Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[CIN]

Because I've actually read philosophers who have theories opposed to utilitarianism. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Locke, to name a few. Anyone who has read a serious non-utilitarian account of morality would know that the account you give is basically a strawman. None of these philosophers' moral theories are implicitly or explicitly a matter of compromising on the basis of epistemic limitations.

My life is too busy for me to be able to read all those authors any time soon. As reading them appears to be a precondition for me talking to you, I'll withdraw from the discussion.

[Good_Egg]

It matters how I treat experiencing subjects, therefore I ought to treat them well if I wish to behave morally.

Again, matters to whom ?

I agree that it matters to experiencing subjects how you treat them.
Whether it matters to you is the point at issue.
Seems like you're an atheist who doesn't believe that it matters to the universe.

I'm suspecting that this is the verbal equivalent of sleight-of-hand. That there's a line missing in your argument - how you get from matters-to-them to matters-to-you (or perhaps to should-matter-to-you). And you're concealing this by using "matters" without an object, as if matters-to-them and matters-to-you are the same thing.

But maybe I'm misreading you.

You seem to believe morality objectively exists as a feature of the universe to be discovered through our moral intuitions, so for example an object like a painting has value in and of itself, regardless of being valued by an experiencing subject. And is worthy of moral consideration in that it would be morally wrong to the painting, or in some other way, to destroy it. I asked you what your basis for this is, but you didn't answer?

That's a fair description. I'd say that it is empirically the case that we have moral intuitions. And that there is a considerable level of agreement or consensus between our moral intuitions, both within and across cultures, suggesting that these intuitions relate to something in nature, rather than being a cultural construct. (Possibly in human nature rather than in the laws of physics).

Noting in passing that those intuitions are at the level of an act being morally good or bad, other things being equal. Rather than at the level of the right trade-off between different moral considerations that are pointing to opposite choices.

And that the job of moral philosophy is to provide a coherent intellectual framework. Within which it is conceivable to conclude that one of our intuitions must be false because it is not coherent with all the others.

Apologies for not answering your question about art. Not sure that I can say much more than that I have a moral intuition that it is wrong (other things being equal) to destroy a thing of beauty. I have, without much hesitation, destroyed my children's early scribblings which were doubtless intended as art. But the destruction of a beautiful thing seems to me bad.

And this seems of a piece with not pulling wings off flies, and not treading on an ant if one easily avoid it, and similar acts. Whose wrongness is not explicable in terms of the suffering of a human-level conscious mind.

[Leontiskos]

Following Aristotle and Aquinas, to say that a tree is good is to say that it fulfills the intrinsic purpose, end, or final cause of a tree. The most general term we have for something which exists in that state is "healthy."

Healthy ( or mature) can't be eternal moral truths because some individuals are what we call good, or mature, who are physically or mentally twisted and eccentric. Good exists despite lack of health, and despite lack of maturity.

To be clear, it seems that your argument here isn't that health or goodness is not an "eternal moral truth" (I think that nebulous term would need to actually be defined), but rather that the concepts of health and goodness diverge.

Your example doesn't work, because someone who is physically or mentally twisted is also physically or mentally unhealthy. Aristotle's idea isn't that every tree that has survived into adulthood is a healthy tree (or that every member of a species that has survived into adulthood is a healthy member of that species). It is rather something like, "Every tree that is ordered towards its final cause, according to its age, is good/healthy." A healthy adult lion is a preeminently good lion, and it is what the cub "aims" towards, but a healthy cub is also a good lion in its own way.

Health is one of the basic things "desired" by any Aristotelian substance, and it is the central thing that describes the goodness of a non-rational substance such as a non-rational animal. Obviously there can be adult members of species which are unhealthy or not well-ordered towards their final cause.

Aristotle's idea of ideal form=goodness and that of Aquinas suits the breeder or farmer of livestock, but it doesn't suit loving parents or friends or anyone else who loves an individual for themself.

Sure it does. In rational animals, such as humans, Aristotle claims that the idea of health becomes more complex, and that the perfection of the rational nature is a matter of virtue. It is of course useful to distinguish health from virtue when it comes to rational animals, for health pertains to their animal and vegetative nature while virtue pertains to their rational nature. But for rational animals "good" applies to both. Both health and virtue are good in the objective sense.

I wrote "good exists----" . Ontic existence is mental as well as physical/physical as well as mental. 'Good' is a shaky armature for the support of human behaviours and it's only when we see downright evil that we can get a glimpse of good. Thus Putin's aggression, and the Crucifixion, serve to highlight what good is.

Yes, in many ways I agree with that. Aristotle would basically agree, although he would also say that ideal specimens can also highlight what good is. And this gets at the fact that Aristotle's moral epistemology is fundamentally empirical. A great deal of observation is required before one can begin to make claims about what is good for a particular kind of thing.

Because I've actually read philosophers who have theories opposed to utilitarianism. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Locke, to name a few. Anyone who has read a serious non-utilitarian account of morality would know that the account you give is basically a strawman. None of these philosophers' moral theories are implicitly or explicitly a matter of compromising on the basis of epistemic limitations.

My life is too busy for me to be able to read all those authors any time soon. As reading them appears to be a precondition for me talking to you, I'll withdraw from the discussion.

I would say that reading at least one non-consequentialist philosopher is a precondition for making umbrella claims about all moral systems. Just as one cannot make broad claims about all the cars in the world when they have only driven one, one similarly cannot make broad claims about all moral systems when they have never even read a non-consequentialist philosopher. In both cases the person is drawing a conclusion from insufficient evidence; they are pretending to know about things that they simply do not know about. That is why I pointed to the historical moral systems themselves as a counterpoint to your claim.

[Belindi]

I had written:

Healthy ( or mature) can't be eternal moral truths because some individuals are what we call good, or mature, who are physically or mentally twisted and eccentric. Good exists despite lack of health, and despite lack of maturity.

Leontiskos replied:

To be clear, it seems that your argument here isn't that health or goodness is not an "eternal moral truth" (I think that nebulous term would need to actually be defined), but rather that the concepts of health and goodness diverge.

I think of Aristotle observing the particular marine ecology that he did observe. But he did not think in terms of the species that he observed evolving naturally into different forms according to the demands of a changing environment. The individuals he observed were healthy and true to type, not deformed, however the virtue of good surpasses the virtue of health because health is limited to a specific environment.

Leontiskos wrote:

Your example doesn't work, because someone who is physically or mentally twisted is also physically or mentally unhealthy. Aristotle's idea isn't that every tree that has survived into adulthood is a healthy tree (or that every member of a species that has survived into adulthood is a healthy member of that species). It is rather something like, "Every tree that is ordered towards its final cause, according to its age, is good/healthy." A healthy adult lion is a preeminently good lion, and it is what the cub "aims" towards, but a healthy cub is also a good lion in its own way.

Wild lions in their habitual environment and left unmolested by humans and epidemics are not going to change as they are the best they can be in that environment. In an adverse environment the adaptable individual and species stands a better chance than the lion. I have a eucalyptus stump in my garden that I thought would be dead but which sprouted abundant and healthy immature foliage.

Leontiskos wrote:

Health is one of the basic things "desired" by any Aristotelian substance, and it is the central thing that describes the goodness of a non-rational substance such as a non-rational animal. Obviously there can be adult members of species which are unhealthy or not well-ordered towards their final cause.

Don't you think Darwin superceded Aristotle?

Aristotle's idea of ideal form=goodness and that of Aquinas suits the breeder or farmer of livestock, but it doesn't suit loving parents or friends or anyone else who loves an individual for themself.

Sure it does. In rational animals, such as humans, Aristotle claims that the idea of health becomes more complex, and that the perfection of the rational nature is a matter of virtue. It is of course useful to distinguish health from virtue when it comes to rational animals, for health pertains to their animal and vegetative nature while virtue pertains to their rational nature. But for rational animals "good" applies to both. Both health and virtue are good in the objective sense.

I wrote:

"good exists----" . Ontic existence is mental as well as physical/physical as well as mental. 'Good' is a shaky armature for the support of human behaviours and it's only when we see downright evil that we can get a glimpse of good. Thus Putin's aggression, and the Crucifixion, serve to highlight what good is.

Leontiskos wrote:

And this gets at the fact that Aristotle's moral epistemology is fundamentally empirical. A great deal of observation is required before one can begin to make claims about what is good for a particular kind of thing.

So does this answer Darwin? Are specialised characters and plastic characters each fulfilling their final cause in their peculiar ways? If so there would be no possibility of Platonic good. I wonder what Aquinas made of this.

[CIN]

Because I've actually read philosophers who have theories opposed to utilitarianism. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Locke, to name a few. Anyone who has read a serious non-utilitarian account of morality would know that the account you give is basically a strawman. None of these philosophers' moral theories are implicitly or explicitly a matter of compromising on the basis of epistemic limitations.

My life is too busy for me to be able to read all those authors any time soon. As reading them appears to be a precondition for me talking to you, I'll withdraw from the discussion.

I would say that reading at least one non-consequentialist philosopher is a precondition for making umbrella claims about all moral systems. Just as one cannot make broad claims about all the cars in the world when they have only driven one, one similarly cannot make broad claims about all moral systems when they have never even read a non-consequentialist philosopher. In both cases the person is drawing a conclusion from insufficient evidence; they are pretending to know about things that they simply do not know about. That is why I pointed to the historical moral systems themselves as a counterpoint to your claim.

I've read Kant. Maybe if I get time I'll refresh my memory of him. I've not looked at him for a long time because deontological approaches to ethics seem to me quite hopeless. 'The most familiar forms of deontology, and also the forms presenting the greatest contrast to consequentialism, hold that some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter how morally good their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden.' (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethi ... tological/). This seems to me mere irrational superstition. I'm willing to be convinced otherwise if you think you yourself can do it, but don't refer me to Plato or Aristotle or Kant. They're no longer answering my calls.

Speaking generally, I've no interest in the kind of discussion in which someone says 'oh, if you read X you might change your mind.' I don't come to a forum like this to be given reading assignments, I come to discuss philosophical questions. By all means tell me what's wrong with utilitarianism by laying out a deontological argument against it (preferably in your own words), but don't expect me to go away and reread the Grundlegung in the middle of a conversation. And whatever you do, don't wave your deontologist card at me and say, 'Kant trumps Bentham'. We're not playing bridge.

[Leontiskos]

Because I've actually read philosophers who have theories opposed to utilitarianism. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Locke, to name a few. Anyone who has read a serious non-utilitarian account of morality would know that the account you give is basically a strawman. None of these philosophers' moral theories are implicitly or explicitly a matter of compromising on the basis of epistemic limitations.

My life is too busy for me to be able to read all those authors any time soon. As reading them appears to be a precondition for me talking to you, I'll withdraw from the discussion.

I would say that reading at least one non-consequentialist philosopher is a precondition for making umbrella claims about all moral systems. Just as one cannot make broad claims about all the cars in the world when they have only driven one, one similarly cannot make broad claims about all moral systems when they have never even read a non-consequentialist philosopher. In both cases the person is drawing a conclusion from insufficient evidence; they are pretending to know about things that they simply do not know about. That is why I pointed to the historical moral systems themselves as a counterpoint to your claim.

I've read Kant. Maybe if I get time I'll refresh my memory of him. I've not looked at him for a long time because deontological approaches to ethics seem to me quite hopeless. 'The most familiar forms of deontology, and also the forms presenting the greatest contrast to consequentialism, hold that some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter how morally good their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden.' (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethi ... tological/). This seems to me mere irrational superstition.

Of course Kant gives arguments for his position, which would have to be assessed. Nevertheless, in <this post> you claimed that intrinsic moral evils are rooted in epistemic limitations. Yet if you have read Kant you would know that none of his arguments are based on epistemic limitations and many of them contradict such a view. So your whole case comes down to a sweeping misrepresentation of non-consequentialist moralities, or else you are employing some fallacy (genetic, ad hominem, psychological, or something similar). As a follow up you have managed an assertion of "irrational superstition" without any accompanying argumentation. Bare assertions never rise above question-begging status, i.e. "Only consequentialist systems are not superstitious; Kant's system is not consequentialist; therefore Kant is superstitious."

I don't come to a forum like this to be given reading assignments, I come to discuss philosophical questions.

It seems to me that you come to level genetic fallacies and get angry at those who point them out to you.

Neither constructing a genetic fallacy nor asserting that something is "irrational superstition" is a matter of philosophy. Both are contrary to philosophy.

[Leontiskos]

Healthy ( or mature) can't be eternal moral truths because some individuals are what we call good, or mature, who are physically or mentally twisted and eccentric. Good exists despite lack of health, and despite lack of maturity.

To be clear, it seems that your argument here isn't that health or goodness is not an "eternal moral truth" (I think that nebulous term would need to actually be defined), but rather that the concepts of health and goodness diverge.

I think of Aristotle observing the particular marine ecology that he did observe. But he did not think in terms of the species that he observed evolving naturally into different forms according to the demands of a changing environment. The individuals he observed were healthy and true to type, not deformed, however the virtue of good surpasses the virtue of health because health is limited to a specific environment.

I am not really following your argument, but I would say that not all of the specimens that Aristotle observed were healthy. There is a continuum of health among the individuals in a species, and cognizance of this continuum is crucial to Aristotelian natural science.

Are you saying that Aristotle neglected good from the evolutionary vantage point because he was unaware of evolution?

Your example doesn't work, because someone who is physically or mentally twisted is also physically or mentally unhealthy. Aristotle's idea isn't that every tree that has survived into adulthood is a healthy tree (or that every member of a species that has survived into adulthood is a healthy member of that species). It is rather something like, "Every tree that is ordered towards its final cause, according to its age, is good/healthy." A healthy adult lion is a preeminently good lion, and it is what the cub "aims" towards, but a healthy cub is also a good lion in its own way.

Wild lions in their habitual environment and left unmolested by humans and epidemics are not going to change as they are the best they can be in that environment. In an adverse environment the adaptable individual and species stands a better chance than the lion. I have a eucalyptus stump in my garden that I thought would be dead but which sprouted abundant and healthy immature foliage.

Again, I'm not exactly following. What do you mean by "[they] are not going to change" and what inferences are you drawing from this claim?

Health is one of the basic things "desired" by any Aristotelian substance, and it is the central thing that describes the goodness of a non-rational substance such as a non-rational animal. Obviously there can be adult members of species which are unhealthy or not well-ordered towards their final cause.

Don't you think Darwin superceded Aristotle?

I think everything Aristotle said in this vein still holds true, but now we can talk about a further kind of non-rational good: evolutionary good.

I wrote "good exists----" . Ontic existence is mental as well as physical/physical as well as mental. 'Good' is a shaky armature for the support of human behaviours and it's only when we see downright evil that we can get a glimpse of good. Thus Putin's aggression, and the Crucifixion, serve to highlight what good is.

Yes, in many ways I agree with that. Aristotle would basically agree, although he would also say that ideal specimens can also highlight what good is. And this gets at the fact that Aristotle's moral epistemology is fundamentally empirical. A great deal of observation is required before one can begin to make claims about what is good for a particular kind of thing.

So does this answer Darwin? Are specialised characters and plastic characters each fulfilling their final cause in their peculiar ways? If so there would be no possibility of Platonic good. I wonder what Aquinas made of this.

For Aquinas all substances--and even everything that exists--"seek" to exist, or in the case of living things, to survive. Aristotle would certainly affirm that all living things "seek" to survive. I don't think either one realized that a species is capable of transforming itself as an adaptation to environment, but it would have been justified by their premise which says that living things seek to survive.

A "plastic character" or a "plastic nature" would at least be thought to have final ends, such as survival. I don't know whether they would be said to have a final cause. This admittedly gets into Teilhardian thought, which I am not fond of.

I honestly haven't done much research on Evolution and Aristotelianism.

[Belindi]

Leontiskos replied to me:

I

am not really following your argument, but I would say that not all of the specimens that Aristotle observed were healthy. There is a continuum of health among the individuals in a species, and cognizance of this continuum is crucial to Aristotelian natural science.

Are you saying that Aristotle neglected good from the evolutionary vantage point because he was unaware of evolution?

I am saying that Aristotle observed that particular marine environment of his as healthy, not toxic, and this gave him ample cause for optimism about nature's being in a stable state in which the various forms that nature takes are generally progressing towards what they should be progressing towards. If Aristotle had been impoverished by a tsunami or an infectious plague on his marina he may not have been optimistic about natural stability.

I had written:

Wild lions in their habitual environment and left unmolested by humans and epidemics are not going to change as they are the best they can be in that environment. In an adverse environment the adaptable individual and species stands a better chance than the lion. I have a eucalyptus stump in my garden that I thought would be dead but which sprouted abundant and healthy immature foliage.

Leontiskos replied:

Again, I'm not exactly following. What do you mean by "[they] are not going to change" and what inferences are you drawing from this claim?

I mean that a top predator in any given stable environment is stable as a species as it has no need to evolve. The inference I draw from that claim is we humans too are top predators however , unlike free lions, we know for a fact our social and physical environment is unstable. We humans can't evolve biologically but we can and must change our natures and we can't do so if Aristotle is correct that we are as individuals or we as a species are bound to a final cause.Unless that final cause is plasticity itself which makes nonsense of Aristotle's final cause.


I had written:

Don't you think Darwin superceded Aristotle?

Leontiskos replied:

I think everything Aristotle said in this vein still holds true, but now we can talk about a further kind of non-rational good: evolutionary good.

But if evolutionary plasticity of species is good, then how can stability of species also be good? To put it another way, only a man who is satisfied with the status quo will be satisfied that human nature is evolving the way it should. There is a class war going on among humans and Aristotle alignes with the winners.

I had written:

So does this answer Darwin? Are specialised characters and plastic characters each fulfilling their final cause in their peculiar ways? If so there would be no possibility of Platonic good. I wonder what Aquinas made of this.

Leontiskos replied:

For Aquinas all substances--and even everything that exists--"seek" to exist, or in the case of living things, to survive. Aristotle would certainly affirm that all living things "seek" to survive. I don't think either one realized that a species is capable of transforming itself as an adaptation to environment, but it would have been justified by their premise which says that living things seek to survive.

A "plastic character" or a "plastic nature" would at least be thought to have final ends, such as survival. I don't know whether they would be said to have a final cause. This admittedly gets into Teilhardian thought, which I am not fond of.

I honestly haven't done much research on Evolution and Aristotelianism.

Unfortunately for humans we have different ideas of how to survive well, and we go to war to support these different ideas. Again I refer to the use of evil as an undeniable criterion for choosing good. Reason is ranged with good.

[Leontiskos]

I am saying that Aristotle observed that particular marine environment of his as healthy, not toxic, and this gave him ample cause for optimism about nature's being in a stable state in which the various forms that nature takes are generally progressing towards what they should be progressing towards. If Aristotle had been impoverished by a tsunami or an infectious plague on his marina he may not have been optimistic about natural stability.

I don't think there is any reason to believe that Aristotle's theory evinces an "optimism" about nature. Plagues and disease were common in his time, and they were evidence of the evil that is contrary to health.

I mean that a top predator in any given stable environment is stable as a species as it has no need to evolve. The inference I draw from that claim is we humans too are top predators however , unlike free lions, we know for a fact our social and physical environment is unstable. We humans can't evolve biologically but we can and must change our natures and we can't do so if Aristotle is correct that we are as individuals or we as a species are bound to a final cause.Unless that final cause is plasticity itself which makes nonsense of Aristotle's final cause.

I think Aristotle is right and Sartre is wrong, and I don't think you are providing any arguments for the latter. For Aristotle the final end of rational beings is happiness achieved through virtue, particularly through things like justice, fortitude, temperance, prudence, generosity, truthfulness, and friendship. There is no plasticity in human nature that will lead to the reality where friendship or truthfulness, for example, are bad for humans.

But if evolutionary plasticity of species is good, then how can stability of species also be good? To put it another way, only a man who is satisfied with the status quo will be satisfied that human nature is evolving the way it should. There is a class war going on among humans and Aristotle alignes with the winners.

Since I have limited time at the moment, it may be useful to note that you are attributing to Aristotle a position which he did not hold. Aristotle did not hold that "stability of species is good." This claim is anachronistic, and doesn't make much sense. For Aristotle that species are stable is just a brute fact, not something that is good or bad. This talk about the status quo and class wars is very strange and unintelligible. Apparently you are attempting to bring moral considerations into a discussion that is revolving around natural science (i.e. The discussion at the moment is, "What is good for non-rational animals?").

Incidentally, the same could be said for Darwin. For Darwin that species evolve is just a brute fact. It is not bad or good. This isn't an ideological or moral contest between Aristotle and Darwin. Even if it were, social Darwinism and Eugenics are based precisely on Evolutionary ideas, not on Aristotelian morality.

Unfortunately for humans we have different ideas of how to survive well, and we go to war to support these different ideas. Again I refer to the use of evil as an undeniable criterion for choosing good. Reason is ranged with good.

We have different ideas, but we all hold survival to be a good, so you're not saying anything contrary to Aristotle or Aquinas. You also need to be more careful about conflating non-rational animals with rational animals. As I already said, the primary Aristotelian criterion for the good of non-rational animals is 'health'. Rational animals seek the good of virtue as well as the good of health.

Also, war doesn't end up being a very good example of our desire for survival. Most wars are not initiated for the sake of survival. Russia would have survived just fine without going to war with Ukraine. Wars occur with reference to virtue and vice. This is why non-rational animals cannot usually be said to go to war, and when the are said to go to war it has much more to do with survival than human wars do.


Let me say a word about Aristotle and Evolution since I will have to step away for awhile. I think the Aristotelian understanding of 'good' really is more accurate than the "Evolutionary" one (if there even is one). If we follow Aristotle then what is good for something depends on what kind of thing it is, and this can even be analogously applied to artifacts like cars or houses. From an Evolutionary perspective good is that which conduces to survival. Again, for Aristotle and Aquinas that which conduces to survival is obviously good, but 'good' is also much more than that. I would also say that that undue Evolutionary emphases (which are very common) create bizarre notions of homogeneity. From a purely Evolutionary perspective all species are the same insofar as they are all fully explained in terms of survival and natural selection. This strikes me as incorrect. Species really are different. What is good for a giraffe really is different from what is good for a caterpillar. Evolutionary ends are exceedingly remote, and take long periods of time to develop. It is perfectly legitimate to include the Evolutionary end in our notion of 'good' and to recognize that Aristotle preceded Darwin, but the emphasis we give to Evolution nowadays is disproportionate, and likely faddish. In 500 years Evolution will be seen as one piece of the puzzle among many, not the sole determining factor.

[CIN]

My life is too busy for me to be able to read all those authors any time soon. As reading them appears to be a precondition for me talking to you, I'll withdraw from the discussion.

I would say that reading at least one non-consequentialist philosopher is a precondition for making umbrella claims about all moral systems. Just as one cannot make broad claims about all the cars in the world when they have only driven one, one similarly cannot make broad claims about all moral systems when they have never even read a non-consequentialist philosopher. In both cases the person is drawing a conclusion from insufficient evidence; they are pretending to know about things that they simply do not know about. That is why I pointed to the historical moral systems themselves as a counterpoint to your claim.

I've read Kant. Maybe if I get time I'll refresh my memory of him. I've not looked at him for a long time because deontological approaches to ethics seem to me quite hopeless. 'The most familiar forms of deontology, and also the forms presenting the greatest contrast to consequentialism, hold that some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter how morally good their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden.' (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethi ... tological/). This seems to me mere irrational superstition.

Of course Kant gives arguments for his position, which would have to be assessed. Nevertheless, in <this post> you claimed that intrinsic moral evils are rooted in epistemic limitations. Yet if you have read Kant you would know that none of his arguments are based on epistemic limitations and many of them contradict such a view. So your whole case comes down to a sweeping misrepresentation of non-consequentialist moralities, or else you are employing some fallacy (genetic, ad hominem, psychological, or something similar). As a follow up you have managed an assertion of "irrational superstition" without any accompanying argumentation. Bare assertions never rise above question-begging status, i.e. "Only consequentialist systems are not superstitious; Kant's system is not consequentialist; therefore Kant is superstitious."

I don't come to a forum like this to be given reading assignments, I come to discuss philosophical questions.

It seems to me that you come to level genetic fallacies and get angry at those who point them out to you.

Neither constructing a genetic fallacy nor asserting that something is "irrational superstition" is a matter of philosophy. Both are contrary to philosophy.

LOL. I'm not angry, I'm just disappointed that you approach philosophy as if the aim of it were to score points off an opponent.

Peace out.

[Leontiskos]

LOL. I'm not angry, I'm just disappointed that you approach philosophy as if the aim of it were to score points off an opponent.

And I am disappointed that your approach to philosophy is to contradict yourself, misrepresent those you disagree with, and give formally fallacious arguments. Such an approach is generally referred to as "Sophism."

[Gertie]

good egg

Gertie wrote: ↑March 14th, 2022, 6:50 am It matters how I treat experiencing subjects, therefore I ought to treat them well if I wish to behave morally.

Again, matters to whom ?

I agree that it matters to experiencing subjects how you treat them.

Correct.

Whether it matters to you is the point at issue.

It's what appropriately justifies me, as a moral agent, showing moral consideration to experiencing subjects. As opposed to rocks, toasters or paintings.

[Good_Egg]

It's what appropriately justifies me, as a moral agent, showing moral consideration to experiencing subjects. As opposed to rocks, toasters or paintings.

Not doubting that compassion with the sufferings of others is a virtue, or that you possess it.

But it seems like you're taking one virtue and making out that this is the whole of morality.

And also seems like you set out to argue that "mattering" bridges the is-ought divide. But are now falling back on an additional "ought" premise that what matters to an experiencing subject ought to matter to you as a moral agent

Next you'll be saying that that's .an eternal truth...

[CIN]

LOL. I'm not angry, I'm just disappointed that you approach philosophy as if the aim of it were to score points off an opponent.

And I am disappointed that your approach to philosophy is to contradict yourself, misrepresent those you disagree with, and give formally fallacious arguments. Such an approach is generally referred to as "Sophism."

Well, I tell you what - let's eschew all these pleasantries and talk about a specific case - a classic scenario with which you will certainly be familiar.

I'm a surgeon. I have six young patients. One is healthy, the other five will die soon if they don't get organ transplants. If they get their transplants, there's every reason to believe that they will live healthily to a ripe old age.

As a consequentialist, I believe I ought to kill the healthy patient and give his organs to the other five. (We will assume that I'm clever enough to make it appear that the guy died naturally.) Am I right when I say I ought to do this, or am I wrong? If I'm wrong, why am I wrong?

If you want to please me (probably unlikely after I've poked the bear so much, but we'll see), you'll answer this not by referring me to Plato or Kant or Uncle Tom Cobbley, but by telling me what you yourself actually think.

Game on, wrestler of Messene?

[Belindi]

If you are a politician and law maker and given resources are finite you should choose the utilitarian solution to the problem including the rationalisation as you descibe.

As a private person with subjective affections and allegiances you should
do what comes naturally and save your nearest and dearest.

Obviously politicians are also private persons . Another ethic applies: to the extent that an individual has power over others so ought that individual to shoulder responsibility for others' welfare even to the detriment of his own welfare and affections. This is a good reason for the celibacy of priests.