only recognise ones similar to ours. (That all neurons seem to be much the same perhaps points to patterns of connectivity being associated with particular 'flavours' of 'what it is like' experience.)


Still, connectivity has to be connectivity of something (a substrate) I think -  agreed?   The question here is whether the substrate-something needs particular properties which brains have and silicon doesn't. Panpsychists might say all substrates, all matter, has such properties, has experience 'built in'. And mimmicking human brain connectivity will simply create experience similar enough to our own to be recognisable to us. Physicalist substance monists might say mimicking the patterns of connectivity of any substrate can produce experience, or that there's some necessary property in brains which will be lost (Penrose and Hammeroff's Orch OR for example). Then substance dualists and idealists will have different takes too. Who knows...

All that I know of networks — not as much as I'd like! — tells me that it isn't possible to narrow down network function to specific nodes or connections. To a great extent, it is the whole network that has a given effect. I don't think it would be possible to identify the 'altruism node' (or connection), because there is no such node. Altruism is probably (i.e. I'm guessing!) an attribute whose functionality is distributed throughout the network. I wish I could be sure about this, and a quick search of the interweb hasn't helped. Links to anything that actually describes how networks work, how the nodes and their connections result in certain processes taking place, seem thin on the ground.

I learned what I learned in practice, from actual networks of computer equipment, and the interweb itself (to some extent). Yes, I picked up bit of 'proper' theory here and there, from articles in trade journals and the like, but that's about it. I suspect that maybe 'network experts' are also thin on the ground?

As I said before, I think that network function is largely dependent on the pattern of connections that the net exhibits. The same nodes, connected differently, could result in surprisingly-different network function(s), I believe.

I'm sure you know more than me!

No there isn't one on/off mechanism for altruism, but we already have insights into some of the parts of the brain which might play a role. Mirror neurons and chemicals like oxytocin for example. I don't see it as an in principle problem (just a highly complex one). Tho how you replicate the effects of different neurotransmitters could be - it might be something only a substrate comprising such chemicals can do. Do you agree at least with this I asked you - connectivity requires a substrate?

[Pattern-chaser]

Do you agree at least with this I asked you - connectivity requires a substrate?

I understand you to be asking whether connectivity requires hardware; something to connect together. And I agree with that, of course. Or perhaps you meant something a little different?

[Gertie]

Do you agree at least with this I asked you - connectivity requires a substrate?

I understand you to be asking whether connectivity requires hardware; something to connect together. And I agree with that, of course. Or perhaps you meant something a little different?

Right. So if we go with the idea that connectivity is key, ie has the necessary and sufficient conditions for conscious experience, how might we in principle account for the experiential differences between neurotransmitters like oxytocin, adrenaline or dopamine?

It's not hard to intuit that different types of substrate 'ingredients' somehow give rise to different types of 'flavour' of experience, but in what type of universe might different patterns of substrate connectivity have that effect?

[GrayArea]

So if I've got you right, you then go on to say -

So what we could do in order to explain subjectivity objectively is to embrace this inherent boundary between the subjectivity of our self and the objectivity of the brain. We simply do this by embracing our own subjective and objective existence (and also describing our objective existence because it is describable)—because that is the very act that “creates” the said boundary of our subjective existences.

OK, so you're saying we recognise there's some kind of boundary between mind and body. But we create the boundary between them by using different types of descriptions of objective/physical stuff, and subjective experience? It's the description itself which creates the boundary which marks difference betwween mind and body? Rather than there being an actual ontological difference between mind and body? 

I'm struggling with that - there's either two different types of stuff/properties which our descriptions point to, or there's one type of stuff/properties which we misperceive as two (which I think you're saying)?

No, I'm not saying that we create the boundary between the mind and the body by using different types of descriptions, nor that the description itself creates the boundary. What I meant to convey but didn't convey successfully was that, to "embrace" our own subjective and objective existence is to exist as this entity we call "ourselves" (which contains both subjective and objective existence by default) in which we already do—and as a consequence, we are now able to be aware of and make descriptions of the objective existence. So the act of description does not play a part in creating what it describes. It's only a byproduct and an indication of us "embracing" the boundary.

[GrayArea]

The boundaries of an object are created by the object itself, while the object itself is also created by its boundaries. Both of these events happen at the same time for the existence of the object to happen, as one cannot happen yet without the other.

Think of it this way. When an object exists, it is both the object as perceived from the object’s perspective, and the object as perceived from outside of the object, that allows for the object’s physical existence to be possible. And what does it mean for the object to see itself from its perspective? It means the same thing as the brain seeing itself from its perspective a.k.a self-awareness.

Here's where I think there's a leap? To say a physical object like a rock, neuron or particle can see itself from its own perspective implies it has subjective experience, is a subject.

It works for humans because we know humans have a mind (subjective experience) as well as a body (physical object). So are you saying all physical stuff, all objects, have subjective experience, a pov, a 'what it is like' experience of being this rock, neuron or particle? 

I can envision that as a form of panpsychism. Or that matter and experience are fundamentally the same stuff, which in some/all configurations has this subjective experiential first person pov. Hence your earlier description of neurons subjectively responding to each other. Maybe analogous to Block's China Brain thought experiment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

To clarify, I don't think every object possesses a mind aka subjective "conscious" experience, nor even any "experience". I just think that for every object, its existence can be separated into:

1. What the object means to the world = Its objective existence
2. What the object means to itself = Its subjective existence (aka what I refer to as "the object's perspective" even though it's really not the kind of perspective that conscious beings have.)

That is to say, when it comes to asking "Why the object is the way it is", it would be determined by both the object itself and the (external) world.
So whatever made the "object itself" determine the object's own existence (aka the reason why the object itself determines the object's own existence) would be the object's subjective existence. And not whatever made the world determine the object's existence.

Moving on, the China Brain thought experiment seems quite interesting to me, because not only does it make you question whether this Brain is conscious, but also where its consciousness is located.

So far, my intuition tells me that the brain's consciousness would be equal to the reason why the people of China are "pressing those buttons" to emit signals, where this "reason" would be located within (and created by) the people's mind—just like any reasons for us to do anything are created inside our minds.

And this "reason" is conserved throughout interactions between different people, because one person's reason to emit a specific type of signal with their gadget is essentially the specific type of signal sent from a previous person, and so on. It is equal to the reason why any person within the China Brain have to react to certain signals in a certain way.

So the China Brain would be conscious, but this specific consciousness would be powered by people's minds instead of the physical/material world—whenever they are aware of the said reason to press those buttons to emit signals.

* and those aforementioned "reasons", when connected in a single ring of causality, would then become "self-aware" of itself—but again—only inside the minds of the people that are aware of those "reasons".

[Gertie]

So if I've got you right, you then go on to say -

So what we could do in order to explain subjectivity objectively is to embrace this inherent boundary between the subjectivity of our self and the objectivity of the brain. We simply do this by embracing our own subjective and objective existence (and also describing our objective existence because it is describable)—because that is the very act that “creates” the said boundary of our subjective existences.

OK, so you're saying we recognise there's some kind of boundary between mind and body. But we create the boundary between them by using different types of descriptions of objective/physical stuff, and subjective experience? It's the description itself which creates the boundary which marks difference betwween mind and body? Rather than there being an actual ontological difference between mind and body? 

I'm struggling with that - there's either two different types of stuff/properties which our descriptions point to, or there's one type of stuff/properties which we misperceive as two (which I think you're saying)?

No, I'm not saying that we create the boundary between the mind and the body by using different types of descriptions, nor that the description itself creates the boundary. What I meant to convey but didn't convey successfully was that, to "embrace" our own subjective and objective existence is to exist as this entity we call "ourselves" (which contains both subjective and objective existence by default) in which we already do—and as a consequence, we are now able to be aware of and make descriptions of the objective existence. So the act of description does not play a part in creating what it describes. It's only a byproduct and an indication of us "embracing" the boundary.

Thanks, got it.

[Gertie]

The boundaries of an object are created by the object itself, while the object itself is also created by its boundaries. Both of these events happen at the same time for the existence of the object to happen, as one cannot happen yet without the other.

Think of it this way. When an object exists, it is both the object as perceived from the object’s perspective, and the object as perceived from outside of the object, that allows for the object’s physical existence to be possible. And what does it mean for the object to see itself from its perspective? It means the same thing as the brain seeing itself from its perspective a.k.a self-awareness.

Here's where I think there's a leap? To say a physical object like a rock, neuron or particle can see itself from its own perspective implies it has subjective experience, is a subject.

It works for humans because we know humans have a mind (subjective experience) as well as a body (physical object). So are you saying all physical stuff, all objects, have subjective experience, a pov, a 'what it is like' experience of being this rock, neuron or particle? 

I can envision that as a form of panpsychism. Or that matter and experience are fundamentally the same stuff, which in some/all configurations has this subjective experiential first person pov. Hence your earlier description of neurons subjectively responding to each other. Maybe analogous to Block's China Brain thought experiment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

To clarify, I don't think every object possesses a mind aka subjective "conscious" experience, nor even any "experience". I just think that for every object, its existence can be separated into:

1. What the object means to the world = Its objective existence
2. What the object means to itself = Its subjective existence (aka what I refer to as "the object's perspective" even though it's really not the kind of perspective that conscious beings have.)

That is to say, when it comes to asking "Why the object is the way it is", it would be determined by both the object itself and the (external) world.
So whatever made the "object itself" determine the object's own existence (aka the reason why the object itself determines the object's own existence) would be the object's subjective existence. And not whatever made the world determine the object's existence.

Thanks for clarifying that.  If you don't mind me pressing you further, you maintain there's a difference between non-experiencing objects based on the 'outside' objective meaning of it to the world, and its own 'internal' meaning to itself and internal perspective. 

To me, like most people I think, meaning and  perspective/point of view require conscious experience.  I'd say there's no such thing as meaning to a non-experiencing rock or neuron, and it has no pov or perspective if it can't experientially observe. It just is. (And physics is the explanatory model for why it is the way it is, which doesn't require an object to have meaning or perspective).

We experiencing humans can give rocks and neurons meaning in our own minds (that rock is pretty, it hurts when I kick it, it's grey and weighs 1kg, etc), but those things are unknowable and meaningless to the rock itself. And we'd assume the same of neurons interacting, but for some reason experience manifests when neurons interact in certain ways.

So to me it's idiosyncratic to say non-experiencing objects can experience meaning, or have a perspective. And a chain of neurons or rocks interacting according to physics would require something in addition to a description of the physical processes causing that interaction for experience to manifest - according to our current understanding of physics.

So I don't get what describing rocks and neurons as having some non-minded meaning or perspective of their own would actually mean, nor how that could be the missing explanatory something.

[Pattern-chaser]

Do you agree at least with this I asked you - connectivity requires a substrate?

I understand you to be asking whether connectivity requires hardware; something to connect together. And I agree with that, of course. Or perhaps you meant something a little different?

Right. So if we go with the idea that connectivity is key, ie has the necessary and sufficient conditions for conscious experience, how might we in principle account for the experiential differences between neurotransmitters like oxytocin, adrenaline or dopamine?

It's not hard to intuit that different types of substrate 'ingredients' somehow give rise to different types of 'flavour' of experience, but in what type of universe might different patterns of substrate connectivity have that effect?

No, no, no! A network comprises nodes and connections. You need to consider both — the whole network — before you reach the Nirvana of "necessary and sufficient". As for the rest of what you wrote: interesting...

[GrayArea]

So I don't get what describing rocks and neurons as having some non-minded meaning or perspective of their own would actually mean, nor how that could be the missing explanatory something.

If we cause any kind of physical impact to an object, then that object will react to that impact according to its own specific nature. And by specific I sort of mean that if I poke a rock with my finger, it won't change its shape—but if I poke a jello, then the jello will change shape. So looking from the jello's non-minded "perspective" (like I said, it is different from the kind of perspective we think of when we hear the word) the finger can be equated to "the way the finger physically altered the jelly" and not the actual finger as seen from the third-person perspective outside of the jelly.

And the way in which the jelly reacts is solely determined by "the way the finger physically altered the jelly", meaning that because the jelly had this perspective, it was able to react accordingly to the finger.

This concept is important in figuring out how consciousness can rise from physical objects because this non-minded perspective is a property of all objects, which may lead one to infer that neurons can generate consciousness as opposed to other inanimate objects because neurons are structured and connected in a way that:

1. Successfully transmits and connects each their "non-minded perspectives"
2. Creates self-awareness (which makes the pre-existing non-minded perspective into "minded perspective")

The way in which I believe they do both of them is in my previous replies within this thread. You will be able to spot them due to how long they are. If not, let me know and I can quote it for you.

So to me it's idiosyncratic to say non-experiencing objects can experience meaning, or have a perspective. And a chain of neurons or rocks interacting according to physics would require something in addition to a description of the physical processes causing that interaction for experience to manifest - according to our current understanding of physics.

The reason why I think that this phenomenon between neurons is equal to our consciousness is because just as the physical neuron cells translate the external world to its own subjective definitions and can (at least according to my own chain of logic) only be “aware” of their subjective definitions of the objective world (and not the actual objective/external world), if we say that the “theoretical” physical vessel of our consciousness also translates the “theoretical” external world to its own subjective definitions, we know that all we’re aware of is our own subjective definition of the world and not the actual world itself.

Neurons should be aware of the “objective world” WITHIN / USING their own “subjective world” according to my chain of logic.
Because they are only able to react to the external world using their own selves, which shapes the subjective world within their own selves according to the way in which the self reacts to the objective world.

And I say the “theoretical physical vessel” and “the actual world” both exist even though we seem to only be trapped in our own subjective selves, as I believe the entire physical world DOES exist, because the physical world first has to exist in order for us to form a subjective definition of it anyway. If existence “exists”—which we can know by the existence of our subjective existence—then it should be possible for the physical existence to exist at the same time if “physical” IS the word in which we use to define what is physical.

And two, this one might be more controversial, but if we have already created the word “physical”, then it means that something that is physical already exists to us to begin with.

Moving on, another reason why I think that this phenomenon between neurons is equal to our consciousness is because the kind of subjective existence that these neurons possess and transmit to one another—is similar to our consciousness in that they are both governed by their own “languages” and are both acting as the basis for the existing world itself.

And for both of them to act as “...the basis for the existing world itself”, is for both of them to not simply exist as a part of the world (like any other inanimate objects) and call it a day, but to exist as a part of this “force that makes the world exist as the world”.

We’re a part of this force as conscious beings, because we are individually what makes each of us exist as ourselves, and that “ourselves” happens to be a part of the world. We are what makes this “part of the world” exist as themselves, and at the same time, we are able to translate other external parts of the world (that do not belong to our biological self) into our own subjective reactions.

And when we subjectively react to these said external impulses, we do not receive the actual physical / objective external impulse inside our physical neurons, but rather, what MAKES that external impulse exist the way it does—as that said thing is what directly determines how “whatever MAKES our physical neurons exist the way they do” reacts to the external impulses and why.


To exist as beings that are a part of the force that makes the world exist as the world, is also to tap into the rest of the said force and be able to interact it—just as our physical selves interact with the rest of the physical world…Since the physical world (the objective) and what makes that physical world exist as itself (the subjective) are co-dependent and correlated.

[Gertie]

GrayArea

Gertie wrote: ↑January 11th, 2023, 8:04 am
So I don't get what describing rocks and neurons as having some non-minded meaning or perspective of their own would actually mean, nor how that could be the missing explanatory something.

If we cause any kind of physical impact to an object, then that object will react to that impact according to its own specific nature. And by specific I sort of mean that if I poke a rock with my finger, it won't change its shape—but if I poke a jello, then the jello will change shape. So looking from the jello's non-minded "perspective" (like I said, it is different from the kind of perspective we think of when we hear the word) the finger can be equated to "the way the finger physically altered the jelly" and not the actual finger as seen from the third-person perspective outside of the jelly.

And the way in which the jelly reacts is solely determined by "the way the finger physically altered the jelly", meaning that because the jelly had this perspective, it was able to react accordingly to the finger.

This concept is important in figuring out how consciousness can rise from physical objects because this non-minded perspective is a property of all objects, which may lead one to infer that neurons can generate consciousness as opposed to other inanimate objects because neurons are structured and connected in a way that:

1. Successfully transmits and connects each their "non-minded perspectives"
2. Creates self-awareness (which makes the pre-existing non-minded perspective into "minded perspective")

Ah OK. 

The way in which I believe they do both of them is in my previous replies within this thread. You will be able to spot them due to how long they are. If not, let me know and I can quote it for you.

It would be helpful if you can point to what the necessary difference is?  Otherwise aren't you just saying we note neuronal interactions in brains correlate with with conscious experience, and therefor those specific neural processes have the necessary and sufficient conditions - reason unknown.  So  we can't eliminate the the possibility that the necessary and sufficient conditions can exist by reproducing the same pattern of interactions in a different substrate, such as AI. 

Gertie wrote: ↑January 11th, 2023, 8:04 am
So to me it's idiosyncratic to say non-experiencing objects can experience meaning, or have a perspective. And a chain of neurons or rocks interacting according to physics would require something in addition to a description of the physical processes causing that interaction for experience to manifest - according to our current understanding of physics.

The reason why I think that this phenomenon between neurons is equal to our consciousness is because just as the physical neuron cells translate the external world to its own subjective definitions and can (at least according to my own chain of logic) only be “aware” of their subjective definitions of the objective world (and not the actual objective/external world),

Just to jump in to say I'd put this as neural patterns of interactions functionally encoding external stimuli in such a way as to create a type of representation (physical model or map) of the the source of the stimuli.  I think we'd be saying the same thing. 

if we say that the “theoretical” physical vessel of our consciousness also translates the “theoretical” external world to its own subjective definitions, we know that all we’re aware of is our own subjective definition of the world and not the actual world itself.

I'd agree there's a neuronal model of the external causal stimuli, which correlates (somehow) to an experiential model.

Neurons should be aware of the “objective world” WITHIN / USING their own “subjective world” according to my chain of logic.
Because they are only able to react to the external world using their own selves, which shapes the subjective world within their own selves according to the way in which the self reacts to the objective world.

And I say the “theoretical physical vessel” and “the actual world” both exist even though we seem to only be trapped in our own subjective selves, as I believe the entire physical world DOES exist, because the physical world first has to exist in order for us to form a subjective definition of it anyway


If existence “exists”—which we can know by the existence of our subjective existence—then it should be possible for the physical existence to exist at the same time if “physical” IS the word in which we use to define what is physical.


And two, this one might be more controversial, but if we have already created the word “physical”, then it means that something that is physical already exists to us to begin with.

I'd say that 'physicalism' is a model of what actually exists following on from the convo so far. 

Within that physicalist model - patterns of neural activity  model stimuli from the body and external world according to physics.   But the way we know this is via the correlated experience which functionally creates colours, solidity, sound, taste and smell, as well as memory, sensations, the thinky voice in our heads, emotions, etc.  The physicalism of trees, gravity and neurons themselves are a way we model the actual reality.  But it's an incredibly detailed, vivid, coherent and predictive model, which infers it's capturing something of the reality. 


In this next part I think you're getting towards what that underlying reality might be, which incorporates what we experientally model as physical trees, gravity,eurons, etc, as well as the experience itself.  Which is where it gets interesting for me. 

You say -

Moving on, another reason why I think that this phenomenon between neurons is equal to our consciousness is because the kind of subjective existence that these neurons possess and transmit to one another—is similar to our consciousness in that they are both governed by their own “languages” and are both acting as the basis for the existing world itself.

And for both of them to act as “...the basis for the existing world itself”, is for both of them to not simply exist as a part of the world (like any other inanimate objects) and call it a day, but to exist as a part of this “force that makes the world exist as the world”.

We’re a part of this force as conscious beings, because we are individually what makes each of us exist as ourselves, and that “ourselves” happens to be a part of the world. We are what makes this “part of the world” exist as themselves, and at the same time, we are able to translate other external parts of the world (that do not belong to our biological self) into our own subjective reactions.

And when we subjectively react to these said external impulses, we do not receive the actual physical / objective external impulse inside our physical neurons, but rather, what MAKES that external impulse exist the way it does—as that said thing is what directly determines how “whatever MAKES our physical neurons exist the way they do” reacts to the external impulses and why.

To exist as beings that are a part of the force that makes the world exist as the world, is also to tap into the rest of the said force and be able to interact it—just as our physical selves interact with the rest of the physical world…Since the physical world (the objective) and what makes that physical  world exist as itself (the subjective) are co-dependent and correlated.

To try to summarise -

There is some ontological  “force that makes the world exist as the world”.   Which accounts for both physical stuff and experience, and which manifests as both when neurons interact, because of how this force operates in specific instances, right?  The specific instances function as perspectives re how the force works physically and sometimes (in the case of the properties neurons have) experientially too? 

What sort of thing might this force be do you think, which both constitutes and 'shapes' all that exists, and how could we potentially test for it?

[GrayArea]

It would be helpful if you can point to what the necessary difference is? Otherwise aren't you just saying we note neuronal interactions in brains correlate with conscious experience, and therefore those specific neural processes have the necessary and sufficient conditions - reason unknown. So we can't eliminate the possibility that the necessary and sufficient conditions can exist by reproducing the same pattern of interactions in a different substrate, such as AI.

1. Successfully transmits and connects each their "non-minded perspectives"

A brain should be able to translate the external world into something that itself can understand, as any brain should have its neurons be able to translate their inputs to outputs using their inherent physical logic, so that other neurons that receive those outputs as their own inputs can perceive that output the same way the previous set of neurons perceived the previous inputs.

The physical logic that governs how the neurons translate their external inputs into their own outputs should be then determined by the neurons’ physical form and the logic behind the laws of physics which govern their physical form.

When we examine neurons, we can observe that a neuron has a set “protocol” governed by its inner physics and chemistry, in terms of which output to produce when met with a certain input(s). And thus one could say that a neuron has its own set ways of translating external inputs (say, from an external world)—which we could call its own “language”.

And as stated some time ago, the neuron’s non-minded perspective, along with its physical form, should be what determines its way of translating an external input to its own output, as in what creates its own language. (The NM perspective allows the physical form to translate, and vice versa, because they are dependent on one another.)

But since the kind of outputs that neurons produce as a result of translating something from the external world, is determined by the same physical logic that determines how a neuron reacts to any input (both from the external world and other neurons), the next connected neuron that receives the output as “its own input” may just non-mindedly perceive the same thing that the previous neuron perceived from the external world.

So in summary, a neuron can perceive another neuron’s non-minded perspective through reading what the another neuron’s non-minded perspective produces—which can only truly be done between neurons as they share the same physical logic aka language—so that the reaction of the “another neuron” to an impulse from an external world can have the same reaction as the connected neuron’s reaction to the “another neuron’s output after it reacted to the external world”

Therefore, the non-minded perspectives of previous neurons are conserved throughout transmission, but more non-minded perspectives of new neurons are added on top of it as more interactions happen throughout the chain of neurons.

——————————————————————————————————————————

2. Creates self-awareness (which makes the pre-existing non-minded perspective into "minded perspective")

As for this second point, here’s a quote from one of my previous replies to Stoppelmann.

You must first remember the idea of the “chain” of neurons that I’ve mentioned above. My theory is that since it seems evident that within the chain, each neuron successfully “perceives” another neuron already in their own “subjective” way, all we have to do is make this chain “perceive itself” in order for it to be considered self-aware, which is quite literally just subjective self-perception.

And then I realized, just as how our brain can be classified into numerous “chains”, it can also be classified into numerous “rings”, which are just the aforementioned chains except they are now making a full circle instead of being a straight line. So when these chain of neurons make a full circle and become a ring, then as long as one neuron perceives another, all the neurons within the ring will perceive all the neurons within the ring. And each single neuron will perceive all other neurons within the ring, because each of the outputs that each neuron creates are caused by the outputs from the previous ring, which is also caused by the previous-previous ring, until it comes full circle so that one output is caused by all other outputs and vice versa. Thus as a result, if each single neurons perceive all other neurons, and if all the neurons perceive all other neurons, then this “ring” of neurons will perceive “it” self as a singular entity because all of its components / ways of generating outputs are causally connected, therefore causally singular.

And that’s just one ring within the brain. Due to how many neurons there are in the brain, the brain can be classified as / divided into billions of rings. All we have to do is to simplify it into a one giant, complex ring, where each of its components are rings of their own instead of neurons. The same logic would apply anyway.

So now that we have the “canvas” a.k.a self-awareness ready, we can finally store “whatever we are aware of” a.k.a Qualia, within the canvas.

Essentially the idea is, if every single component within an object stores the subjective existence of at least ONE neighboring component, it would be equal to the object as a whole storing the subjective existence of itself (aka perceiving itself) as a whole—given that there is a single unifying causal logic through all of the components, making each component’s state of subjective existence as much as determined by the other neighboring components as their own selves. Which in this case I theorize that neurons do, because the reason for their specific way of translations (their subjective existences) are determined equally by A. Their own selves and B. The other neighboring neurons. (”equally” since both of them define one another when A is altered by physically reacting to B and vice versa.)

[GrayArea]

To try to summarise -

There is some ontological “force that makes the world exist as the world”. Which accounts for both physical stuff and experience, and which manifests as both when neurons interact, because of how this force operates in specific instances, right? The specific instances function as perspectives re how the force works physically and sometimes (in the case of the properties neurons have) experientially too?

Yes, I believe you are correct. And by “how this force operates in specific instances” I would say there would both be objective and subjective instances.

What sort of thing might this force be do you think, which both constitutes and 'shapes' all that exists, and how could we potentially test for it?

The way I came to believe in the existence of such a thing is rather very simple and straightforward. The reason why I believe that there is this force that shapes everything that exists into "the specific way they exist", is simply because we know that everything that exists has indeed been shaped to exist in the specific ways they do.

That, in my opinion, is all there is to it. It's not about God or some otherworldly force, and it's not some undiscovered science either, but just a way in which I divide my definitions of reality so that I can explore it in more detail and with more flexibility.

[Gertie]

To try to summarise -

There is some ontological “force that makes the world exist as the world”. Which accounts for both physical stuff and experience, and which manifests as both when neurons interact, because of how this force operates in specific instances, right? The specific instances function as perspectives re how the force works physically and sometimes (in the case of the properties neurons have) experientially too?

Yes, I believe you are correct. And by “how this force operates in specific instances” I would say there would both be objective and subjective instances.

What sort of thing might this force be do you think, which both constitutes and 'shapes' all that exists, and how could we potentially test for it?

The way I came to believe in the existence of such a thing is rather very simple and straightforward. The reason why I believe that there is this force that shapes everything that exists into "the specific way they exist", is simply because we know that everything that exists has indeed been shaped to exist in the specific ways they do.

That, in my opinion, is all there is to it. It's not about God or some otherworldly force, and it's not some undiscovered science either, but just a way in which I divide my definitions of reality so that I can explore it in more detail and with more flexibility.

OK, thanks again for bearing with me, I think I'm about there!

So would you say this one ontological force is what physics currently recognises as the fundamental forces and particles of the standard model?  That the model just hasn't been able to look deeply enough to see the underlying one ontological force? 

Or do you view the standard model as more ontologically fundamental (irreducible) and that its forces and particles operate to functionally produce a system which effectively acts like one force which shapes the universe into the specific way it is?

[GrayArea]

To try to summarise -

There is some ontological “force that makes the world exist as the world”. Which accounts for both physical stuff and experience, and which manifests as both when neurons interact, because of how this force operates in specific instances, right? The specific instances function as perspectives re how the force works physically and sometimes (in the case of the properties neurons have) experientially too?

Yes, I believe you are correct. And by “how this force operates in specific instances” I would say there would both be objective and subjective instances.

What sort of thing might this force be do you think, which both constitutes and 'shapes' all that exists, and how could we potentially test for it?

The way I came to believe in the existence of such a thing is rather very simple and straightforward. The reason why I believe that there is this force that shapes everything that exists into "the specific way they exist", is simply because we know that everything that exists has indeed been shaped to exist in the specific ways they do.

That, in my opinion, is all there is to it. It's not about God or some otherworldly force, and it's not some undiscovered science either, but just a way in which I divide my definitions of reality so that I can explore it in more detail and with more flexibility.

OK, thanks again for bearing with me, I think I'm about there!

So would you say this one ontological force is what physics currently recognises as the fundamental forces and particles of the standard model?  That the model just hasn't been able to look deeply enough to see the underlying one ontological force? 

Or do you view the standard model as more ontologically fundamental (irreducible) and that its forces and particles operate to functionally produce a system which effectively acts like one force which shapes the universe into the specific way it is?

This force that makes anything exist the way they do is not what physics recognizes as the fundamental forces / standard model, but it's what makes physics itself, and everything else, the way it is. This force doesn't operate on logic such as mathematics or physics (unlike everything in physics), nor can it be described by logic, but rather it is what logic IS. That is to also say, this force is not something within the real world, but rather it is what the real world exists as.

The ontological force I talk about is equal to the definition of an object within reality itself that makes that object exist the way it does. A neuron exists the way it does because it is defined to exist the way it does. Defined not by human beings or observers, but defined by its own existence, and existence itself.