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[GrayArea]

Hi, before I discuss my ideas, I would just like to point out that I am not a professional neuroscientist. I am just an avid enjoyer of the subject. So take what I say with a grain of salt.

With that said, I've been wondering for some time about how the brain becomes aware of itself. And I think I may have a basic gist.

I will first divide awareness into two main parts:
1. The things we would become aware of, once we actually become aware. In other words, Qualia.
2. The awareness itself, which allows us to be aware of 1.

Let's talk about 1 first. I believe that neurons, like any other objects, have a natural tendency to "translate" the outside world into their own terms. This, in other words, means for an object to be affected by the world, and then reacting to it in a certain way that is native to the object.

Take a stationary jelly for instance. I poke the jelly with my finger. As you can see, the jelly has been affected by the outside world. From a third-person perspective, the outside world simply equals my finger. But from the jelly's perspective, the outside world is not my actual finger. Instead, it is what the finger caused TO the jelly. It is the physical alteration that happened TO the jelly BY the finger. (This is all theoretical. Of course, the jelly won’t be aware of all this, due to 2 not existing.)

Another more subject-centered and specific example is the creation of colors within the mind. The color red should be how neurons specifically react to the "red lightwave", according to their native functions. It is not the red lightwave itself, but rather, what the red lightwave causes WITHIN the neurons. What it means TO them. And that's what we (= the neurons) perceive as "red".

This whole process is the aforementioned "translating" process, so to speak. It is what creates 1.


However, 1 is still meaningless without the existence of 2. And here is when things start getting more theoretical. My current theory as to how 2 arises is that a neuron cell naturally "translates" ANOTHER physically connected neuron cell just like it translates the red lightwave—except this time it leads to 2 instead of 1.

Here is my basic reasoning for this.

So imagine a neuron “translates” another neuron. What does this another neuron really “mean” to the original neuron? I’ve deduced that it “means” its own literal existence, simply because this “another neuron” is physically connected to the original neuron, and therefore they can be seen as a single entity.

In other words, to the Neuron #1, a neighboring Neuron #2 is essentially Neuron #1…given that those two are physically connected where one causes the activation of another, essentially turning the pair of neurons into a single system.

Therefore, we end up with a neuron translating itself. Considering my definition of “translating”, this is when a neuron is affected by its own self and then reacts to itself accordingly. Seen from the perspective of the neuron, it is essentially for it to control itself and to exist due to itself.
→ Itself is caused by itself, meaning that it is to itself, literally “itself”.

And the more interesting thing is that this can work vice versa of course, since it’s a single system either way. That is to say, not only is Neuron #1 aware of Neuron #1 and Neuron #2, but Neuron #2 is also aware of Neuron #1 and Neuron #2. Thus, Neuron #1 and Neuron #2 are both aware of the combination of Neuron #1 and Neuron #2 at the same time.

So this isn’t just a single neuron being aware of another neuron anymore. It is a pair of neurons being aware of itself as a singular entity. My theory is that this is how a brain can be aware of itself as a singular entity, as opposed to each and every neuron within the brain being independently aware of its own selves.

But still, looking at it from a third-person, objective perspective, the neuron(s) are still not aware. However, from the pair of neurons’ perspective, they are indeed aware, and as a single entity. It’s just like how when one looks at a lifeform, one does not have any idea if that lifeform is aware. (One only thinks so because they seem like they are, or because they say so.)

Even so, this “subjective” awareness of the neurons still spans throughout objective reality, just because in reality, they are still “subjectively aware” of the objective reality.

The sheer act of an object translating the outside world into its own terms IS all that makes an object an object. And vice versa—for an object to be an object is to translate the outside world into its own terms.
(Meaning that the outside world and the object’s “inner world” are symbiotic to each other. One causes the other.)

[GrayArea]

More on why physically connected neurons can be seen as a single entity:

The neurons’ entire sense of existence is solidified and re-created when it is only caused by a fellow neuron and vice versa—when it causes a fellow neuron. As in, when it is activated or when it activates, a neuron requires its full self to be used, in terms of its inner functions. That is to say, a neuron is the entire existence of another neuron, because one CAUSES, or ACTIVATES the other. Which is only possible because they are physically connected. (Literally, each function within a neuron seems to be a cause for another(Membrane potentials, gated channels opening etc)).

[value]

Interesting topic!

Especially the notion of a jelly to have a 'perspective' I find to be of interest. The fundamental nature of such a 'perspective' could hold the key to many answers in my opinion, including consciousness.

With regard your idea that consciousness can be explained by an inside-out functional 'translation' of an outer world, as if consciousness can be causally explained in a mechanistic way, it is not plausible in my opinion.

First argument

The presupposition that the outer world is 'really real' and causally underlays conscious experience is not justified in my opinion.

The idea that reality is really real is based on a magical belief that underlays ontological realism. It is the belief that objective reality is ultimately something non-disputable within any context of thinking.

One has merely the begin of a pattern as ground for the assumption that reality is really real (a certainty), which is empirical (a retro-perspective).

A pattern (as a concept) cannot be the origin of itself. The 'begin' that is introduced by pattern recognition (the observing mind) is necessarily the begin of the world itself and any inference within the scope of a pattern cannot be evidence of anything 'real' because one is to address the fundamental question 'why' a pattern is possible in the first place.

Before one can assume reality to have a certain quality that allows one to consider it to be objectively real so that it can potentially causally underlay conscious experience, it will be important to be able to answer the fundamental questions such as "why does reality exist?" (i.e. what can explain causality).

The following comment by a user on this forum illustrates the problem:

First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

My reply: Because without knowledge of 'why' reality exists, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens. Such a situation does not allow one to make a claim that poses that reality is 'real'.

The idea that reality is 'really real' and can causally underlay conscious experience is therefore based on a magical belief that involves the idea that the facts of science are valid without philosophy.

Second argument

If physical reality would precede conscious experience causally, how would it be logical that there is an experience at all? If the physical reality to be experienced would be 'known' beforehand there would fundamentally not be anything to experience so it would make no sense for consciousness to have arisen.

Third argument

In my opinion it is simple logic that sensing precedes conscious experience which would imply that when one is to consider the 'chicken vs egg' question when it concerns consciousness and physical reality that that which underlays the potential for sensing must have come first.

It would imply that the complete human body, including the brain and sensing organisms, are a product of sensing. It would imply that the root of sensing (valuing) underlays physical reality and that sensing and consciousness as manifestation is to have a non-subjective origin or nature (cannot originate within an organism).

The sense-paradox provides evidence.

Sense Paradox

Subjective experience cannot have preceded the sense-data and that means that sensing must be primary.

It causes a paradox because when it concerns sensing, it concerns an aspect that provides any potential sense-data that can be used to facilitate subjective experience but sensing itself requires subjectivity, for example attention for an 'outer world' (attention for an 'other').

A thought experiment shows the paradox: how is it possible envision oneself (as a subjective experience) in complete darkness (nothingness) since the beginning of time to then all of the sudden to become motivated to 'explore an outer world'? The subjective experience that is required at the root of life wouldn't have any ground to be subjective of.

Thus it is seen that sensing requires something that cannot originate on a subjective level. The origin of consciousness therefore, cannot be subjective of nature.

[GrayArea]

With regard your idea that consciousness can be explained by an inside-out functional 'translation' of an outer world, as if consciousness can be causally explained in a mechanistic way, it is not plausible in my opinion.

Thank you for your extensive, thought-out counterarguments. I will look into them after I make this reply.

But prior to this, I would just like to ask if you meant "consciousness" as a "1" or "2" (as described in the original post) on that quoted sentence. This is because my original post meant to convey that consciousness itself (Not what one is conscious of after gaining consciousness) is actually explained by neurons' translation of other neighboring neurons as opposed to them directly translating the outer world—or do you personally count these "other neurons" as a part of the "outer world" too?

[GrayArea]

First argument

The presupposition that the outer world is 'really real' and causally underlays conscious experience is not justified in my opinion.

The idea that reality is really real is based on a magical belief that underlays ontological realism. It is the belief that objective reality is ultimately something non-disputable within any context of thinking.

One has merely the begin of a pattern as ground for the assumption that reality is really real (a certainty), which is empirical (a retro-perspective).

A pattern (as a concept) cannot be the origin of itself. The 'begin' that is introduced by pattern recognition (the observing mind) is necessarily the begin of the world itself and any inference within the scope of a pattern cannot be evidence of anything 'real' because one is to address the fundamental question 'why' a pattern is possible in the first place.

Before one can assume reality to have a certain quality that allows one to consider it to be objectively real so that it can potentially causally underlay conscious experience, it will be important to be able to answer the fundamental questions such as "why does reality exist?" (i.e. what can explain causality).

The following comment by a user on this forum illustrates the problem:

First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

My reply: Because without knowledge of 'why' reality exists, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens. Such a situation does not allow one to make a claim that poses that reality is 'real'.

The idea that reality is 'really real' and can causally underlay conscious experience is therefore based on a magical belief that involves the idea that the facts of science are valid without philosophy.

I’d say we have this so-called “magical belief” because we’re just as magical. It is all we can have—we have no other choice! It doesn’t affect the true reality, because the true reality is just as magical as long as it is thought of by us.

This simple argument is what leads me to believe in the objective reality that is, in your words, “really real”. Because how can one tell the difference between the reality perceived by reality itself (outside the conscious self) and the one perceived by the self? "One" can't tell, neither can "Reality", because they are both subject to this problem. Only both can tell at the same time. We simply have to do our job and keep on perceiving reality as if it were the reality outside of our senses, if reality is something outside our senses.

So given all that above, I believe that this “inside-out functional 'translation'” that you mentioned before is not consciousness itself, though it is controlled by non-mechanistic means that arises from 2. This non-mechanistic force behind 2 would be the same force behind the laws of physics—and not the laws themselves which are mechanical. The laws of physics and 2 are quite different by definition, however. It’s just that I believe the subjective experience that is 2 is caused by the objective reality which runs in the direction of the laws of physics, thus controlled by whatever controls the laws of physics’ direction. If whatever controls the laws of physics isn’t mechanical, then the subjective experience of those consequences of the laws of physics would also be not mechanical—as I believe that there is no way to subjectively “translate” mechanicality and non-mechanicality into something else opposite.

After all, the neurons should probably only translate whatever the mechanical/non-mechanical systems direct/create. Not the “kind” of system that it translates.

The kind of system should determine the “way” the neurons translate the system, not what it translates. The concept of translating is, as you said, simply mechanical.

[GrayArea]

Second argument

If physical reality would precede conscious experience causally, how would it be logical that there is an experience at all? If the physical reality to be experienced would be 'known' beforehand there would fundamentally not be anything to experience so it would make no sense for consciousness to have arisen.

It would work if "to know" was equal to "to experience", perhaps? Or if both happened at the same time?

[GrayArea]

Third argument

In my opinion it is simple logic that sensing precedes conscious experience which would imply that when one is to consider the 'chicken vs egg' question when it concerns consciousness and physical reality that that which underlays the potential for sensing must have come first.

It would imply that the complete human body, including the brain and sensing organisms, are a product of sensing. It would imply that the root of sensing (valuing) underlays physical reality and that sensing and consciousness as manifestation is to have a non-subjective origin or nature (cannot originate within an organism).

The sense-paradox provides evidence.

Sense Paradox

Subjective experience cannot have preceded the sense-data and that means that sensing must be primary.

It causes a paradox because when it concerns sensing, it concerns an aspect that provides any potential sense-data that can be used to facilitate subjective experience but sensing itself requires subjectivity, for example attention for an 'outer world' (attention for an 'other').

A thought experiment shows the paradox: how is it possible envision oneself (as a subjective experience) in complete darkness (nothingness) since the beginning of time to then all of the sudden to become motivated to 'explore an outer world'? The subjective experience that is required at the root of life wouldn't have any ground to be subjective of.

Thus it is seen that sensing requires something that cannot originate on a subjective level. The origin of consciousness therefore, cannot be subjective of nature.

I assume that your idea of "sensory" and my idea of "translation" are quite similar by definition. To sense is for an object to become affected and to know what that means to the object, isn't it?

Adding on, I suppose that subjectiveness is what decides the objectiveness and vice versa. They are ultimately symbiotic to one another. To explain more, the sheer act of an object translating the outside world into its own terms IS all that makes an object into "an object" within the objective world. Due to how the only reason why the objects' own subjective perspective exist to begin with is because of their own existence, which roots itself on the objective reality. Meaning that both kinds of perspectives are needed for one another—they come in pairs and are causally united/simultaneous, so to speak. Both the subjective and the objective need each other in order to exist as one.

Not to mention that for an object to be affected and to know what that means to itself not only alters the subjective perspective of itself, but its objective self.

I suppose the conclusion is that an object needs both the existence seen from itself(subjective) and seen from outside of itself(objective) in order to exist. If it does not exist to itself ( = no subjective perspective), then "itself" is not there to begin with, and so "it" does not exist to begin with. Same goes with the case where it does not exist to the outer world. ( = no objective perspective)

As per your argument, I believe that the sensory of itself (= subjective experience) can happen at the same time as the sensory of the outer world(translating the objective to the subjective), neither preceding the other. This can be because they are both a part of a single act of sensory(=translation in general) that all object seems to have by nature.

[value]

With regard your idea that consciousness can be explained by an inside-out functional 'translation' of an outer world, as if consciousness can be causally explained in a mechanistic way, it is not plausible in my opinion.

Thank you for your extensive, thought-out counterarguments. I will look into them after I make this reply.

But prior to this, I would just like to ask if you meant "consciousness" as a "1" or "2" (as described in the original post) on that quoted sentence. This is because my original post meant to convey that consciousness itself (Not what one is conscious of after gaining consciousness) is actually explained by neurons' translation of other neighboring neurons as opposed to them directly translating the outer world—or do you personally count these "other neurons" as a part of the "outer world" too?

My apologies for the late reply.

The topic and OP are very interesting and seem to be a basis for a valuable discussion on consciousness.

With regard your question.

It seems that you see 2 as merely 'self-awareness as an empirical feature', is that correct?

"My current theory as to how 2 arises is that a neuron cell naturally "translates" ANOTHER physically connected neuron cell just like it translates the red lightwave—except this time it leads to 2 instead of 1."

In that sense you would seem to assume that the translational activity provided by neurons by which 1 is performed (i.e. translating 'qualia' of the outer world into empirical awareness) would stand on its own and that it is merely required to explain the ability to become 'self-aware' as if that would be the ultimate fundamental question when it concerns consciousness.

In my opinion self-awareness is not the most fundamental question when it concerns consciousness. Therefore, in my opinion the description of 2 'The awareness itself' cannot be a 'product' of anything.

What would explain (as fundamental ground) the activity of neurons translating an outer world of qualia if not 'awareness itself'? It would seem nonsensical that such a process can be assumed to be the basis of 'awareness itself'.

Did you consider relevance of an a priori aspect as ground for 'awareness itself'? If not, why would it be logical that 1) neurons have developed and 2) that they perform as they do to 'produce' awareness? (what would be your explanation that neurons exist and perform?)

[value]

First argument

The idea that reality is really real is based on a magical belief that underlays ontological realism. It is the belief that objective reality is ultimately something non-disputable within any context of thinking.

First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

Because without knowledge of 'why' reality exists, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens. Such a situation does not allow one to make a claim that poses that reality is 'real'.

The idea that reality is 'really real' and can causally underlay conscious experience is therefore based on a magical belief that involves the idea that the facts of science are valid without philosophy.

I’d say we have this so-called “magical belief” because we’re just as magical. It is all we can have—we have no other choice! It doesn’t affect the true reality, because the true reality is just as magical as long as it is thought of by us.

You seem to intend to imply that one can know that reality is real by inferring that one can be certain that one has 'conscious experience', as in René Descartes his assertion 'I think, therefore I am' (cogito, ergo sum). Is that correct?

This simple argument is what leads me to believe in the objective reality that is, in your words, “really real”. Because how can one tell the difference between the reality perceived by reality itself (outside the conscious self) and the one perceived by the self? "One" can't tell, neither can "Reality", because they are both subject to this problem. Only both can tell at the same time. We simply have to do our job and keep on perceiving reality as if it were the reality outside of our senses, if reality is something outside our senses.

Your argument seems to be that the realness of reality is to be inferred from a moral obligation (ought) to 'do ones job' to perceive reality as it is perceived. It would be interesting but what would explain that moral ought?

So given all that above, I believe that this “inside-out functional 'translation'” that you mentioned before is not consciousness itself, though it is controlled by non-mechanistic means that arises from 2.

How can this be said when you would consider 2 ('awareness itself') to arise from the translation activity of 'another neuron'?

"My current theory as to how 2 arises is that a neuron cell naturally "translates" ANOTHER physically connected neuron cell just like it translates the red lightwave—except this time it leads to 2 instead of 1."

This non-mechanistic force behind 2 would be the same force behind the laws of physics—and not the laws themselves which are mechanical. The laws of physics and 2 are quite different by definition, however. It’s just that I believe the subjective experience that is 2 is caused by the objective reality which runs in the direction of the laws of physics, thus controlled by whatever controls the laws of physics’ direction. If whatever controls the laws of physics isn’t mechanical, then the subjective experience of those consequences of the laws of physics would also be not mechanical—as I believe that there is no way to subjectively “translate” mechanicality and non-mechanicality into something else opposite.

After all, the neurons should probably only translate whatever the mechanical/non-mechanical systems direct/create. Not the “kind” of system that it translates.

The kind of system should determine the “way” the neurons translate the system, not what it translates. The concept of translating is, as you said, simply mechanical.

Do you consider the mentioned 'non-mechanistic force' at the basis of 'translation activity of neurons' to be a potential option or a certain option? What would be the ground for either idea? And most importantly, what would be the origin of that non-mechanistic force? Could such a force lay within neurons (i.e. the individual organism)?

[value]

Second argument

If physical reality would precede conscious experience causally, how would it be logical that there is an experience at all? If the physical reality to be experienced would be 'known' beforehand there would fundamentally not be anything to experience so it would make no sense for consciousness to have arisen.

It would work if "to know" was equal to "to experience", perhaps? Or if both happened at the same time?

The implication of the idea that 'awareness itself' is produced by neuron activity is that the mentioned 'experience' would causally originate (be produced) by physical reality. In such a case, how can it be said that what is to be experienced cannot have been known beforehand, i.e. is not causally explainable?

If 'awareness itself' is to be produced by physical reality it seems to be impossible to escape causality and thus 'experience' could not potentiall achieve a quality that is non-deterministic. Do you disagree?

[value]

Third argument

Subjective experience cannot have preceded the sense-data and that means that sensing must be primary.

Sensing requires something that cannot originate on a subjective level. The origin of consciousness therefore, cannot be subjective of nature.

I assume that your idea of "sensory" and my idea of "translation" are quite similar by definition. To sense is for an object to become affected and to know what that means to the object, isn't it?

Yes, but what would justify the assumption of sensing potential-in-effect by which the idea of neural activity can be considered a subjective origin of 'awareness itself'?

Do you see that there is a paradox when it concerns the explanation of that sensing potential relative to a life form or organism? The ability to sense an 'outer world' cannot logically have come from within.

Adding on, I suppose that subjectiveness is what decides the objectiveness and vice versa. They are ultimately symbiotic to one another. To explain more, the sheer act of an object translating the outside world into its own terms IS all that makes an object into "an object" within the objective world. Due to how the only reason why the objects' own subjective perspective exist to begin with is because of their own existence, which roots itself on the objective reality. Meaning that both kinds of perspectives are needed for one another—they come in pairs and are causally united/simultaneous, so to speak. Both the subjective and the objective need each other in order to exist as one.

Not to mention that for an object to be affected and to know what that means to itself not only alters the subjective perspective of itself, but its objective self.

I suppose the conclusion is that an object needs both the existence seen from itself(subjective) and seen from outside of itself(objective) in order to exist. If it does not exist to itself ( = no subjective perspective), then "itself" is not there to begin with, and so "it" does not exist to begin with. Same goes with the case where it does not exist to the outer world. ( = no objective perspective)

As per your argument, I believe that the sensory of itself (= subjective experience) can happen at the same time as the sensory of the outer world(translating the objective to the subjective), neither preceding the other. This can be because they are both a part of a single act of sensory(=translation in general) that all object seems to have by nature.

But what about the potential for sensing of which the root of sensory experience in an organism would be 'sensing potential-in-effect'? Can it originate on either a subjective or objective level?

[GrayArea]

With regard your idea that consciousness can be explained by an inside-out functional 'translation' of an outer world, as if consciousness can be causally explained in a mechanistic way, it is not plausible in my opinion.

Thank you for your extensive, thought-out counterarguments. I will look into them after I make this reply.

But prior to this, I would just like to ask if you meant "consciousness" as a "1" or "2" (as described in the original post) on that quoted sentence. This is because my original post meant to convey that consciousness itself (Not what one is conscious of after gaining consciousness) is actually explained by neurons' translation of other neighboring neurons as opposed to them directly translating the outer world—or do you personally count these "other neurons" as a part of the "outer world" too?

My apologies for the late reply.

The topic and OP are very interesting and seem to be a basis for a valuable discussion on consciousness.

With regard your question.

It seems that you see 2 as merely 'self-awareness as an empirical feature', is that correct?

"My current theory as to how 2 arises is that a neuron cell naturally "translates" ANOTHER physically connected neuron cell just like it translates the red lightwave—except this time it leads to 2 instead of 1."

In that sense you would seem to assume that the translational activity provided by neurons by which 1 is performed (i.e. translating 'qualia' of the outer world into empirical awareness) would stand on its own and that it is merely required to explain the ability to become 'self-aware' as if that would be the ultimate fundamental question when it concerns consciousness.

In my opinion self-awareness is not the most fundamental question when it concerns consciousness. Therefore, in my opinion the description of 2 'The awareness itself' cannot be a 'product' of anything.

What would explain (as fundamental ground) the activity of neurons translating an outer world of qualia if not 'awareness itself'? It would seem nonsensical that such a process can be assumed to be the basis of 'awareness itself'.

Did you consider relevance of an a priori aspect as ground for 'awareness itself'? If not, why would it be logical that 1) neurons have developed and 2) that they perform as they do to 'produce' awareness? (what would be your explanation that neurons exist and perform?)

The neurons translating their outer world does not hold basis on anything I would say, because it is only driven by an object’s desire to be that object. It doesn’t apply to just the neurons.

Also more regarding your last paragraph, neurons were perhaps something that were inevitably bound to be created through sheer probability, since evolution kept itself going for millions of years.
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.
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Neurons do become aware of the outside environment as just individual neurons, yes. But ONLY after they become aware of themselves. And they cannot become aware of themselves without the help of other neurons.

That is to say, they can only become “aware” of the outside environment once they are “aware” of themselves “translating” the outside environment. Translation itself does not bring awareness. Or else—if they are not aware of themselves—they would simply be “reacting” to the outside environment like any other inanimate objects with only the translating capabilities and not self-awareness.

A neuron can translate other neurons outside of its physical self, simply by interacting with it. But just because it can do that, it does not mean that it is aware of itself. How will it accomplish this? A single neuron cannot accomplish that. Instead, it should actually be the brain that becomes aware of itself.

I’ve always believed that “awareness” is when an object translates ITSELF, not when it translates its outer environment. To translate the outer world is to perceive the outer world. To translate itself is then, therefore, to perceive itself.

Perhaps if all the neurons in a set group of neurons (which we call the brain) become aware of ONE ANOTHER, then that group of neurons could become aware of itself as a single entity, because each and every group of neurons translate each other (Or perhaps, translating what other neighboring neurons translate from itself.), which leads to those “each other” translating the each and every group of neurons, meaning that this “group of neurons” as a single entity has its components translating one another and being translated by one another (Overall like a snake biting its own tail)—therefore translating itself as a whole.

The original neuron #1 translates itself by first making the other neurons translate itself and then begin a cycle of translating that, eventually, leads to a neuron 2 affecting neuron 1 after a lot of translations. Of course, the information from neuron #1 is preserved throughout the translation. This is because when a post-synaptic neuron receives neurotransmitters from the pre-synaptic neuron, and lets out neurotransmitters of its own towards a different neuron(which then causes various results), the translated context of the neurons will still remain intact since the neurons’ translations are merely the “ways” in which they are affected, meaning that the “ways in which they send out information” according to “the ways in which they were affected” is all that matters (as long as the neurotransmitters and things that they cause are all solely caused by the specific “ways in which the neuron was affected” for every different instances of neural translation—which they are—therefore fully conveying the consequences of “in what way the neuron was affected”.), instead of having the same identical neurotransmitter from a single neuron go around every single neuron cell for consciousness to be created.

[GrayArea]

You seem to intend to imply that one can know that reality is real by inferring that one can be certain that one has 'conscious experience', as in René Descartes his assertion 'I think, therefore I am' (cogito, ergo sum). Is that correct?

Not entirely so, I’d say. Because even the process of thinking, or conscious experience, which one such as Descartes could argue proves our existence, has to be “real” to us first in order for it to happen. But one thing is for sure: What us humans—including you and I—perceive as “reality”, does exist, simply because there is a term for it, which is the word “reality”.

Your argument seems to be that the realness of reality is to be inferred from a moral obligation (ought) to 'do ones job' to perceive reality as it is perceived. It would be interesting but what would explain that moral ought?

It’s not much of a moral ought now that I think about it, but more of a description of human life that we have no choice but to inevitably follow, as long as we are living that human life. It is not what we choose—it is simply what we are.

How can this be said when you would consider 2 ('awareness itself') to arise from the translation activity of 'another neuron'?

You’re not entirely wrong—It can perhaps be said that awareness within the brain is both a product and the creator of the translational activity of another neuron, at the same time.

To start off, the brain controls the translational activity of neurons, because the neurons altogether create the brain, and since the reason why the neurons translate one another is because it is affected by another neuron.

So if the brain is the amalgamation of “all the pre-synaptic neurons that each activate another post-synaptic neuron to make them translate the pre-synaptic neurons”, then that makes the brain the creator of the translational activity of another neuron.

But at the same time, the brain is also the amalgamation of “all the post-synaptic neurons that translate all the other pre-synaptic neurons”. So at the same time, it is also the product of the translational activity of other neurons. Think of it as like the two sides of the same coin.

(Not to mention that all the neurons should act as both pre-synaptic neurons and post-synaptic neurons.)

From a third-person perspective, there is no awareness involved. It’s just the brain being able to control (and be the product of) the translational process of its neurons.

How does awareness play a role in all this, you may ask? All this also applies from the perspective of the aware brain itself. Awareness means self control from the perspective of the aware object, because all objects control themselves, and a self-aware object sees itself as an object too. So even from a self-aware / local perspective, the brain DOES control the translational activities of neurons as much as it is its PRODUCT. But the awareness itself technically does not.

Do you consider the mentioned 'non-mechanistic force' at the basis of 'translation activity of neurons' to be a potential option or a certain option? What would be the ground for either idea? And most importantly, what would be the origin of that non-mechanistic force? Could such a force lay within neurons (i.e. the individual organism)?

The origin of that non-mechanistic force would lie in an object’s ability to be able to choose which information to take in / translate from the outer world (at any time), and choose the way to react to that outer world. That is to say, it originates once more from the fact that an object / individual organism was SPECIFICALLY MADE to be what it is, just because it could be. And if you ask if that object had control over how it was specifically made, I would say it did. An object, during its creation, creates itself as much as its external forces do. That’s why “that specific object” is the one to be created to begin with, out of all other possible objects.


Let me know if you're wondering about anything else. I think that, based on the complex nature of the topic, I probably wouldn't be able to answer all questions in one go, even if I do try my best.

[GrayArea]

Second argument

If physical reality would precede conscious experience causally, how would it be logical that there is an experience at all? If the physical reality to be experienced would be 'known' beforehand there would fundamentally not be anything to experience so it would make no sense for consciousness to have arisen.

It would work if "to know" was equal to "to experience", perhaps? Or if both happened at the same time?

The implication of the idea that 'awareness itself' is produced by neuron activity is that the mentioned 'experience' would causally originate (be produced) by physical reality. In such a case, how can it be said that what is to be experienced cannot have been known beforehand, i.e. is not causally explainable?

If 'awareness itself' is to be produced by physical reality it seems to be impossible to escape causality and thus 'experience' could not potentiall achieve a quality that is non-deterministic. Do you disagree?

Neuron activity does causally originate from physical reality—and consciousness causally originates from the neuron activity. The neuron activity is only a half of what consciousness should be.

If I understood your question correctly, while neuron activity IS the physical reality, consciousness is NOT neuron activity.

What is to be experienced within consciousness cannot indeed have been known beforehand (before neural activity), because neurons are an aspect of physical reality that can become aware of itself, unlike all other aspects of physical reality that can translate the external world but not become aware of that translation (by translating itself).

I think the awareness itself had as much part in creating itself, as the physical reality did. Therefore, I do not completely think that our awareness is determined by the external world. Like I said in one of my previous replies in this thread—an object, during its creation, creates itself as much as its external forces do. That’s why “that specific object” is the one to be created to begin with, out of all other possible objects. This also applies to awareness, because when I say object, I just mean “an existing thing”, not purely physical.

Now, does this say that our awareness is governed by deterministic forces or not? I think it’s both at the same time. It has to be. Our awareness must require both its own existence and the external physical world in order to be created “as” its own existence.

[GrayArea]

Third argument

Subjective experience cannot have preceded the sense-data and that means that sensing must be primary.

Sensing requires something that cannot originate on a subjective level. The origin of consciousness therefore, cannot be subjective of nature.

I assume that your idea of "sensory" and my idea of "translation" are quite similar by definition. To sense is for an object to become affected and to know what that means to the object, isn't it?

Yes, but what would justify the assumption of sensing potential-in-effect by which the idea of neural activity can be considered a subjective origin of 'awareness itself'?

Do you see that there is a paradox when it concerns the explanation of that sensing potential relative to a life form or organism? The ability to sense an 'outer world' cannot logically have come from within.

Adding on, I suppose that subjectiveness is what decides the objectiveness and vice versa. They are ultimately symbiotic to one another. To explain more, the sheer act of an object translating the outside world into its own terms IS all that makes an object into "an object" within the objective world. Due to how the only reason why the objects' own subjective perspective exist to begin with is because of their own existence, which roots itself on the objective reality. Meaning that both kinds of perspectives are needed for one another—they come in pairs and are causally united/simultaneous, so to speak. Both the subjective and the objective need each other in order to exist as one.

Not to mention that for an object to be affected and to know what that means to itself not only alters the subjective perspective of itself, but its objective self.

I suppose the conclusion is that an object needs both the existence seen from itself(subjective) and seen from outside of itself(objective) in order to exist. If it does not exist to itself ( = no subjective perspective), then "itself" is not there to begin with, and so "it" does not exist to begin with. Same goes with the case where it does not exist to the outer world. ( = no objective perspective)

As per your argument, I believe that the sensory of itself (= subjective experience) can happen at the same time as the sensory of the outer world(translating the objective to the subjective), neither preceding the other. This can be because they are both a part of a single act of sensory(=translation in general) that all object seems to have by nature.

But what about the potential for sensing of which the root of sensory experience in an organism would be 'sensing potential-in-effect'? Can it originate on either a subjective or objective level?

There is a possibility that you may think of it all as a paradox, because where the “sensing” occurs (the sensing of the outer world by an object) is the infinitesimally thin in-between of the outer world and the object. It does seem like you are approaching this from an “either-this-or-that” perspective, that the ability to sense an outer world would have to come either from within or not within. And perhaps because of this, you see the “infinitesimally thin in-between” as something that is neither the outer world or the object. But personally, I see it as something that is both the outer world and the object. With that said, I would say your viewpoint is just as correct as mine, because the in-between can never fully be defined as the outer world OR the object. But we don't necessarily have to call this a paradox. A paradox is when we cannot choose between one point of view or the other. We can simply accept all involved viewpoints in order to fully fledge out the definitions. These viewpoints are but two sides of the same coin, if you will.