Cornelius Van Til famously writes in A Survey of Christian Epistemology (p.205):
Cornelius Van Til wrote:We must therefore give our opponents better treatment than they give us. We must point out to them that univocal reasoning itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we must meet our enemy on their own ground. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. The contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the basis of its own assumptions.A typical formulation of such a transcendental argument for God (or TAG) might go like this, lifted straight from Wikipedia's article on the same:
Wikipedia wrote: 1. God is a necessary precondition for logic and morality (because these are immaterial, yet real universals).The solution is to attack the first premise: that God is a necessary precondition for logic. This is the argument that presuppositionalists make in all kinds of different forms, and I submit that they are all putting the cart before the horse.
2. People depend upon logic and morality, showing that they depend upon the universal, immaterial, and abstract realities which could not exist in a materialist universe but presupposes (presumes) the existence of an immaterial and absolute God.
3. Therefore, God exists. If He didn't, we could not rely upon logic, reason, morality, and other absolute universals (which are required and assumed to live in this universe, let alone to debate), and could not exist in a materialist universe where there are no absolute standards or an absolute Lawgiver.
First, it is necessary for me to lay out what I mean when I say "the laws of logic." When I say this, I'm referring to the Aristotelian sort:
Identity (A = A, or something that exists, exists as what it is)
Excluded Middle (A v ¬A, or something is either itself or it is something else)
Non-Contradiction (¬(A ^ ¬A), or something can't be both itself and something else at the same time and in the same respect)
The presuppositionalist will say that these are actually laws of thought, and that in order for these things to be true, there must be a mind in which they obtain: God's. That by virtue of God's existence these things universally obtain.
I say that this is problematic, as mentioned before, because it puts the cart firmly before the horse. How could God be the foundation for anything at all without being God? In other words, doesn't it seem a necessary condition for God = God to be true before God can somehow make A = A to be true? But that is Identity: it seems as though identity is a necessary precondition for God to be God rather than the other way around!
The presuppositionalist might turn around and say that this is nonsense: God is a se, exists unto Himself, is not dependent on anything to exist by virtue of His aseity. But herein lies another riposte: I submit that God cannot exist a se because God is dependent on at least one thing transcendental to Himself: that which makes God, God (or limits God to being God and not from being not-God, however we want to phrase this).
Alvin Plantinga poses a little problem in his book, Does God Have a Nature?: we hold these two intuitions about God, that God has aseity and that God has absolute sovereignty. But these intuitions make a paradox when all that we do is we ask: could God have decided to have different properties?
The answer can't be "yes" (which would be the route where we agree with absolute sovereignty) as that also puts the cart before the horse: in order for God to have decided to have different properties "in the beginning" (and I don't mean temporally "the beginning," I just mean whatever "initial" properties God may have had) then God would have had to already have properties, such as the property of knowing what properties are possible to have, and the property of power to make it so. Put shortly, God couldn't have chosen His initial properties because the very act of choosing properties to have requires properties to already exist.
So God can't have absolute sovereignty: God's properties, at least initially, were beyond God's control, He couldn't help but to have those properties. But that means that God is relevantly dependent on something else, something transcendental to God: the thing that makes God God, and not anything else. That thing can't be God Himself (by way of the argument just above). So the presuppositionalist can no longer say that nothing is transcendental to God, because something has to be in order for God to be God in the first place.
Logic, or the "laws of logic," is one of those things that has to be transcendental to God. God is relevantly dependent on logic in order to be God and not the other way around. Thus God can't be the "foundation" or "source" of logic, and thus the Transcendental Argument for God fails before it ever gets off the ground.
--Richard Feynman