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[JackDaydream]

Part of the mind and body comes down to the question of dualism but it is also related to the issue of materialism or idealism. It also comes down to how mind and body are defined. In particular, I am thinking how other concepts come in, such as the 'soul' and the 'self' come in, to speak of mental states of human beings.

I have been reading Noam Chomsky on the mind and body problem, in his lecture titled, 'The View Beyond: Prospects for the Study of Mind', in which he explores the way in which the idea of the body itself is vague. He states,
'there is no definite concept of the body. Rather, there is a material world, the properties of which are to be discovered, with no a priori demarcation of what will count as "body". The mind-body problem can therefore not be formulated. The problem cannot be solved, because there is no clear way to state it. Unless someone proposes a definite concept of the body, we cannot ask whether some phenomena exceed its bounds. Similarly, we cannot pose the problem of other minds'.

I am wondering how this fits into the psychological and philosophy debates about what is 'mind', which is sometimes ambiguous. I am quoting Chomsky with a view to questioning the ambiguity of body as well as mind. I am also thinking how many see the issue of mind in terms of neuroscience, which is about connecting mental states to the brain. Does this approach solve the problem of the mind-body problem, or does it still leave unanswered philosophy questions about the meaning and relationship between mind and body? Can mind be reduced to 'brain' and the body or is consciousness a larger 'reality' imminent through the organs of human perception?

[JackDaydream]

I guess that my thread is questioning the physicalist perspective. So many thinkers view the body and brain as 'real' and see the mind and consciousness from the standpoint of mechanical materialism. I am not advocating idealism necessarily but questioning the underlying basis of how 'reality is seen. Is 'mind' itself as real as the physical aspects of the world, or is the attempt to split mind and body as categories a philosophical mistake in itself?

[GrayArea]

I guess that my thread is questioning the physicalist perspective. So many thinkers view the body and brain as 'real' and see the mind and consciousness from the standpoint of mechanical materialism. I am not advocating idealism necessarily but questioning the underlying basis of how 'reality is seen. Is 'mind' itself as real as the physical aspects of the world, or is the attempt to split mind and body as categories a philosophical mistake in itself?

I think that the concept of mind should not be taken into consideration because we can never fully define the mind. This "true" mind is what allows us to define things in the first place anyway. I suppose that means that the only way to define the "true" mind is to know that we already have, through simply existing.

We should only care about how the physical world works affects us from the perspective of the mind and not be so attached to the mind itself—as in, where that perspective comes from. To wonder where that perspective comes from is only possible because of our mind anyway.

[stevie]

There is no [direct] scientific evidence for "the mind". There are only circumstantial evidences that imply a hypothesis "mind". However there is scientific evidence for "the body" because scientific evidence necessarily is based on materiality.
"mind" is usually used as a collective term for all mental phenomena including "consciousness" like "mentality" is used. All mental phenomena have the same status of hypothesis like "mind".
Since scientific evidence is necessarily material (accessible to the five senses independent of beliefs) mentality being a product of materiality is a necessary hypothesis.
Now the word "hypothesis" has be applied three times: "mind" as hypothesis, "all mental phenomena" as hypothesis and "mentality being a product of materiality" as necessary hypothesis. The last hypothesis follows necessarily from the two preceding hypotheses from the perspective of science. But is any of these hypotheses a scientific hypothesis? No these can't be scientific hypotheses because a scientific hypothesis is a verbal expression that is based on logic and circumstantial evidences AND that is subject to being tested in an experimental setting, i.e. a scientific hypothesis is designed in a way that it can be experimentally tested. But currently not experimental setting is available to test the hypotheses "mind", "all mental phenomena" and "mentality is a product of materiality".

[Pattern-chaser]

I guess that my thread is questioning the physicalist perspective. So many thinkers view the body and brain as 'real' and see the mind and consciousness from the standpoint of mechanical materialism. I am not advocating idealism necessarily but questioning the underlying basis of how 'reality is seen. Is 'mind' itself as real as the physical aspects of the world, or is the attempt to split mind and body as categories a philosophical mistake in itself?

To identify the mind as a distinct thing is a "philosophical mistake", I think. To look at the mind in isolation is not useful, that I can see. A human mind is embodied; a human body is 'enminded'. To consider one without the other cannot lead to useful or usable conclusions. Dualism for intellectual convenience can sometimes be useful. But in this case, we cannot afford to consider the mind as an isolated entity because our conclusions will be incomplete, and thereby mistaken.

[SteveKlinko]

Part of the mind and body comes down to the question of dualism but it is also related to the issue of materialism or idealism. It also comes down to how mind and body are defined. In particular, I am thinking how other concepts come in, such as the 'soul' and the 'self' come in, to speak of mental states of human beings.

I have been reading Noam Chomsky on the mind and body problem, in his lecture titled, 'The View Beyond: Prospects for the Study of Mind', in which he explores the way in which the idea of the body itself is vague. He states,
'there is no definite concept of the body. Rather, there is a material world, the properties of which are to be discovered, with no a priori demarcation of what will count as "body". The mind-body problem can therefore not be formulated. The problem cannot be solved, because there is no clear way to state it. Unless someone proposes a definite concept of the body, we cannot ask whether some phenomena exceed its bounds. Similarly, we cannot pose the problem of other minds'.

I am wondering how this fits into the psychological and philosophy debates about what is 'mind', which is sometimes ambiguous. I am quoting Chomsky with a view to questioning the ambiguity of body as well as mind. I am also thinking how many see the issue of mind in terms of neuroscience, which is about connecting mental states to the brain. Does this approach solve the problem of the mind-body problem, or does it still leave unanswered philosophy questions about the meaning and relationship between mind and body? Can mind be reduced to 'brain' and the body or is consciousness a larger 'reality' imminent through the organs of human perception?

I don't quite understand the premise that the Body is not definable. What are some examples of things that are ambiguous about the Body?

[Consul]

I have been reading Noam Chomsky on the mind and body problem, in his lecture titled, 'The View Beyond: Prospects for the Study of Mind', in which he explores the way in which the idea of the body itself is vague. He states, 'there is no definite concept of the body. Rather, there is a material world, the properties of which are to be discovered, with no a priori demarcation of what will count as "body". The mind-body problem can therefore not be formulated. The problem cannot be solved, because there is no clear way to state it. Unless someone proposes a definite concept of the body, we cannot ask whether some phenomena exceed its bounds. Similarly, we cannot pose the problem of other minds'.

A body (in the physical sense of the term) is a spatially or spatiotemporally extended material object or substance. A body is three-dimensional or four-dimensional, depending on whether or not it has temporal parts in addition to its spatial parts; but it cannot be zero-dimensional, such that if elementary particles were literally like mathematical points, they wouldn't be bodies.

Here are traditional definitions:

QUOTE>
"The word body, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which filleth, or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the universe."

(Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 1651. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. [Pt. 3, ch. 34, §2.] p. 261)

"We now understand the nature of imaginary space, in which we suppose nothing external to exist, but only the pure absence of the things which, when they existed, left their images in the mind. Let us next suppose that one of these things is put back again, or re-created. It is therefore necessary for that re-created or replaced thing not only to occupy some part of the said space (i.e. to coincide and be coextensive with it), but also to be something which does not depend on our imagination. But this is the very thing which is customarily called body on account of its extension; self-subsistent on account of its independence from our thought; existent because it subsists outside us; and finally substance or subject because it seems to support and underlie imaginary space, so that it is not by the senses, but only by reason that we understand that something is there. So the definition of body is something like this: Body is whatever coincides or is coextensive with a part of space, and does not depend on our thought."

(Hobbes, Thomas. Elementorum philosophiae, sectio prima: De corpore (1655, engl. 1656), Part II, Ch. 8: Body and Accident, 8.1 The Definition of "Body")

"A body, in the physical sense, is a matter between determinate boundaries (which therefore has a figure). The space between these boundaries, considered in accordance with its magnitude, is the volume [of the body]."

(Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. 1786. Translated and edited by Michael Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 64)

"…to be body, that is to say, to be formed and specifically determined matter…"

(Schopenhauer, Arthur. Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. p. 107)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

QUOTE>
"A body, in the physical sense, is a matter between determinate boundaries (which therefore has a figure). The space between these boundaries, considered in accordance with its magnitude, is the volume [of the body]."

(Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. 1786. Translated and edited by Michael Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 64)
<QUOTE

Kant's definition implies that the physical world as a whole isn't a body if it is spatially infinite, since an extended object with an infinite volume doesn't have a spatial boundary (and thus doesn't have a figure either). But I think this restriction is unnecessary for the general concept of a body. The concept of an infinitely extended body is acceptable, whereas the concept of a non-extended body is not.

[JackDaydream]

I guess that my thread is questioning the physicalist perspective. So many thinkers view the body and brain as 'real' and see the mind and consciousness from the standpoint of mechanical materialism. I am not advocating idealism necessarily but questioning the underlying basis of how 'reality is seen. Is 'mind' itself as real as the physical aspects of the world, or is the attempt to split mind and body as categories a philosophical mistake in itself?

I think that the concept of mind should not be taken into consideration because we can never fully define the mind. This "true" mind is what allows us to define things in the first place anyway. I suppose that means that the only way to define the "true" mind is to know that we already have, through simply existing.

We should only care about how the physical world works affects us from the perspective of the mind and not be so attached to the mind itself—as in, where that perspective comes from. To wonder where that perspective comes from is only possible because of our mind anyway.

It may be that the idea of understanding how the physical world may be the basis for knowing mind. The idea of the 'true' mind may be important in terms of the authentic self. This may be the important aspect of mind but mind can only be known by mind itself, apart from the way it is understood and observed through the effects on behaviour. Even emotions are a combination of the physical alongside the subjective sense of mind or mental states.

[JackDaydream]

There is no [direct] scientific evidence for "the mind". There are only circumstantial evidences that imply a hypothesis "mind". However there is scientific evidence for "the body" because scientific evidence necessarily is based on materiality.
"mind" is usually used as a collective term for all mental phenomena including "consciousness" like "mentality" is used. All mental phenomena have the same status of hypothesis like "mind".
Since scientific evidence is necessarily material (accessible to the five senses independent of beliefs) mentality being a product of materiality is a necessary hypothesis.


Now the word "hypothesis" has be applied three times: "mind" as hypothesis, "all mental phenomena" as hypothesis and "mentality being a product of materiality" as necessary hypothesis. The last hypothesis follows necessarily from the two preceding hypotheses from the perspective of science. But is any of these hypotheses a scientific hypothesis? No these can't be scientific hypotheses because a scientific hypothesis is a verbal expression that is based on logic and circumstantial evidences AND that is subject to being tested in an experimental setting, i.e. a scientific hypothesis is designed in a way that it can be experimentally tested. But currently not experimental setting is available to test the hypotheses "mind", "all mental phenomena" and "mentality is a product of materiality".

Scientific evidence for the mind is difficult because it comes down to material effects of mind. The experimental psychologists tried to measure it in terms of behaviour and some followed in the footsteps of B F Skinner, who dismissed the idea of mind and saw human beings as reactive.

Of course, part of the scientific understanding of mind comes down to psychiatry. This is interrelated to neuroscience and it is a biochemical level that mental states and behaviour can be altered. Many psychiatrists do believe in the mind, even though it may be interconnected to the brain and the body. The cognitive behavioral thinkers do believe that working with beliefs has a profound effect on psychology and it does seem that cognitive processes are aspects arising from the brain but they van be viewed as processes and as having a 'real' existence which goes beyond physicality.

[JackDaydream]

I guess that my thread is questioning the physicalist perspective. So many thinkers view the body and brain as 'real' and see the mind and consciousness from the standpoint of mechanical materialism. I am not advocating idealism necessarily but questioning the underlying basis of how 'reality is seen. Is 'mind' itself as real as the physical aspects of the world, or is the attempt to split mind and body as categories a philosophical mistake in itself?

To identify the mind as a distinct thing is a "philosophical mistake", I think. To look at the mind in isolation is not useful, that I can see. A human mind is embodied; a human body is 'enminded'. To consider one without the other cannot lead to useful or usable conclusions. Dualism for intellectual convenience can sometimes be useful. But in this case, we cannot afford to consider the mind as an isolated entity because our conclusions will be incomplete, and thereby mistaken.

The viewing of the mind as a separate entity was the approach of Cartesian dualism and it even was related to ideas of immortality, in the form of a soul which could live on beyond death. It is probable that the reason why many do not believe in life after death in the twentieth first century is because the idea of disembodied minds doesn't work too well. Fritjof Capra, a physicist who wrote about the limitations of Cartesian dualism spoke of the complexity of the interrelationship between mind and body..However, in such a picture mind itself is not ruled about but seen as imminent within it, as opposed to separate.

[Pattern-chaser]

I guess that my thread is questioning the physicalist perspective. So many thinkers view the body and brain as 'real' and see the mind and consciousness from the standpoint of mechanical materialism. I am not advocating idealism necessarily but questioning the underlying basis of how 'reality is seen. Is 'mind' itself as real as the physical aspects of the world, or is the attempt to split mind and body as categories a philosophical mistake in itself?

To identify the mind as a distinct thing is a "philosophical mistake", I think. To look at the mind in isolation is not useful, that I can see. A human mind is embodied; a human body is 'enminded'. To consider one without the other cannot lead to useful or usable conclusions. Dualism for intellectual convenience can sometimes be useful. But in this case, we cannot afford to consider the mind as an isolated entity because our conclusions will be incomplete, and thereby mistaken.

The viewing of the mind as a separate entity was the approach of Cartesian dualism, and it even was related to ideas of immortality, in the form of a soul which could live on beyond death. It is probable that the reason why many do not believe in life after death in the twentieth first century is because the idea of disembodied minds doesn't work too well. Fritjof Capra, a physicist who wrote about the limitations of Cartesian dualism, spoke of the complexity of the interrelationship between mind and body. However, in such a picture mind itself is not ruled about but seen as imminent within it, as opposed to separate.

Yes, and I see no real problem with 'life after death' either. In that case, we would have to learn about a new vehicle for mind ... or maybe a disembodied mind? I'm not sure about the latter. Actually, I'm not sure about any of this, but that's the fun of topics like this, yes?

[JackDaydream]

Part of the mind and body comes down to the question of dualism but it is also related to the issue of materialism or idealism. It also comes down to how mind and body are defined. In particular, I am thinking how other concepts come in, such as the 'soul' and the 'self' come in, to speak of mental states of human beings.

I have been reading Noam Chomsky on the mind and body problem, in his lecture titled, 'The View Beyond: Prospects for the Study of Mind', in which he explores the way in which the idea of the body itself is vague. He states,
'there is no definite concept of the body. Rather, there is a material world, the properties of which are to be discovered, with no a priori demarcation of what will count as "body". The mind-body problem can therefore not be formulated. The problem cannot be solved, because there is no clear way to state it. Unless someone proposes a definite concept of the body, we cannot ask whether some phenomena exceed its bounds. Similarly, we cannot pose the problem of other minds'.

I am wondering how this fits into the psychological and philosophy debates about what is 'mind', which is sometimes ambiguous. I am quoting Chomsky with a view to questioning the ambiguity of body as well as mind. I am also thinking how many see the issue of mind in terms of neuroscience, which is about connecting mental states to the brain. Does this approach solve the problem of the mind-body problem, or does it still leave unanswered philosophy questions about the meaning and relationship between mind and body? Can mind be reduced to 'brain' and the body or is consciousness a larger 'reality' imminent through the organs of human perception?

I don't quite understand the premise that the Body is not definable. What are some examples of things that are ambiguous about the Body?

It does seem that seeing the body as indefinable is an unusual perspective, as most people do take the body and the material world as givens. It seems to me that Chomsky is coming from the angle of seeing the body as a reality apart from its connection with mental processes as meaningless. If one was simply a body without the life of subjective experience it would be like some kind of non living being. This would be like people who are unconscious after some kind of accident, often kept alive artificially on respiratory. Even then, it may be that these people do have some kind of dream states.

Of course, there is the philosophy of idealism, but it does not mean that Chomsky goes that far. But, there is the whole perspective which sees the physical as an illusion and the mental as more real. This is the perspective of Berkley and some Eastern metaphysics. In many ways this is the opposite to the way most people think because the body can be observed and measured. However, at a phenomenological level, mind as the processing aspect of consciousness is the lens through which this is observed. It is possible to check this out through interaction with others, although it does mean that the reality has to involve believing that the other people are real. If this was doubted it would involve a solipsism in which everything in the outer world was seen as being like a dream.

[JackDaydream]

I have been reading Noam Chomsky on the mind and body problem, in his lecture titled, 'The View Beyond: Prospects for the Study of Mind', in which he explores the way in which the idea of the body itself is vague. He states, 'there is no definite concept of the body. Rather, there is a material world, the properties of which are to be discovered, with no a priori demarcation of what will count as "body". The mind-body problem can therefore not be formulated. The problem cannot be solved, because there is no clear way to state it. Unless someone proposes a definite concept of the body, we cannot ask whether some phenomena exceed its bounds. Similarly, we cannot pose the problem of other minds'.

A body (in the physical sense of the term) is a spatially or spatiotemporally extended material object or substance. A body is three-dimensional or four-dimensional, depending on whether or not it has temporal parts in addition to its spatial parts; but it cannot be zero-dimensional, such that if elementary particles were literally like mathematical points, they wouldn't be bodies.

Here are traditional definitions:

QUOTE>
"The word body, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which filleth, or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the universe."

(Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 1651. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. [Pt. 3, ch. 34, §2.] p. 261)

"We now understand the nature of imaginary space, in which we suppose nothing external to exist, but only the pure absence of the things which, when they existed, left their images in the mind. Let us next suppose that one of these things is put back again, or re-created. It is therefore necessary for that re-created or replaced thing not only to occupy some part of the said space (i.e. to coincide and be coextensive with it), but also to be something which does not depend on our imagination. But this is the very thing which is customarily called body on account of its extension; self-subsistent on account of its independence from our thought; existent because it subsists outside us; and finally substance or subject because it seems to support and underlie imaginary space, so that it is not by the senses, but only by reason that we understand that something is there. So the definition of body is something like this: Body is whatever coincides or is coextensive with a part of space, and does not depend on our thought."

(Hobbes, Thomas. Elementorum philosophiae, sectio prima: De corpore (1655, engl. 1656), Part II, Ch. 8: Body and Accident, 8.1 The Definition of "Body")

"A body, in the physical sense, is a matter between determinate boundaries (which therefore has a figure). The space between these boundaries, considered in accordance with its magnitude, is the volume [of the body]."

(Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. 1786. Translated and edited by Michael Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 64)

"…to be body, that is to say, to be formed and specifically determined matter…"

(Schopenhauer, Arthur. Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. p. 107)
<QUOTE

The definitions of body are extremely useful because there is so much philosophy which addresses the existence of mind but rarely does philosophy touch upon the body itself. It is often viewed from the standpoint of the physical sciences, especially biology, rather than given much attention within philosophy. It was probably seen rather differently in previous ages and the interface between mind and body itself is an important aspect of phenomenology.

[JackDaydream]

QUOTE>
"A body, in the physical sense, is a matter between determinate boundaries (which therefore has a figure). The space between these boundaries, considered in accordance with its magnitude, is the volume [of the body]."

(Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. 1786. Translated and edited by Michael Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 64)
<QUOTE

Kant's definition implies that the physical world as a whole isn't a body if it is spatially infinite, since an extended object with an infinite volume doesn't have a spatial boundary (and thus doesn't have a figure either). But I think this restriction is unnecessary for the general concept of a body. The concept of an infinitely extended body is acceptable, whereas the concept of a non-extended body is not.

Kant's definition is helpful and one aspect leading on from this is the way in which Schopenhauer develops the idea of Kant. In particular, Schopenhauer views the 'thing in itself' or noumenon as being known through human consciousness itself. Such a philosophy does place an emphasis on mind as a central aspect of existence. So, does Hegel. It does appear that Hegel is not given much attention, especially on philosophy forums, and that may be due to the emphasis which he places on mind.