Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[3017Metaphysician]

Thank you again for imparting your wisdom.

Bit of a stretch to call it that, unless it is sarcasm, something for which I've been told I have little radar.

1. Do you think, since 'numbers' or equation's describe the initial conditions prior to the BB, that there is any significance to that?

I sure didn't say that. I wouldn't say the phrase 'prior to the BB", and I said that things are singular at the BB, so no meaningful 'conditions'.

And a follow-up, as you alluded in your other replies, our equation's indeed only speak to 'subsequent' BB events, and does not capture the exact or precise moment in time. Does that in itself have any significance for you?

That only subsequent conditions are described. It's been a sort of Zeno thing, where they've driven their descriptions ever closer to the goal line, but they never reach it.

The interesting question is whether statements such as this one are true; and if they are, what makes them true given that Hogwarts and its students don't exist?

The truth of any statement (concerning fiction or reality) is probably context dependent, so it's the relevant context that makes them true, false, undetermined, or meaningless.
What you call 'nonlinguistic numbers' is what I call 'number', the vast majority of which cannot be expressed via any language or abstraction. For instance, the set of expressible real numbers are countable, but set of real numbers is not.
I have ideas about numbers themselves (as opposed to any abstraction of them), but that would seem off-topic.
[/quote]

Halc!

No sarcasm here. I suppose to the first part of the question, you're saying that numbers themselves have no meaning. Is that pretty much what you are saying?

And in the second part of that question, I'm guessing you are hopeful that they would reach the "goal line" as you say, in that you feel certain the BB theory is the most accurate theory?

I don't want to lead the questions, after your reply, I'll tell you why I'm asking them.

[Belindi]

Sure. Be happy to go back to the Searle thread and copy/past your quote where you said material neuron's exclusively cause all human behavior.

Yes, that is my claim.

Does that mean angry neuron's cause human anger or, does some other thing cause human anger?

1. Are you now claiming humans are not 'sentient'?

No, I have not claimed that. You appear to be assuming otherwise. Why?

Because material neurons can't get angry (or can they) yet you claim they cause all human behavior?

2. Are you now claiming material neuron's in themselves, do not cause human behavior?

No. I've claimed many times that they do, and re-affirm that above. Why would you think otherwise?

Great. Are you now suggesting neurons are sentient?

3. And are you now claiming neuron's have no qualities of consciousness?

Correct; they do not. Do you see some inconsistency there? If so, point it out.

Sure. If neurons have no qualitative properties, how can they cause human feeling?

I was taught a neuron works electrochemically and is either on or off. So its effect is not on a spectrum so its effect can't be described as quantity.(Is there such a word as 'quantivised ?)

No such things as "angry neurons". There are two nervous systems( the sympathetic and the parasympathetic) which are directly acted on by hormones. Hormones are chemical messengers. Some hormones cause a sympathetic nervous system response called fear. Anger is a cognitive(CNS)response to fear which in itself is not a central nervous system response but is a sympathetic nervous system response.

Not that only creatures with central nervous systems feel anger whereas all sentient beings react to danger.

[3017Metaphysician]

Sure. Be happy to go back to the Searle thread and copy/past your quote where you said material neuron's exclusively cause all human behavior.

Yes, that is my claim.

Does that mean angry neuron's cause human anger or, does some other thing cause human anger?

1. Are you now claiming humans are not 'sentient'?

No, I have not claimed that. You appear to be assuming otherwise. Why?

Because material neurons can't get angry (or can they) yet you claim they cause all human behavior?

2. Are you now claiming material neuron's in themselves, do not cause human behavior?

No. I've claimed many times that they do, and re-affirm that above. Why would you think otherwise?

Great. Are you now suggesting neurons are sentient?

3. And are you now claiming neuron's have no qualities of consciousness?

Correct; they do not. Do you see some inconsistency there? If so, point it out.

Sure. If neurons have no qualitative properties, how can they cause human feeling?

I was taught a neuron works electrochemically and is either on or off. So its effect is not on a spectrum so its effect can't be described as quantity.(Is there such a word as 'quantivised ?)

Hi Belindi!

Thank you for chiming in. Most of us are scratching our heads over GE's theory (too), can you make sense of it, by chance?

One of the main concerns is of course, how does he change inanimate material objects like neuron's into animate objects(?). Anyway, I listed 8 other concerns/questions for him to parse thru about three posts back on the previous page....

Thanks again. if you have time and don't mind, check out those questions to him and offer some guidance.

[Belindi]

No, it is not the case that "anything we can denote with a term and usefully communicate about exists," because many things we meaningfully think or talk about, mention or refer to have no form of being, existence, or reality whatsoever. They are just not there, being nowhere and nowhen!

Do you seriously think Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson are to be counted among the people who lived in Victorian England?

Not really. But Oliver Twist was a type of boy who lived in Victorian England.

Sherlock Holmes arose from the invention of the novel a century previously. As such he did exist as a doyen of logical analysis, itself a product of the European scientific enlightenment. Sherlock Holmes is real in the sense that a sign is real.

[Consul]

Do you seriously think Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson are to be counted among the people who lived in Victorian England?

Not really. But Oliver Twist was a type of boy who lived in Victorian England.

Yes, there may have been real boys whose lives were very similar to Oliver Twist's fictional life.

Sherlock Holmes arose from the invention of the novel a century previously. As such he did exist as a doyen of logical analysis, itself a product of the European scientific enlightenment. Sherlock Holmes is real in the sense that a sign is real.

The name "Sherlock Holmes" doesn't refer to any sign or representation of Sherlock Holmes but to Sherlock Holmes. No existing Sherlock-Holmes-representation is Sherlock Holmes, so it is not the case that "Sherlock Holmes is real in the sense that a sign is real."

[GE Morton]

WOW. You said neuron's cause feeling, and I'm guessing action too. If you don't mind me saying, your theory is very very strange GE. Most of us are scratching our heads, but that's ok.

Er, no. Just you. "My" theory is not mine, but that of virtually everyone working in this field.

1. In your foregoing analogy, is lighting, water, and other particles equivalent to 'conscious' neuron's?

No, they are not. They are only analogous, with respect to the question of whether the cause of an effect must have the properties of the effect. And, of course, neurons are not conscious --- that is the category mistake you refuse to correct.

2. If all neuron's cause human feeling, are those material neuron's waiting for us to somehow advise them we need to be angry over something?

Same category mistake. Neurons, not being sentient creatures, don't "advise" anyone nor solicit or heed advice.

3. If neuron's are the exclusive cause to human anger, can they cause us to feel angry when they feel like it?

Same category mistake. Not being conscious entities neurons don't "feel" anything. They are merely electro-biochemical transceivers, which respond to certain stimuli and stimulate other neurons.

4. Do neuron's have primacy over making me angry, or do we have primacy over them?

Neurons generate your feelings of anger, and all other feelings you may experience. Not sure what you mean by "primacy," but in the sense that causes have "primacy" over effects, yes, they have primacy.

5. If you believe neuron's have primacy, does that mean we somehow have to communicate with them to advise we need to be angry?

"We" don't communicate with neurons. Same category mistake.

6. If you believe neuron's are material objects (which they are) like your lightening, water, etc.,, do you also consider both men and women material objects, and should they be treated as such?

Yes, men and women are material objects. So are all other animals. Are you questioning that? As for how they ought to be treated, whether or not they're material objects has no bearing on that; that depends on the kinds of material objects they are.

7. If you believe neuron's cause all human action and conduct, how do we take responsibility for that action and conduct?

Easily --- the neurons causing your actions are YOUR neurons. That makes you responsible for the feelings and actions they generate.

8. Are all neuron's sentient in-themselves? (I'm not sure you ever gave us a straight answer on that).

Oh, I have answered that silly question several times. No, they are not. Nor do they need to be in order to produce sentience in an organism, any more than photons need to be beautiful in order to assemble into a beautiful scene.

Until you grasp and correct that category mistake you'll persist with these silly questions. They're not worth any more of my time.

[GE Morton]

I was taught a neuron works electrochemically and is either on or off.

That is not true. A neuron is "on" as long as it is alive. It is a transceiver, able to detect signals from other neurons and transmit signals of its own to other neurons, muscle cells, etc., depending on the signals it receives.

[Belindi]

Consul wrote:

The name "Sherlock Holmes" doesn't refer to any sign or representation of Sherlock Holmes but to Sherlock Holmes. No existing Sherlock-Holmes-representation is Sherlock Holmes, so it is not the case that "Sherlock Holmes is real in the sense that a sign is real."

Consul, same for Oliver Twist who was a sign of the times and the state of the society and its culture.The thing about 'serious' fiction is it's true to life .

The difference between Oliver Twist and Sherlock Holmes is Conan Doyle was not trying to signal a state of society, whereas Dickens was a journalist who intended Oliver Twist as a signal as well as a sign

[Belindi]

I was taught a neuron works electrochemically and is either on or off.

That is not true. A neuron is "on" as long as it is alive. It is a transceiver, able to detect signals from other neurons and transmit signals of its own to other neurons, muscle cells, etc., depending on the signals it receives.

You may as well say an electric light is on as long as it can make a connection.You confuse potential with kinetic.

A neuron is not working , it's inert, until the synapses are breached by the electrochemical.

[Halc]

I'm not happy with truth relativism, because I think truth is always grounded in the actual/real world, and there is only one such all-encompassing world.

Fine for the realist, but the latter assertion is not made by the relativist.
Admittedly, it is difficult to suggest that the sum of 3 and 5 being 8 is merely a relative truth. But the standard duration of a Hogwarts education being 7 is definitely relative only to the Hogwarts I know, and not to a different one envisioned by say a different author. The electron actually going through the left slit likely isn’t even a relative truth/falsity if it isn’t thus measured.

if you assert its relative truth, you "can avoid the standard charge of self-refutation by accepting that relativism cannot be proven true in any non-relative sense—viz., that relativism itself as a philosophical position is at best true only relative to a cultural or historical context and therefore could be false in other frameworks or cultures.

Hard to parse all that, but I’m not suggesting its truth is relative to a culture or belief system, or for that matter, to the utter absence of entities with culture or beliefs.

But such an admission will undermine the relativist’s attempt to convince others of her position, for the very act of argumentation, as it is commonly understood, is an attempt to convince those who disagree with us of the falsehood of their position.

Hard to argue for any position then. The stance is more of what’s left after more classic stances fail. The realists for instance have trouble explaining the reality of whatever it is they designate to be real. This includes even say idealism, which is a realist-of-mind sort of position.

No sarcasm here. I suppose to the first part of the question, you're saying that numbers themselves have no meaning. Is that pretty much what you are saying?

I’m kind of saying there are no numbers ‘there’.

And in the second part of that question, I'm guessing you are hopeful that they would reach the "goal line" as you say, in that you feel certain the BB theory is the most accurate theory?

I know of no alternative. The BBT isn’t one theory, but a general label assigned to the idea that since all distant things appear to be moving away, it was all closer together in the past.
Sure there are cyclic models (pretty much falsified), a big bounce model which is just a different framing of the same BBT theory suggesting no useful falsification tests. BBT doesn’t attempt to explain the origin of our spacetime, only its subsequent evolution. There are people working on models of what might be on the other side of that singularity, but that’s all beyond the label of BBT.

- - -

I’m barely able to keep up with those interacting with me, and have only touched on some of the conversations about say neurons and such.

[Consul]

If something I think about doesn't exist, I still think of it.
Objects of thought needn't be mere objects of thought, since I/we can think both about existent things and about nonexistent ones.

Begs the question. If it exists "in thought," it exists in some sense. You're just (arbitrarily and unnecessarily) restricting "exists" there to physical ("external world") existents. That restriction renders much of common (and highly useful) speech meaningless; i.e., you're forced to deny that love, anger, ideas, thoughts --- all conscious phenomena --- exist.

No, I am not using "existence" synonymously with "physical existence"! I am not definitionally restricting the scope of existence to any particular sort of existents (entities). (If my physicalist worldview is true, it isn't true by definition.) Anything that is not only an object of thought or imagination exists. Therefore, there are no fictional entities, because they are mere (nothing more than) objects of thought or imagination, with being nothing more than an object of thought or imagination not being a way of being but of nonbeing.

What "exists in thought" is nothing more than thought itself, because "to exist in thought" can only mean "to exist as a thought"; and nothing but a thought can exist as a thought. Unless what is thought about/of, i.e. the object of thought, is itself a thought, objects of thoughts are nonthoughts. When I think of Sherlock Holmes, I think of a person, and persons are nonthoughts.

I do not "postulate" nonexistent thought-objects, because I do not claim self-contradictorily that nonexistent thought-objects exist. I'm merely claiming that some of my/our thought-objects don't exist, which is different from claiming that there (really) are nonexistent thought-objects.

"I'm merely claiming that some of my/our thought-objects don't exist" --- by which you mean, "Don't exist as physical (external world) entities." Right?

Once again: WRONG!
Nonexistent objects of thought exist as nothing, not even as nonphysical entities, since they don't exist at all.

Why not just add that qualifier, rather than denying that unicorns don't exist in any sense? Surely you'll agree that "thought objects" exist (as thought objects). If a unicorn is a thought object, then doesn't it exist as such?

No, because unicorns are imaginary creatures that have no form of being, existence, or reality, which fact doesn't prevent me/us from imagining them. Unicorns don't exist as thought-objects, and they don't exist as something else either, simply because they don't exist at all.

Being an object of thought means nothing more than being thought about/of by somebody or some people, and there are no such "passive properties". There is only the "active property" of thinking about/of something/some things. When I think of a unicorn, I have the active property of thinking of it, but the unicorn I think of doesn't have the passive property of being thought about by me. I call it an object of thought, simply because it is what I think about/of. What makes it true that unicorns are objects of thought is my thinking about/of them rather than their being thought about/of by me.

Being an object of thought or imagination is not an existence-entailing property, and it is not even a genuine property at all. I can certainly think of existent things as well, but existing is not a necessary condition for a thing's being thought of, for its being an object of thought.

" . . . which is different from claiming that there (really) are nonexistent thought-objects." "Nonexistent thought objects" is oxymoronic. It implies a "thought object" which is not thought.

No, it doesn't. The phrase "unthought thought-object" is certainly a contradiction in terms, but the phrase "nonexistent thought-object" is not.

Moreover, there are different kinds of existents, but no different meanings of "existence". Existing as an elephant is different from existing as a mouse, simply because elephants are different in kind from mice, and not because they exist in different senses of "exist". Existence is a genus with exactly one species, so to speak: Existence is existence, and there aren't any lower or higher forms of it—"subsistence" or "supersistence".

Actually I agree with that --- but only because I take "existence," "to exist," to have a meaning different from the one you assume. In my view, to say something exists is just to say that we can construct true and informative propositions about it. If we can construct true and informative propositions about Frodo Baggins, then Frodo exists. If we can construct true and informative propositions about quarks, then quarks exist. As long as we can construct true and informative propositions about the luminiferous ether, then the ether exists. When it turns out some of those propositions are false, the ether ceases to exist. The problem with "exists" is not one of ambiguity of the concept, but in mistaking the ontological category to which some existent belongs, or imputing properties applicable to one category to existents in another category.

"Informativeness" can mean "mere meaningfulness", and it can mean "meaningfulness plus truthfulness". Correspondingly, there is a distinction between information as mere, i.e. truth-independent, semantic content and information as truth-dependent knowledge. Dis- or misinformation is information in the former sense but not in the latter. If everything I tell you is false, I have conveyed meaning to you but no knowledge.

As for your definition of "exist", the question is whether there are any "true and informative propositions" about things which arguably don't exist—in which case your definition would turn out to be inadequate. Is there any knowledge of nonexistents?
There certainly is knowledge of our existent representations of nonexistents, of how we represent them to be; but can there be any knowledge of how they are (in themselves), of their essence or nature?

I think there cannot be any factual knowledge of the essence or nature (Sosein) of things lacking existence (Dasein), but there can be counterfactual knowledge of them. For example, don't we know that if unicorns existed, they would have four legs? Isn't the counterfactual proposition <If unicorns existed, they would have four legs> informative and true despite the nonexistence of unicorns?

I could construct many other counterfactual truths about nonentities with the following general form:
"If x/Xs existed, then x/Xs would be Y/Ys."
For example, if Wookiees (and the planet Kashyyyk) existed, then they would be a species of tall, hairy humanoids that were native to the planet Kashyyyk. Isn't this an informative and true proposition about Wookiees, albeit a counterfactual one?

Okay, you could qualify your definition by saying that something or some kind of thing exists if and only if there can be factually/non-counterfactually true propositions and corresponding factual/non-counterfactual knowledge about it.

The truth of non-counterfactual propositions depends on the existence of (what David Lewis calls) their subject matter, i.e. what they are about or refer to; so truth is existence-dependent in this regard, but does existence—what exists and what doesn't exist—depend on our ability to "construct true and informative propositions" about it?

I can imagine a possible world where many (kinds of) things exist, but the conditions there are such that there cannot live anybody there who is able to acquire true information or knowledge of the facts in that world. Given this plausibly consistent imaginary scenario, I'm skeptical about the adequacy of your definition of "exist", because it makes existence dependent on and determined by our cognitive/epistemic capacities. A world devoid of knowing minds isn't thereby devoid of existing things!

There is a difference between an object of thought and the thought of an object.

Heh. That "difference" is pretty subtle. Contrived, even.

Subtle yet relevant—not "contrived"!

Existent objects (of thought) aren't necessarily represented by some kind of signs or other, but nonexistent ones are.

True. But that is the difference between physical, "external world" existents and phenomenal existents; not between existence and non-existence.

If the idealistic doctrine that being is being perceived or being otherwise represented mentally were true, then both existents and nonexistents would be "necessarily represented by some kind of signs or other", by "ideas", as Locke would say. But I think it is false that what exists and what doesn't exist depend on and are determined by our minds (our conceptual or propositional representations, our perceptions, our cognitions)—except for man-made sociocultural existence with its institutions and organizations.

[Consul]

The name "Sherlock Holmes" doesn't refer to any sign or representation of Sherlock Holmes but to Sherlock Holmes. No existing Sherlock-Holmes-representation is Sherlock Holmes, so it is not the case that "Sherlock Holmes is real in the sense that a sign is real."

Consul, same for Oliver Twist who was a sign of the times and the state of the society and its culture.The thing about 'serious' fiction is it's true to life .
The difference between Oliver Twist and Sherlock Holmes is Conan Doyle was not trying to signal a state of society, whereas Dickens was a journalist who intended Oliver Twist as a signal as well as a sign.

Oliver Twist and Sherlock Holmes are both fictional and thus unreal persons, which is not to say that all fictional stories are equally unrealistic, equally remote from reality. Fictional literature needn't be completely/totally unrealistic. The Oliver Twist story and the Harry Potter story are both works of fiction, but the former is surely more realistic than the latter.

[GE Morton]

You may as well say an electric light is on as long as it can make a connection.You confuse potential with kinetic.

A better analogy is with a thermostat, or a radio transmitter. They are "on" as long as there is power to them. But they don't send a signal until they receive one. When "off," they cannot detect or respond to signals.

A neuron is not working , it's inert, until the synapses are breached by the electrochemical.

Hardly. They are constantly carrying on all the metabolic processes that keep them alive, just as do all other cells.

[Belindi]

You may as well say an electric light is on as long as it can make a connection.You confuse potential with kinetic.

A better analogy is with a thermostat, or a radio transmitter. They are "on" as long as there is power to them. But they don't send a signal until they receive one. When "off," they cannot detect or respond to signals.

A neuron is not working , it's inert, until the synapses are breached by the electrochemical.

Hardly. They are constantly carrying on all the metabolic processes that keep them alive, just as do all other cells.

Healthy neurons can potentially communicate 'information' . When healthy neurons communicate 'information' with other neurons these events always correlate with electrochemical synaptic connection.

It's true that merely staying alive uses energy. One is told that brains use a lot of energy. However merely staying alive does not communicate 'information'.

[Pattern-chaser]

To assign a number value, we must first have something to assign it to.

For instance, I don't buy this. We can assign 7 to the number of years one attends at Hogwarts despite the lack of existence of Hogwarts or pupils.

Unless existence is built into the concept of somethingness by definition, "…we must first have something to assign it to" is ambiguous between "…we must first have something existent to assign it to" and "…we must first have something existent or nonexistent to assign it to".

Given the distinction between nonlinguistic numbers and linguistic numerals (numerical symbols), we can certainly use the latter meaningfully in statements about fictional states of affairs such as "Students attend Hogwarts for seven years". (I read that Harry Potter and his two best friends didn't do so, because they blew off their senior year.) The interesting question is whether statements such as this one are true; and if they are, what makes them true given that Hogwarts and its students don't exist?

Hogwarts has imaginary existence; it's part of a story, and the story does exist, even though what it describes has no spacetime-universe 'existence'. That is, I think, just a little bit different from "non-existent". As for statements concerning imaginary things being 'true', I don't think that's a meaningful or useful idea. 'Truth' and fiction are not good bedfellows, IME.