- June 15th, 2022, 4:11 pm
#414340
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"Illusionists don’t deny the existence of consciousness in the everyday sense. We don’t deny that creatures have conscious experiences of seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and smelling. We really do taste Marmite! What illusionists deny is that experiences involve awareness of non-physical, private mental qualities, presented like a show to some kind of inner observer. In other words, we deny that the Marmite taste is a private inner quality. There’s definitely a box, but there isn’t really a beetle in it!
On the illusionist’s view, conscious experience is essentially an informational process. Think of it like a news report rather than a theatrical show. Of course, this report isn’t in a human language – it’s in the brain’s internal language of neural signalling – and it’s not for the benefit of an ‘inner you’. Sensory systems pass their reports directly to the brain’s control systems, which generate the physiological, psychological and behavioural responses mentioned earlier. You – the person – are the sum of all this activity."
(Keith Frankish. In Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind, edited by Jack Symes. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. pp. 92-3)
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I too deny that "experiences involve awareness of non-physical…qualities," but I don't deny that they "involve awareness of…private mental qualities." (Note that I don't use "mental" and "(irreducibly) nonphysical" synonymously!)
It may be true that "conscious experience is essentially an informational process," but in any event it is obvious that it is essentially a (subjective) experiential process consisting in havings of (subjective) experiential qualities by subjects or undergoings of (subjective) experiential affections or passions by subjects.
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"So, illusionists reject the idea of an inner show, decked out with non-physical qualities, presented to an inner observer. That’s the kind of consciousness we do deny. However, some people think this is wrong; they say that these qualities are the very essence of consciousness! In fact, idealists go so far as to say that there is nothing else to the world: everything exists in the mind! According to this view, it’s the physical world which is illusory. Idealists deny the existence of consciousness as we illusionists conceive of it – they deny the existence of a physical brain! So, each of us could be accused of ‘denying consciousness’, but I don’t think it is a very profitable way of moving the debate forward. Let’s just say illusionists and their opponents disagree about what consciousness is and get on with working out who is right."
(Keith Frankish. In Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind, edited by Jack Symes. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. p. 93)
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The question is: Do illusionists and non-illusionists share the same concept of consciousness to begin with? When illusionists say "Consciousness exists" and non-illusionists say "Consciousness exists", are they referring to the same thing? No, they don't, since illusionist consciousness is non-phenomenal consciousness, whereas non-illusionist consciousness is phenomenal consciousness. So when illusionists use the term "consciousness" to refer to something that is different from what non-illusionists use it to refer to, then they are just talking past each other.
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"As we’ve seen, illusionists deny that consciousness is an inner show. Instead, we say that having conscious experiences involves processing information about the world. But that’s not the whole story. After all, we can do more than just experience the world around us; we can think about our experiences too. We can recognize our experience (‘it tastes like Marmite’), say whether we like it (‘absolutely’) and describe the experience to other people (‘you’ll probably hate it’)."
(Keith Frankish. In Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind, edited by Jack Symes. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. pp. 93-4)
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Thinking about tasting Marmite is an experiential property of subjects just like tasting Marmite!
Yes, "having conscious experiences involves processing information about the world"—"but that’s not the whole story" precisely because it also involves or consists in subjective experiencings and perceivings of the world through subjective experiences (qua appearances of the world).
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"The first thing to say is that illusionists don’t deny that we can be aware of our own experiences. Of course we can look inwards and introspect! However, we do hold that introspection misleads us about the nature of our experiences. As illusionists see it, introspection – like sense perception – depends on sub-personal mechanisms of reporting and reacting. It doesn’t involve an inner self which is experiencing non-physical qualities. Introspection is just another layer of information processing, this time directed onto other brain processes."
(Keith Frankish. In Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind, edited by Jack Symes. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. p. 94)
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Introspection is inner awareness of our own subjective experiences. Ned Block has defined phenomenal consciousness as subjective experience; so the illusionist denial of phenomenal consciousness entails the denial of subjective experience. But, astonishingly and puzzlingly, Frankish doesn't deny the existence of "our own experiences"; so it's unclear what he means by "experience". If Frankishian experience is nothing more than a purely functional-informational process, what's experiential about it, so that it deserves to be called experience?
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"Introspective mechanisms monitor the complex informational and reactive processes that make up our experiences and send information about them to the brain’s control systems."
(Keith Frankish. In Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind, edited by Jack Symes. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. p. 94)
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Once again, what's genuinely experiential about "our experiences" in his obscure sense of "experience"? It seems Frankishian experiences can be had by nonconscious zombie agents, being nothing more than ontologically objective "complex informational and reactive processes."
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"The result is that introspection systematically misleads us. Its impressionistic sub-personal reports on complex brain processes lead us to think that we have direct and infallible awareness of private mental qualities, but we don’t. This is the ‘illusion’ in illusionism."
(Keith Frankish. In Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind, edited by Jack Symes. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. p. 95)
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Our introspective awareness of our experiences may not be direct (I think it is), and it may not be infallible (I think it isn't); but the central point at issue is the very existence of subjective experience as such, i.e. whether there is anything to be introspectively aware of in the first place (I think there sure is).
However, even regarding the concept of introspection, illusionists and non-illusionists are talking past each other, since according to the former there are still "experiences" of which we are introspectively aware. But the introspectable "experiences" acknowledged by illusionists aren't experiences in the non-illusionistic sense of the term.
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"I have tried to give a sense of what illusionism is and why it’s worth taking seriously. Still, you may feel, it just can’t be right. The feel of things – the taste of Marmite, the pain of hunger, the guilt of lying to your partner – these can’t be just a matter of information. They’re too concrete, too vivid, too present! ‘They’re real, dammit!’
That’s a natural reaction – and one that is predicted by the illusionist theory itself. As we have seen, our judgements about our experiences will be compelling in just this way, since they are produced by mechanisms of which we have no awareness. I have given only a simplified sketch of the processes involved here, couched in metaphorical terms of reporting and such like. In reality, the full picture will be immensely complex, and it will take many years of scientific work to complete it. As we slowly fill in the picture – mapping the vast, intricate, multi-layered web of informational and reactive processes – the gap between the illusionist’s theory and our personal impression of what is happening will diminish. We just need to put the work in and be very patient."
(Keith Frankish. In Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind, edited by Jack Symes. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. p. 96)
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Well, I'm afraid we've reached the point where illusionists and non-illusionists can only agree to disagree.
"However, I’m open to the idea that certain radical forms of physicalism may be correct. One radical form of physicalism is illusionism, the idea that consciousness is just a physical illusion. I’m inclined to think that’s crazy, but nonetheless, I find it a very interesting idea. After all, who’s to say that I’m not in the grip of some strange illusion here and now?"
(David Chalmers. In Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind, edited by Jack Symes. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. p. 31)
I too "think that's crazy," but—pace Chalmers—I do not "find it a very interesting idea." Actually, I think it's a pretty silly idea.
"I am convinced that philosophical debate almost always ends in a deadlock[.]"
(Lewis, David. "Evil for Freedom's Sake." In Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy, 101-127. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 102)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars