SteveKlinko wrote: ↑March 30th, 2022, 7:39 amI disagree that Eliminativism is not a Theory about Conscious Experience. It explicitly says there are no such things as Qualia.
There is a distinction between
absolute eliminativism about
all kinds of mental entities and
relative eliminativism about
some (but not all) kinds of mental entities. For example, one of the most famous eliminative materialists, Paul Churchland, is not an absolute eliminativist, because he is a
reductive materialist and thus a non-eliminativist (realist) about
sensations. Instead, his target of elimination are
propositional attitudes such as belief and desire.
QUOTE>
"In one important area, a
blanket eliminative materialism bids fair to be just plain wrong. The reason is simple: The portion of folk psychology concerned with the various
sensations to which we are subject is in the process of finding a moderately smooth and highly illuminating
reduction at the hands of unfolding neuroscience."
(p. 166)
"Where the common-sense ontology of sensations is concerned, eliminative materialism looks to be false. Sensations are not likely to be eliminated from our scientific ontology. They are already in the process of being smoothly reduced thereto."
(p. 171)
(Churchland, Paul M. "The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism." In
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, 160-181. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.)
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