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[psyreporter]

The word "illusion" implies that the illusory thing doesn't exist. Otherwise don't use that term.

If we want to say that "free will is an illusion" (that is, free will doesn't exist, even though it appears to), then that's what we should say.

There is a distinction between perceptual illusions and doxastic illusions: A doxastic illusion is a false belief (an erroneous conviction), whereas a perceptual illusion is a case where the object of perception exists/is real, but it doesn't appear as it really is. So, strictly speaking, perceptual illusions are different from perceptual hallucinations, where there appears to be an object of perception, but there isn't really any.

So-called "illusionism" about phenomenal consciousness is a form of eliminativism about it, according to which it doesn't exist/isn't real. So:

"According to the standard distinction, 'hallucinationism' might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) name for the position Frankish is advocating."

(Chrisley, Ron, and Aaron Sloman. "Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia." APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 6/1 (2016): 2–13. p. 3)

On your view, how do any of those distinctions help make the idea coherent?

Wouldn't it be obvious that 'doesn't appear as it really is' refers to 'meaningful experience' that humans tend to attach to consciousness, by which it is said that consciousness is other than that (thus: an illusion)?

When you ask 'what' is an illusion from a purely empirical perspective, it would imply that consciousness would be non-existent as opposed to existent.

When it concerns meaningful experience, it cannot be captured in an empirical measurement (note the philosophical zombie theory that indicates that it is impossible to know whether another human is conscious). Thus when one argues that consciousness is an illusion, one essentially argues that the meaningful experience that one assigns to consciousness, is an illusion. And in that case, the non-existence of consciousness is not applicable when the term illusion is used.

The following question is still unanswered:

I'm a realist and a physicalist (aka "materialist").

... I'm convinced that the mind is simply brain processes.

When mind originates from the physical, how can consciousness not be an illusion?

[psyreporter]

What do you think of the quoted reasoning by free will sceptics that argues that a purely physical world is necessarily bound by determinism?

Quote:

To make a choice that wasn’t merely the next link in the unbroken chain of causes, you’d have to be able to stand apart from the whole thing, a ghostly presence separate from the material world yet mysteriously still able to influence it. But of course you can’t actually get to this supposed place that’s external to the universe, separate from all the atoms that comprise it and the laws that govern them. You just are some of the atoms in the universe, governed by the same predictable laws as all the rest.

(2021) The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/a ... n-illusion

The following question is unanswered as well:

I'm a realist and a physicalist (aka "materialist").

... I'm convinced that the mind is simply brain processes.

When mind originates from the physical, how can consciousness not be an illusion?

Obviously I do not agree with it. Hence me informing you that even if we're only talking about the world in absence of any living creatures, I'm not a determinist.

What would be the argumentative foundation for the idea that you can escape determinism when you consider intrinsic existence of 'physical reality' without mind?

What aspect would result in a theoretical foundation for free will or the ability to argue that you are not a determinist?

1. Do you believe in intrinsic existence without mind?
2. Do you believe that mind has a cause within the scope of physical reality?

Yes and yes. I'm a realist and a physicalist (aka "materialist").

But of course you can’t actually get to this supposed place that’s external to the universe, separate from all the atoms that comprise it and the laws that govern them. You just are some of the atoms in the universe, governed by the same predictable laws as all the rest.[/i]

I'm not a realist on physical laws.

What factor do you consider to be valid within the scope of what can be named 'physical reality' that does not amount to 'law' and that enables you to escape determinism?

[psyreporter]

Mr. Nicholas Humphry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Humphrey was asked whether consciousness is an illusion and he replied: "Yes", that he believed it was. Nicholas is a self proclaimed Materialist, and a cognitive scientist. As such, it begs the question: is his belief in the concept of 'illusion' self-refuting, ironic, and paradoxical? The philosophical reason why this belief may be paradoxical is because the definition of 'illusion' in itself, is a 'metaphysical phenomenon' (or is it)?

The denotion illusion could be a product of a meaningless predetermined process. What is at question is merely: is meaning applicable to consciousness?

The philosophical zombie theory provides a clue that the origin of the problem may lay in the inability to capture meaningful experience within an empirical measurement (i.e. all of which it can be said that it amounts to 'physical reality'), while in the same time, the notion that consciousness doesn't exist or isn't real is considered absurd by most people who are witness of their own 'meaningful' conscious experience.

2. Philosophically, does the explanation of consciousness itself break the rules of formal logic (a priori) and other logical axioms such as Bivalence and LEM? I would submit yes it does. It does by virtue of the infamous 'driving while daydreaming' scenario where both the conscious and subconscious mind is perceived to be operating independently of each other. This suggests that consciousness cannot be explained/described logically in the formal sense. Alternatively, should one be also prepared to embrace other absurdities about the perceptions of reality (Subjective Idealism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_idealism ) and conclude that consciousness itself (which is apparently 'logically impossible' by formal definition standards, yet exists) is all that we know exists?

Other philosophical concerns resulting from the limitations of 'pure reason' might include the questions about the paradoxical apperceptions of reality. Is "I think therefore I am" proof of a reality that exists only in one's mind? How can logic and rationality save us from this nightmare?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum

"not not" doesn't have a word, perhaps it is indicative

[Consul]

There is a distinction between perceptual illusions and doxastic illusions: A doxastic illusion is a false belief (an erroneous conviction), whereas a perceptual illusion is a case where the object of perception exists/is real, but it doesn't appear as it really is. So, strictly speaking, perceptual illusions are different from perceptual hallucinations, where there appears to be an object of perception, but there isn't really any.

So-called "illusionism" about phenomenal consciousness is a form of eliminativism about it, according to which it doesn't exist/isn't real. So:

"According to the standard distinction, 'hallucinationism' might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) name for the position Frankish is advocating."

(Chrisley, Ron, and Aaron Sloman. "Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia." APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 6/1 (2016): 2–13. p. 3)

On your view, how do any of those distinctions help make the idea coherent?

I don't think they do, because no matter whether the view is called illusionism or hallucinationism, it is self-refuting if the perceptual illusion or hallucination of phenomenal consciousness involves subjective appearances/experiences, and also if the doxastic illusion of phenomenal consciousness involves subjective experiences in the form of conscious thoughts. For it is impossible for me to think consciously that I am conscious without really being conscious.

[Terrapin Station]

Wouldn't it be obvious that 'doesn't appear as it really is' refers to 'meaningful experience' that humans tend to attach to consciousness, by which it is said that consciousness is other than that (thus: an illusion)?

If we're saying that there's an illusion that conscious is such and such, or has such and such qualities, then we'd need to actually say that.

In English, you don't express that by saying that consciousness (unqualified) is an illusion.

one essentially argues that the meaningful experience that one assigns to consciousness, is an illusion

That would be expressed in conventional English as "Meaningful experience is an illusion." That still has problems, but we'd probably need to sort out--or rather pin down, just what we're referring to re "meaningful" and/or "meaningful experience" before we address those problems.

When mind originates from the physical, how can consciousness not be an illusion?

And we go right back to using English in a way that's incoherent. Are you saying "When mind originates from the physical, how can meaningful experience be an illusion?"

Saying that consciousness is an illusion there is incoherent. So "How consciousness can not be an illusion" is answered by "The very notion of consciousness being an illusion is completely incoherent." It doesn't even make sense to ask how it could be an illusion.

[Consul]

For example, here's someone trying to make coherent sense of illusionism:

Daniel Shabasson: Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion (2021)

[Terrapin Station]

There is a distinction between perceptual illusions and doxastic illusions: A doxastic illusion is a false belief (an erroneous conviction), whereas a perceptual illusion is a case where the object of perception exists/is real, but it doesn't appear as it really is. So, strictly speaking, perceptual illusions are different from perceptual hallucinations, where there appears to be an object of perception, but there isn't really any.

So-called "illusionism" about phenomenal consciousness is a form of eliminativism about it, according to which it doesn't exist/isn't real. So:

"According to the standard distinction, 'hallucinationism' might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) name for the position Frankish is advocating."

(Chrisley, Ron, and Aaron Sloman. "Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia." APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 6/1 (2016): 2–13. p. 3)

On your view, how do any of those distinctions help make the idea coherent?

I don't think they do, because no matter whether the view is called illusionism or hallucinationism, it is self-refuting if the perceptual illusion or hallucination of phenomenal consciousness involves subjective appearances/experiences, and also if the doxastic illusion of phenomenal consciousness involves subjective experiences in the form of conscious thoughts. For it is impossible for me to think consciously that I am conscious without really being conscious.

Right--that was my point basically.

[3017Metaphysician]

Mr. Nicholas Humphry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Humphrey was asked whether consciousness is an illusion and he replied: "Yes", that he believed it was. Nicholas is a self proclaimed Materialist, and a cognitive scientist. As such, it begs the question: is his belief in the concept of 'illusion' self-refuting, ironic, and paradoxical? The philosophical reason why this belief may be paradoxical is because the definition of 'illusion' in itself, is a 'metaphysical phenomenon' (or is it)?

The denotion illusion could be a product of a meaningless predetermined process. What is at question is merely: is meaning applicable to consciousness?

The philosophical zombie theory provides a clue that the origin of the problem may lay in the inability to capture meaningful experience within an empirical measurement (i.e. all of which it can be said that it amounts to 'physical reality'), while in the same time, the notion that consciousness doesn't exist or isn't real is considered absurd by most people who are witness of their own 'meaningful' conscious experience.

2. Philosophically, does the explanation of consciousness itself break the rules of formal logic (a priori) and other logical axioms such as Bivalence and LEM? I would submit yes it does. It does by virtue of the infamous 'driving while daydreaming' scenario where both the conscious and subconscious mind is perceived to be operating independently of each other. This suggests that consciousness cannot be explained/described logically in the formal sense. Alternatively, should one be also prepared to embrace other absurdities about the perceptions of reality (Subjective Idealism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_idealism ) and conclude that consciousness itself (which is apparently 'logically impossible' by formal definition standards, yet exists) is all that we know exists?

Other philosophical concerns resulting from the limitations of 'pure reason' might include the questions about the paradoxical apperceptions of reality. Is "I think therefore I am" proof of a reality that exists only in one's mind? How can logic and rationality save us from this nightmare?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum

"not not" doesn't have a word, perhaps it is indicative

Hello psyr!!

My quandary there is from a metaphysical perspective. If the materialist believes that the nature of one's existence is apperceived as being not real by virtue of claiming that consciousness is an illusion, then how can the materialist reconcile their own physicalist position knowing or similarly claiming that their own consciousness is not real or an illusion(?). The self refuting part seems to be the materialist is believing that their apperception of reality (the conscious experience) consists only of things that are physical. Yet an illusion is not physical (?) Hence they are believing in something (their own consciousness) that appears as not being real/physical; an illusion. And that seems to exclude (I'm not a 'materialist') the dualist arguments and/or other qualities (Qualia) of conscious existence and sentient experience (Affect Consciousness)...

By contrast, the idealist (Subjective Idealism), I think would be more consistent in his belief that an illusion is reality. But to the materialist, he seems to be saying that his own consciousness is an illusion yet it still exists as such. I could stand corrected there.

With respect to the logically impossible aspect of conscious existence, yes, the 'not not' is like saying I'm driving and not driving. From language, that's the 'illogical' or logically impossible explanation from an experience of driving while daydreaming. Our minds our wonderful things-in-themselves!

You raise an intriguing possibility relative to 'meaning'! Can you elucidate a bit on that?

[Terrapin Station]

For example, here's someone trying to make coherent sense of illusionism:

Daniel Shabasson: Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion (2021)

I'll have to read through that, but just re the abstract:

According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem (Frankish 2016) is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious.

"Judging that we are phenomenally conscious" is evidence of being phenomenally conscious. So consciousness can't be an illusion in that case, it's not something we can be mistaken about.

I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states.

His usage of "unconscious" is curious there. What would be an unconscious inference and how would we know about it? (Especially without consciousness obtaining?)

Being subject to the illusion of phenomenal consciousness consists in having this disposition.

The disposition in question, and being capable of being subject to an illusion in the first place, IS consciousness. So consciousness can't be an illusion if we have sensory states that we can be aware of, if we are capable of inferences about sensory states, etc.

[Terrapin Station]

My quandary there is from a metaphysical perspective. If the materialist believes that the nature of one's existence is apperceived as being not real by virtue of claiming that consciousness is an illusion,

Any materialist/physicalist who would claim such a thing is a bozo who doesn't know what the f--- they're talking about.

[Terrapin Station]

For example, here's someone trying to make coherent sense of illusionism:

Daniel Shabasson: Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion (2021)

Reading through a bit of that article, my first comment is this:

In my view, attempts of a distinction between "phenomenal consciousness" and "(non phenomenal) consciousness," as well as things like "phenomenal red" or "what it's like to see red" versus just "seeing red" or "undergoing a red state" etc. are again incoherent garbage. It's not at all clear what we're supposed to be adding or removing by adding or removing words like "phenomenal." There aren't two different ideas there. You're either conscious of red or you're not, and adding or removing words like "phenomenal" does zero work.

[Consul]

In my view, attempts of a distinction between "phenomenal consciousness" and "(non phenomenal) consciousness," as well as things like "phenomenal red" or "what it's like to see red" versus just "seeing red" or "undergoing a red state" etc. are again incoherent garbage. It's not at all clear what we're supposed to be adding or removing by adding or removing words like "phenomenal." There aren't two different ideas there. You're either conscious of red or you're not, and adding or removing words like "phenomenal" does zero work.

The word "consciousness" has several meanings, and the adjective "phenomenal" is used in the phrase "phenomenal consciousness" so as to clarify and indicate that the consciousness talked about is subjective experience. (Phenomenal consciousness = experiential consciousness.)

Phenomenal colors are colors-as-experienced, and they are distinguished from objective physical colors defined e.g. in terms of wavelengths.

[Terrapin Station]

In my view, attempts of a distinction between "phenomenal consciousness" and "(non phenomenal) consciousness," as well as things like "phenomenal red" or "what it's like to see red" versus just "seeing red" or "undergoing a red state" etc. are again incoherent garbage. It's not at all clear what we're supposed to be adding or removing by adding or removing words like "phenomenal." There aren't two different ideas there. You're either conscious of red or you're not, and adding or removing words like "phenomenal" does zero work.

The word "consciousness" has several meanings, and the adjective "phenomenal" is used in the phrase "phenomenal consciousness" so as to clarify and indicate that the consciousness talked about is subjective experience. (Phenomenal consciousness = experiential consciousness.)

Phenomenal colors are colors-as-experienced, and they are distinguished from objective physical colors defined e.g. in terms of wavelengths.

There isn't some sort of consciousness that's not subjective experience.

[Consul]

According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem (Frankish 2016) is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious.

"Judging that we are phenomenally conscious" is evidence of being phenomenally conscious. So consciousness can't be an illusion in that case, it's not something we can be mistaken about.

For the sake of its consistency, illusionism should be expected to also deny that there are conscious judgments, i.e. judgings as conscious acts of inner speech.
However, strictly speaking, illusionism's basic denial is that there are mental/experiential events or states with phenomenal properties, which doesn't include a denial of the existence of mental/experiential occurrents without phenomenal properties. So illusionists can argue that there are conscious thoughts, including conscious judgments, but they lack phenomenal properties, being conscious but not phenomenally conscious (whatever exactly it means to say so). Actually, the illusionists aren't the only philosophers of mind who believe that there is no phenomenology of thought. I think they are wrong!

What makes illusionism especially confusing is that its adherents such as Keith Frankish haven't stopped using the words "consciousness" and "experience"; and instead of attributing phenomenal properties to them (which they believe don't exist), they attribute obscure "quasi-phenomenal" properties to experiences. But, to put it mildly, it is anything but clear that Frankishian "experiences" with "quasi-phenomenal properties" (whose existence is said to be compatible with illusionism) still deserve to be called so. It seems to me that we have a case of homonymy here: one word—"experience"—with the same pronunciation and spelling, but with two different meanings.

An analogy:

QUOTE>
"If someone seemingly tells us that God exists, and then goes on to tell us that 'God' denotes the evolutionary-historical process that has brought us into being, and if we ourselves think that this evolutionary-historical process is far from deserving the name he gives it, then we should count him as an atheist. We may report that he says the words 'God exists', but we would be wrong to say that he says that God exists. (Or at least we would be wrong to say it without immediate qualification.) He believes in something that he thinks deserves the name 'God'. But if we are right and he is wrong about what it takes to deserve the name, then he does not believe in anything that would in fact deserve that name, and we would be wrong to say otherwise."

(Lewis, David. "Noneism or Allism." In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 152-163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 153)
<QUOTE

So: If someone seemingly tells us that experience exists, and then goes on to tell us that "experience" denotes nothing more than "the mental states that are the direct output of sensory systems", then…

When illusionists keep on referring to and talking about experience as something that is really part of the mind, they're doing what Galen Strawson calls semantic "looking-glassing"—by redefining "experience" in nonphenomenological, purely functionalistic terms.

QUOTE>
"To looking-glass or reversify a term is to define it in such a way that whatever one means by it, it excludes what the term means."

(Strawson, Galen. "Fundamental Singleness: How to Turn the 2nd Paralogism into a Valid Argument." 2010. Reprinted in The Subject of Experience, 165-187. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. p. 167n6)
<QUOTE

QUOTE>
"Conscious experience has a subjective aspect; we say it is like something to see colours, to hear sounds, smell odours, and so on. Such talk is widely construed to mean that conscious experiences have introspectable qualitative properties, or 'feels', which determine what it is like to undergo them. Various terms are used for these putative properties. I shall use 'phenomenal properties', and, for variation, 'phenomenal feels' and 'phenomenal character', and I shall say that experiences with such properties are phenomenally conscious. (I shall use the term 'experience' itself in a functional sense, for the mental states that are the direct output of sensory systems. In this sense it is not definitional that experiences are phenomenally conscious.)"
(p. 13)

"Illusionism makes a very strong claim: it claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory; experiences do not really have qualitative, ‘what-it’s-like’ properties, whether physical or non-physical."
(p. 15)

"A quasi-phenomenal property is a non-phenomenal, physical property (perhaps a complex, gerrymandered one) that introspection typically misrepresents as phenomenal. For example, quasi-phenomenal redness is the physical property that typically triggers introspective representations of phenomenal redness. There is nothing phenomenal about such properties—nothing 'feely' or qualitative—and they present no special explanatory problem. Strong illusionists hold that the introspectable properties of experience are merely quasi-phenomenal ones."
(p. 15)

(Frankish, Keith. "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness." In Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, edited by Keith Frankish, 11-39. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2017.)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

…It seems to me that we have a case of homonymy here: one word—"experience"—with the same pronunciation and spelling, but with two different meanings.

Wrong! I have to correct myself, because what I describe above is ambiguity rather than homonymy. For in the case of the latter there are two different words with the same pronunciation and spelling, but with two different meanings.