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[Consul]

So the reality is that Consciousness is not only Not an Illusion, but it is absolutely Necessary for us to See. The Conscious Visual Experience is How we See. It cannot Logically be an Illusion. Take the Visual Experience away and the resultant Zombie would be Blind.

But (phenomenal) zombies could be capable of "blindsight", i.e. (phenomenally) nonconscious visual perception.

[SteveKlinko]

So the reality is that Consciousness is not only Not an Illusion, but it is absolutely Necessary for us to See. The Conscious Visual Experience is How we See. It cannot Logically be an Illusion. Take the Visual Experience away and the resultant Zombie would be Blind.

But (phenomenal) zombies could be capable of "blindsight", i.e. (phenomenally) nonconscious visual perception.

Yes, and how good is Blindsight? A person with only Blindsight would be very Handicapped, and would not be able to move around in the world with much ease.

[3017Metaphysician]

Thank you Steve for sharing your thoughts... . And thanks for quoting the original post (it's been a while thank you). In bullet point fashion my first reaction is, I'm thinking that there are still some challenges to overcome (for those who consider all concrete objects exclusive to all of reality).

* If the materialist considers all of reality concrete, how do they reconcile the obvious contradiction resulting from their own conclusion that one can experience an actual illusion? On the surface, it seems for them, believing in an illusion (that an illusion actually exists--and what all that means-- since illusions themselves are not material reality because they are not defined as such) inconsistent with their belief system?

* A visual experience consists of at least two existing precepts; the subject and the object. In both a mental and material world, the materialist's challenges include say, defining where cosmic singularity originated (material objects themselves), and explaining the material causes behind all human motivation (the phenomenon of all subjective experiences). For example what is it like to experience an experience (visual and non visual- think Hellen Keller here).

* If illusions then, themselves, are what they are defined as (are real only to the subject experiencing the illusion), it almost becomes tantamount to subjective idealism, which of course is a metaphysical principle. In spite of that, even if the mind and the human experience(s) can be quantified mathematically, then I think it still presents a 'meta-physical' challenge for the materialist since cognizing mathematics itself is a metaphysical exercise (a mentally abstract form of reality). And of course confers little to no biological survival advantages. Also, that does not include the quality distinctions ( versus quantity) of an individual having a subjective 'experience'. In other words, it doesn't capture the explanation of the full sentient human experience or phenomena (the feeling of experiencing an experience).


Those are just some random thoughts that first came to mind. Please feel free to educate me on the tenets of what it means to have an actual experience associated with the Conscious Visual Experience... , as I'm not familiar with that.

Slightly off topic, this discussion is inspiring me to start a thread on human causation. Meaning, what actually causes a human to be or become a some-thing (kind of like the why is there something and not nothing debate, only with a subjective/metaphysical/propagation twist).

A lot of Materialists like to say Consciousness is an Illusion. In my way of thinking they are just saying that they are having a Conscious Experience when they say it is an Illusion. You are correct, they cannot reconcile these Conscious Experiences they have with their Materialist Beliefs. The only strategy they have is to go further and say that not only is Conscious Experience an Illusion but that it does not even really exist. When you confront them with the obvious Incoherence of that they will just smugly and with a grin say that you are just not thinking properly about Conscious Experience. They will not listen when I tell them my argument that the Conscious Visual Experience is the next stage in the Processing after the Neural Activity.

If you would like to see more of my thinking about Consciousness, Light, and the Visual Experience please visit https://TheInterMind.com, to specifically read something on the Visual Experience and the Conscious Light Screen visit https://TheInterMind.com/#ConsciousLightScreen

Steve!

...yeah, it's kind of funny since if a materialist were to argue that their own Conscious Experiences are illusions, does that mean that they themselves don't really exist? And/or which parts exist and which parts don't exist(?)

I wonder what a materialist would say to the fact that their own reason to live (and not die by suicide, etc. or for some other reason/their 'Schopenhauer' Will) is not an exclusive material phenomenon? Similarly, I don't think they could make a case for ONLY genetically coded emergence or instinct because human consciousness includes features such as self-awareness, intellect, sentience and volition... . Certainly, if one didn't include those exiting features of human mental phenomena in such a theory, then a convincing case could be made.

Material things are mostly just means-to-ends. The aesthetical world of objects (think Kant of course) is just a medium for sentient existence and human purpose (say, as a means to ultimately seek happiness/pleasure and avoid pain as well as propagate the species/ the Will). Kind of like the camera being invented/used by humans to keepsake a photograph for one's own purposes of happiness and pleasure. The lists of material objects and inventions that are just used for a greater purpose are endless (beautiful/ugly houses, cars, clothes, cosmetics, computers, nature, Einsteinian music of the spheres, the cosmos/nature, ad nauseum...) . And of course, kind of like the use mathematics itself (materially purposefull?). LOL

On a broader scale of things, one obvious danger to the either/or approach to 'all of reality' (AKA dichotomizing the explanations of reality or even all mental phenomena), is that denying the meta-physical elements becomes then a kind of political exercise in rhetorical extremism and human finitude (AKA far right/far-left).

I will definitely check-out the link Steve, and report back any other possibilities... . Thank you.

[Sy Borg]

...yeah, it's kind of funny since if a materialist were to argue that their own Conscious Experiences are illusions, does that mean that they themselves don't really exist? And/or which parts exist and which parts don't exist(?)

I am not a materialist per se, but close enough, and I think it's lazy to consider real phenomena as illusory. The phenomenal process of consciousness is as much a part of reality as the phenomenon of digestion or respiration. It's just the processing of information, processing energy and processing fine amounts of immediately absorbed energy respectively.

When you scratch the surface of the arguments, the argument tends to end up seeing the self as an illusion. I'd disagree again - the self is temporal and dynamic rather than solid and stable, but that does not make it unreal.

I wonder what a materialist would say to the fact that their own reason to live (and not die by suicide, etc. or for some other reason/their 'Schopenhauer' Will) is not an exclusive material phenomenon? Similarly, I don't think they could make a case for ONLY genetically coded emergence or instinct because human consciousness includes features such as self-awareness, intellect, sentience and volition... . Certainly, if one didn't include those exiting features of human mental phenomena in such a theory, then a convincing case could be made.

Those qualities aren't so special. Numerous animals display those qualities in varying degrees, aside from intellect, although plenty of intelligent mammal species build local bodies of knowledge that they pass down generations.

The reason not to commit suicide is that it's awful. Imagine trying to do it. Wouldn't you find the leadup to be terrifying and disturbing? Not to mention extremely painful in most cases. Further, suicide would horrify family and friends, even workmates and acquaintances, and leave an unpleasant legacy.

Nah, for most of us, terminal illness or extreme irretrievable losses are the only reasonable rationale to take one's own life.

Material things are mostly just means-to-ends. The aesthetical world of objects (think Kant of course) is just a medium for sentient existence and human purpose (say, as a means to ultimately seek happiness/pleasure and avoid pain as well as propagate the species/ the Will).

Absolutely not! Life is not just about humans!!

There is an entire biosphere and we are all in this together, even humans who forget their roots, putting aside their "embarrassing" heritage like locking an idiot bastard under the staircase. When my creationist Mum was alive she would say indignantly, "I did NOT come from an ape!".

No Mum, you ARE an ape. Deal with it :)

On a broader scale of things, one obvious danger to the either/or approach to 'all of reality' (AKA dichotomizing the explanations of reality or even all mental phenomena), is that denying the meta-physical elements becomes then a kind of political exercise in rhetorical extremism and human finitude (AKA far right/far-left).

Ignore the politics. Follow the evidence. Denying metaphysical elements stems from a lack of evidence, aside from that which is anecdotal, apocryphal or even wildly inaccurate. The problem with the politicisation you mentioned is that too many on each side of the argument are too quick to settle their views based on the first set of evidence/ideas that seem to confirm their claims.

[Belindi]

Sy Borg wrote:

I am not a materialist per se, but close enough, and I think it's lazy to consider real phenomena as illusory. The phenomenal process of consciousness is as much a part of reality as the phenomenon of digestion or respiration. It's just the processing of information, processing energy and processing fine amounts of immediately absorbed energy respectively.

When you scratch the surface of the arguments, the argument tends to end up seeing the self as an illusion. I'd disagree again - the self is temporal and dynamic rather than solid and stable, but that does not make it unreal.

For an absolute idealist the self is created or constructed by mind as is all of science and all quanta of information. There are no "things in themselves" but there is a plenum of possibility which remains inert until some living experiencer of any species creates quanta or actual phenomena. An absolute idealist doesn't think of information as being 'out there' pending its transmission.

Mind you, Sy Borg, I have to work quite hard to keep alive my intellectual faith in absolute idealism. For instance last night I saw a TV programme presented by physicist Jim Al-Khalili who showed us photos of an adorable microscopic wasp who is so small he fast- paddles through the thick air as we'd paddle through liquid. Such revelations are seductive for me trying not to be a materialist.

[SteveKlinko]

A lot of Materialists like to say Consciousness is an Illusion.

As far as I can see, illusionism (as a form of eliminativism) about phenomenal consciousness is a minority view among materialists.

Could be, but within the group of Materialists that like to write books and talk about it, there are way more that are likely to be Illusionists.

[SteveKlinko]

Thank you Steve for sharing your thoughts... . And thanks for quoting the original post (it's been a while thank you). In bullet point fashion my first reaction is, I'm thinking that there are still some challenges to overcome (for those who consider all concrete objects exclusive to all of reality).

* If the materialist considers all of reality concrete, how do they reconcile the obvious contradiction resulting from their own conclusion that one can experience an actual illusion? On the surface, it seems for them, believing in an illusion (that an illusion actually exists--and what all that means-- since illusions themselves are not material reality because they are not defined as such) inconsistent with their belief system?

* A visual experience consists of at least two existing precepts; the subject and the object. In both a mental and material world, the materialist's challenges include say, defining where cosmic singularity originated (material objects themselves), and explaining the material causes behind all human motivation (the phenomenon of all subjective experiences). For example what is it like to experience an experience (visual and non visual- think Hellen Keller here).

* If illusions then, themselves, are what they are defined as (are real only to the subject experiencing the illusion), it almost becomes tantamount to subjective idealism, which of course is a metaphysical principle. In spite of that, even if the mind and the human experience(s) can be quantified mathematically, then I think it still presents a 'meta-physical' challenge for the materialist since cognizing mathematics itself is a metaphysical exercise (a mentally abstract form of reality). And of course confers little to no biological survival advantages. Also, that does not include the quality distinctions ( versus quantity) of an individual having a subjective 'experience'. In other words, it doesn't capture the explanation of the full sentient human experience or phenomena (the feeling of experiencing an experience).


Those are just some random thoughts that first came to mind. Please feel free to educate me on the tenets of what it means to have an actual experience associated with the Conscious Visual Experience... , as I'm not familiar with that.

Slightly off topic, this discussion is inspiring me to start a thread on human causation. Meaning, what actually causes a human to be or become a some-thing (kind of like the why is there something and not nothing debate, only with a subjective/metaphysical/propagation twist).

A lot of Materialists like to say Consciousness is an Illusion. In my way of thinking they are just saying that they are having a Conscious Experience when they say it is an Illusion. You are correct, they cannot reconcile these Conscious Experiences they have with their Materialist Beliefs. The only strategy they have is to go further and say that not only is Conscious Experience an Illusion but that it does not even really exist. When you confront them with the obvious Incoherence of that they will just smugly and with a grin say that you are just not thinking properly about Conscious Experience. They will not listen when I tell them my argument that the Conscious Visual Experience is the next stage in the Processing after the Neural Activity.

If you would like to see more of my thinking about Consciousness, Light, and the Visual Experience please visit https://TheInterMind.com, to specifically read something on the Visual Experience and the Conscious Light Screen visit https://TheInterMind.com/#ConsciousLightScreen

Steve!

...yeah, it's kind of funny since if a materialist were to argue that their own Conscious Experiences are illusions, does that mean that they themselves don't really exist? And/or which parts exist and which parts don't exist(?)

I wonder what a materialist would say to the fact that their own reason to live (and not die by suicide, etc. or for some other reason/their 'Schopenhauer' Will) is not an exclusive material phenomenon? Similarly, I don't think they could make a case for ONLY genetically coded emergence or instinct because human consciousness includes features such as self-awareness, intellect, sentience and volition... . Certainly, if one didn't include those exiting features of human mental phenomena in such a theory, then a convincing case could be made.

Material things are mostly just means-to-ends. The aesthetical world of objects (think Kant of course) is just a medium for sentient existence and human purpose (say, as a means to ultimately seek happiness/pleasure and avoid pain as well as propagate the species/ the Will). Kind of like the camera being invented/used by humans to keepsake a photograph for one's own purposes of happiness and pleasure. The lists of material objects and inventions that are just used for a greater purpose are endless (beautiful/ugly houses, cars, clothes, cosmetics, computers, nature, Einsteinian music of the spheres, the cosmos/nature, ad nauseum...) . And of course, kind of like the use mathematics itself (materially purposefull?). LOL

On a broader scale of things, one obvious danger to the either/or approach to 'all of reality' (AKA dichotomizing the explanations of reality or even all mental phenomena), is that denying the meta-physical elements becomes then a kind of political exercise in rhetorical extremism and human finitude (AKA far right/far-left).

I will definitely check-out the link Steve, and report back any other possibilities... . Thank you.

I agree with what you say. Let me know if you have any questions about the website. Thank You.

[Sy Borg]

Sy Borg wrote:

I am not a materialist per se, but close enough, and I think it's lazy to consider real phenomena as illusory. The phenomenal process of consciousness is as much a part of reality as the phenomenon of digestion or respiration. It's just the processing of information, processing energy and processing fine amounts of immediately absorbed energy respectively.

When you scratch the surface of the arguments, the argument tends to end up seeing the self as an illusion. I'd disagree again - the self is temporal and dynamic rather than solid and stable, but that does not make it unreal.

For an absolute idealist the self is created or constructed by mind as is all of science and all quanta of information. There are no "things in themselves" but there is a plenum of possibility which remains inert until some living experiencer of any species creates quanta or actual phenomena. An absolute idealist doesn't think of information as being 'out there' pending its transmission.

Mind you, Sy Borg, I have to work quite hard to keep alive my intellectual faith in absolute idealism. For instance last night I saw a TV programme presented by physicist Jim Al-Khalili who showed us photos of an adorable microscopic wasp who is so small he fast- paddles through the thick air as we'd paddle through liquid. Such revelations are seductive for me trying not to be a materialist.

Yes, the fairyfly is an awesome little beast! Like all very tiny wasps, it's a parasite.

The delineation of the self is based on pragmatic materialism. The entity called Belinda does not stop at the skin. She is surrounded by an EM field and a "microbial cloud", each of which is unique to her. Yet, by law and convention, Belinda ends at the skin, the parts that can feel pain.

[Belindi]

I think my dog knows my microbial cloud and/or my EM field. I hope the plants in my garden know my microbial cloud and/or my EM field, as I respect them including my nettles that nurse crops of butterflies. Now you have informed me I know microbial cloud and EM field cognitively, which is better than not knowing because it adds evidence to the contention that delineation is man- made and intersubjective.

Fairy wasps are especially interesting as they show how surface area relates to possible size limits that apply to all life forms and their adaptations. All life forms in order to exist must fit with physical laws . And so science is so impressively coherent that it's really not surprising that absolute idealism is unfashionable.

Regarding imperative physical laws , polytheism makes more sense morally and psychologically than theism .

[3017Metaphysician]

* If the materialist considers all of reality concrete, how do they reconcile the obvious contradiction resulting from their own conclusion that one can experience an actual illusion? On the surface, it seems for them, believing in an illusion (that an illusion actually exists--and what all that means-- since illusions themselves are not material reality because they are not defined as such) inconsistent with their belief system?

I'm not a "materialist" but perhaps close enough to answer.

The answer is that, indeed, illusions are material in that they can only exist in the context of a physical substrate (a brained body).

* A visual experience consists of at least two existing precepts; the subject and the object. In both a mental and material world, the materialist's challenges include say, defining where cosmic singularity originated (material objects themselves), and explaining the material causes behind all human motivation (the phenomenon of all subjective experiences). For example what is it like to experience an experience (visual and non visual- think Hellen Keller here).

In humans visible light consists of photons of a wavelength between 400THz (red) and 790THz (violent). Many animals can visually perceive ultraviolet and infra-red light. Humans perceive all frequencies from infra-red upwards as heat (lower frequencies tend to simply pass though us).

The main reason (aside from having eyes) that visible light is not usually thought of in terms of temperature is that infra-red is far more dominant in the environment than higher frequencies, so we routinely receive enough of those frequencies to feel them. By contrast, ultra-violet is a higher frequency and thus far hotter, but it is also vastly less prevalent in our environment. If it was, life on Earth could not survive.

* If illusions then, themselves, are what they are defined as (are real only to the subject experiencing the illusion), it almost becomes tantamount to subjective idealism, which of course is a metaphysical principle. In spite of that, even if the mind and the human experience(s) can be quantified mathematically, then I think it still presents a 'meta-physical' challenge for the materialist since cognizing mathematics itself is a metaphysical exercise (a mentally abstract form of reality). And of course confers little to no biological survival advantages. Also, that does not include the quality distinctions ( versus quantity) of an individual having a subjective 'experience'. In other words, it doesn't capture the explanation of the full sentient human experience or phenomena (the feeling of experiencing an experience).

This seems like a long way of saying that the answer to Chalmers's hard problem of consciousness remains elusive.

Cognising relative quantities, aka mathematics, is certainly naturally selected. Numerous species can count, including "gorillas, rhesus, capuchin, and squirrel monkeys, lemurs, dolphins, elephants, birds, salamanders and fish". (Google)

Dogs might not count, as such, but they certainly know the difference if they receive fewer treats than another. Social species need to keep track of favours so that some members of a group are doing all the giving while others just take.

Thank you Sy Borg!

Do you think that when the materialist claims that consciousness is an 'illusion', is that considered a euphemism for the meta-physical? For example, when you dichotomized the answer (your answer) by correctly assigning, only one piece to the puzzle, as a" physical substrate" (which we can all agree on), you forgot to assign the second piece as meta-physical (i.e., the color red, sentience, Will, intentionality, love, etc. etc..).

[JackDaydream]

* If the materialist considers all of reality concrete, how do they reconcile the obvious contradiction resulting from their own conclusion that one can experience an actual illusion? On the surface, it seems for them, believing in an illusion (that an illusion actually exists--and what all that means-- since illusions themselves are not material reality because they are not defined as such) inconsistent with their belief system?

I'm not a "materialist" but perhaps close enough to answer.

The answer is that, indeed, illusions are material in that they can only exist in the context of a physical substrate (a brained body).

* A visual experience consists of at least two existing precepts; the subject and the object. In both a mental and material world, the materialist's challenges include say, defining where cosmic singularity originated (material objects themselves), and explaining the material causes behind all human motivation (the phenomenon of all subjective experiences). For example what is it like to experience an experience (visual and non visual- think Hellen Keller here).

In humans visible light consists of photons of a wavelength between 400THz (red) and 790THz (violent). Many animals can visually perceive ultraviolet and infra-red light. Humans perceive all frequencies from infra-red upwards as heat (lower frequencies tend to simply pass though us).

The main reason (aside from having eyes) that visible light is not usually thought of in terms of temperature is that infra-red is far more dominant in the environment than higher frequencies, so we routinely receive enough of those frequencies to feel them. By contrast, ultra-violet is a higher frequency and thus far hotter, but it is also vastly less prevalent in our environment. If it was, life on Earth could not survive.

* If illusions then, themselves, are what they are defined as (are real only to the subject experiencing the illusion), it almost becomes tantamount to subjective idealism, which of course is a metaphysical principle. In spite of that, even if the mind and the human experience(s) can be quantified mathematically, then I think it still presents a 'meta-physical' challenge for the materialist since cognizing mathematics itself is a metaphysical exercise (a mentally abstract form of reality). And of course confers little to no biological survival advantages. Also, that does not include the quality distinctions ( versus quantity) of an individual having a subjective 'experience'. In other words, it doesn't capture the explanation of the full sentient human experience or phenomena (the feeling of experiencing an experience).

This seems like a long way of saying that the answer to Chalmers's hard problem of consciousness remains elusive.

Cognising relative quantities, aka mathematics, is certainly naturally selected. Numerous species can count, including "gorillas, rhesus, capuchin, and squirrel monkeys, lemurs, dolphins, elephants, birds, salamanders and fish". (Google)

Dogs might not count, as such, but they certainly know the difference if they receive fewer treats than another. Social species need to keep track of favours so that some members of a group are doing all the giving while others just take.

Thank you Sy Borg!

Do you think that when the materialist claims that consciousness is an 'illusion', is that considered a euphemism for the meta-physical? For example, when you dichotomized the answer (your answer) by correctly assigning, only one piece to the puzzle, as a" physical substrate" (which we can all agree on), you forgot to assign the second piece as meta-physical (i.e., the color red, sentience, Will, intentionality, love, etc. etc..).

Hello, I am glad to see you back after a while. It does seem that metaphysics is often being dismissed in philosophy. Even from the materialist perspective, it all ideas are aspects of evolutionary consciousness there doesn't seem to be a way of accounting for way in which ideas, including love, time, happiness and Will arise in all cultures. The languages vary and the specifics of the ideas are different according to geographical and historical contexts but most conceptual ideas seem to exist universally. It does suggest some aspect of consciousness which has inherent archetypal ideas. This, from my point of view, does suggest some underlying basis for metaphysics.

[Sy Borg]

* If the materialist considers all of reality concrete, how do they reconcile the obvious contradiction resulting from their own conclusion that one can experience an actual illusion? On the surface, it seems for them, believing in an illusion (that an illusion actually exists--and what all that means-- since illusions themselves are not material reality because they are not defined as such) inconsistent with their belief system?

I'm not a "materialist" but perhaps close enough to answer.

The answer is that, indeed, illusions are material in that they can only exist in the context of a physical substrate (a brained body).

* A visual experience consists of at least two existing precepts; the subject and the object. In both a mental and material world, the materialist's challenges include say, defining where cosmic singularity originated (material objects themselves), and explaining the material causes behind all human motivation (the phenomenon of all subjective experiences). For example what is it like to experience an experience (visual and non visual- think Hellen Keller here).

In humans visible light consists of photons of a wavelength between 400THz (red) and 790THz (violent). Many animals can visually perceive ultraviolet and infra-red light. Humans perceive all frequencies from infra-red upwards as heat (lower frequencies tend to simply pass though us).

The main reason (aside from having eyes) that visible light is not usually thought of in terms of temperature is that infra-red is far more dominant in the environment than higher frequencies, so we routinely receive enough of those frequencies to feel them. By contrast, ultra-violet is a higher frequency and thus far hotter, but it is also vastly less prevalent in our environment. If it was, life on Earth could not survive.

* If illusions then, themselves, are what they are defined as (are real only to the subject experiencing the illusion), it almost becomes tantamount to subjective idealism, which of course is a metaphysical principle. In spite of that, even if the mind and the human experience(s) can be quantified mathematically, then I think it still presents a 'meta-physical' challenge for the materialist since cognizing mathematics itself is a metaphysical exercise (a mentally abstract form of reality). And of course confers little to no biological survival advantages. Also, that does not include the quality distinctions ( versus quantity) of an individual having a subjective 'experience'. In other words, it doesn't capture the explanation of the full sentient human experience or phenomena (the feeling of experiencing an experience).

This seems like a long way of saying that the answer to Chalmers's hard problem of consciousness remains elusive.

Cognising relative quantities, aka mathematics, is certainly naturally selected. Numerous species can count, including "gorillas, rhesus, capuchin, and squirrel monkeys, lemurs, dolphins, elephants, birds, salamanders and fish". (Google)

Dogs might not count, as such, but they certainly know the difference if they receive fewer treats than another. Social species need to keep track of favours so that some members of a group are doing all the giving while others just take.

Thank you Sy Borg!

Do you think that when the materialist claims that consciousness is an 'illusion', is that considered a euphemism for the meta-physical? For example, when you dichotomized the answer (your answer) by correctly assigning, only one piece to the puzzle, as a" physical substrate" (which we can all agree on), you forgot to assign the second piece as meta-physical (i.e., the color red, sentience, Will, intentionality, love, etc. etc..).

Might this be a matter of language? What some call metaphysics, I would call "information" or "undiscovered physics". Metaphysics looks to me like a black box for the unknown, just as some use God as a black box for phenomena not understood.

At this stage I lean tentatively towards neuroscientist, Christof Koch's interpretation of IIT, simplified in this article:

https://medium.com/top-down-or-bottom-u ... e416ff344a

It's basically soft panpsychism, which does not treat consciousness as a "thing" but a continuum. Certainly not illusory. The self and the ego, however, are rather more ephemeral and deceptive. Perhaps pundits sometimes conflate consciousness with aspects of the self?

I also question (and much more strongly) the casual terming of biology as "life", and everything else as "non-living". This is a biocentric view, based on the difference between a living being and a corpse. The "life" has gone.

However, failing annihilation via explosions or extreme radiation, life continues after death, only in a less integrated manner. As our gut bacteria run out of food they start eating the gut lining and work outwards. As body systems shut down, many cell and microbe communities die, overrun by bacteria, fungi and viruses that would have otherwise been controlled by macrophages. I also see galaxies, stars and planets as living entities, just that their lives have a different general configuration to those biological entities. Again, their exclusion is biocentric, as though the only possible model of life must involve cells, DNA and a hungry metabolism.

[Belindi]

Thanks, Sy Borg, for the link

At this stage I lean tentatively towards neuroscientist, Christof Koch's interpretation of IIT, simplified in this article:

https://medium.com/top-down-or-bottom-u ... e416ff344a

There is an element of Sartre in the passages about intentionality as defining consciousness, even although I guess Sartre did not discuss livers or other components of living bodies in the context of consciousness.

Panpsychism is on the table however psyches can't attach to things such as quantities of H2O that lack intentionality. Can it?

The "Whole" and associated comments about integration of information chime nicely with Spinozan necessity , and hard determinism. We aren't fatalists : the future does not exist yet and this fact shows the difference between e.g. a quantity of H2O and some other entity( liver, tree, toadstool, human)that unlike the glass of H2O does have a care to the future.

The other theme that also accords with Spinozan ontology is the connection between physical brain and mental mind. Spinoza said the mind is the idea of the body, thus showing what the connection is between mind(or 'consciousness') and brain(or body proper+ brain). The connection is indissoluble so we know that consciousness (or 'mind') implies environment (or brain and body proper and so forth to commensal organisms to breathable air and food supplies).

[3017Metaphysician]

* If the materialist considers all of reality concrete, how do they reconcile the obvious contradiction resulting from their own conclusion that one can experience an actual illusion? On the surface, it seems for them, believing in an illusion (that an illusion actually exists--and what all that means-- since illusions themselves are not material reality because they are not defined as such) inconsistent with their belief system?

I'm not a "materialist" but perhaps close enough to answer.

The answer is that, indeed, illusions are material in that they can only exist in the context of a physical substrate (a brained body).

* A visual experience consists of at least two existing precepts; the subject and the object. In both a mental and material world, the materialist's challenges include say, defining where cosmic singularity originated (material objects themselves), and explaining the material causes behind all human motivation (the phenomenon of all subjective experiences). For example what is it like to experience an experience (visual and non visual- think Hellen Keller here).

In humans visible light consists of photons of a wavelength between 400THz (red) and 790THz (violent). Many animals can visually perceive ultraviolet and infra-red light. Humans perceive all frequencies from infra-red upwards as heat (lower frequencies tend to simply pass though us).

The main reason (aside from having eyes) that visible light is not usually thought of in terms of temperature is that infra-red is far more dominant in the environment than higher frequencies, so we routinely receive enough of those frequencies to feel them. By contrast, ultra-violet is a higher frequency and thus far hotter, but it is also vastly less prevalent in our environment. If it was, life on Earth could not survive.

* If illusions then, themselves, are what they are defined as (are real only to the subject experiencing the illusion), it almost becomes tantamount to subjective idealism, which of course is a metaphysical principle. In spite of that, even if the mind and the human experience(s) can be quantified mathematically, then I think it still presents a 'meta-physical' challenge for the materialist since cognizing mathematics itself is a metaphysical exercise (a mentally abstract form of reality). And of course confers little to no biological survival advantages. Also, that does not include the quality distinctions ( versus quantity) of an individual having a subjective 'experience'. In other words, it doesn't capture the explanation of the full sentient human experience or phenomena (the feeling of experiencing an experience).

This seems like a long way of saying that the answer to Chalmers's hard problem of consciousness remains elusive.

Cognising relative quantities, aka mathematics, is certainly naturally selected. Numerous species can count, including "gorillas, rhesus, capuchin, and squirrel monkeys, lemurs, dolphins, elephants, birds, salamanders and fish". (Google)

Dogs might not count, as such, but they certainly know the difference if they receive fewer treats than another. Social species need to keep track of favours so that some members of a group are doing all the giving while others just take.

Thank you Sy Borg!

Do you think that when the materialist claims that consciousness is an 'illusion', is that considered a euphemism for the meta-physical? For example, when you dichotomized the answer (your answer) by correctly assigning, only one piece to the puzzle, as a" physical substrate" (which we can all agree on), you forgot to assign the second piece as meta-physical (i.e., the color red, sentience, Will, intentionality, love, etc. etc..).

Hello, I am glad to see you back after a while. It does seem that metaphysics is often being dismissed in philosophy. Even from the materialist perspective, it all ideas are aspects of evolutionary consciousness there doesn't seem to be a way of accounting for way in which ideas, including love, time, happiness and Will arise in all cultures. The languages vary and the specifics of the ideas are different according to geographical and historical contexts but most conceptual ideas seem to exist universally. It does suggest some aspect of consciousness which has inherent archetypal ideas. This, from my point of view, does suggest some underlying basis for metaphysics.

Hello Jack!

Thank you. Actually, when you think about it, (in consciousness) not only is the discourse much about discouraging the either/or approach (instead of embracing the appropriate both/and) consciousness is both material and immaterial. But what we are left with is the question over primacy. For instance, "St. Thomas, the Intellectualist, had argued that the intellect in man is prior to the will because the intellect determines the will, since we can desire only what we know. Scotus, the Voluntarist, replied that the will determines what ideas the intellect turns to, and thus in the end determines what the intellect comes to know."

In that case it's a little of both working together (subjective sentience/feeling and objective logic/intellect). It's all a matter of degree.

To this end, given that the feeling of human Will (for happiness, purpose, Being, etc.) is metaphysical, I would argue that the metaphysical takes primacy in human causation. In other words, what primarily causes human behavior (why do we do the things that we do)? Is it because we want to feel a something? What is that something?

Even if it's emergent instinct, the mysterious explanations of genetically coded anthropic conditions are partially beyond the physical because of our self-awareness and volition (we don't act on instinct alone). Our human motivations are different. It's called one's quality of life (quality over quantity). And so we are left with what it is that causes us to want to live and be a somebody? We typically want to feel pleasure and avoid pain, whatever that may be.

The short, the two part question there is: either/or, or both/and? And also, which takes primacy? Or, does it also depend on the happenstance? In discussing behavioral features of human consciousness and causation, I would consider the primacy of quality over quantity. Is quality metaphysical? What would it look like if we didn't have quality?

[3017Metaphysician]

* If the materialist considers all of reality concrete, how do they reconcile the obvious contradiction resulting from their own conclusion that one can experience an actual illusion? On the surface, it seems for them, believing in an illusion (that an illusion actually exists--and what all that means-- since illusions themselves are not material reality because they are not defined as such) inconsistent with their belief system?

I'm not a "materialist" but perhaps close enough to answer.

The answer is that, indeed, illusions are material in that they can only exist in the context of a physical substrate (a brained body).

* A visual experience consists of at least two existing precepts; the subject and the object. In both a mental and material world, the materialist's challenges include say, defining where cosmic singularity originated (material objects themselves), and explaining the material causes behind all human motivation (the phenomenon of all subjective experiences). For example what is it like to experience an experience (visual and non visual- think Hellen Keller here).

In humans visible light consists of photons of a wavelength between 400THz (red) and 790THz (violent). Many animals can visually perceive ultraviolet and infra-red light. Humans perceive all frequencies from infra-red upwards as heat (lower frequencies tend to simply pass though us).

The main reason (aside from having eyes) that visible light is not usually thought of in terms of temperature is that infra-red is far more dominant in the environment than higher frequencies, so we routinely receive enough of those frequencies to feel them. By contrast, ultra-violet is a higher frequency and thus far hotter, but it is also vastly less prevalent in our environment. If it was, life on Earth could not survive.

* If illusions then, themselves, are what they are defined as (are real only to the subject experiencing the illusion), it almost becomes tantamount to subjective idealism, which of course is a metaphysical principle. In spite of that, even if the mind and the human experience(s) can be quantified mathematically, then I think it still presents a 'meta-physical' challenge for the materialist since cognizing mathematics itself is a metaphysical exercise (a mentally abstract form of reality). And of course confers little to no biological survival advantages. Also, that does not include the quality distinctions ( versus quantity) of an individual having a subjective 'experience'. In other words, it doesn't capture the explanation of the full sentient human experience or phenomena (the feeling of experiencing an experience).

This seems like a long way of saying that the answer to Chalmers's hard problem of consciousness remains elusive.

Cognising relative quantities, aka mathematics, is certainly naturally selected. Numerous species can count, including "gorillas, rhesus, capuchin, and squirrel monkeys, lemurs, dolphins, elephants, birds, salamanders and fish". (Google)

Dogs might not count, as such, but they certainly know the difference if they receive fewer treats than another. Social species need to keep track of favours so that some members of a group are doing all the giving while others just take.

Thank you Sy Borg!

Do you think that when the materialist claims that consciousness is an 'illusion', is that considered a euphemism for the meta-physical? For example, when you dichotomized the answer (your answer) by correctly assigning, only one piece to the puzzle, as a" physical substrate" (which we can all agree on), you forgot to assign the second piece as meta-physical (i.e., the color red, sentience, Will, intentionality, love, etc. etc..).

Might this be a matter of language? What some call metaphysics, I would call "information" or "undiscovered physics". Metaphysics looks to me like a black box for the unknown, just as some use God as a black box for phenomena not understood.

At this stage I lean tentatively towards neuroscientist, Christof Koch's interpretation of IIT, simplified in this article:

https://medium.com/top-down-or-bottom-u ... e416ff344a

It's basically soft panpsychism, which does not treat consciousness as a "thing" but a continuum. Certainly not illusory. The self and the ego, however, are rather more ephemeral and deceptive. Perhaps pundits sometimes conflate consciousness with aspects of the self?

I also question (and much more strongly) the casual terming of biology as "life", and everything else as "non-living". This is a biocentric view, based on the difference between a living being and a corpse. The "life" has gone.

However, failing annihilation via explosions or extreme radiation, life continues after death, only in a less integrated manner. As our gut bacteria run out of food they start eating the gut lining and work outwards. As body systems shut down, many cell and microbe communities die, overrun by bacteria, fungi and viruses that would have otherwise been controlled by macrophages. I also see galaxies, stars and planets as living entities, just that their lives have a different general configuration to those biological entities. Again, their exclusion is biocentric, as though the only possible model of life must involve cells, DNA and a hungry metabolism.

Sy Borg!

Thank you for that. I'm just getting back in the saddle so I need time to research some stuff. I just wanted to say that your use of the word concepts of 'information' and 'undiscovered physics' is very intriguing. I think the notion of 'information' most of us embrace on many levels with few exceptions. Whether it's cosmological black holes or human consciousness, 'information' does seem to be at the heart of the equation. As such, the rub is higher level mathematical equations/ability (describing most physical things like black holes) are also abstract qualities of human consciousness. Do we categorize mathematical ability as physical, metaphysical or informational? And if it's informational, what is its purpose? And; what, where, when and how did that feature of informational ability propagate and come into Being? And finally, is 'information' sentient?

Anyway, great stuff, thank you Sy! I will check your link and offer some other possibilities as applicable. I like your wholistic view of biology... . I remember reading top-down v. bottom-up but forgot many of its tenets...