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[GE Morton]

Of course, if the idea of an actual infinity is incoherent, then the idea of an infinitely extended body is incoherent too.

Here is an excerpt from an essay of mine, written years ago, on the arguments for the existence of God, concerning the problems with applying infinite attributes to "beings." You might find it interesting.

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Claim #1 (first version): God is a "being" which exists in neither time nor space, or alternatively (second version), He exists in all times and places simultaneously.

With regard to the first version (no location), the question to ask is, What is the difference between a "being" which does not exist at any time or place and a being which does not exist at all? How can we tell the difference? The reader is invited to pause here and attempt to answer that question before proceeding . . . . After every location in the universe has been examined and nothing is found which we can agree is God, what do we believe we are saying when we continue to claim that He exists?

In our ordinary understanding of the term, to say that a thing exists is to say that if we look in a certain place (and time) we will find the thing. The time and place need not be specified, and may not even be known: often a claim that something exists is made in order to launch a search -- "Thar's gold in them hills!" It is this implication --- that the thing might be found -- which gives the verb, "to exist," any purpose in the language. Those who would disagree that this implication follows from a claim of existence are invited to explain what communication function "to exist" would serve otherwise -- what good would the term be in such a case? What use would it have? What information would anyone convey by asserting it of something?

"To be" is to be someplace, somewhen. If propositions of the form "X exists" carry any information at all, it is the information, "There is a time t and a place s such that at t and s one can find X." To say that something does not exist is to say that there is no intersection of t and s such that X can be found there; all possible combinations of t and s are empty of X. Thus (on our ordinary interpretation), to assert that something "exists outside space and time" is to assert a contradiction.

It is important to realize that none of this has the slightest thing to with what the universe is like. It has only to do with how effectively we can communicate with one another about the universe. To claim that "X exists outside of space and time" is to abolish the distinction intended when we say that something either exists or does not exist; someone who makes this claim has said that this distinction is of no value. Instead of things which exist and things which do not, we have things which exist in space and time and things which exist outside them; if God "exists outside of space and time," why not assert that demons, unicorns, fairies and poltergeists exist outside space and time? Why not argue that in this realm outside space and time, electrons, stars, and worlds exist also, populated by gorgons and dragons? Or even by cowboys and Indians? Or by Rhett Butler and Scarlet O'Hara? Instead of saying that Santa Claus does not exist, why not say he exists outside of spacetime?

Saying that God (or anything else) exists "outside space and time" is to propose a new construal of the verb "to exist." As we suggested above, we do not reject such proposals out of hand. But we are entitled to a certain conservatism: before we accept such proposals we should demand some showing of how our ability to describe the world to one another is improved by the proposed conceptual shift. And it is difficult to see what advantages for comprehension the strategy here proposed confers. A Santa that "exists outside space and time" leaves no more gifts than a non-existent Santa; a non-spatio-temporal unicorn is no easier to ride than an unreal one. How, in fact, do we tell the two apart? On the other hand, there would seem to be a major disadvantage: we have just created, willy-nilly, a new universe utterly bizarre and totally inaccessible. And how does that facilitate our understanding of the world?

We stress that it is a logical point we are making here, not an ontological one. We are not trying to say what does and what does not exist or where things exist. Nonetheless, someone may say "It does not seem impossible to me that something might exist outside space and time. Surely the universe is bigger than our imaginations.” But this critic assumes that “spacetime" is itself a place; that it is something one can either be inside or outside of, and that (for all we know) things can be outside as well as in. He assumes that the proposition "God exists outside spacetime" is of the same form as "Ginkgoes are known to exist outside China." But this assumption is mistaken: "spacetime" is not itself a place and time; it is intended to refer to all the places and times that there are. Saying that something exists "outside space and time" is not to say it exists somewhere else, because there is nowhere else; it is to say it does not exist.*

___________________________
*Denying that things exist "outside space and time" is not to rule out the possibility of multiple space-time domains. If the universe is "closed" (finite but unbounded) there may be universes other than ours. Objects in these "parallel universes" are outside our space-time continuum, but not "outside space and time." They have coordinates within their own local continuum, and also within a larger coordinate system that embraces our universe, as well.


We proceed to the second version of Claim #1: God is omnipresent. On my desk before me is a half-cupful of cold coffee. If God is everywhere, He is presumably in that cup. If I pour out the coffee, God will presumably remain in the cup (although part of Him would also have been poured out with the coffee). If I launch the cup into the vacuum of high orbit, still God will remain in the cup. We thus face another question similar to our earlier one: how do I tell a cup containing God from an empty cup? And if the two states of affairs cannot be distinguished, why not opt for the simpler, i.e., the empty cup?

The believer may now say, "God is not 'in' the cup in the same way that the coffee is 'in' the cup. The coffee is contained in the cup, but God is immanent in all things; it is His presence in it that sustains the cup. If God were not immanent in the cup it could not exist."

But this latter is surely an empirical claim. "If God were removed from the cup (or was to remove Himself from it) it would cease to exist" is of the same form as "If the latent heat were removed from the coffee, it would freeze." But the believer will not likely be able to remove God from the cup, or persuade Him to remove Himself; he will not be able to show that his claim is true. He thus predicates a property of the cup but does not show how a cup with this property differs from one that lacks it. Of course (the believer tells us), this property is not lacked by anything; it is a property of all things whatsoever. But we can certainly imagine that things might lack this property and yet exist. How do we tell, then, a universe in which all things possess this property from one in which things lack this property but exist anyway? If we have no way to decide whether our universe is made up of the first kind of objects or the second, why not (again) choose the simpler story?

We can no doubt imagine a universe in which all things exhibit a certain property; one, say, in which all things are blue. The inhabitants of this universe will not notice that all things are blue, and will not even have a word in their language for "blue" (or any other color, if all things are blue). Yet by hypothesis, all things in their universe are blue, whether they realize it or not. And so (says the believer) is God in all things in our universe.

Now the first thing to realize about this scenario is that there is a difference between what we outside observers are entitled to say about the blue universe and what its inhabitants are entitled to say (recall that it is what we are entitled to say that is at issue here). Being able to perceive colors ourselves (and aware that there are many colors), we, if we behold this imagined universe, are entitled to say all things in it are blue. We can distinguish blue things from orange and purple things, and can therefore have evidence, namely the evidence of our senses, that things in the blue universe are blue. The inhabitants, on the other hand, never having seen a color other than blue, have no concept of color; they can't have any evidence for the claim that things in their universe are blue. They have no point of reference; they are in the position we (in our universe) are in with respect to the conjecture (mentioned by Russell) that the universe, and everything within it, is doubling in size every second. Because no conceivable observation could confirm this conjecture, it is vacuous; no one is entitled to claim that the universe is doubling in size every second because no one can produce supporting evidence -- even though it may well be doubling in size every second (we dismiss this conjecture simply because it is uneconomical: if the universe is doubling in size every second, then we will need some account of the mechanism driving this expansion, etc.). Being similarly in want of evidence, the inhabitants of the blue universe are not entitled to claim all things in their universe are blue.

Imagine, however, that eventually the blue people discover the wave theory of light and produce a spectrometer. They measure the wavelengths of light reflected by things in their universe and discover that all things reflect at the same wavelength. Being imaginative, they propose that light might exist at other wavelengths, and call the wavelength with which they're familiar "blue.” They are now entitled to do this (and they are also obliged to demonstrate their hypothesis by actually producing light of another color).

It may be that God (regarded as some so far undiscovered property) is present in all things. But only someone in possession of evidence (or who can at least say what would count as evidence) is in a position to so claim. Until such evidence presents itself the claim is of the same status as the claim that the universe is doubling in size every second.

There is another possible problem with God's omnipresence: God is presumed to be a being. But are not beings necessarily local? It seems to be necessary for the identification of any being that the being have limits; that we be able to determine where the being begins and ends. Else how do we identify the being as a being? Suppose someone invites us to a zoo in another universe to gaze upon the incredible omnipresent elephant. Would we be able to see anything but an endless expanse of gray? How would we know we did not behold, instead, an omnipresent mouse? Or merely a dense fog?
Endowing any object with natural attributes carried to infinity is to invite conceptual mayhem, particularly when several are predicated simultaneously. Within our common conceptual framework only space and time can be extended to infinity in an orderly way. The logics of such formulae as "infinite wisdom," "infinite benevolence," "infinite power," "infinite knowledge," "infinite being," et cetera, are undeveloped; we have no consensus as to how such expressions ought to function. And if we attempt to interpret them using the logics of their component terms, we easily derive contradictions. An obvious example is the classical "problem of evil": if God is simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely beneficent, how does one explain the existence of evil? Another: if God is omnipotent and immutable, can He change Himself? Or if, per Anselm's definition, God is "that which nothing greater than can be conceived," then He must be able to conceive a being greater than Himself. For if He cannot, then we can conceive a greater being, namely one who can conceive a being greater than himself. So if God is that which nothing greater than can be conceived, then He is not. And so on.

I am doubtful whether the notion of an "infinite being" can be made coherent (although I grant that the above problem of visualizing an infinite elephant seems less troublesome in the case of a being which is also invisible and intangible). The concept of infinity, itself, is not a problem; the set of integers is a coherent infinity, and perhaps the universe is a spatio-temporal infinity of some cardinality. The question is whether a being (and the properties of a being) can coherently be described as infinite; whether "infinite being" may not be a predicative construct of the same ilk as "round square." I admit my uncertainty on this point, and welcome any arguments in opposition to my tentative conclusion. I would insist, however, that any proposed clarification preserve the differences between beings and things which are not beings, and that after "clarification" such things as elephants and mice continue to count as beings.

[Pattern-chaser]

An infinitely extended body is as incoherent, as self-contradictory, as an unextended one. We are justified in denoting some X as a body only when we can discern, and specify, its limits. An infinitely extended elephant would be indistinguishable from a non-existent one.

Interesting. This seems to make sense ... until we consider that there is no rational/reasonable/logical reason to distinguish "some X" as being distinct within the universe. We have assumed, axiomatically, that the things we believe to be distinct and independent are, in actuality, distinct, independently-existing things.

But the truth is that there are no compelling reasons to assume (guess) as we do. We do what we do because our assumptions seem to make sense to us, so we accept them as axiomatic, purely for our convenience.

So, I suggest that one way we could look at it - one perspective, if you will - is that any 'body' can be usefully and correctly seen as "infinitely extended".

[GE Morton]

Interesting. This seems to make sense ... until we consider that there is no rational/reasonable/logical reason to distinguish "some X" as being distinct within the universe. We have assumed, axiomatically, that the things we believe to be distinct and independent are, in actuality, distinct, independently-existing things.

Two things are distinct if we can distinguish between them, and, conversely, any two things we can distinguish are distinct, by definition. The world we perceive is the only world of which we can usefully speak. Any "actuality" which may exist beyond that is beyond our knowledge and therefore any speculation regarding its properties is vacuous and pointless.

[Pattern-chaser]

An infinitely extended body is as incoherent, as self-contradictory, as an unextended one. We are justified in denoting some X as a body only when we can discern, and specify, its limits. An infinitely extended elephant would be indistinguishable from a non-existent one.

Interesting. This seems to make sense ... until we consider that there is no rational/reasonable/logical reason to distinguish "some X" as being distinct within the universe. We have assumed, axiomatically, that the things we believe to be distinct and independent are, in actuality, distinct, independently-existing things.

Two things are distinct if we can distinguish between them, and, conversely, any two things we can distinguish are distinct, by definition. The world we perceive is the only world of which we can usefully speak. Any "actuality" which may exist beyond that is beyond our knowledge and therefore any speculation regarding its properties is vacuous and pointless.

Distinct adjective - clearly separate and different (from something else).

I don't speak of Objectivism/Objective Reality here, as your words seem to say. I only observe that there is no clear, rational and logical reason to assume that any subsidiary part of the universe is separate, distinct or independent (of the rest of the universe).

[Consul]

Here is an excerpt from an essay of mine, written years ago, on the arguments for the existence of God, concerning the problems with applying infinite attributes to "beings." You might find it interesting.

-----------------------

Claim #1 (first version): God is a "being" which exists in neither time nor space, or alternatively (second version), He exists in all times and places simultaneously.

With regard to the first version (no location), the question to ask is, What is the difference between a "being" which does not exist at any time or place and a being which does not exist at all? How can we tell the difference? The reader is invited to pause here and attempt to answer that question before proceeding . . . . After every location in the universe has been examined and nothing is found which we can agree is God, what do we believe we are saying when we continue to claim that He exists?

In our ordinary understanding of the term, to say that a thing exists is to say that if we look in a certain place (and time) we will find the thing. The time and place need not be specified, and may not even be known: often a claim that something exists is made in order to launch a search -- "Thar's gold in them hills!" It is this implication --- that the thing might be found -- which gives the verb, "to exist," any purpose in the language. Those who would disagree that this implication follows from a claim of existence are invited to explain what communication function "to exist" would serve otherwise -- what good would the term be in such a case? What use would it have? What information would anyone convey by asserting it of something?

"To be" is to be someplace, somewhen. If propositions of the form "X exists" carry any information at all, it is the information, "There is a time t and a place s such that at t and s one can find X." To say that something does not exist is to say that there is no intersection of t and s such that X can be found there; all possible combinations of t and s are empty of X. Thus (on our ordinary interpretation), to assert that something "exists outside space and time" is to assert a contradiction.

It is important to realize that none of this has the slightest thing to with what the universe is like. It has only to do with how effectively we can communicate with one another about the universe. To claim that "X exists outside of space and time" is to abolish the distinction intended when we say that something either exists or does not exist; someone who makes this claim has said that this distinction is of no value. Instead of things which exist and things which do not, we have things which exist in space and time and things which exist outside them; if God "exists outside of space and time," why not assert that demons, unicorns, fairies and poltergeists exist outside space and time? Why not argue that in this realm outside space and time, electrons, stars, and worlds exist also, populated by gorgons and dragons? Or even by cowboys and Indians? Or by Rhett Butler and Scarlet O'Hara? Instead of saying that Santa Claus does not exist, why not say he exists outside of spacetime?

Saying that God (or anything else) exists "outside space and time" is to propose a new construal of the verb "to exist."

A definition of "existence" is one thing, and a criterion for existence is another. The former gives a semantic answer to the question as to what it is or takes to exist, and the latter gives an epistemological/methodological answer to the question as to how we can find out what exists. However, the concept of existence is one of our basic concepts, such that it is virtually indefinable by other concepts which are even more basic. And like Quine…

"I shall find no use for the narrow sense which some philosophers have given to 'existence', as against 'being'; viz., concreteness in space-time."

(Quine, W. V. Methods of Logic. 4th ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. p. 263)

If both concrete, spatiotemporal objects and abstract, non-spatiotemporal objects exist, both kinds of objects exists in one and the same sense of "exist".

"The concept of existence is probably basic and primitive in the sense that it is not possible to produce an informative definition of it in terms that are more clearly understood and that would tell us something important and revealing about what it is for something to exist."

(Kim, Jaegwon, and Ernest Sosa, eds. Metaphysics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. p. 3)

As we suggested above, we do not reject such proposals out of hand. But we are entitled to a certain conservatism: before we accept such proposals we should demand some showing of how our ability to describe the world to one another is improved by the proposed conceptual shift. And it is difficult to see what advantages for comprehension the strategy here proposed confers. A Santa that "exists outside space and time" leaves no more gifts than a non-existent Santa; a non-spatio-temporal unicorn is no easier to ride than an unreal one. How, in fact, do we tell the two apart? On the other hand, there would seem to be a major disadvantage: we have just created, willy-nilly, a new universe utterly bizarre and totally inaccessible. And how does that facilitate our understanding of the world?

We stress that it is a logical point we are making here, not an ontological one. We are not trying to say what does and what does not exist or where things exist. Nonetheless, someone may say "It does not seem impossible to me that something might exist outside space and time. Surely the universe is bigger than our imaginations.” But this critic assumes that “spacetime" is itself a place; that it is something one can either be inside or outside of, and that (for all we know) things can be outside as well as in. He assumes that the proposition "God exists outside spacetime" is of the same form as "Ginkgoes are known to exist outside China." But this assumption is mistaken: "spacetime" is not itself a place and time; it is intended to refer to all the places and times that there are. Saying that something exists "outside space and time" is not to say it exists somewhere else, because there is nowhere else; it is to say it does not exist.*

Again, I beg to differ. I'm aware that the sentence "X doesn't exist anywhere"/"X exists nowhere" is ambiguous between "X does not exist at all" and "X does exist, but not at any place"; but the former interpretation is correct only if non-spatial (non-spatiotemporal) existence is equated with non-existence—which I think shouldn't be done!

…
Endowing any object with natural attributes carried to infinity is to invite conceptual mayhem, particularly when several are predicated simultaneously. Within our common conceptual framework only space and time can be extended to infinity in an orderly way. The logics of such formulae as "infinite wisdom," "infinite benevolence," "infinite power," "infinite knowledge," "infinite being," et cetera, are undeveloped; we have no consensus as to how such expressions ought to function. And if we attempt to interpret them using the logics of their component terms, we easily derive contradictions. An obvious example is the classical "problem of evil": if God is simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely beneficent, how does one explain the existence of evil? Another: if God is omnipotent and immutable, can He change Himself? Or if, per Anselm's definition, God is "that which nothing greater than can be conceived," then He must be able to conceive a being greater than Himself. For if He cannot, then we can conceive a greater being, namely one who can conceive a being greater than himself. So if God is that which nothing greater than can be conceived, then He is not. And so on.

I am doubtful whether the notion of an "infinite being" can be made coherent (although I grant that the above problem of visualizing an infinite elephant seems less troublesome in the case of a being which is also invisible and intangible). The concept of infinity, itself, is not a problem; the set of integers is a coherent infinity, and perhaps the universe is a spatio-temporal infinity of some cardinality. The question is whether a being (and the properties of a being) can coherently be described as infinite; whether "infinite being" may not be a predicative construct of the same ilk as "round square." I admit my uncertainty on this point, and welcome any arguments in opposition to my tentative conclusion. I would insist, however, that any proposed clarification preserve the differences between beings and things which are not beings, and that after "clarification" such things as elephants and mice continue to count as beings.

First of all, there is a distinction between multitudinal infinities, i.e. infinite numbers of things (including infinite sets/classes with infinitely many members), and magnitudinal infinities, i.e. infinite (extensive or intensive) quantities (physical or geometrical ones).

When infinite properties are attributed to God, are they multitudinal or magnitudinal?

* If there are infinitely many knowable truths, and God knows them all, then his knowledge is multitudinally infinite in the sense that the number of truths he knows is infinite.

* Wisdom includes but isn't identical to knowledge. The more truths you know, the wiser you are; so there is a multitudinal aspect; but the other apects of wisdom are qualities rather than quantities. So it's not clear what infinite wisdom is (if it's not the same as infinite knowledge).
As for the concept of wisdom, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wisdom/

* It seems a moral quality such as benevolence can only be infinite in the sense of being unrestricted.

* When God is said to have infinite power, it seems the only intelligible meaning of this is that God's power is unsurpassable by any other powers in the world.

[GE Morton]

I don't speak of Objectivism/Objective Reality here, as your words seem to say. I only observe that there is no clear, rational and logical reason to assume that any subsidiary part of the universe is separate, distinct or independent (of the rest of the universe).

My comment addressed the necessary and sufficient conditions for two or more things being distinct. It didn't address whether they are independent, which is a different claim and not implied by the things being distinct.

[Consul]

Two things are distinct if we can distinguish between them, and, conversely, any two things we can distinguish are distinct, by definition.

There is a psychological meaning of "distinct" = "clearly perceptible or discernible by the senses or the mind" (OED); but there are also nonpsychological meanings, particularly a weak one in which "distinct" = "numerically different", and a strong one in which "distinct" = "numerically different and separate", with "separate" meaning "non-overlapping" = "having no parts in common". For example, my head and my body aren't one and the same thing, but they overlap (mereologically) by sharing a part, viz. my head. (In standard mereology parthood is a reflexive relation, so my head is part both of itself and of my body.)

[Consul]

For example, my head and my body aren't one and the same thing, but they overlap (mereologically) by sharing a part, viz. my head. (In standard mereology parthood is a reflexive relation, so my head is part both of itself and of my body.)

Using the concept of partial identity, one can say that my head and my body are partially identical by overlapping (sharing some part(s)). And where there is partial identity, there is also partial difference: My head and my body are both partially identical and partially different, whereas my head and your head are totally nonidentical and totally different (= different and separate), because they have no parts in common.

[GE Morton]

Here is an excerpt from an essay of mine, written years ago, on the arguments
Saying that God (or anything else) exists "outside space and time" is to propose a new construal of the verb "to exist."

A definition of "existence" is one thing, and a criterion for existence is another. The former gives a semantic answer to the question as to what it is or takes to exist, and the latter gives an epistemological/methodological answer to the question as to how we can find out what exists. However, the concept of existence is one of our basic concepts, such that it is virtually indefinable by other concepts which are even more basic. And like Quine…

"I shall find no use for the narrow sense which some philosophers have given to 'existence', as against 'being'; viz., concreteness in space-time."

(Quine, W. V. Methods of Logic. 4th ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. p. 263)

If both concrete, spatiotemporal objects and abstract, non-spatiotemporal objects exist, both kinds of objects exists in one and the same sense of "exist".

"The concept of existence is probably basic and primitive in the sense that it is not possible to produce an informative definition of it in terms that are more clearly understood and that would tell us something important and revealing about what it is for something to exist."

(Kim, Jaegwon, and Ernest Sosa, eds. Metaphysics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. p. 3)

My quoted statement above is only true in context, i.e., with regard to what is required for a "being" to exist. There are many non-spatiotemporal existents (but they are not "beings").

I also think a definition of "existence," or "to exist," in order to be useful, must imply a criterion for existence. If there is no means of determining whether a claimed X exists, then the claim is vacuous. All terms, BTW, contrary to Kim, can be defined. If they could not then we could never learn to use them, or use them properly (meaning to communicate actionable information).

Again, I beg to differ. I'm aware that the sentence "X doesn't exist anywhere"/"X exists nowhere" is ambiguous between "X does not exist at all" and "X does exist, but not at any place"; but the former interpretation is correct only if non-spatial (non-spatiotemporal) existence is equated with non-existence—which I think shouldn't be done!

As I said above, I agree. There are many non-spatiotemporal existents, e.g., universals. If were asked for a definition of "to exist," it would be something like, "Has some communicative utility." In other words, what exists is whatever we say exists, as long as what we say enables or facilitates some communicable experience. The real challenge is not defining "existence," but in classifying existents, so that one sort of existent is not equated or confused with another.

First of all, there is a distinction between multitudinal infinities, i.e. infinite numbers of things (including infinite sets/classes with infinitely many members), and magnitudinal infinities, i.e. infinite (extensive or intensive) quantities (physical or geometrical ones).

I'm not sure that distinction is meaningful. If the members of the multitude are separated by finite distances, then a magnitudinal infinity is automatically created. E.g., since we know stars are separated by finite distances, if the universe consists of infinitely many stars, then it has infinite extent (magnitude).

When God is said to have infinite power, it seems the only intelligible meaning of this is that God's power is unsurpassable by any other powers in the world.

Well, that surely doesn't constitute an infinity. That would mean the most powerful star in the universe is God.

"Infinitely powerful" is another of those claims which leads to a paradox: Can God make a rock so heavy he can't pick it up?

[JackDaydream]

Of course, if the idea of an actual infinity is incoherent, then the idea of an infinitely extended body is incoherent too.

Here is an excerpt from an essay of mine, written years ago, on the arguments for the existence of God, concerning the problems with applying infinite attributes to "beings." You might find it interesting.

-----------------------

Claim #1 (first version): God is a "being" which exists in neither time nor space, or alternatively (second version), He exists in all times and places simultaneously.

With regard to the first version (no location), the question to ask is, What is the difference between a "being" which does not exist at any time or place and a being which does not exist at all? How can we tell the difference? The reader is invited to pause here and attempt to answer that question before proceeding . . . . After every location in the universe has been examined and nothing is found which we can agree is God, what do we believe we are saying when we continue to claim that He exists?

In our ordinary understanding of the term, to say that a thing exists is to say that if we look in a certain place (and time) we will find the thing. The time and place need not be specified, and may not even be known: often a claim that something exists is made in order to launch a search -- "Thar's gold in them hills!" It is this implication --- that the thing might be found -- which gives the verb, "to exist," any purpose in the language. Those who would disagree that this implication follows from a claim of existence are invited to explain what communication function "to exist" would serve otherwise -- what good would the term be in such a case? What use would it have? What information would anyone convey by asserting it of something?

"To be" is to be someplace, somewhen. If propositions of the form "X exists" carry any information at all, it is the information, "There is a time t and a place s such that at t and s one can find X." To say that something does not exist is to say that there is no intersection of t and s such that X can be found there; all possible combinations of t and s are empty of X. Thus (on our ordinary interpretation), to assert that something "exists outside space and time" is to assert a contradiction.

It is important to realize that none of this has the slightest thing to with what the universe is like. It has only to do with how effectively we can communicate with one another about the universe. To claim that "X exists outside of space and time" is to abolish the distinction intended when we say that something either exists or does not exist; someone who makes this claim has said that this distinction is of no value. Instead of things which exist and things which do not, we have things which exist in space and time and things which exist outside them; if God "exists outside of space and time," why not assert that demons, unicorns, fairies and poltergeists exist outside space and time? Why not argue that in this realm outside space and time, electrons, stars, and worlds exist also, populated by gorgons and dragons? Or even by cowboys and Indians? Or by Rhett Butler and Scarlet O'Hara? Instead of saying that Santa Claus does not exist, why not say he exists outside of spacetime?

Saying that God (or anything else) exists "outside space and time" is to propose a new construal of the verb "to exist." As we suggested above, we do not reject such proposals out of hand. But we are entitled to a certain conservatism: before we accept such proposals we should demand some showing of how our ability to describe the world to one another is improved by the proposed conceptual shift. And it is difficult to see what advantages for comprehension the strategy here proposed confers. A Santa that "exists outside space and time" leaves no more gifts than a non-existent Santa; a non-spatio-temporal unicorn is no easier to ride than an unreal one. How, in fact, do we tell the two apart? On the other hand, there would seem to be a major disadvantage: we have just created, willy-nilly, a new universe utterly bizarre and totally inaccessible. And how does that facilitate our understanding of the world?

We stress that it is a logical point we are making here, not an ontological one. We are not trying to say what does and what does not exist or where things exist. Nonetheless, someone may say "It does not seem impossible to me that something might exist outside space and time. Surely the universe is bigger than our imaginations.” But this critic assumes that “spacetime" is itself a place; that it is something one can either be inside or outside of, and that (for all we know) things can be outside as well as in. He assumes that the proposition "God exists outside spacetime" is of the same form as "Ginkgoes are known to exist outside China." But this assumption is mistaken: "spacetime" is not itself a place and time; it is intended to refer to all the places and times that there are. Saying that something exists "outside space and time" is not to say it exists somewhere else, because there is nowhere else; it is to say it does not exist.*

___________________________
*Denying that things exist "outside space and time" is not to rule out the possibility of multiple space-time domains. If the universe is "closed" (finite but unbounded) there may be universes other than ours. Objects in these "parallel universes" are outside our space-time continuum, but not "outside space and time." They have coordinates within their own local continuum, and also within a larger coordinate system that embraces our universe, as well.


We proceed to the second version of Claim #1: God is omnipresent. On my desk before me is a half-cupful of cold coffee. If God is everywhere, He is presumably in that cup. If I pour out the coffee, God will presumably remain in the cup (although part of Him would also have been poured out with the coffee). If I launch the cup into the vacuum of high orbit, still God will remain in the cup. We thus face another question similar to our earlier one: how do I tell a cup containing God from an empty cup? And if the two states of affairs cannot be distinguished, why not opt for the simpler, i.e., the empty cup?

The believer may now say, "God is not 'in' the cup in the same way that the coffee is 'in' the cup. The coffee is contained in the cup, but God is immanent in all things; it is His presence in it that sustains the cup. If God were not immanent in the cup it could not exist."

But this latter is surely an empirical claim. "If God were removed from the cup (or was to remove Himself from it) it would cease to exist" is of the same form as "If the latent heat were removed from the coffee, it would freeze." But the believer will not likely be able to remove God from the cup, or persuade Him to remove Himself; he will not be able to show that his claim is true. He thus predicates a property of the cup but does not show how a cup with this property differs from one that lacks it. Of course (the believer tells us), this property is not lacked by anything; it is a property of all things whatsoever. But we can certainly imagine that things might lack this property and yet exist. How do we tell, then, a universe in which all things possess this property from one in which things lack this property but exist anyway? If we have no way to decide whether our universe is made up of the first kind of objects or the second, why not (again) choose the simpler story?

We can no doubt imagine a universe in which all things exhibit a certain property; one, say, in which all things are blue. The inhabitants of this universe will not notice that all things are blue, and will not even have a word in their language for "blue" (or any other color, if all things are blue). Yet by hypothesis, all things in their universe are blue, whether they realize it or not. And so (says the believer) is God in all things in our universe.

Now the first thing to realize about this scenario is that there is a difference between what we outside observers are entitled to say about the blue universe and what its inhabitants are entitled to say (recall that it is what we are entitled to say that is at issue here). Being able to perceive colors ourselves (and aware that there are many colors), we, if we behold this imagined universe, are entitled to say all things in it are blue. We can distinguish blue things from orange and purple things, and can therefore have evidence, namely the evidence of our senses, that things in the blue universe are blue. The inhabitants, on the other hand, never having seen a color other than blue, have no concept of color; they can't have any evidence for the claim that things in their universe are blue. They have no point of reference; they are in the position we (in our universe) are in with respect to the conjecture (mentioned by Russell) that the universe, and everything within it, is doubling in size every second. Because no conceivable observation could confirm this conjecture, it is vacuous; no one is entitled to claim that the universe is doubling in size every second because no one can produce supporting evidence -- even though it may well be doubling in size every second (we dismiss this conjecture simply because it is uneconomical: if the universe is doubling in size every second, then we will need some account of the mechanism driving this expansion, etc.). Being similarly in want of evidence, the inhabitants of the blue universe are not entitled to claim all things in their universe are blue.

Imagine, however, that eventually the blue people discover the wave theory of light and produce a spectrometer. They measure the wavelengths of light reflected by things in their universe and discover that all things reflect at the same wavelength. Being imaginative, they propose that light might exist at other wavelengths, and call the wavelength with which they're familiar "blue.” They are now entitled to do this (and they are also obliged to demonstrate their hypothesis by actually producing light of another color).

It may be that God (regarded as some so far undiscovered property) is present in all things. But only someone in possession of evidence (or who can at least say what would count as evidence) is in a position to so claim. Until such evidence presents itself the claim is of the same status as the claim that the universe is doubling in size every second.

There is another possible problem with God's omnipresence: God is presumed to be a being. But are not beings necessarily local? It seems to be necessary for the identification of any being that the being have limits; that we be able to determine where the being begins and ends. Else how do we identify the being as a being? Suppose someone invites us to a zoo in another universe to gaze upon the incredible omnipresent elephant. Would we be able to see anything but an endless expanse of gray? How would we know we did not behold, instead, an omnipresent mouse? Or merely a dense fog?
Endowing any object with natural attributes carried to infinity is to invite conceptual mayhem, particularly when several are predicated simultaneously. Within our common conceptual framework only space and time can be extended to infinity in an orderly way. The logics of such formulae as "infinite wisdom," "infinite benevolence," "infinite power," "infinite knowledge," "infinite being," et cetera, are undeveloped; we have no consensus as to how such expressions ought to function. And if we attempt to interpret them using the logics of their component terms, we easily derive contradictions. An obvious example is the classical "problem of evil": if God is simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely beneficent, how does one explain the existence of evil? Another: if God is omnipotent and immutable, can He change Himself? Or if, per Anselm's definition, God is "that which nothing greater than can be conceived," then He must be able to conceive a being greater than Himself. For if He cannot, then we can conceive a greater being, namely one who can conceive a being greater than himself. So if God is that which nothing greater than can be conceived, then He is not. And so on.

I am doubtful whether the notion of an "infinite being" can be made coherent (although I grant that the above problem of visualizing an infinite elephant seems less troublesome in the case of a being which is also invisible and intangible). The concept of infinity, itself, is not a problem; the set of integers is a coherent infinity, and perhaps the universe is a spatio-temporal infinity of some cardinality. The question is whether a being (and the properties of a being) can coherently be described as infinite; whether "infinite being" may not be a predicative construct of the same ilk as "round square." I admit my uncertainty on this point, and welcome any arguments in opposition to my tentative conclusion. I would insist, however, that any proposed clarification preserve the differences between beings and things which are not beings, and that after "clarification" such things as elephants and mice continue to count as beings.

I have just read your essay and found it interesting because the issue of mind and body has often been seen as connected to the issue of 'God' although that has become less prominent. Many have chosen to write the idea of 'God' out of the picture because they cannot see a clear evidence of God, but it may come down to how God is seen. The fundamentalist religious perspectives may have created a narrowing down of the idea of God. In some ways, the debate about mind and body developed in the context of spiritual philosophy. Also, even though there are differences in worldviews, in the esoteric traditions there may be more unity concerning the nature of transcendent consciousness itself. This may be the way in which the human and the God merge, as expressed in the Hindu idea of 'Brahman merging with Atman.'

There is also the question of whether the transcendent is called God or not, and, perhaps it doesn't really matter how it is named exactly. One idea which I find helpful is the idea of the 'overself', spoken of by Paul Brunton. He described it in the following way, as the second self which he sees as,
''the union of spirit and matter, through a commingling of particles of consciousness drawn from the ever-consciousness real body. The second and later self is the one we each of us know, the personal self, but the first and real sense, which being of man, is the one which few of us know, which is subtle and not so apparent because it makes us partake of divinity. It lives always over our heads, as an angelic thing of unimaginable grandeur and mysterious sublimity, and therefore I call it the Overself'.

It may be that this reality as the source beyond mind and body is spoken of sometimes as 'God', as the daimon by Plato and by Bucke as 'cosmic consciousness'.


'

[JackDaydream]

It does seem that seeing the body as indefinable is an unusual perspective, as most people do take the body and the material world as givens. It seems to me that Chomsky is coming from the angle of seeing the body as a reality apart from its connection with mental processes as meaningless. If one was simply a body without the life of subjective experience it would be like some kind of non living being. This would be like people who are unconscious after some kind of accident, often kept alive artificially on respiratory. Even then, it may be that these people do have some kind of dream states.

Of course, there is the philosophy of idealism, but it does not mean that Chomsky goes that far. But, there is the whole perspective which sees the physical as an illusion and the mental as more real. This is the perspective of Berkley and some Eastern metaphysics. In many ways this is the opposite to the way most people think because the body can be observed and measured. However, at a phenomenological level, mind as the processing aspect of consciousness is the lens through which this is observed. It is possible to check this out through interaction with others, although it does mean that the reality has to involve believing that the other people are real. If this was doubted it would involve a solipsism in which everything in the outer world was seen as being like a dream.

If you are saying that the Body is ambiguous because of Idealism which says there is no real Body but, but only Consciousness, then maybe I get it. From my point of view there is a Real External Physical Universe plus an separate Real Internal Conscious Universe. These two Universes are Connected in some unknown way. The Physical Universe can go away, as it eventually will, but the Conscious Universe will always still be around. Since we are actually Conscious Minds in this Conscious Universe we will be around after the Physical Universe falls back into the Big Crunch or expands into the Big Whimper. There will be no more Physical Stuff for Conscious Stuff to Connect to. We will all then be Pure Conscious Experience. We cannot imagine what that will be like at this time.

That's an interesting perspective with the two universes of mind and body. It could be like an overlapping Venn diagram whereby the two come together. I am interested in the perspective of non dualism which is about overcoming the two aspects of mind and matter itself. It is complex though, from the standpoint of the human mind which cannot see beyond completely, as both Kant pointed out.

As for the idea that the physical may fall away and the consciousness remain, that is a form of idealism. But, it could also be that mind fell into matter initially. That is the viewpoint of some esoteric thinkers. Of course, it is hard to know how mind could exist prior to matter or after it has vanished. Such a view is at odds with the basics of scientific materialism.

I do find the area interesting but it is hard to know how minds would exist but it may be that there are inherent structures of mind or memory which do exist even though most people are unaware of them. One writer who speaks of such memories underlying nature is Rupert Sheldrake. His theory of morphic resonance suggests morphogenic fields as memories underlying developments in nature and life forms.

One other aspect is whether the mind is a blank state at birth. That is what John Locke thought and the contemporary thinker, Stephen Pinker. But, that is where one gets into the nitty gritty question of what is mind exactly? If at some point the physical world does cease to exist it could be asked if consciousness of beings were to continue. What form would it take. I imagine that disembodied forms would be like spirits. The idea of spirits is not accepted much very easily and is often compartmentalised into religious or esoteric thinking but it may be that there is a lot more to life and reality than most people are aware, although it is hard to find clear evidence because that is bound up with the knowledge and perception of the material world. I am not certain of such dimensions but I keep an open mind.

The Physicalist view will prevent the understanding that there could be a Conscious Mind in Conscious Space, separate from, a Physical Mind (Brain) in Physical Space. This is simply because the Physicalist must always insist that the Conscious Mind IS the Physical Mind. To a Physicalist there could never be a Conscious Mind if there was no Physical Universe. The Physicalist view has been researched and studied for a Hundred years, but Science has Zero Explanation for how Conscious Experiences ARE the Brain. Emphasis on the Zero. Conscious Experiences do not even Seem like they could BE the Brain. It's the Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience that have fooled almost everyone, including the best Minds on the planet, into pursuing the Physicalist point of view. We need to start designing Modern Models for the old Dualism. Like it or not Dualism seems to be the most Coherent approach, given the absolute Categorical Differences between any Conscious Experience and any kind of Neural Activity. Conscious Experience refuses to be pushed back into the Neurons. The Experiences just seem to sort of float there in some unknown place outside of what the Neurons are doing. I call this unknown place Conscious Space.

Your approach to mind leads me to think about the systems understanding of mind, especially Gregory Bateson' s idea of the 'ecology of mind'. This idea was summarised by Mary Catherine Bateson. She says,
'Bateson argued that the ecology of mind is an ecology of pattern, information, and ideas that happen to be embodied in material things...Mind is not separate from its material base, and tradition dualisms separating mind from body or mind from matter are erroneous.'
In addition, the 'emphasis on mental systems as including more than single organisms leads Gregory to the insistence that the unit of survival is always organism and environment'.

Even though beings develop unique individual consciousness there are aspects of group mind. Also, the history of dualism resulted in the idea of 'the ghost in the machine' which was too simplistic in the way it saw the mind and body relationship because it almost views the body as a container. Mind permeates the body, and body itself may be the expression of mind. It may be about going beyond idealism and materialism, and the conflict between the two perspectives may be that both are too concrete and do not give enough scope for the subtle intricacies of material form and consciousness.

[SteveKlinko]

If you are saying that the Body is ambiguous because of Idealism which says there is no real Body but, but only Consciousness, then maybe I get it. From my point of view there is a Real External Physical Universe plus an separate Real Internal Conscious Universe. These two Universes are Connected in some unknown way. The Physical Universe can go away, as it eventually will, but the Conscious Universe will always still be around. Since we are actually Conscious Minds in this Conscious Universe we will be around after the Physical Universe falls back into the Big Crunch or expands into the Big Whimper. There will be no more Physical Stuff for Conscious Stuff to Connect to. We will all then be Pure Conscious Experience. We cannot imagine what that will be like at this time.

That's an interesting perspective with the two universes of mind and body. It could be like an overlapping Venn diagram whereby the two come together. I am interested in the perspective of non dualism which is about overcoming the two aspects of mind and matter itself. It is complex though, from the standpoint of the human mind which cannot see beyond completely, as both Kant pointed out.

As for the idea that the physical may fall away and the consciousness remain, that is a form of idealism. But, it could also be that mind fell into matter initially. That is the viewpoint of some esoteric thinkers. Of course, it is hard to know how mind could exist prior to matter or after it has vanished. Such a view is at odds with the basics of scientific materialism.

I do find the area interesting but it is hard to know how minds would exist but it may be that there are inherent structures of mind or memory which do exist even though most people are unaware of them. One writer who speaks of such memories underlying nature is Rupert Sheldrake. His theory of morphic resonance suggests morphogenic fields as memories underlying developments in nature and life forms.

One other aspect is whether the mind is a blank state at birth. That is what John Locke thought and the contemporary thinker, Stephen Pinker. But, that is where one gets into the nitty gritty question of what is mind exactly? If at some point the physical world does cease to exist it could be asked if consciousness of beings were to continue. What form would it take. I imagine that disembodied forms would be like spirits. The idea of spirits is not accepted much very easily and is often compartmentalised into religious or esoteric thinking but it may be that there is a lot more to life and reality than most people are aware, although it is hard to find clear evidence because that is bound up with the knowledge and perception of the material world. I am not certain of such dimensions but I keep an open mind.

The Physicalist view will prevent the understanding that there could be a Conscious Mind in Conscious Space, separate from, a Physical Mind (Brain) in Physical Space. This is simply because the Physicalist must always insist that the Conscious Mind IS the Physical Mind. To a Physicalist there could never be a Conscious Mind if there was no Physical Universe. The Physicalist view has been researched and studied for a Hundred years, but Science has Zero Explanation for how Conscious Experiences ARE the Brain. Emphasis on the Zero. Conscious Experiences do not even Seem like they could BE the Brain. It's the Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience that have fooled almost everyone, including the best Minds on the planet, into pursuing the Physicalist point of view. We need to start designing Modern Models for the old Dualism. Like it or not Dualism seems to be the most Coherent approach, given the absolute Categorical Differences between any Conscious Experience and any kind of Neural Activity. Conscious Experience refuses to be pushed back into the Neurons. The Experiences just seem to sort of float there in some unknown place outside of what the Neurons are doing. I call this unknown place Conscious Space.

Your approach to mind leads me to think about the systems understanding of mind, especially Gregory Bateson' s idea of the 'ecology of mind'. This idea was summarised by Mary Catherine Bateson. She says,
'Bateson argued that the ecology of mind is an ecology of pattern, information, and ideas that happen to be embodied in material things...Mind is not separate from its material base, and tradition dualisms separating mind from body or mind from matter are erroneous.'
In addition, the 'emphasis on mental systems as including more than single organisms leads Gregory to the insistence that the unit of survival is always organism and environment'.

Even though beings develop unique individual consciousness there are aspects of group mind. Also, the history of dualism resulted in the idea of 'the ghost in the machine' which was too simplistic in the way it saw the mind and body relationship because it almost views the body as a container. Mind permeates the body, and body itself may be the expression of mind. It may be about going beyond idealism and materialism, and the conflict between the two perspectives may be that both are too concrete and do not give enough scope for the subtle intricacies of material form and consciousness.

From my point of view the Physical Mind (Brain) is a Tool that is separate from the Conscious Mind which uses the Tool. This is close to the Ghost in the Machine concept on the surface, but in reality when you think a little Deeper about this, it is a very different concept. The Conscious Mind is Connected (Connectism) to the Physical Mind. The Physical Mind does not Embody the Conscious Mind. These two Minds are separate and different Phenomena. I think this is intuitively clear. All Physicalist efforts to push the Conscious Mind back into the Physical Mind ring Hollow to me and are really quite Incoherent. The fact that we don't know how the two Minds are Connected does not invalidate the point of view. At least it is more satisfying to me to think about these two Minds as separate and different than to try to squash them together into one thing. It is the duty of Science to pursue the Connectist approach in their study of the Conscious Mind.

[GE Morton]

I have just read your essay and found it interesting because the issue of mind and body has often been seen as connected to the issue of 'God' although that has become less prominent.

Although arguments for the existence of God provoked the essay, the real thrust is the difficulties with predicating infinite attributes, to God or anything else.

[The Beast]

This what we call the body is formed by substance in a gravitational state. This substance is arranged by the intelligence/plan of DNA. The origin of life is the origin of the body and of DNA. The existence of virtual particles is accepted as true. If there are virtual particles it must be possible that there is a virtual substance. This substance is then categorized as metaphysical by many and interdimensional by others or both. If a picture is in the mind it must be a hologram made of virtual particles. The reality of this image exist within the reality of the body and therefore in a Universal x-dimensional coordinates sharing the x, y, z. Whether two systems share one point is mathematically possible. A difference of opinion is a formation of virtual particles. This arrangement might be shared or not. However, there is a cascade or a virtual recursive procedure that is dependent of the Universal substance and this explains why there are birds and why there are humans. It is this of a virtual image of a butterfly and of wings.
IMO. The origin of life is in a property of energy to arrange the fields and gate the virtual particles. Life on Earth is the recursive record since. This we call human virtue might be properties of the virtual particles or the realization of the ongoing human thought.

[JackDaydream]

That's an interesting perspective with the two universes of mind and body. It could be like an overlapping Venn diagram whereby the two come together. I am interested in the perspective of non dualism which is about overcoming the two aspects of mind and matter itself. It is complex though, from the standpoint of the human mind which cannot see beyond completely, as both Kant pointed out.

As for the idea that the physical may fall away and the consciousness remain, that is a form of idealism. But, it could also be that mind fell into matter initially. That is the viewpoint of some esoteric thinkers. Of course, it is hard to know how mind could exist prior to matter or after it has vanished. Such a view is at odds with the basics of scientific materialism.

I do find the area interesting but it is hard to know how minds would exist but it may be that there are inherent structures of mind or memory which do exist even though most people are unaware of them. One writer who speaks of such memories underlying nature is Rupert Sheldrake. His theory of morphic resonance suggests morphogenic fields as memories underlying developments in nature and life forms.

One other aspect is whether the mind is a blank state at birth. That is what John Locke thought and the contemporary thinker, Stephen Pinker. But, that is where one gets into the nitty gritty question of what is mind exactly? If at some point the physical world does cease to exist it could be asked if consciousness of beings were to continue. What form would it take. I imagine that disembodied forms would be like spirits. The idea of spirits is not accepted much very easily and is often compartmentalised into religious or esoteric thinking but it may be that there is a lot more to life and reality than most people are aware, although it is hard to find clear evidence because that is bound up with the knowledge and perception of the material world. I am not certain of such dimensions but I keep an open mind.

The Physicalist view will prevent the understanding that there could be a Conscious Mind in Conscious Space, separate from, a Physical Mind (Brain) in Physical Space. This is simply because the Physicalist must always insist that the Conscious Mind IS the Physical Mind. To a Physicalist there could never be a Conscious Mind if there was no Physical Universe. The Physicalist view has been researched and studied for a Hundred years, but Science has Zero Explanation for how Conscious Experiences ARE the Brain. Emphasis on the Zero. Conscious Experiences do not even Seem like they could BE the Brain. It's the Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience that have fooled almost everyone, including the best Minds on the planet, into pursuing the Physicalist point of view. We need to start designing Modern Models for the old Dualism. Like it or not Dualism seems to be the most Coherent approach, given the absolute Categorical Differences between any Conscious Experience and any kind of Neural Activity. Conscious Experience refuses to be pushed back into the Neurons. The Experiences just seem to sort of float there in some unknown place outside of what the Neurons are doing. I call this unknown place Conscious Space.

Your approach to mind leads me to think about the systems understanding of mind, especially Gregory Bateson' s idea of the 'ecology of mind'. This idea was summarised by Mary Catherine Bateson. She says,
'Bateson argued that the ecology of mind is an ecology of pattern, information, and ideas that happen to be embodied in material things...Mind is not separate from its material base, and tradition dualisms separating mind from body or mind from matter are erroneous.'
In addition, the 'emphasis on mental systems as including more than single organisms leads Gregory to the insistence that the unit of survival is always organism and environment'.

Even though beings develop unique individual consciousness there are aspects of group mind. Also, the history of dualism resulted in the idea of 'the ghost in the machine' which was too simplistic in the way it saw the mind and body relationship because it almost views the body as a container. Mind permeates the body, and body itself may be the expression of mind. It may be about going beyond idealism and materialism, and the conflict between the two perspectives may be that both are too concrete and do not give enough scope for the subtle intricacies of material form and consciousness.

From my point of view the Physical Mind (Brain) is a Tool that is separate from the Conscious Mind which uses the Tool. This is close to the Ghost in the Machine concept on the surface, but in reality when you think a little Deeper about this, it is a very different concept. The Conscious Mind is Connected (Connectism) to the Physical Mind. The Physical Mind does not Embody the Conscious Mind. These two Minds are separate and different Phenomena. I think this is intuitively clear. All Physicalist efforts to push the Conscious Mind back into the Physical Mind ring Hollow to me and are really quite Incoherent. The fact that we don't know how the two Minds are Connected does not invalidate the point of view. At least it is more satisfying to me to think about these two Minds as separate and different than to try to squash them together into one thing. It is the duty of Science to pursue the Connectist approach in their study of the Conscious Mind.

I am interested by your approach. Most people seem to see the brain and mind as connected. The mind is a far wider reality than may be seen as the brain. Some see the nature of mind as almost solved by neuroscience. But, that may be simply about the wiring of the nervous system and the nervous system. So, I am interested by how you see mind and consciousness. Is it as something which is a far larger reality than can ever be pinpointed to the brain itself, as posited in reductive understanding of consciousness?