SteveKlinko wrote: ↑May 21st, 2022, 8:30 amIf Color Impressions are the same thing as Color Experiences and Color Qualia then I agree.
I use the following terms synonymously: "sensation", "sense-impression ", "sense-experience", "sense-appearance", "sense-quale", "sense-datum", "sense-content".
SteveKlinko wrote: ↑May 21st, 2022, 8:30 amI think it is a mistake to think that since there is this Visual Experience, that there needs to be some Inner Eye that Sees it. This just leads to the old infinite regression of further Experiences and Eyes. There is no need for this. The Visual Experience is the final stage of the Seeing Process. Period. We may not understand it but there it is floating and Embedded in the front of our faces letting us move around in the World without bumping into things or walking off cliffs.
I think the higher-theories of experiential/phenomenal consciousness are right insofar as no mental/neural state is an experiential/phenomenal one unless its subject is (somehow) conscious or aware of it. That is, conscious perception requires what Leibniz calls
apperception and what Locke calls
reflection, i.e.
"the perception of the operations of our own mind within us" or
"that notice which the mind takes of its own operations". For example, one isn't visually conscious of a tomato unless one is also apperceptively/reflectively/introspectively conscious of its visual appearance (a round patch of phenomenal red).
"It is well to make the distinction between perception, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the reflexive knowledge of this internal state itself and which is not given to all souls, nor at all times to the same soul."
(Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace, par. 4, G VI 600: L 637)