Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[PhilosophersStoned]

I think there are absolute moral truths. I would suggest that 'it's wrong to deliberately cause pain without good reason' is such a truth. Of course we then have to ask what counts as a good reason, but the fact that we haven't yet established that doesn't prevent the statement being true.

But that is the whole point of my statement.
Let's take for example the proposition you used. "It's wrong to deliberately cause pain without good reason" i agree it is a morally acceptable statement but it is not, in my opinion, a statement that would define enough moral guidance. The idea of good and bad, of pain and of good reasons are all individual states of mind. That the sentence loses value if analysed. Unless we only consider the extremes.
Is it morally right to torture an alleged terrorist to find out if there is an attack planned?
And if it is right how much pain can we inflict him?
Is his pain threshold higher than our so should we torture him harder to make sure he does feel enough pain to break?
And what if he doesn't know of any plan and he told us so after the first 10 minutes of interrogation?
Good reason would suggest we can torture him until he breaks in order to save hundreds of lives if we can avoid an attack.
But does it make it morally right?

You say, "The idea of good and bad, of pain and of good reasons are all individual states of mind." That is merely your belief. You need to provide good arguments to support it.

If you had good reason to believe that the terrorist know about the attack, and you have no other way of finding out when it is planned, then yes, it is morally right to torture him. The reason is that the total pain of the attack is likely to be greater than the pain inflicted on the terrorist. Since pain is an evil, the attack is likely to be more evil than torturing the terorrist, so it's morally right to torture him.

Perfect, we agree on that for sure.
Now let's put the case the terrorist is an american soldier and we are vietnamese from Saigon.
Would it be right to torture the american soldier to avoid the death of all the innocent people in Saigon? Or would it be right for the american troops to invade Saigon to "free" the innocent people of Saigon from the dictatorship of communist China, killing many of them in the process?
One as to be good and one as to be bad. Unfortunately depending if you are american or if you are from Saigon what's good for one is bad for the other. So they are both right. And they are both wrong. Depending from which side of the river you are look at.
And in regarding of pain threshold neural terminations respond to stimulation at different degree for different people. Pain is not objective. What hurts me physically might not hurt you as much. Even more so for psychological pain. Different people have different level of resilience.

[LuckyR]

... more importantly you have to ask wrong according to whom? That's the part that makes morality subjective.

You've got it the wrong way round. It's because you think morality is subjective that you think you have to ask wrong according to whom.

I put the ideas in one order, you put them in the opposite order. The truth is: it doesn't matter, both deserve to be addressed. In other words, it doesn't matter WHY different individuals consider different behaviors to be wrong or right, the fact that they do, makes morality subjective.

[Pattern-chaser]

Moral subjectivists sometimes seem to think like this:

1. People disagree about morality.
2. Therefore there are no absolute moral truths.

But that's not a valid argument.

I think it is. Morality was/is created by humans; it originates from humans. If we create it, we also decide what it is and does. The fact that we do not all agree on a 'one and only' morality does justify and validate the argument you claim is invalid. Also, there are no absolute moral values because these values are ineluctably human-dependent, which prevents them from being 'absolute'.

[Pattern-chaser]

It seems to me that morality is about choices.

And that we make choices by a process of "weighing up" aspects of the situation.

People have different answers as to how we should do that weighing up. There is no objectively-moral method for making choices. No right answer to the trolley problem.

But there is a high level of consensus, both within and across cultures, that certain acts are morally weighty in either the good or the bad direction.

Someone who doesn't agree that the trolley problem is a problem - that either choice involves a morally-bad aspect - has failed to understand it.

OK...

So yes there are eternal moral truths. Moral facts, if you will.

Whoa! I was with your initial text, but, as far as I can see, it does not justify your conclusion (above). In fact, it appears to me to refute the argument you just presented.

[Good_Egg]

there is a high level of consensus, both within and across cultures, that certain acts are morally weighty in either the good or the bad direction.

OK...

So yes there are eternal moral truths. Moral facts, if you will.

Whoa! I was with your initial text, but, as far as I can see, it does not justify your conclusion (above). In fact, it appears to me to refute the argument you just presented.

I'm making the distinction between

- elementary propositions that some acts are morally good or bad (which I'm calling "moral facts")

- decision processes which take account of those "moral facts" in order to decide whether a particular choice is morally permissible.

If you don't know the "facts" that torture is morally bad and that those who are employed to safeguard the population against crime should do so effectively, then I think you've not understood the question.

But if you think that the right way to trade off between those considerations is itself one of those "facts" then I think you're making a philosophical error.

[PhilosophersStoned]

there is a high level of consensus, both within and across cultures, that certain acts are morally weighty in either the good or the bad direction.

OK...

So yes there are eternal moral truths. Moral facts, if you will.

Whoa! I was with your initial text, but, as far as I can see, it does not justify your conclusion (above). In fact, it appears to me to refute the argument you just presented.

I'm making the distinction between

- elementary propositions that some acts are morally good or bad (which I'm calling "moral facts")

- decision processes which take account of those "moral facts" in order to decide whether a particular choice is morally permissible.

If you don't know the "facts" that torture is morally bad and that those who are employed to safeguard the population against crime should do so effectively, then I think you've not understood the question.

But if you think that the right way to trade off between those considerations is itself one of those "facts" then I think you're making a philosophical error.

But here lays the misconception I think.
We already agreed torturing isn't morally wrong in every and each point of view. look up to the whole reasoning I put earlier in the thread.

[Pattern-chaser]

there is a high level of consensus, both within and across cultures, that certain acts are morally weighty in either the good or the bad direction.

OK...

So yes there are eternal moral truths. Moral facts, if you will.

Whoa! I was with your initial text, but, as far as I can see, it does not justify your conclusion (above). In fact, it appears to me to refute the argument you just presented.

I'm making the distinction between

- elementary propositions that some acts are morally good or bad (which I'm calling "moral facts")

- decision processes which take account of those "moral facts" in order to decide whether a particular choice is morally permissible.

If you don't know the "facts" that torture is morally bad and that those who are employed to safeguard the population against crime should do so effectively, then I think you've not understood the question.

But if you think that the right way to trade off between those considerations is itself one of those "facts" then I think you're making a philosophical error.

That's as may be. I simply commented that your argument was incorrect. First, you note that consensus exists on the morality of certain acts, and from this you conclude the "eternal moral truths" exist. Your conclusion does not follow from the existence of a degree of consensus.

[Good_Egg]

First, you note that consensus exists on the morality of certain acts, and from this you conclude the "eternal moral truths" exist. Your conclusion does not follow from the existence of a degree of consensus.

Sure, I've not proved it yet.

But I hope I've at least communicated the idea. That the eternal truths are at the level of basic principles and not at the level of how you trade off between them. So that if that idea is in any way incoherent you and others can point out the inconsistency. From which I will learn something....

Not sure about the argument from consensus. Isn't there a sense in which we know that a proposition is empirically true if and only if every time we test it we get a result consistent with that proposition ? So what counts as knowledge about the ideas in other people's minds, if it's not that whenever you test it by asking someone, what they say agrees with the theory ?

I always struggle with the philosophy of knowledge...

We already agreed torturing isn't morally wrong in every and each point of view. look up to the whole reasoning I put earlier in the thread.

Are you saying that we agree that there are conceivable circumstances in which torturing someone is the most moral choice that a person can make ?

I think that's true. Because "Thou shalt not torture" is not the only moral principle in existence, and when moral principles conflict we have to try to work out what's the best way to resolve the conflict - which is the lesser evil ?

Or are you saying that empirically some people don't agree that "Thou shalt not torture" is a moral principle at all ?

To which I answer that somebody who says they don't believe in gravity doesn't lessen the reality of gravity...

Or are you saying that a reasoning rational person might deny that torture is any way morally undesirable ? What sort of morality would that be ? Can you explain how that would be a tenable position to hold ?

Can we conceive of a society in which torture isn't considered wrong at all ?

[PhilosophersStoned]

First, you note that consensus exists on the morality of certain acts, and from this you conclude the "eternal moral truths" exist. Your conclusion does not follow from the existence of a degree of consensus.

Sure, I've not proved it yet.

But I hope I've at least communicated the idea. That the eternal truths are at the level of basic principles and not at the level of how you trade off between them. So that if that idea is in any way incoherent you and others can point out the inconsistency. From which I will learn something....

Not sure about the argument from consensus. Isn't there a sense in which we know that a proposition is empirically true if and only if every time we test it we get a result consistent with that proposition ? So what counts as knowledge about the ideas in other people's minds, if it's not that whenever you test it by asking someone, what they say agrees with the theory ?

I always struggle with the philosophy of knowledge...

We already agreed torturing isn't morally wrong in every and each point of view. look up to the whole reasoning I put earlier in the thread.

Are you saying that we agree that there are conceivable circumstances in which torturing someone is the most moral choice that a person can make ?

I think that's true. Because "Thou shalt not torture" is not the only moral principle in existence, and when moral principles conflict we have to try to work out what's the best way to resolve the conflict - which is the lesser evil ?

Or are you saying that empirically some people don't agree that "Thou shalt not torture" is a moral principle at all ?

To which I answer that somebody who says they don't believe in gravity doesn't lessen the reality of gravity...

Or are you saying that a reasoning rational person might deny that torture is any way morally undesirable ? What sort of morality would that be ? Can you explain how that would be a tenable position to hold ?

Can we conceive of a society in which torture isn't considered wrong at all ?

But that is the whole point.
It does not have to be wrong at all times not to be eternal, the point is sometimes it is morally right to torture someone.
When the good for the higher amount of people is achieved then we have achieved morality.
So torturing become moral, even if in that one exception only. Therefore it's not always true because once it's false. Therefore it isn't an eternal truth.
If we look at the definition of eternal truth it is an entity or a proposition that is true with no relation to time. That is, it is true, not only always, but always with absolute necessity.
And we have agreed it is not always true. So it is not eternal.

[Pattern-chaser]

First, you note that consensus exists on the morality of certain acts, and from this you conclude the "eternal moral truths" exist. Your conclusion does not follow from the existence of a degree of consensus.

Sure, I've not proved it yet.

But I hope I've at least communicated the idea.

You've communicated the idea by using a misleading and incorrect argument. This surely indicates that the idea might be somewhat lacking?

That the eternal truths are at the level of basic principles and not at the level of how you trade off between them. So that if that idea is in any way incoherent you and others can point out the inconsistency.

Moral truths do not have, or rely on, "principles". Morality is created and invented by humans. And we change our minds all the time. So that something wrong today could be right tomorrow. The formative 'forces' of morality are emotional, social and cultural; there are no "principles" involved. And the malleability of morality gives the lie to "eternal" too, doesn't it?

[Gertie]

Good Egg

But I hope I've at least communicated the idea. That the eternal truths are at the level of basic principles and not at the level of how you trade off between them.

Right. Tho I'm more comfortable talking about moral principles as rules of thumb, rather than 'eternal truths', which suggest they exist independantly waiting for us to discover them. The discovery traditionally being made through divine revelation, or reason - I don't think morality is like that.

This raises the issue of what moral foundation do we draw our principles from then. That has to be the starting point imo. On what basis do we derive moral Oughts from the Is of the state of affairs?

If you establish that foundation, then principles fall into place. And you have a foundational touchstone to refer to in cases of trading off competing goods/bads.

[Belindi]

The practical problem is how much time and energy I ought to allocate to evaluating any given option.

Whether or not my perception of a moral truth is absolutely, "eternally", always, and objectively true is something I will never know however as long as I live I will have to evaluate.
What I have just written implies that owning my own decisions is absolutely and objectively morally true. I own my claim.

[Good_Egg]

... the point is sometimes it is morally right to torture someone.
When the good for the higher amount of people is achieved then we have achieved morality.

I agree with you that it is moral to choose the lesser of two evils. But being the lesser of two evils is not the same thing as not being an evil at all.

I'm suggesting that the eternal moral truth is that torturing people is an evil, and the methods of weighing up when it is the lesser evil are the human constructs.

I'm more comfortable talking about moral principles as rules of thumb, rather than 'eternal truths', which suggest they exist independantly waiting for us to discover them. The discovery traditionally being made through divine revelation, or reason - I don't think morality is like that.

Why do you reject the possibility of moral truths discoverable by reason ? (I'm not arguing for divine revelation).

Do you think it logically incoherent ? Or just empirically false ?

Just to clarify what we mean by reasoned knowledge.
Seems to me that reason works from premises to conclusion. If there is an Ought in the conclusion then there has to be an Ought in the premises. Moral reasoning needs something to work on, some underlying moral perception.

We check our fallible perceptions against the perceptions of others, which is back to consensus. And we reason from perceptions of specific instances - e.g. it strikes me as wrong for A to torture B in the way that she did - to general propositions.

How would the world be different if there were unchanging moral principles which humans could distantly and fallibly perceive in action and then formulate by reason ? And if it wouldn't be different, why reject the hypothesis ?

[Gertie]

Good Egg

Gertie wrote: ↑Today, 3:25 am I'm more comfortable talking about moral principles as rules of thumb, rather than 'eternal truths', which suggest they exist independantly waiting for us to discover them. The discovery traditionally being made through divine revelation, or reason - I don't think morality is like that.

Why do you reject the possibility of moral truths discoverable by reason ? (I'm not arguing for divine revelation).

Do you think it logically incoherent ? Or just empirically false ?
Just to clarify what we mean by reasoned knowledge.


Seems to me that reason works from premises to conclusion. If there is an Ought in the conclusion then there has to be an Ought in the premises. Moral reasoning needs something to work on, some underlying moral perception.

I think the underlying prob is deriving Oughts from the Is state of affairs. For reason to get traction on that problem it needs some foundational, quasi axiomatic justification.

I believe the appropriate foundational justification for Oughts is the qualiative nature of conscious experience. That conscious beings have this special quality which means we can experience flourishing or suffering, and what happens to us, the state of affairs, is meaningful and matters. My claim is that it is the nature of being an experiencing subject which is the appropriate grounding for morality. And from there we can reason our way through the morality of particular scenarios, and to ought rules of thumb principles.


If we take the torture scenario, the rule of thumb would obviously be not to torture conscious beings. But as my foundation is inherently consequentialist, there may be situations where it's the lesser of two evils.


But there are some uncomfortable issues with my position. One being that consequentialism requires reliable prediction. Another is that experiencing subjects aren't homogenous, we have idiosyncratic notions of flourishing and suffering, personal desires and goals, and so on. We also ought to treat other conscious species with moral consideration according to my moral foundation, and their experiential needs and desires are pretty much guess work for us. And another is that conscious experience isn't measurable in the way physical stuff is, so when comparing competing goods or harms there is no equation or calibration to rely on. It's weighing competing goods/harms against each other without a weighing machine. In this messy subject based context, talk of ''eternal truths'' seems inappropriate, akin to a category error.

We check our fallible perceptions against the perceptions of others, which is back to consensus. And we reason from perceptions of specific instances - e.g. it strikes me as wrong for A to torture B in the way that she did - to general propositions.

But we now have the outline of an evolutionary account of human 'moral intuitions'. If our moral consensus derives from our species' evolution, honed by environmental circumstances, we're reasoning and finding consensus from a foundation of evolutionary happenstance. (As it happens we're a social species who form bonds and care about others, in particular ways relating to our tribal past and resulting neurobiology, which are a different kettle of fish to eternal moral truths).

How would the world be different if there were unchanging moral principles which humans could distantly and fallibly perceive in action and then formulate by reason ? And if it wouldn't be different, why reject the hypothesis ?

Well I'd say my foundation captures the appropriate basis for oughts, and a touchstone which allows us to adjust, check back and progress, albeit with no realistic expectation of perfection, just trying to improve. Eternal moral truths which exist out there somewhere we can distantly perceive are a better fit with a perfectly good all knowing god as their source, which can never be wrong, and supercedes our fallible mortal concerns. That thinking is anachronistic imo unless you're religious in that way. There's hope of a satisfying tidy certainty behind it, but that can bring a lot of harm, and is resistant to change or reappraisal/progress in the light of consequences or new knowledge.

[Pattern-chaser]

... the point is sometimes it is morally right to torture someone.
When the good for the higher amount of people is achieved then we have achieved morality.

I agree with you that it is moral to choose the lesser of two evils. But being the lesser of two evils is not the same thing as not being an evil at all.

I don't disagree with what you say here , but I feel obliged to point out, yet again, that "evil" is too ill-defined to be useful. You need to state specifically who or what is assessing the 'evilness'. Evil to/for humans? Evil to/for animals? Evil to/for living things? Evil to/for God? Evil to/for Libertarians? The list goes on forever, but without this qualification, "evil" is without meaning. If we could, at least, agree that, in this topic, "evil" refers specifically to humans, then it could take a vaguely-useful role in this discussion. "Good" likewise.