Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[Gertie]

GE

GE

This is nice and clear., I might finally understand Kant! Can I pull it apart a bit to see what you think?

I'm basically a Kantian. I take there to be 3 "first-order" categories of existents, of "real" things. Only one of them is "fundamental," or primitive, i.e., not reducible to the other two or to anything else:

1. Phenomena (the contents of experience), including percepts and their properties, feelings, moods, thoughts, ideas, memories, etc. This is the "fundamental" one, and the only one I'd call "ontologically real" (the other two are only "theoretically real"). Entities in this category are the only ones of whose existence we can be certain pre-theoretically, a priori, i.e., about which we can have no Cartesian doubt. If I see a tree I may wonder what is causing that percept, why I'm experiencing what I'm experiencing, but I can't doubt that I'm having the experience.

2. An external realm of existents (which may be singular rather than plural). This is Kant's noumena. This is a postulated realm which, though the postulate is created by minds and thus is dependent upon them, is independent of minds per the postulate. So if we accept the postulate we accept the existence of an independent external world of some sort. We are forced (so to speak) to this postulate because our minds are, per Kant, "programmed" to demand causes for effects --- that is what "explanation" is --- and hence we demand some cause(s) for the phenomena of experience, i.e., for our own existence. Since none is to be found within experience, we must assume some outside cause for it --- an external world of some sort.

3. Conceptual constructs. This one embraces everything else we take to be "real," to exist, everything from rocks and trees and cats and other people to electrons, quarks, and "quantum foam." These are entities we invent in order to usefully explain our experiences (what we observe, feel, remember, and so on), to provide causes for them ---a useful explanation being one which allows us to predict and manipulate those experiences, to control them to some extent, and to communicate about them. In its totality it amounts to a coherent conceptual model of the noumena, a "possible noumena," or of an aspect or portion of the noumena. Though we can never know just how accurately or completely this model represents the noumena, we allow it to "stand in" for the noumena as long as it and the entities it defines prove useful in predicting and controlling experience.

In short, except for phenomena, which are the only existents of which we can be apodicticly certain, "reality" is whatever we say it is --- provided what we say exists has some explanatory or communicative utility.

...........

I'm basically a Kantian. I take there to be 3 "first-order" categories of existents, of "real" things. Only one of them is "fundamental," or primitive, i.e., not reducible to the other two or to anything else:....
In short, except for phenomena, which are the only existents of which we can be apodicticly certain, "reality" is whatever we say it is --- provided what we say exists has some explanatory or communicative utility.

I think we need to distinguish between epistemological 'reducibility' and ontological reducibility from the outset. Number 1 is the only category which is epistemologically certain ('irreducible') right? I know for certain my conscious experience exists. Also note - not minds generally, (other minds are part of the content of my experience whose independent ontological reality can be doubted) just my own first person pov experiential states.

So number 2 is a postulated realm of ontologically real stuff, which exists independently of me experiencing it.

But here's a blurring of epistemology and ontology I think -

This is Kant's noumena. This is a postulated realm which, though the postulate is created by minds and thus is dependent upon them, is independent of minds per the postulate.

This world is epistemologically 'dependent'/doubtable, but if the postulate is correct, not ontologically dependent, yes? There is an actual state of affairs where-by all that exists is my experience, OR a world exists independently of my experience. And Kant is postulating the ontologically existing world really exists.

3 then assumes the postulate to be true, a world 'out there' does ontologically exist as an actual state of affairs, and goes on to consider what we can epistemologically know about that world. And there is doubt there too, about how comprehensively and accurately we subjects in that world can know it via our experiential interactions with it. [And evidence supports the idea that we create experiential useful models, 'Darwinian Fictions' which comprise solid tables, colours, sounds, and patterns which we conceptually theorise as cause and effect, lawlike forces, bounded by reason, logic. Which are rooted in limited and flawed experiential representations of the reality].

So my summary would be something like -

1. The only thing I can directly know for certain to exist is my own experience.

2. The content of my experience presents a coherent, complex world from a specific first person point of view, located in a specific body moving through a physical world of space and time, and also including other similarly experiencing subjects.

3. If I assume the content of my experience represents something ontologically real 'out there', then I can share notes with other minded subjects to create a model of our shared world as we experience it. Inter-subjectively reliably agreeing on third-person observable/measurable/physical aspects of that world, and conceptually theorising from those observations. [This is the basis for the scientific physicalist model of the world].

4. This process of shared model building itself has come to suggest we are limited and flawed observers and thinkers, who construct flawed and limited experiential models of the world, which can't ultimately be tested against reality. But can be reliably and usefully coherent, consistent and predictive, suggesting some correlation with the actual reality.

[Consul]

QUOTE>
"The upshot of Bell’s theorem, together with the empirical violation of Bell’s inequality, is often described as refuting local realism; that is, Bell’s theorem is described as requiring, as the two main assumptions, locality and realism. Let me focus first on realism. Sometimes different things are meant by this term, so let me formulate several options for what “realism” might mean here (without implying that “realism” is a good name for any of these conditions):

(R1) Every quantum observable (…) actually has a definite value even before any attempt to measure it; the measurement reveals that value.

(R2) The outcome of every experiment is predetermined by some (“hidden”) variable λ.

(R3) There is some (“hidden”) variable λ that influences the outcome in a probabilistic way, as represented by the probability P(A, B|a, b, λ).

(R4) Every experiment has an unambiguous outcome, and records and memories of that outcome agree with what the outcome was at the space–time location of the experiment."
(p. 80)

"…If the claims I have made are right, one should conclude that there is no assumption of realism that enters the proof of Bell’s theorem next to the assumption of locality, and thus that we do not have the choice between the two options of abandoning realism and abandoning locality, but that we must abandon locality. One should conclude further that the widespread statement that “Bell’s theorem refutes local realism” is misleading, and that Bell’s theorem simply refutes locality."
(p. 82)

(Tumulka, Roderich. "The Assumptions of Bell’s Proof." In Quantum Nonlocality and Reality: 50 Years of Bell's Theorem, edited by Mary Bell and Shan Gao, 79-90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.)
<QUOTE

[GE Morton]

It certainly matters what exactly is meant by "realism" in this particular physical context:

Bell's Theorem > On "local realism"

"The terminology of “local realistic theories” as the targets of experimental tests of Bell inequalities was introduced by Clauser and Shimony (1978), intended as a synonym for what Clauser and Horne (1974) called “objective local theories.” …For Clauser and Shimony realism is “a philosophical view according to which external reality is assumed to exist and have definite properties, whether or not they are observed by someone” (1978, 1883)."

Realism according to Clauser&Shimony:

1. There is an external reality. ("external" = "belonging or pertaining to the world of things or phenomena, considered as outside of the perceiving mind. external world: the totality of objects existing outside the conscious subject; the objective world; the 'non-ego'." – OED)
+
2. The things in external reality have objectively (observation- or measurement-independently) definite/determinate properties.

However, external realism as such doesn't entail objective definitism/determinism about properties.

Whether the concept of an indefinite/indeterminate property makes coherent ontological sense is another question. (I think it doesn't.)

I agree with respect to "definite." X either has some property P or it doesn't. Each of those alternatives is definite. Properties are intrinsically definite; an "indefinite property" is oxymoronic. Whether that property is determinate, however, is another issue. Being determinate is not a property of properties (so to speak); that adjective subtly introduces an observer into the question. Something can only be said to be determinate if it is determinable by an observer. Many things will have properties which are definite, but which are not determinable, e.g., the masses of any of the rocks observable in photos of Mars.

[Consul]

As for the basic physical property called spin:

QUOTE>
"spin (intrinsic angular momentum). Symbol m_s or s. The part of the total angular momentum of a particle, atom, nucleus, etc., that is distinct from its orbital angular momentum. A molecule, atom, or nucleus in a specified energy level, or a particular elementary particle, has a particular spin, just as it has a particular charge or mass. According to quantum theory, this is quantized and is restricted to multiples of h/2π, where h is the Planck constant."
—Oxford Dictionary of Physics

———

"Here I will say a bit about spin, which may be the least familiar property.

If you’ve ever played with a gyroscope, you’ll have a head start on understanding the spin of elementary particles. The basic idea of spin is that elementary particles are ideal, frictionless gyroscopes, which never run down.

The fun of a gyroscope, or gyro, is that it moves in ways that are unfamiliar in everyday (nongyro) experience. Specifically, a rapidly spinning gyro resists attempts to alter its axis of rotation. Unless you exert a large force, the orientation of that axis won’t change much. We say that the gyro has orientational inertia. That effect is used to guide aircraft and spacecraft, which carry gyros inside to help keep themselves oriented.

The faster a gyro rotates, the more effectively it will resist attempts to change its orientation. By comparing the force with the response, you can define a quantity that measures orientational inertia. It is called angular momentum. Big gyros that rotate rapidly have large angular momentum, and show small responses to applied forces.

Elementary particles, on the other hand, are tiny gyros, indeed. Their angular momentum is very small. When angular momentum gets as small as it does for elementary particles, we enter the domain of quantum physics. Quantum mechanics often reveals that quantities which were once thought to be continuously variable actually come in small discrete units, or quanta. (This is how quantum mechanics got its name.) So it is for angular momentum. According to quantum mechanics, there is a theoretical minimum to the amount of angular momentum any object can carry. All possible angular momenta are whole-number multiples of that minimal unit.

It turns out that electrons, quarks, and several other kinds of elementary particles carry exactly the theoretical minimum unit of angular momentum. Physicists express that fact by saying that electrons, and the other examples, are particles with spin 1/2. (There’s an interesting mathematical reason why physicists call the basic unit of angular momentum spin 1/2, rather than spin 1, but it is beyond the scope of this book.)"

(Wilczek, Frank. Fundamentals: Ten Keys to Reality. New York: Penguin, 2021. pp. 74-5)

"Modern science gives an answer that, while completely different in its details [from Democritus's—added], is no less bold. It is even more radical in its simplicity. Most important, it is backed up by mountains of experimental evidence. According to our present best understanding, the primary properties of matter, from which all its other properties can be derived, are these three:

Mass
Charge
Spin

That’s it.
From a philosophical perspective, the key takeaways are that there are very few primary properties, and that they are things you can define and measure precisely. And also this: As Democritus anticipated, the connection of the primary properties—the deep structure of reality—to the everyday appearance of things is quite remote. While it seems to me too strong to say that sweet, bitter, hot, cold, and color are “conventions,” it is surely true that it takes quite some doing to trace those things—and the world of everyday experience more generally—to their origins in mass, charge, and spin."

(Wilczek, Frank. Fundamentals: Ten Keys to Reality. New York: Penguin, 2021. pp. 73-4)

"Philosophy of Properties:
Let me emphasize, again, that the most important and remarkable point about our trinity of properties—mass, charge, and spin—is simply that there are so few of them. For any elementary particle, once you’ve specified the magnitude of those three things, together with its position and velocity, you’ve described it completely.

How different it is for the objects of everyday life! Objects we commonly encounter have all kinds of properties: sizes, shapes, colors, smells, tastes, and many others. And when we describe a person, it is useful to specify their gender, age, personality, state of mind, and a host of other variables. All those properties of objects or people supply more or less independent pieces of information about them. No subset determines the rest. Evidently, there is a startling contrast between the stark simplicity of the basic ingredients and the complexity of the products they produce, just as Democritus suspected.

Contrary to Democritus, though, our modern basic ingredients don’t have hooks. They aren’t even solid bodies. Indeed, though it’s convenient to call them “elementary particles,” they aren’t really particles. (That is, they have little in common with what the word “particle” suggests.) Our modern fundamental ingredients have no intrinsic size or shape. If we insist on visualizing them, we should think of structureless points where concentrations of mass, charge, and spin reside. We have, in place of “atoms and the void,” space-time and properties."

(Wilczek, Frank. Fundamentals: Ten Keys to Reality. New York: Penguin, 2021. pp. 76-7)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

QUOTE>
"…Elementary particles, on the other hand, are tiny gyros, indeed. Their angular momentum is very small.…"

(Wilczek, Frank. Fundamentals: Ten Keys to Reality. New York: Penguin, 2021. pp. 74-5)

"…Our modern fundamental ingredients have no intrinsic size or shape. If we insist on visualizing them, we should think of structureless points where concentrations of mass, charge, and spin reside."

(Wilczek, Frank. Fundamentals: Ten Keys to Reality. New York: Penguin, 2021. pp. 76-7)
<QUOTE

If elementary particles "have no intrinsic size or shape", being "structureless points", then they cannot literally be "tiny gyros", since points qua 0D objects cannot rotate like 1D, 2D, or 3D objects. Moreover, points qua 0D objects cannot be visualized.

[Consul]

If elementary particles "have no intrinsic size or shape", being "structureless points",…

I think regarding particles as point-sized, zero-dimensional objects is just a case of mathematical idealization; and there is a serious physical problem with point-particles:

"Questions about the electron's dimensions exerted a formative influence on the development of physics. Classical electrodynamics precluded the electron from being a point particle. A point particle would have an infinite self-energy (a clearly absurd consequence). Thus, it followed that the electron was an extended particle."

(Arabatzis, Theodore. Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to Theoretical Entities. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006. p. 41)

By the way, being point-sized entails being structureless; but being structureless doesn't entail being point-sized, because there can be so-called extended simples, i.e. three-dimensional objects which are structureless in the sense of not being composed of any smaller objects.

[GE Morton]

...QM keeps throwing up bizarre conceptions of reality; and they haven't been proven, have they?

I don't think you understand what science is, or how it works. Science has never proven anything. Science is not capable of proving anything. Science can only disprove theories. Theories that have not (yet) been disproven are tentatively accepted, until better ones emerge.

QM's "bizarre concepts" have been tested very thoroughly, and the testing has not (yet) disproven QM, or even shown that its more "bizarre" ideas are wrong. So it is, as I said, tentatively accepted until something better comes along.

I don't think you understand that for religious and political reasons, Western philosophy has unreasonably emphasised subjectivism; while bashing science at every turn, and Popper's concept of science as falsification fits very comfortably within that tradition. If you adhere to Popper's theory of falsification, how can you ask:

"OK, so how do you respond to the fact that QM is the most tested and the most successful theory in the history of science?"

You clearly appeal to a concept of substantiation in support of QM; not falsification. Consequently, it's entirely reasonable for me to point out that the bizarre implications of QM understood as the search for a fundamental building block, are unsubstantiated. Which is to say "unproven" - something which we certainly would say were Western philosophy not infected with, and dying from a rabid religio-political anti-science disease!

Popper's other works include the Problem of Induction, and my particular favourite Enemies of an Open Society - in which he argues that science, because it's true, would be tyrannical were it recognised as truth. Taken altogether, Popper's works epitomise the religio-political assault upon science dating back to Descartes. Whereas, outside of this tradition, in science and in society - scientific proof is a much used and well understood term.

Almost everyone except philosophers are sophisticated enough to be able to appreciate that scientific proof is proof of the hypothesis specified in relation to the evidence offered - and does not imply some absolutist concept of truth with a capital T - but a valid condition within the specified range, open to revision in light of further evidence. Your failure to describe, and allude to such a qualified concept of proof is a demonstration of the one eyed myopia of the tradition from which you speak, because clearly, science does provide proof - and everyone knows that but you!

You're conflating theories with hypotheses. One may prove an hypothesis, but not a theory. Scientific theories are neither true nor false; they are only good or bad --- "good" if they render coherent a wide range of apparently disparate phenomena and the predictions (hypotheses) they generate are mostly confirmable. If a theory generates an hypothesis which is falsified, one need not necessarily abandon the theory --- sometimes a "tweak" will fix it.

[Sy Borg]

I took Mercury's use of "hypothesis" in the last para to be a mental typo. Replace "hypothesis" with "theory" and it makes sense. In fact, without the error, it would be a terrific observation :)

"Almost everyone except philosophers are sophisticated enough to be able to appreciate that scientific proof is proof of the theory specified in relation to the evidence offered - and does not imply some absolutist concept of truth with a capital T - but a valid condition within the specified range, open to revision in light of further evidence."

[Consul]

If elementary particles "have no intrinsic size or shape", being "structureless points", then they cannot literally be "tiny gyros", since points qua 0D objects cannot rotate like 1D, 2D, or 3D objects. Moreover, points qua 0D objects cannot be visualized.

QUOTE>
"…a physical property that is not related to the particle’s position or velocity, and it has a resemblance to an intrinsic spinning. It is therefore called spin. To get a preliminary visualization of spin, consider the particle as carrying an arrow that can spin around pointing toward any direction of space. This arrow corresponds essentially to spin, and the number that distinguishes between different particles corresponds to the arrows “length.” However, one should not take this picture literally. Particles do not really carry any arrows. Moreover, they are supposed to be pointlike, and it is meaningless to talk about the self-rotation of a single point: only extended objects can self-rotate. Hence, while spin is mathematically similar to a rotation, it is unlike any rotation that we can ever perceive with our senses. Nonetheless,…it does exist as a physical property of particles."

(Anastopoulos, Charis. Particle or Wave: The Evolution of the Concept of Matter in Modern Physics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. p. 140)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

* But What Is Quantum Spin?

"Understanding quantum spin is difficult, not least because the name implies a particle is spinning when it is not!"

* What exactly is the 'spin' of subatomic particles such as electrons and protons? Does it have any physical significance, analogous to the spin of a planet?

"Morton Tavel, a professor of physics at Vassar College, responds:

"When certain elementary particles move through a magnetic field, they are deflected in a manner that suggests they have the properties of little magnets. In the classical world, a charged, spinning object has magnetic properties that are very much like those exhibited by these elementary particles. Physicists love analogies, so they described the elementary particles too in terms of their 'spin.'

"Unfortunately, the analogy breaks down, and we have come to realize that it is misleading to conjure up an image of the electron as a small spinning object. Instead we have learned simply to accept the observed fact that the electron is deflected by magnetic fields. If one insists on the image of a spinning object, then real paradoxes arise; unlike a tossed softball, for instance, the spin of an electron never changes, and it has only two possible orientations. In addition, the very notion that electrons and protons are solid 'objects' that can 'rotate' in space is itself difficult to sustain, given what we know about the rules of quantum mechanics. The term 'spin,' however, still remains.""

[Sy Borg]

Consul, are you aware of any terms that could have been used instead of "spin", which would give a clearer impression of what is physically happening?

[Consul]

Consul, are you aware of any terms that could have been used instead of "spin", which would give a clearer impression of what is physically happening?

All I know is that physicists use "spin" synonymously with "intrinsic angular momentum".

[Consul]

Whether the concept of an indefinite/indeterminate property makes coherent ontological sense is another question. (I think it doesn't.)

I agree with respect to "definite." X either has some property P or it doesn't. Each of those alternatives is definite. Properties are intrinsically definite; an "indefinite property" is oxymoronic. Whether that property is determinate, however, is another issue. Being determinate is not a property of properties (so to speak); that adjective subtly introduces an observer into the question. Something can only be said to be determinate if it is determinable by an observer. Many things will have properties which are definite, but which are not determinable, e.g., the masses of any of the rocks observable in photos of Mars.

"definite" = "having fixed or exact limits; clearly defined, determinate, fixed, certain; exact, precise" (Oxford Dictionary of English)

In the relevant context here, I'm using "definite" and "determinate" synonymously.

There is a common distinction in the ontology of properties between determinable properties (determinables) and determinate properties (determinates): https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dete ... rminables/

There is the following principle:

"9. Requisite determination: If x has Q at a time t, then for every level L of determination of Q: x must have some L-level determinate P of Q at t. Objects must have a determinate of every determinable they have. For example, if something is colored, then it must be some specific color (e.g., red)."

For example, according to this principle, it is impossible for a particle to have (a) mass without having any determinate mass.

For the alleged ontological possibility of indeterminate properties, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dete ... /#MetaInde

"Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate: macro-objects (clouds, mountains) appear to have imprecise boundaries; the future, it seems, might be genuinely open; on certain interpretations of quantum mechanics, some properties of a system (e.g., position and momentum, orthogonal spin components) cannot jointly have precise values. In these and other cases there are reasons to think that the indeterminacy is metaphysical, as opposed to merely semantic or epistemic. Elder (1996) suggests that determinables might be useful for purposes of making sense of “the idea that corresponding to (at least some) vague predicates there really are, in the world, vague properties” (1996: 150). Wilson (2013) more specifically argues that determinables and determinates provide the basis for an account of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) having several advantages, including being reductive, compatible with classical logic, and such as to make systematic sense of MI in a wide range of cases, as follows:

Determinable-based MI: For a SOA to be metaphysically indeterminate in a given respect R at a time t is for the SOA to constitutively involve an object (entity) O such that (i) O has a determinable property P at t, and (ii) for some level L of determination of P, O does not have a unique level-L determinate of P at t.
…
Determinable-based MI is also usefully applied to the case of value indeterminacy on (some interpretations of) quantum mechanics."

I uphold the principle of Requisite Determination, thinking that it is ontologically impossible for something to have some determinable property without having any determinate property belonging to that determinable property.

[Mercury]

...QM keeps throwing up bizarre conceptions of reality; and they haven't been proven, have they?

I don't think you understand what science is, or how it works. Science has never proven anything. Science is not capable of proving anything. Science can only disprove theories. Theories that have not (yet) been disproven are tentatively accepted, until better ones emerge.

QM's "bizarre concepts" have been tested very thoroughly, and the testing has not (yet) disproven QM, or even shown that its more "bizarre" ideas are wrong. So it is, as I said, tentatively accepted until something better comes along.

I don't think you understand that for religious and political reasons, Western philosophy has unreasonably emphasised subjectivism; while bashing science at every turn, and Popper's concept of science as falsification fits very comfortably within that tradition. If you adhere to Popper's theory of falsification, how can you ask:

"OK, so how do you respond to the fact that QM is the most tested and the most successful theory in the history of science?"

You clearly appeal to a concept of substantiation in support of QM; not falsification. Consequently, it's entirely reasonable for me to point out that the bizarre implications of QM understood as the search for a fundamental building block, are unsubstantiated. Which is to say "unproven" - something which we certainly would say were Western philosophy not infected with, and dying from a rabid religio-political anti-science disease!

Popper's other works include the Problem of Induction, and my particular favourite Enemies of an Open Society - in which he argues that science, because it's true, would be tyrannical were it recognised as truth. Taken altogether, Popper's works epitomise the religio-political assault upon science dating back to Descartes. Whereas, outside of this tradition, in science and in society - scientific proof is a much used and well understood term.

Almost everyone except philosophers are sophisticated enough to be able to appreciate that scientific proof is proof of the hypothesis specified in relation to the evidence offered - and does not imply some absolutist concept of truth with a capital T - but a valid condition within the specified range, open to revision in light of further evidence. Your failure to describe, and allude to such a qualified concept of proof is a demonstration of the one eyed myopia of the tradition from which you speak, because clearly, science does provide proof - and everyone knows that but you!

You're conflating theories with hypotheses. One may prove an hypothesis, but not a theory. Scientific theories are neither true nor false; they are only good or bad --- "good" if they render coherent a wide range of apparently disparate phenomena and the predictions (hypotheses) they generate are mostly confirmable. If a theory generates an hypothesis which is falsified, one need not necessarily abandon the theory --- sometimes a "tweak" will fix it.

Am I? I've read your comment, and re-read mine and I don't see any conflation on my part. I'm explaining what scientific proof is, not what a theory is. As you say, one can prove a hypothesis. However, that said:

"The fundamental core of contemporary Darwinism, the theory of DNA-based reproduction and evolution, is now beyond dispute among scientists. It demonstrates its power every day, contributing crucially to the explanation of planet-sized facts of geology and meteorology, through middle-sized facts of ecology and agronomy, down to the latest microscopic facts of genetic engineering. It unifies all of biology and the history of our planet into a single grand story. Like Gulliver tied down in Lilliput, it is unbudgeable, not because of some one or two huge chains of argument that might–hope against hope–have weak links in them, but because it is securely tied by hundreds of thousands of threads of evidence anchoring it to virtually every other field of knowledge."
Daniel C. Dennett.

Is that not proof of a theory?

I took Mercury's use of "hypothesis" in the last para to be a mental typo. Replace "hypothesis" with "theory" and it makes sense. In fact, without the error, it would be a terrific observation

Thanks, but I'm explaining to PatternChaser what scientific proof is. He uses the term theory. I use the more accurate term hypothesis.

[Sy Borg]

Consul, are you aware of any terms that could have been used instead of "spin", which would give a clearer impression of what is physically happening?

All I know is that physicists use "spin" synonymously with "intrinsic angular momentum".

One might say that point particles ARE angular momentum per se. It would seem not possible for them to have internal properties. Then again, there's considerable room between quarks and the Planck scale for things to happen.