GE Morton wrote: ↑September 4th, 2022, 1:19 pm
Consul wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 6:05 pmNo, I am not using "existence" synonymously with "physical existence"! I am not definitionally restricting the scope of existence to any particular sort of existents (entities). (If my physicalist worldview is true, it isn't true by definition.) Anything that is not only an object of thought or imagination exists.
What existents that are not objects of thought or imagination are there, other than "physical" existents? What you're claiming there certainly seems to be a defintion of "exists" --- you're proposing to define that term in such a way that only "external world," "physical" things can properly be denoted or described with it.
I am a physicalist, and physicalists certainly do claim that
all existents are physical (or reducible to physical ones); but this
metaphysical claim is different from and doesn't entail the
semantic claim that
"existence" is synonymous with "physical existence". If it were, then physicalism would be a necessary analytic truth
per definitionem, which it surely isn't.
GE Morton wrote: ↑September 4th, 2022, 1:19 pmAs I said above, that entails that objects of thought or imagination do not exist, doesn't it? So when we speak of ideas, dreams, love, memories, etc., are we uttering meaningless gibberish?
No, what I wrote doesn't entail
that! An object of thought/imagination
can but needn't exist.
Mere objects of thought/imagination do not exist. That is, if something is
nothing but/more than/over and above an object of thought/imagination, it doesn't exist. And, again,
merely being an object of thought/imagination isn't a kind or way of
being.
Medieval philosophers distinguish between an
ens realis (real entity) and an
ens rationis (literally, entity of reason), the latter of which is "another term for an intentional object or object of thought, as opposed to self-subsistent or independent objects" (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy). A mere
ens rationis is said by them to have
esse intentionale (intentional being) or
esse intra mentem (intramental being) rather than
esse reale (real being) or
esse extra mentem (extramental being).
My point is that it is a basic ontological mistake to regard mere
entia rationis or objects of thoughts
as a sort of entities or existents, and to ascribe a form of being or existence to them, viz.
intentional or intramental being or existence. The
only thing that has real
intramental being in the case of a mere, i.e. fictional or imaginary, object of thought is
the thought of it.
GE Morton wrote: ↑September 4th, 2022, 1:19 pmConsul wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 6:05 pmTherefore, there are no fictional entities, because they are mere (nothing more than) objects of thought or imagination, with being nothing more than an object of thought or imagination not being a way of being but of nonbeing.
You can't even make that claim without refuting it by the very words you use --- when you say, "they are, "are/is" being a synonym for "exists." Can a dream or idea be a "way of non-being" if it doesn't exist? Doesn't the dream have to exist to be a "way of non-being"?
I didn't mean to speak of "
a way of non-being", so I should have omitted the second
"of" in
"…not being a way of being but of nonbeing", because there are different
ways of being but no different
ways of nonbeing: "…not being a way of being
but nonbeing" – Sorry, my fault!
Mental ideas (concepts) or images of nonexistent things such as those entertained in dreams are certainly existent things, but an idea (concept) or image of a thing is not the thing
but something different from it. Ideas or images of entities or nonentities must exist or occur in order for entities or nonentities to be(come) objects of thought, but
existent ideas or images of things don't require
existent things whose ideas or images they are.
QUOTE:
"[W]e have power to conceive things which neither do nor ever did exist. We have power to conceive attributes without regard to their existence. The conception of such an attribute is a real and individual act of the mind; but the attribute conceived is common to many individuals that do or may exist. We are too apt to confound an object of conception with the conception of that object."
(Reid, Thomas.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. 1785. In
The Works of Thomas Reid, 3rd ed., edited by William Hamilton, 213-508. Edinburgh: Maclachlan & Stewart, 1852. pp. 403-4)
:QUOTE
GE Morton wrote: ↑September 4th, 2022, 1:19 pmConsul wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 6:05 pmWhat "exists in thought" is nothing more than thought itself, because "to exist in thought" can only mean "to exist as a thought"; and nothing but a thought can exist as a thought.
I agree. That is a tautology. So can nothing but a tiger exist as a tiger ("A is A"). But something that "exists as a thought" therefore exists, does it not? Didn't you just say so, by making that claim?
Once again, nonexistent objects of thought require existent thoughts, but existent thoughts don't require existent objects.
QUOTE:
"[T]he powers of sensation, of perception, of memory, and of consciousness, are all employed solely about objects that do exist, or have existed. But conception is often employed about objects that neither do, nor did, nor will exist. This is the very nature of this faculty, that its object, though distinctly conceived, may have no existence. Such an object we call a creature of imagination; but this creature never was created.
That we may not impose upon ourselves in this matter, we must distinguish between that act or operation of the mind, which we call conceiving an object, and the object which we conceive. When we conceive anything, there is a real act or operation of the mind. Of this we are conscious, and can have no doubt of its existence. But every such act must have an object; for he that conceives must conceive something. Suppose he conceives a centaur, he may have a distinct conception of this object, though no centaur ever existed."
(Reid, Thomas.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. 1785. In
The Works of Thomas Reid, 3rd ed., edited by William Hamilton, 213-508. Edinburgh: Maclachlan & Stewart, 1852. p. 368)
:QUOTE
GE Morton wrote: ↑September 4th, 2022, 1:19 pmConsul wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2022, 6:05 pm
Nonexistent objects of thought exist as nothing, not even as nonphysical entities, since they don't exist at all.
"Nonexistent objects . . . exist as nothing?" Isn't that the same as saying, "Nonexistent objects don't exist," which is a truism? Doesn't "objects of thought don't exist as nonphysical entities," nor, of course, as physical entities, imply that objects of thought don't exist, that there are no objects of thought?
We could go on with this, but I think I've shown that you can't even advance your thesis without refuting it. That is because what "exists" is an artifact of language, a term denoting something, anything, we wish to talk about and can exchange useful information about. When we say such things as, "Unicorns don't exist," we only mean unicorns are not physical animals in the "external world" we can ride, photograph, are studied by zoologists, etc. But they certainly exist as imaginary animals. If they didn't, we wouldn't be having this conversation!
To exist
as nothing is
not to exist. Bare existence without essence is impossible!
Dasein requires
Sosein (and vice versa)!
If the expression
"there is/are" is regarded as "existentially loaded" and thus as being equivalent to the existential quantifier, such that using it entails an ontological commitment to what is said to be there, then the sentence "
There are things (objects of thought) which don't exist" is doubtless self-contradictory. But it is doubtful that the expression
"there is/are" cannot be consistently regarded as "existentially unloaded" and thus
as being ontologically neutral and non-committing, such that
"There are nonexistent objects (of thought)" is
not synonymous with the obvious contradiction
"There exist objects (of thought) which don't exist" or
"Objects (of thought) exist which don't exist".
If
"there is/are" is used
as an existential quantifier with an intended ontological commitment, then, of course, there are no nonexistent objects (of thought), and there cannot possibly be any.
But I can sidestep the question as to whether or not
"there is/are" is always ontologically committing or binding simply by saying that
some objects (of thought) do not exist rather than that
there are some objects (of thought) which do not exist. For I see no logico-semantic problem with using
"some" as an
existentially neutral quantifier called
"the particular quantifier" rather than as an
existentially non-neutral quantifier called
"the existential quantifier". So
"Some Xs are Ys" needn't be read as
"There are some Xs which are Ys". (And there are philosophers who argue that even the latter needn't be read as
"There exist some Xs/Some Xs exist which are Ys".)
When I say unicorns don't exist, I do
not at all mean to say that unicorns
exist as imaginary animals rather than as real ones—for the same good old reason that imaginary existence is not a form of existence. To exist imaginarily is not to exist!
The
meaningfulness of our
existing thought and talk about things doesn't depend on
their existence. So we can happily be having this conservation, which doesn't consist in gibberish, does it?