Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Pattern-chaser]

Moreover, when your thinking this red abstract shape endures over a few moments the red shape begins to acquire meaning such as for instance the works of an artist who has painted abstract coloured shapes, and even feelings, e.g. "I liked that red shirt I had in the 70s".

I think those associations - red = danger, pool-ball, roses, and so on - happen unconsciously, during the process of transforming sensation into perception, prior to conscious awareness. What you describe sounds like conscious reflection...?

[The Beast]

I speculate that stalemate is a negative covariance. Does it have a hue or in the case of AI is it dangerous? If a negative Hue, it may have an spectacular gloss. I do think synesthesia is possible.

[Consul]

Yes, of course it does—unless, of course, consciousness is a state of supernatural souls!

Churchland is right that "[h]ere there is definite encouragement for the identity theorist’s suggestion that any given sensation is simply identical with a set or pattern of spiking frequencies in the appropriate sensory brain area." For, arguably, those patterns are not just neural correlates of tastes and colors, but their neural constituters, such that they are (identical with) what you experience as tastes or colors.

But you are postulating Supernatural properties for the Neurons when you claim Conscious Experience is in the Neurons, but have no idea How it is in the Neurons. Yes, that Redness Experience is just Magically produced by the Neurons. No Explanation, no Chain of Logic, just pure Belief.

Experiences are in the central nervous system by being neural processes therein. The electrochemical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain don't magically produce it, because they naturally constitute it and are thereby identical with it.

[SteveKlinko]

Yes, of course it does—unless, of course, consciousness is a state of supernatural souls!

Churchland is right that "[h]ere there is definite encouragement for the identity theorist’s suggestion that any given sensation is simply identical with a set or pattern of spiking frequencies in the appropriate sensory brain area." For, arguably, those patterns are not just neural correlates of tastes and colors, but their neural constituters, such that they are (identical with) what you experience as tastes or colors.

But you are postulating Supernatural properties for the Neurons when you claim Conscious Experience is in the Neurons, but have no idea How it is in the Neurons. Yes, that Redness Experience is just Magically produced by the Neurons. No Explanation, no Chain of Logic, just pure Belief.

Experiences are in the central nervous system by being neural processes therein. The electrochemical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain don't magically produce it, because they naturally constitute it and are thereby identical with it.

Yes exactly, some Magical property of the Neurons that nobody knows about. It's only a Speculation and not any kind of Scientific fact. Doesn't mean the Physicalist/Materialist proposition is wrong, but it sure has not been shown to be true.

In fact, the statement that Conscious Experience is Identical to Electrochemical Mechanisms in the Brain doesn't make sense at any level as an Explanation of anything. The statement is completely Incoherent on the face of it. The Experience of Redness for example stands as a Phenomenon that exists as a Thing-In-Itself. The Experience of Redness is in a different Category of Phenomenon than any Phenomenon of Electrochemical Neural Activity. You are expressing a pure Belief, without any Chain of Logic to explain it.

[Consul]

Experiences are in the central nervous system by being neural processes therein. The electrochemical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain don't magically produce it, because they naturally constitute it and are thereby identical with it.

Yes exactly, some Magical property of the Neurons that nobody knows about.

No, just (certain combinations and interactions of) natural properties physicists and chemists know about!

It's only a Speculation and not any kind of Scientific fact. Doesn't mean the Physicalist/Materialist proposition is wrong, but it sure has not been shown to be true.

It's by far the most coherent and most credible ontological explanation of psychophysical correlations in the light of our scientific knowledge of the world in general, and of organisms, their brains and minds in particular.

In fact, the statement that Conscious Experience is Identical to Electrochemical Mechanisms in the Brain doesn't make sense at any level as an Explanation of anything. The statement is completely Incoherent on the face of it. The Experience of Redness for example stands as a Phenomenon that exists as a Thing-In-Itself. The Experience of Redness is in a different Category of Phenomenon than any Phenomenon of Electrochemical Neural Activity. You are expressing a pure Belief, without any Chain of Logic to explain it.

Reductive materialism is definitely not incoherent.
I'm not sure what it means to call experiences "things-in-themselves". Whatever, psychological or phenomenological concepts are different from (and semantically independent of) physiological or physical ones, but it by no means follows that the entities falling under psychological/phenomenological concepts are (irreducibly) nonphysiological/nonphysical.

[Consul]

Reductive materialism is definitely not incoherent.
I'm not sure what it means to call experiences "things-in-themselves". Whatever, psychological or phenomenological concepts are different from (and semantically independent of) physiological or physical ones, but it by no means follows that the entities falling under psychological/phenomenological concepts are (irreducibly) nonphysiological/nonphysical.

According to reductive materialism, everything falling under psychological/phenomenological concepts also falls under physiological/physical concepts. For there is a sameness of reference, even if there is no sameness of meaning (sense).

[SteveKlinko]

Experiences are in the central nervous system by being neural processes therein. The electrochemical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain don't magically produce it, because they naturally constitute it and are thereby identical with it.

Yes exactly, some Magical property of the Neurons that nobody knows about.

No, just (certain combinations and interactions of) natural properties physicists and chemists know about!

It's only a Speculation and not any kind of Scientific fact. Doesn't mean the Physicalist/Materialist proposition is wrong, but it sure has not been shown to be true.

It's by far the most coherent and most credible ontological explanation of psychophysical correlations in the light of our scientific knowledge of the world in general, and of organisms, their brains and minds in particular.

In fact, the statement that Conscious Experience is Identical to Electrochemical Mechanisms in the Brain doesn't make sense at any level as an Explanation of anything. The statement is completely Incoherent on the face of it. The Experience of Redness for example stands as a Phenomenon that exists as a Thing-In-Itself. The Experience of Redness is in a different Category of Phenomenon than any Phenomenon of Electrochemical Neural Activity. You are expressing a pure Belief, without any Chain of Logic to explain it.

Reductive materialism is definitely not incoherent.
I'm not sure what it means to call experiences "things-in-themselves". Whatever, psychological or phenomenological concepts are different from (and semantically independent of) physiological or physical ones, but it by no means follows that the entities falling under psychological/phenomenological concepts are (irreducibly) nonphysiological/nonphysical.

Ok, then if the Conscious Experience of Redness is Physiological/Physical then what is it in terms of Physiological/Physical processes? And you can't just say it IS Physiological/Physical without any Chain of Logic. If you don't have a chain of Logic then your Physiological/Physical speculation is no better than my Connectism speculation. Yours and mine are both perspectives on Conscious Experience, they are not Theories of Conscious Experience. If you insist you are correct without a Chain of Logic then you have a Belief. I don't insist that Connectism is correct, and It might not be, so I definitely don't have a belief. I just like to defend the possibility of it. The possibility of it seems more an more likely especially after 100 years of Science not being able to Explain Conscious Experience within the Physiological/Physical paradigm.

[Consul]

Ok, then if the Conscious Experience of Redness is Physiological/Physical then what is it in terms of Physiological/Physical processes?

Your question can only be answered a posteriori, i.e. through empirical inquiry. It's up to the neuroscientists to identify, describe, and explain the specific constitutive neural mechanisms of consciousness.

[SteveKlinko]

Ok, then if the Conscious Experience of Redness is Physiological/Physical then what is it in terms of Physiological/Physical processes?

Your question can only be answered a posteriori, i.e. through empirical inquiry. It's up to the neuroscientists to identify, describe, and explain the specific constitutive neural mechanisms of consciousness.

Agreed.

[GrayArea]

Yes, of course it does—unless, of course, consciousness is a state of supernatural souls!

Churchland is right that "[h]ere there is definite encouragement for the identity theorist’s suggestion that any given sensation is simply identical with a set or pattern of spiking frequencies in the appropriate sensory brain area." For, arguably, those patterns are not just neural correlates of tastes and colors, but their neural constituters, such that they are (identical with) what you experience as tastes or colors.

But you are postulating Supernatural properties for the Neurons when you claim Conscious Experience is in the Neurons, but have no idea How it is in the Neurons. Yes, that Redness Experience is just Magically produced by the Neurons. No Explanation, no Chain of Logic, just pure Belief.

Experiences are in the central nervous system by being neural processes therein. The electrochemical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain don't magically produce it, because they naturally constitute it and are thereby identical with it.

Yes exactly, some Magical property of the Neurons that nobody knows about. It's only a Speculation and not any kind of Scientific fact. Doesn't mean the Physicalist/Materialist proposition is wrong, but it sure has not been shown to be true.

In fact, the statement that Conscious Experience is Identical to Electrochemical Mechanisms in the Brain doesn't make sense at any level as an Explanation of anything. The statement is completely Incoherent on the face of it. The Experience of Redness for example stands as a Phenomenon that exists as a Thing-In-Itself. The Experience of Redness is in a different Category of Phenomenon than any Phenomenon of Electrochemical Neural Activity. You are expressing a pure Belief, without any Chain of Logic to explain it.

If I may interject, I personally believe that Conscious Experience is essentially identical to the enclosed system of the neurons' own dialectics that is created from neural interactions——where their languages within the dialectics are the sheer "facts" that electrochemical mechanisms work in a specific way within the neurons themselves and the meanings/each symbols of the languages are how exactly the electrochemical mechanisms work in certain areas. I'd like to hear your thoughts on this one.

[SteveKlinko]

But you are postulating Supernatural properties for the Neurons when you claim Conscious Experience is in the Neurons, but have no idea How it is in the Neurons. Yes, that Redness Experience is just Magically produced by the Neurons. No Explanation, no Chain of Logic, just pure Belief.

Experiences are in the central nervous system by being neural processes therein. The electrochemical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain don't magically produce it, because they naturally constitute it and are thereby identical with it.

Yes exactly, some Magical property of the Neurons that nobody knows about. It's only a Speculation and not any kind of Scientific fact. Doesn't mean the Physicalist/Materialist proposition is wrong, but it sure has not been shown to be true.

In fact, the statement that Conscious Experience is Identical to Electrochemical Mechanisms in the Brain doesn't make sense at any level as an Explanation of anything. The statement is completely Incoherent on the face of it. The Experience of Redness for example stands as a Phenomenon that exists as a Thing-In-Itself. The Experience of Redness is in a different Category of Phenomenon than any Phenomenon of Electrochemical Neural Activity. You are expressing a pure Belief, without any Chain of Logic to explain it.

If I may interject, I personally believe that Conscious Experience is essentially identical to the enclosed system of the neurons' own dialectics that is created from neural interactions——where their languages within the dialectics are the sheer "facts" that electrochemical mechanisms work in a specific way within the neurons themselves and the meanings/each symbols of the languages are how exactly the electrochemical mechanisms work in certain areas. I'd like to hear your thoughts on this one.

It is fine to Speculate and Believe. You might be right. But there must be some Chain of Logic that starts with the Neural Activity you specified and shows how something like the Experience of Redness is produced.

[GrayArea]

Experiences are in the central nervous system by being neural processes therein. The electrochemical mechanisms of consciousness in the brain don't magically produce it, because they naturally constitute it and are thereby identical with it.

Yes exactly, some Magical property of the Neurons that nobody knows about. It's only a Speculation and not any kind of Scientific fact. Doesn't mean the Physicalist/Materialist proposition is wrong, but it sure has not been shown to be true.

In fact, the statement that Conscious Experience is Identical to Electrochemical Mechanisms in the Brain doesn't make sense at any level as an Explanation of anything. The statement is completely Incoherent on the face of it. The Experience of Redness for example stands as a Phenomenon that exists as a Thing-In-Itself. The Experience of Redness is in a different Category of Phenomenon than any Phenomenon of Electrochemical Neural Activity. You are expressing a pure Belief, without any Chain of Logic to explain it.

If I may interject, I personally believe that Conscious Experience is essentially identical to the enclosed system of the neurons' own dialectics that is created from neural interactions——where their languages within the dialectics are the sheer "facts" that electrochemical mechanisms work in a specific way within the neurons themselves and the meanings/each symbols of the languages are how exactly the electrochemical mechanisms work in certain areas. I'd like to hear your thoughts on this one.

It is fine to Speculate and Believe. You might be right. But there must be some Chain of Logic that starts with the Neural Activity you specified and shows how something like the Experience of Redness is produced.

I would say that sensory experiences such as the experience of seeing red is created when our neurons receive information in their own ways and try to process it in their own ways. As in, it happens during the process in which the neurons try to translate the impulse from light into the electrochemical languages that they operate on.

Basically, colors are what lightwaves mean to the overall dialectics between the biological components/neurons. Or how lightwaves affect their network.

Since colors are purely native to the mind and do not exist in the actual world, we can safely assume that colors arise from the interactions that involve what makes our mind, our mind. In this case, what makes our mind our mind, in the face of outside environmental impulse (lightwaves) that is not internal. To look into what neural interactions display this notion, we can look into how the neurons *unknowingly* solidify what makes the mind what it is—their own languages within the dialectic system, while they translate lightwaves into their own languages.

[Papus79]

I would say that sensory experiences such as the experience of seeing red is created when our neurons receive information in their own ways and try to process it in their own ways. As in, it happens during the process in which the neurons try to translate the impulse from light into the electrochemical languages that they operate on.

Basically, colors are what lightwaves mean to the overall dialectics between the biological components/neurons. Or how lightwaves affect their network.

Since colors are purely native to the mind and do not exist in the actual world, we can safely assume that colors arise from the interactions that involve what makes our mind, our mind. In this case, what makes our mind our mind, in the face of outside environmental impulse (lightwaves) that is not internal. To look into what neural interactions display this notion, we can look into how the neurons *unknowingly* solidify what makes the mind what it is—their own languages within the dialectic system, while they translate lightwaves into their own languages.

I don't know where you're at with Michael Levin's work, if your not familiar with him he's been making the rounds in the past few years with research that he's done into both bodily information systems and bioelectric information that acts as a mediator of cell behavior. I bring that up because neurons, while special in certain kinds of potency, seem to be a difference in amount rather than a difference in kind. He brings up how the bioelectric systems that give rise to cell differentiation behavior in embryos work through ion channels and that it's a much older system which single celled organisms and anything too small to have a nervous system or brain utilizes for the internal communications that it uses for finding food, avoiding predation, etc..

I think the most credible materialist cases sort of need to be non-reductive because to orchestrate something like the experience of red you'd need a network effect feeding downward causality and optimizing neural pathways for those purposes. Admittedly I don't know the state of thinking in academia right at this moment as to how controversial downward causality is but I remember even four or five years ago there were various professors in the neurology departments who were suggesting that the evidence coming in suggested that it was a thing. IMHO it doesn't have to be anything 'spooky' necessarily, I just feel like we still have a very weak grasp on truly complex rather than complicated systems. To that degree I've tended to side with functionalism w/ multiple realizability because it allows for aggregate forms of consciousness and helps resolve combination and binding problems (as well as also suggesting plausible answers to the 'woo' that don't require a tribal response or blanket dismissal).

[GrayArea]

I would say that sensory experiences such as the experience of seeing red is created when our neurons receive information in their own ways and try to process it in their own ways. As in, it happens during the process in which the neurons try to translate the impulse from light into the electrochemical languages that they operate on.

Basically, colors are what lightwaves mean to the overall dialectics between the biological components/neurons. Or how lightwaves affect their network.

Since colors are purely native to the mind and do not exist in the actual world, we can safely assume that colors arise from the interactions that involve what makes our mind, our mind. In this case, what makes our mind our mind, in the face of outside environmental impulse (lightwaves) that is not internal. To look into what neural interactions display this notion, we can look into how the neurons *unknowingly* solidify what makes the mind what it is—their own languages within the dialectic system, while they translate lightwaves into their own languages.

I don't know where you're at with Michael Levin's work, if your not familiar with him he's been making the rounds in the past few years with research that he's done into both bodily information systems and bioelectric information that acts as a mediator of cell behavior. I bring that up because neurons, while special in certain kinds of potency, seem to be a difference in amount rather than a difference in kind. He brings up how the bioelectric systems that give rise to cell differentiation behavior in embryos work through ion channels and that it's a much older system which single celled organisms and anything too small to have a nervous system or brain utilizes for the internal communications that it uses for finding food, avoiding predation, etc..

I think the most credible materialist cases sort of need to be non-reductive because to orchestrate something like the experience of red you'd need a network effect feeding downward causality and optimizing neural pathways for those purposes. Admittedly I don't know the state of thinking in academia right at this moment as to how controversial downward causality is but I remember even four or five years ago there were various professors in the neurology departments who were suggesting that the evidence coming in suggested that it was a thing. IMHO it doesn't have to be anything 'spooky' necessarily, I just feel like we still have a very weak grasp on truly complex rather than complicated systems. To that degree I've tended to side with functionalism w/ multiple realizability because it allows for aggregate forms of consciousness and helps resolve combination and binding problems (as well as also suggesting plausible answers to the 'woo' that don't require a tribal response or blanket dismissal).

Oof, those are some big philosophical terms I haven't learned yet. (FYI English is not my first language) Could you dumb it down for me a little? Thanks a lot.

[Belindi]

Papus79 wrote:

----neurons, while special in certain kinds of potency, seem to be a difference in amount rather than a difference in kind.

Yes. There are several chemical psychoactive secretions in the brain each of which activates a different sort of consciousness, e.g. REM sleep, deep sleep: waking awareness. These psychoactive secretions become depleted by turns and then another secretion becomes dominant.