GE Morton wrote: ↑March 10th, 2022, 2:52 pmMy quoted statement above is only true in context, i.e., with regard to what is required for a "being" to exist. There are many non-spatiotemporal existents (but they are not "beings").
I also think a definition of "existence," or "to exist," in order to be useful, must imply a criterion for existence. If there is no means of determining whether a claimed X exists, then the claim is vacuous. All terms, BTW, contrary to Kim, can be defined. If they could not then we could never learn to use them, or use them properly (meaning to communicate actionable information).
If we cannot find out whether X exists (because there is no possible way of getting evidence for, or gathering information about its existence), then the assertion or belief that X exists is unjustifiable; but the sentence "X exists" isn't thereby rendered meaningless.
Do you have an informative definition of "to exist"?
The concept of existence is used to select a subset of the set of my/our objects of thought, namely, the one whose members are something in and for
themselves, and not just something in and for
my/our thoughts. What doesn't exist is
nothing more than something thought or imagined, whereas what exists is
something more than something thought or imagined.
Foonote: Existing thoughts and mental images are themselves something in and for themselves, and something more than something thought or imagined, in the sense that they are what they are, no matter whether or not they are themselves objects of
higher-order thoughts or imaginations.
GE Morton wrote: ↑March 10th, 2022, 2:52 pmAs I said above, I agree. There are many non-spatiotemporal existents, e.g., universals. If were asked for a definition of "to exist," it would be something like, "Has some communicative utility." In other words, what exists is whatever we say exists, as long as what we say enables or facilitates some communicable experience. The real challenge is not defining "existence," but in classifying existents, so that one sort of existent is not equated or confused with another.
Sorts of
existents are not to be confused with sorts of
existence!
It's obviously circular to define "what exists" as "whatever we say exists."
Anyway, existence isn't determined by existence-beliefs/-claims: What is believed/claimed to exist needn't exist.
GE Morton wrote: ↑March 10th, 2022, 2:52 pmConsul wrote: ↑March 10th, 2022, 11:08 amFirst of all, there is a distinction between multitudinal infinities, i.e. infinite numbers of things (including infinite sets/classes with infinitely many members), and magnitudinal infinities, i.e. infinite (extensive or intensive) quantities (physical or geometrical ones).
I'm not sure that distinction is meaningful. If the members of the multitude are separated by finite distances, then a magnitudinal infinity is automatically created. E.g., since we know stars are separated by finite distances, if the universe consists of infinitely many stars, then it has infinite extent (magnitude).
Yes, but the distinction between multitudes and magnitudes, and correspondingly between multitudinal infinities and magnitudinal ones is still meaningful.
Extent is a magnitude or quantity (quantitative property); but note that by "magnitude" I don't only mean "greatness of size or extent" in the geometrical sense, but all kinds of quantitative, i.e. measurable and numerically representable, properties such as density, heat, or mass.