SteveKlinko wrote: ↑March 3rd, 2022, 3:58 pm
It is completely Sensible to say that Neural Activity causes the Conscious Experience. If it does not, then the proper Explanation will show why the Inter Mind is misguided. But there is no proper Explanation, so we should stick with what we know and what is Sensible. We should especially not make assumptions like that Neural Activity doesn't cause Conscious Experience. From a Systems Engineering and Signal Processing process flow point of view your Assumption is misguided. The Conscious Experience most certainly does seem like a further stage after the Neural Processing. It is just not Sensible to say they are the same thing.
I doubt it's more sensible to endorse property dualism and to say that experiential properties (qualia) are emergent properties which are irreducibly different from (complexes of) neural properties.
Problem #1: The "attachment problem"
"[T]he notion of these unique properties is a mysterious one. We are to think of the central nervous system as somehow stippled over with a changing pattern of these special properties. ...Just how do these properties attach to the brain? I, at any rate, can form no clear conception of such properties and their attachment."
(Armstrong, D. M.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. p. 48)
Problem #1: Qualia dualism can hardly avoid epiphenomenalism.
"To believe in the [irreducibility of the (my add.)] phenomenal aspect of the world, but deny that it is epiphenomenal, is to bet against the truth of physics."
(Lewis, David. "What Experience Teaches." 1988. In
Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 262-290. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 283)