Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Leontiskos]

So yes there are eternal moral truths. Moral facts, if you will. But the existence of those facts is insufficient to determine the right moral choice in every situation. The process of weighing up moral facts is not itself a moral fact.

But if you think that the right way to trade off between those considerations is itself one of those "facts" then I think you're making a philosophical error.

You have written some goods posts in this thread, but I want to challenge what you say in these two quotes. Why isn't the relative weight of moral facts itself a moral fact?

Why do you reject the possibility of moral truths discoverable by reason?

Thank you for this. I have found the moral philosophy on this forum to be deeply impoverished. Everyone claims to reject moral realism before sneaking it back in without realizing what they are doing. It's nice to see a simple affirmation of moral truths without any legerdemain.

[Leontiskos]

Moral subjectivists sometimes seem to think like this:

1. People disagree about morality.
2. Therefore there are no absolute moral truths.

But that's not a valid argument.

Exactly right. There is also the corollary subjectivist claim, so common in Peter Holmes' thread, that consensus itself creates objectivity and justifies morality (see P1 in <this post>).

[Belindi]

Moral subjectivists sometimes seem to think like this:

1. People disagree about morality.
2. Therefore there are no absolute moral truths.

But that's not a valid argument.

Exactly right. There is also the corollary subjectivist claim, so common in Peter Holmes' thread, that consensus itself creates objectivity and justifies morality (see P1 in <this post>).

If the collective were the arbiter of values then consensus would be the basis for its morality. On the other hand if the individual were the arbiter of values then we would have autocracy. To steer between Scylla and Charybdis we choose democracy.

Democracy is founded upon the utilitarian ethic. The utilitarian ethic is inapplicable to individuals' aims and behaviours but politically utilitarianism is the one ethic that most approaches an objective criterion.

[Pattern-chaser]

Democracy is founded upon the utilitarian ethic. The utilitarian ethic is inapplicable to individuals' aims and behaviours but politically utilitarianism is the one ethic that most approaches an objective criterion.

I have this nagging feeling that one can "approach" objectivity in the same way that one can "approach" being pregnant. I.e. you are pregnant, or you are not. Being objective seems similar? Objectivity is a fairly certain, precise, and defined thing, is it not?

[Leontiskos]

Exactly right. There is also the corollary subjectivist claim, so common in Peter Holmes' thread, that consensus itself creates objectivity and justifies morality (see P1 in <this post>).

If the collective were the arbiter of values then consensus would be the basis for its morality. On the other hand if the individual were the arbiter of values then we would have autocracy. To steer between Scylla and Charybdis we choose democracy.

Democracy is founded upon the utilitarian ethic. The utilitarian ethic is inapplicable to individuals' aims and behaviours but politically utilitarianism is the one ethic that most approaches an objective criterion.

Why think that democracy does not make the collective the "arbiter" of values? It seems that it clearly does. In democracy the collective will is the sovereign.

[Belindi]

Exactly right. There is also the corollary subjectivist claim, so common in Peter Holmes' thread, that consensus itself creates objectivity and justifies morality (see P1 in <this post>).

If the collective were the arbiter of values then consensus would be the basis for its morality. On the other hand if the individual were the arbiter of values then we would have autocracy. To steer between Scylla and Charybdis we choose democracy.

Democracy is founded upon the utilitarian ethic. The utilitarian ethic is inapplicable to individuals' aims and behaviours but politically utilitarianism is the one ethic that most approaches an objective criterion.

Why think that democracy does not make the collective the "arbiter" of values? It seems that it clearly does. In democracy the collective will is the sovereign.

Democracy depends upon competing individuals and their party allegiances so it's not like I understand about communism where the collective will, i.e the will of the proletariat, is sovereign and lacks competition.

[Belindi]

Democracy is founded upon the utilitarian ethic. The utilitarian ethic is inapplicable to individuals' aims and behaviours but politically utilitarianism is the one ethic that most approaches an objective criterion.

I have this nagging feeling that one can "approach" objectivity in the same way that one can "approach" being pregnant. I.e. you are pregnant, or you are not. Being objective seems similar? Objectivity is a fairly certain, precise, and defined thing, is it not?

I too understand by objectivity that it's all or nothing. I should have included that, barring miracles, all or nothing objectivity is impossible. So we poor souls have to make do with common -or - garden fairness. Utilitarianism is the fairest political ethic.

[Leontiskos]

Why think that democracy does not make the collective the "arbiter" of values? It seems that it clearly does. In democracy the collective will is the sovereign.

Democracy depends upon competing individuals and their party allegiances so it's not like I understand about communism where the collective will, i.e the will of the proletariat, is sovereign and lacks competition.

In democracy blocs of individuals compete with others blocs of individuals, just as in Communism blocs of the proletariat compete with other blocs of the proletariat. But in democracy the majority does not compete with the minority, and the collective-majority is the arbiter of values. Democracy is arguably more collectivist than Communism, both in structure and outcome. Apart from the right to vote, individual rights are not inherently wedded to democracy. For example, democracy per se has a significant tendency towards oppressing minorities. The disenfranchisement of minorities is more or less a basic corollary of democracy. This is why in countries like the United States we have so many checks on democratic excess.

[Belindi]

Why think that democracy does not make the collective the "arbiter" of values? It seems that it clearly does. In democracy the collective will is the sovereign.

Democracy depends upon competing individuals and their party allegiances so it's not like I understand about communism where the collective will, i.e the will of the proletariat, is sovereign and lacks competition.

In democracy blocs of individuals compete with others blocs of individuals, just as in Communism blocs of the proletariat compete with other blocs of the proletariat. But in democracy the majority does not compete with the minority, and the collective-majority is the arbiter of values. Democracy is arguably more collectivist than Communism, both in structure and outcome. Apart from the right to vote, individual rights are not inherently wedded to democracy. For example, democracy per se has a significant tendency towards oppressing minorities. The disenfranchisement of minorities is more or less a basic corollary of democracy. This is why in countries like the United States we have so many checks on democratic excess.

The greatest happiness of the greatest number is not faultless but I can't think of a better or safer political ethic . It's sometimes tempting to wish that intelligent individuals had extra votes but that would be a slippery slope.

[Leontiskos]

In democracy blocs of individuals compete with others blocs of individuals, just as in Communism blocs of the proletariat compete with other blocs of the proletariat. But in democracy the majority does not compete with the minority, and the collective-majority is the arbiter of values. Democracy is arguably more collectivist than Communism, both in structure and outcome. Apart from the right to vote, individual rights are not inherently wedded to democracy. For example, democracy per se has a significant tendency towards oppressing minorities. The disenfranchisement of minorities is more or less a basic corollary of democracy. This is why in countries like the United States we have so many checks on democratic excess.

The greatest happiness of the greatest number is not faultless but I can't think of a better or safer political ethic . It's sometimes tempting to wish that intelligent individuals had extra votes but that would be a slippery slope.

Your claim that democracy and utilitarianism go hand in hand is interesting. There might be something to it. I certainly know there are lots of non-utilitarians, such as myself, who favor democratic forms.

[Good_Egg]

@Gertie , I think we've at least partial agreement here, although the points of difference may be more interesting, because that's what challenges our thinking.

I think the underlying prob is deriving Oughts from the Is state of affairs. For reason to get traction on that problem it needs some foundational, quasi axiomatic justification.

Agree that reason needs something to "get traction on", but I see that something as moral perception or moral intuition, rather than any philosophical axiom about the nature of consciousness.

My claim is that it is the nature of being an experiencing subject which is the appropriate grounding for morality.

If a Buddhist goes out of his way to avoid stepping on an ant, then I think we can recognise that as a moral act without imputing any form of consciousness to the ant.

And from there we can reason our way through the morality of particular scenarios, and to ought rules of thumb principles.

Agree that the principles we hold are reasoned-to, induced from our first- and second-hand experience of perceiving acts as morally wrong.

The question is whether the principles we reach and hold can be incorrect. Is there a reality that they can be judged as adequate to ?

as my foundation is inherently consequentialist, there may be situations where it's the lesser of two evils.

Don't think you need to be a consequentialist for that to occur. It's a feature of rule-following and virtue-seeking types of ethic also.

But there are some uncomfortable issues with my position. One being that consequentialism requires reliable prediction.

There are bigger issues than that.

Consequentialism, as I understand it, says that it is morally right to execute an innocent man if it will prevent a riot in which N people are likely to be killed, for a sufficiently large value of N.

I suggest that the uncertainty of the prediction isn't the primary reason for rejecting such an ethic. It would be morally wrong to conduct such an execution even if one were magically certain of the outcome.

And another is that conscious experience isn't measurable in the way physical stuff is, so when comparing competing goods or harms there is no equation or calibration to rely on. It's weighing competing goods/harms against each other without a weighing machine.

True.

But we now have the outline of an evolutionary account of human 'moral intuitions'. If our moral consensus derives from our species' evolution, honed by environmental circumstances, we're reasoning and finding consensus from a foundation of evolutionary happenstance. (As it happens we're a social species who form bonds and care about others, in particular ways relating to our tribal past and resulting neurobiology, which are a different kettle of fish to eternal moral truths).

Evolution is irrelevant. I think you're contradicting your earlier statement that the foundation is the nature of consciousness.

If in some sci-fi future you were to meet an android that had been constructed rather than having evolved, I suggest that your moral duties to such a creature would not be affected by that lack of evolutionary process.

Eternal moral truths which exist out there somewhere we can distantly perceive are a better fit with a perfectly good all knowing god as their source, which can never be wrong, and supercedes our fallible mortal concerns.

Not a valid argument. You haven't ruled out the possibility of eternal moral truths without a deity. This is guilt by association, smearing the concept of objective morality with what you perceive to be the faults of religion.

If you think physical truths like gravity can exist without god, then you need a good argument why moral truths cannot equally do so.

[CIN]

Now let's put the case the terrorist is an american soldier and we are vietnamese from Saigon.
Would it be right to torture the american soldier to avoid the death of all the innocent people in Saigon?

Are the Americans going to retaliate if he's tortured? If so, you have to factor that into the calculation. But if not, then I'd say yes, it's right.

Or would it be right for the american troops to invade Saigon to "free" the innocent people of Saigon from the dictatorship of communist China, killing many of them in the process?

I doubt if anyone could work that out. The felcific calculus is very hard to work out at the best of times, and the outcomes of wars, especially in the long term, are notoriously unpredictable.

One as to be good and one as to be bad. Unfortunately depending if you are american or if you are from Saigon what's good for one is bad for the other. So they are both right. And they are both wrong. Depending from which side of the river you are look at.

The fact that X is good for A and bad for B does not show that X is not actually good or bad. It's good for Putin and bad for the Ukrainians if he conquers Ukraine, but his trying to conquer Ukraine is bad because the bad for all those millions of Ukrainians is vastly greater than the good for Putin.

And in regarding of pain threshold neural terminations respond to stimulation at different degree for different people. Pain is not objective. What hurts me physically might not hurt you as much. Even more so for psychological pain. Different people have different level of resilience.

What matters for this discussion is the subjectively experienced intensity and duration of pain or suffering, not the amount of neural stimulation that produces it. If you were able to work out how much subjective pain was caused to each person by each quantity of neural stimulation, then you could factor those differences into your felicific calculus. Of course in practice this may be impossible, but that doesn't stop objectivism being true in principle.

[CIN]

Moral subjectivists sometimes seem to think like this:

1. People disagree about morality.
2. Therefore there are no absolute moral truths.

But that's not a valid argument.

I think it is. Morality was/is created by humans; it originates from humans. If we create it, we also decide what it is and does.

Whe you say 'Morality was/is created by humans', what do you mean by 'morality'? If you mean moral judgments and moral statements, then you are right. If you mean what these judgments and statements are about - i.e. moral truths - then whether these are created by humans is precisely what we are arguing about. You say they are, I say they aren't.

The fact that we do not all agree on a 'one and only' morality does justify and validate the argument you claim is invalid.

It's not a valid argument according to the rules of formal logic, which is what philosophers generally mean when they say 'invalid'.

Also, there are no absolute moral values because these values are ineluctably human-dependent, which prevents them from being 'absolute'.

That's what we're disagreeing about.

[CIN]

Consequentialism, as I understand it, says that it is morally right to execute an innocent man if it will prevent a riot in which N people are likely to be killed, for a sufficiently large value of N.

I suggest that the uncertainty of the prediction isn't the primary reason for rejecting such an ethic. It would be morally wrong to conduct such an execution even if one were magically certain of the outcome.

Why would it be wrong?

[Atla]

But there is a high level of consensus, both within and across cultures, that certain acts are morally weighty in either the good or the bad direction.

Someone who doesn't agree that the trolley problem is a problem - that either choice involves a morally-bad aspect - has failed to understand it.

So yes there are eternal moral truths. Moral facts, if you will.

That only shows that all healthy humans across the planet have an evolved basic moral processing (obviously). How do you get from there to the eternal moral truths?