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[JackDaydream]

@3017Metaphysican

The flow of the stream of consciousness is definitely important, and I do some meditation and try to watch this stream. It is even possible to stop thoughts, but it extremely difficult while awake, and I have only ever managed this for moments. As far as the unconscious is concerned, one aspect of this is that the 'I' continues in dreams, even while images of objects are the main experiences. The sense of identity exists independently, although even in dreams it is most frequent to have a body and to continue to be oneself rather than someone else. The sense of being separate is learned in early childhood and is recognized by psychoanalysts as being one of the most intrinsic development. Of course, it is possible to imagine that one is someone else and step into a fantasy or fictitious world completely, like when fiction or music leads to an immersion into a different mode of being from that experienced in the actual world.

But, the question of whether 'metaphysics' can be experienced directly is complex. Perhaps, what can be experienced is metaphysical ideas. Apart from Kant, the other thinker who is so important here is Plato, in relation to the cave analogy. Human beings see the shadows and mistake them for 'reality' itself.

However, some systems of meditation and mysticism do maintain that it is possible to reach more 'transcendent' states in a more direct way, and would argue that these may be closer 'approximations' of possible 'metaphysical' aspects of reality beyond the physical. One form of this which I came across was in 'transmission meditation', which was a form of meditation developed by Benjamin Creme. He maintained that in such meditation, one was levelling down energies of the divine hierarchy of masters on the non physical plane, including the Christ. I have participated in transmission meditation workshops, and it was the most helpful form of meditation which I have ever experienced, but I was not convinced that it was really about connecting with the energies of the hierarchy as Creme maintained.



'

[3017Metaphysician]

@3017Metaphysican

The flow of the stream of consciousness is definitely important, and I do some meditation and try to watch this stream. It is even possible to stop thoughts, but it extremely difficult while awake, and I have only ever managed this for moments. As far as the unconscious is concerned, one aspect of this is that the 'I' continues in dreams, even while images of objects are the main experiences. The sense of identity exists independently, although even in dreams it is most frequent to have a body and to continue to be oneself rather than someone else. The sense of being separate is learned in early childhood and is recognized by psychoanalysts as being one of the most intrinsic development. Of course, it is possible to imagine that one is someone else and step into a fantasy or fictitious world completely, like when fiction or music leads to an immersion into a different mode of being from that experienced in the actual world.

But, the question of whether 'metaphysics' can be experienced directly is complex. Perhaps, what can be experienced is metaphysical ideas. Apart from Kant, the other thinker who is so important here is Plato, in relation to the cave analogy. Human beings see the shadows and mistake them for 'reality' itself.

However, some systems of meditation and mysticism do maintain that it is possible to reach more 'transcendent' states in a more direct way, and would argue that these may be closer 'approximations' of possible 'metaphysical' aspects of reality beyond the physical. One form of this which I came across was in 'transmission meditation', which was a form of meditation developed by Benjamin Creme. He maintained that in such meditation, one was levelling down energies of the divine hierarchy of masters on the non physical plane, including the Christ. I have participated in transmission meditation workshops, and it was the most helpful form of meditation which I have ever experienced, but I was not convinced that it was really about connecting with the energies of the hierarchy as Creme maintained.



'

Hey Jack!

You said: Of course, it is possible to imagine that one is someone else and step into a fantasy or fictitious world completely, like when fiction or music leads to an immersion into a different mode of being from that experienced in the actual world.

But, the question of whether 'metaphysics' can be experienced directly is complex. Perhaps, what can be experienced is metaphysical ideas...


I'm wondering if the infamous 'driving while daydreaming' running a red-light, crashing and possibly killing oneself 'experience/phenomenon' fits the bill? After all, one's mind is telling us we are on the beach, and the other mind is telling us how to react to one's driving conditions. Is that a version of dualism, I wonder?

[JackDaydream]

@3017Metaphysican

I don't drive, and part of the reason for this is that I am such a daydreamer, and I never even bothered with driving lessons. The reason why I chose Daydream for my second name was I acquired the title Mr Daydream, after the Mr Men character, at work a couple of years ago. I am lost in another world sometimes and have to jolt myself back.

But, I have thought about this in connection with the issue of dualism, because often do do physical tasks it is as though I have to climb into my physical body and into the physical world. My housemates notice it, especially when I get up first thing in the morning, as I spill my coffee etc.and knock things over. Of course, in some systems of thought there is a term for getting out of one's body, which is astral projection and the astral plane. The idea of astral projection implies a subtle form of dualism and being able to move into aspects beyond physical reality. This would be compatible with the 'reality' in which hallucinogenic drugs transport people to, or near death experiences. One aspect of area within Christianity is whether the resurrection 'body' is a physical or spiritual body, or what kind reality one goes to after death, so there has been a big dilemma about dualism and what is 'reality' within Christian traditions.

[3017Metaphysician]

@3017Metaphysican

I don't drive, and part of the reason for this is that I am such a daydreamer, and I never even bothered with driving lessons. The reason why I chose Daydream for my second name was I acquired the title Mr Daydream, after the Mr Men character, at work a couple of years ago. I am lost in another world sometimes and have to jolt myself back.

But, I have thought about this in connection with the issue of dualism, because often do do physical tasks it is as though I have to climb into my physical body and into the physical world. My housemates notice it, especially when I get up first thing in the morning, as I spill my coffee etc.and knock things over. Of course, in some systems of thought there is a term for getting out of one's body, which is astral projection and the astral plane. The idea of astral projection implies a subtle form of dualism and being able to move into aspects beyond physical reality. This would be compatible with the 'reality' in which hallucinogenic drugs transport people to, or near death experiences. One aspect of area within Christianity is whether the resurrection 'body' is a physical or spiritual body, or what kind reality one goes to after death, so there has been a big dilemma about dualism and what is 'reality' within Christian traditions.

Jack!

Indeed I certainly understand that from an anecdotal perspective. With respect to Christian resurrection and the like, one could make a case for that particular logically impossible phenomena being analogous to consciousness itself (the nature of consciousness itself-conscious, subconscious and unconscious mind-can be deduced as logically impossible since its qualities [Qualia] and multiple brain functions break the rules of formal logic/LEM/Bivalence). In other words, formal logic (a priori) is not completely germane to the creation/design/emergence of self-aware biological existence.

Although one related irony is that while mathematics (a form of said formal logic) can describe things like initial conditions and other phenomena like dark energy, gravity, super nova, time and relativity, etc.. etc.. (pre and post BB), along with the creation of modern day things like design/engineering components, mathematics itself is considered a metaphysical language on to its own. The rub is that, a so-called unchanging metaphysical truth describes/explains an otherwise changing truth. What's behind the skyscraper building is a metaphysical-mathematical formula that was used in its creation. And music is yet another interesting thing-in-itself phenomena.

Anyway, back to illusions. Perhaps the more absurd things are, one should rejoice accordingly. Otherwise, in theory, I suppose we'd be somewhere's else

BTW, for fun, check out the video in the other thread (beyond today's physical world...) where the guy talks about modern day beam-me-up-Scotty kinds of stuff. If we don't chat, have a great weekend!

[JackDaydream]

3017Metaphysican

I can definitely rejoice in the absurd, and I do try to keep a sense of humour. At times I get too serious, but usually it doesn't take too much for me to be able to laugh. My reply to you in the night was a bit grungy, and that was because I couldn't sleep. I think negatively if I can't sleep and despite being a daydreamer I often have trouble sleeping...too much thinking. Anyway , hope you have a good weekend.

[stevie]

Hello Philosophers!

I have two questions up for consideration:

Mr. Nicholas Humphry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Humphrey was asked whether consciousness is an illusion and he replied: "Yes", that he believed it was. Nicholas is a self proclaimed Materialist, and a cognitive scientist. As such, it begs the question: is his belief in the concept of 'illusion' self-refuting, ironic, and paradoxical? The philosophical reason why this belief may be paradoxical is because the definition of 'illusion' in itself, is a 'metaphysical phenomenon' (or is it)?

Of course making such assertive statements about consciousness should at least take into account that either the statements as such are fabrications of this illusory consciousness or the statements as concepts are no different from the alleged illusory consciousness (depending on whether one takes 'consciousness to be an agent or the self-display of a conscious object). To insist that the statements are or represent truth but are either fabricated by what one calls "illusion" or are the same may lead to the paradox concept of "illusory truth" ... why does one make such kinds of statement nevertheless? And why do I say this here when my consciousness and its display might be illusory?

From my perspective "illusion" is the reciprokal concept of "truth" and "reality", both sides depend on each other and are impossible to utter or 'speak about' without consciousness. So what might be called 'illusion' is the intuition that anything at all that is verbally expressible might be proven to be grounded on something independent of consciousness because we cannot leave the sphere of consciousness when we verbally express something. But whether consciousness as such is an illusion or true reality is beyond judgement and therefore both judgements have to be suspended.

Happy Friday Stevie!

Great question(s).

To answer the first concerning "....why dies one make such kinds of statement nevertheless?", I would have to agree with physicist Paul Davies:

"...human rationality, that it is legitimate to seek 'explanations' for things, and that we truly understand something only when it is 'explained'.


I bring him into the mix for several reasons, one of which related to Mr. Humphries 'Materialism' (it would be nice if somehow he were able to stumble on this thread-wishfully thinking on my part of course-or maybe yet another kind of illusion ). And, I also bring him into the mix because he doesn't deny the possibility that "...the case that the reason for existence has no explanation in the usual sense?...only that an understanding of [universe] existence and [its] properties lies outside the usual categories of rational human thought."

That all speaks to the limitations of human reason and observation. Existentially, it speaks to the specifics of finitude.

To your second paragraph/point, yes, I think your interpretation is quite Existential. To embellish a bit, we somehow feel as though something is not right (existential angst), and we continue to seek logical explanations for things and feel good only when they make sense. Our minds seem to crave logic, only to realize its own futility. In cosmology, its kind of like repeating/saying the infamous metaphysical judgement of the synthetic a priori: all events must have a cause. We can't help to advance these thoughts and subsequent theories to seek the answers to those suppositions/theories in the first place. And in some cases, its like the circular analogy to the liars paradox.

As an aside, ( and in the Continental/Post Modern tradition) that human condition provides for further analogy relative to sentience. After all, who understands the phenomena of Love? Is it physical/material, meta-physical, or both? We don't understand it, yet we seek to have it (some semblance of the feeling) in our lives. Another paradox, I wonder?

Referring to your quote of Paul Davies: sometimes it might be kind of 'virtuous' to leave questions open [as they as such are], especially when answers to not appear spontaneously to oneself.

Coming back to Nicholas Humphry it would be interesting to know the understanding of "illusion" of him and other eliminative materialists. To me it appears that not only from a materialist perspective appearances of the five sense are considered more reliable than mere thought by most humans and it appears to me that these sense appearances are altogether based on materiality. But to draw the extreme conclusion that consciousness therefore is an illusion while only the material is real (does not only ignore the inherent cognition of that conclusion) but does not "explain" (see your quote of Paul Davies) anything for me while it seems to explain "much" for eliminative materialist (because they have come up with this "explanation"). This discrepancy of explanatory satisfactoriness I think is caused by the fact that I do not share the metaphysical outlook of eliminative materialist in this context because my outlook in this context is phenomenological: both matter/materiality and consciousness are mere appearances for me and I can't seen while I should assign different degrees of truth/reality/existence to any of these.

[stevie]

Typo in last sentence: Not "while I should assign" but "why I should assign"

[Jorixgr8]

Just sharing this link "the VEIL OF THOUGHTS" lecture of Alan Watts that might be worth reflecting

https://shrinke.me/5vtzU63

[Consul]

* Keith Frankish: Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness (PDF)

* Illusionism about Qualia

* The Illusionist Movement

QUOTE>
"It is not easy to persuade people to take illusionism seriously. In part, this is because it is easily caricatured as denying that we have sensations in the everyday sense (it would be more accurate to say that it rejects a certain conception of what sensations are)."

(Frankish, Keith. Editorial Introduction to Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. In Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, edited by Keith Frankish, 9-10. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2017. p. 9)
———
"According to illusionists, our sense that it is like something to undergo conscious experiences is due to the fact that we systematically misrepresent them (or, on some versions, their objects) as having phenomenal properties. "
(p. 11)

"I propose ‘illusionism’ as a more accurate and inclusive name, and I shall refer to the problem of explaining why experiences seem to have phenomenal properties as the illusion problem."
(p. 12)

"I shall use ‘phenomenal properties’, and, for variation, ‘phenomenal feels’ and ‘phenomenal character’, and I shall say that experiences with such properties are phenomenally conscious.
(I shall use the term 'experience' itself in a functional sense, for the mental states that are the direct output of sensory systems. In this sense it is not definitional that experiences are phenomenally conscious.)"
(p. 13)

"Illusionists deny that experiences have phenomenal properties and focus on explaining why they seem to have them."
(p. 14)

"Illusionism makes a very strong claim: it claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory; experiences do not really have qualitative, ‘what-it’s-like’ properties, whether physical or non-physical."
(p. 15)

"A quasi-phenomenal property is a non-phenomenal, physical property (perhaps a complex, gerrymandered one) that introspection typically misrepresents as phenomenal. For example, quasi-phenomenal redness is the physical property that typically triggers introspective representations of phenomenal redness. There is nothing phenomenal about such properties—nothing 'feely' or qualitative—and they present no special explanatory problem. Strong illusionists hold that the introspectable properties of experience are merely quasi-phenomenal ones."
(p. 15)

"I characterized illusionism as the view that phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion[.]"
(p. 19)

"Does illusionism entail eliminativism about consciousness? Is the illusionist claiming that we are mistaken in thinking we have conscious experiences? It depends on what we mean by 'conscious experiences'. If we mean experiences with phenomenal properties, then illusionists do indeed deny that such things exist. But if we mean experiences of the kind that philosophers characterize as having phenomenal properties, then illusionists do not deny their existence. They simply offer a different account of their nature, characterizing them as having mere quasi-phenomenal properties. Similarly, illusionists deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness properly so-called, but do not deny the existence of a form of consciousness (perhaps distinct from other kinds, such as access consciousness) which consists in the possession of states with quasi-phenomenal properties and is commonly mischaracterized as phenomenal. Henceforth, I shall use 'consciousness' and 'conscious experience' without qualification in an inclusive sense to refer to states that might turn out to be either genuinely phenomenal or only quasi-phenomenal. In this sense realists and illusionists agree that consciousness exists."
(p. 21)

"Are illusionists claiming that we are (phenomenal) zombies? If the only thing zombies lack is phenomenal consciousness properly so called, then illusionists must say that, in this technical sense, we are zombies. However, zombies are presented as creatures very different from ourselves—ones with no inner life, whose experience is completely blindsighted. As Chalmers puts it, 'There is nothing it is like to be a zombie…all is dark inside' (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 95-6). And illusionists will not agree that this is a good description of us. Rather, they will deny the equivalence between having an inner life and having phenomenal consciousness. Having the kind of inner life we have, they will say, consists in having a form of introspective self-awareness that creates the illusion of a rich phenomenology.

But aren't phenomenal properties precisely what makes experience like something? That is certainly a common way of construing what-it's-like talk, but there is another way. Illusionists can say that one's experiences are like something if one is aware of them in a functional sense, courtesy of introspective representational mechanisms. Indeed, this is a plausible reading of the phrase; experiences are like something for a creature, just as external objects are like something for it, if it mentally represents them to itself. Illusionists agree that experiences are like something in this sense, though they add that the representations are non-veridical, misrepresenting experiences as having phenomenal properties. (what-it's-like-ness in the first sense). And in this second sense there is something it is like to be a zombie, since zombies have introspective mechanisms functionally identical to our own. When we imagine zombies as being different from us, we are—illegitimately—imagining creatures with different introspective capacities."
(pp. 22-3)

"This brings us back to talk of it being like something| to be us. As noted earlier, such talk may mean simply that we have an introspective awareness of our experiences, generated by representational mechanisms. We might call this introspective subjectivity. Illusionists agree that we have introspective subjectivity, though they hold that it is radically misleading. But 'like something' talk can be understood in a stronger sense, as indicating that we possess a subjective dimension that is not a product of introspective mechanisms but arises simply from our being the things we are. Call this intrinsic subjectivity."
(p. 31)

(Frankish, Keith. "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness." In Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, edited by Keith Frankish, 11-39. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2017.)
———
"The explanandum is the thing we call 'conscious experience', where it is an open question whether this involves phenomenality or the illusion of it."
(p. 257)

"[W]e can employ an inclusive concept of consciousness that does not carry a commitment to phenomenal realism and allows us to affirm the reality and significance of consciousness in a natural way."
(p. 274)

"There's no point mincing words: we don't have phenomenal properties, only representations of them."
(p. 274)

"[Schwitzgebel's] definition is so innocent, it is not incompatible with illusionism. As I stressed in the target article, illusionists do not deny the existence of the mental states we describe as phenomenally conscious, nor do they deny that we can introspectively recognize these states when they occur in us. Moreover, they can accept that these states share some unifying feature. But they add that this feature is not possession of phenomenal properties (qualia, what-it’s-like-ness, etc.) in the substantive sense created by the phenomenality language game. Rather, it is possession of introspectable properties that dispose us to judge that the states possess phenomenal properties in that substantive sense (of course, we could call this feature phenomenality’ if we want, but I take it that phenomenal realists will not want to do that). "
(p. 277)

"Martine Nida-Rümelin begins her commentary by rejecting the widely held view that phenomenal consciousness consists in having experiences with phenomenal properties. Talk of experiences having phenomenal properties is, she argues, a confused way of talking about subjects having experiential properties, where these are properties that it is like something to undergo. If this is correct, then it immediately undercuts illusionism as originally presented. If it is confused to think that being phenomenally conscious involves having experiences with phenomenal properties, then it is equally confused to think that it involves having experiences that are misrepresented as having phenomenal properties. However, as Nida-Riimelin notes, illusionists may simply recast their view as the claim that we misrepresent ourselves as having experiential properties, and she goes on to argue against this claim."
(p. 286)

"Nida-Rümelins main argument appeals to facts about reference fixing. She argues that reference to experiential properties should be introduced in the following, two-step way. First, we point to paradigm examples, such as suffering pain, feeling sad, or being visually presented with blueness. Second, we establish reference to a feature all the examples share, using metaphors and provisional descriptions (perhaps talking of ‘what it is like’ to have the properties), but without making any theoretical commitments as to the nature of the feature. This shared feature is what marks out experiential properties and thus phenomenal consciousness. Since illusionists deny the existence of experiential properties, Nida-Rümelin argues, they must either deny that this procedure picks out a common feature of experiential properties or say that experiential properties are never instantiated. Neither option, she argues, is attractive.

This argument is similar to Schwitzgebel’s, and my response is similar. I grant that the first step picks out real properties — the personal-level properties we call ‘being in pain’, ‘feeling sad’, ‘seeing a blue colour’, and so on. Illusionists do not deny that something is going on when we are in pain or feeling sad. And I grant, too, that the second step establishes reference to a common feature of these properties. However, I deny that it is the sort of feature realists think it is. It is not some intrinsic quality, akin to the property characterized by the phenomenality language game. Rather, it is (roughly) the property of having a cluster of introspective representational states and dispositions that create the illusion that one is acquainted with some intrinsic quality. I am sure that this is not what Nida-Riimelin thinks the procedure picks out, but I don’t see how she can rule out the possibility. She makes it clear that in the second step reference is to be fixed by ostension, not description (she says that any descriptions used are merely an aid to identification and may not survive later theorizing — this issue, p. 168). So I am happy to concede the truth of realism about experiential properties in this sense. However, this is a very weak kind of realism, which is compatible with the ontology of illusionism."
(pp. 287-8)

(Frankish, Keith. "Not Disillusioned: Reply to Commentators." In Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, edited by Keith Frankish, 256-289. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2017. )
<QUOTE

[Consul]

An illusion is a false appearance or impression, or a false belief. Illusionism is self-refuting if it claims that there is no experiential/phenomenal consciousness but only false experiential/phenomenal appearances or impressions of it; so its claim can only be that we falsely believe in experiential/phenomenal consciousness. However, again illusionism is self-refuting if the false beliefs in question are occurrent, conscious belief-experiences or experiential manifestations of beliefs in the form of belief-sentences uttered in conscious inner speech ("I believe that…"). So its claim can only be that I hold a (experientially/phenomenally) nonconscious false belief in (experiential/phenomenal) consciousness. But then how do I know that I do so when that belief never manifests itself in my consciousness, because there is no such consciousness?

Moreover, illusionists assert that experiential/phenomenal consciousness is misrepresented by introspection as involving distinctively experiential/phenomenal qualities (qualia); so they presuppose that introspective awareness is mediated by representations. But I think that's not the case: The "tool" of introspection is inner attention (attention directed at one's own mind/consciousness); and inner attention is directly presentational rather than representational. That is, introspection qua inner attention is a form of immediate perception; and where there is no representation, there can be no misrepresentation.

Anyway, if there were no subjective experiences, there would be nothing to introspect in the first place. And if there were nothing experiential to introspect, then the cognitive faculty of introspection wouldn't have evolved at all, would it?

Moreover:

"According to the standard distinction, 'hallucinationism' might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) name for the position Frankish is advocating."

(Chrisley, Ron, and Aaron Sloman. "Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia." APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 6/1 (2016): 2–13. p. 3)

The term "illusionism" is a euphemism for eliminativism or nihilism about experiential/phenomenal consciousness. And:

"If 'consciousness' means conscious experience in the concrete, the proposition 'Consciousness does not exist' shows itself 'absurd and impossible' by the fundamental canons of science, philosophy, and common sense. Either the proposition, therefore, is false, or it entails the most searching scientific revolution ever envisioned, not merely in psychology but in all human concept-systems and all logical and scientific methodology. Such revision, although not impossible, is greater than any attempted by a Plato, a Darwin, or an Einstein. Its positive nature I cannot conjecture, and the behaviorists themselves have shown small interest or aptitude for it. Finally, even if it were accomplished, it must be so complex that no conceivable psychological advantage would warrant its substitution for the current scheme. No living man, I think, ever seriously thought through so recondite a possibility."

(Williams, Donald Cary. "The Existence of Consciousness." In Principles of Empirical Realism: Philosophical Essays, 23-40. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1966. p. 30)

[3017Metaphysician]

An illusion is a false appearance or impression, or a false belief. Illusionism is self-refuting if it claims that there is no experiential/phenomenal consciousness but only false experiential/phenomenal appearances or impressions of it; so its claim can only be that we falsely believe in experiential/phenomenal consciousness. However, again illusionism is self-refuting if the false beliefs in question are occurrent, conscious belief-experiences or experiential manifestations of beliefs in the form of belief-sentences uttered in conscious inner speech ("I believe that…"). So its claim can only be that I hold a (experientially/phenomenally) nonconscious false belief in (experiential/phenomenal) consciousness. But then how do I know that I do so when that belief never manifests itself in my consciousness, because there is no such consciousness?

Moreover, illusionists assert that experiential/phenomenal consciousness is misrepresented by introspection as involving distinctively experiential/phenomenal qualities (qualia); so they presuppose that introspective awareness is mediated by representations. But I think that's not the case: The "tool" of introspection is inner attention (attention directed at one's own mind/consciousness); and inner attention is directly presentational rather than representational. That is, introspection qua inner attention is a form of immediate perception; and where there is no representation, there can be no misrepresentation.

Anyway, if there were no subjective experiences, there would be nothing to introspect in the first place. And if there were nothing experiential to introspect, then the cognitive faculty of introspection wouldn't have evolved at all, would it?

Moreover:

"According to the standard distinction, 'hallucinationism' might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) name for the position Frankish is advocating."

(Chrisley, Ron, and Aaron Sloman. "Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia." APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 6/1 (2016): 2–13. p. 3)

The term "illusionism" is a euphemism for eliminativism or nihilism about experiential/phenomenal consciousness. And:

"If 'consciousness' means conscious experience in the concrete, the proposition 'Consciousness does not exist' shows itself 'absurd and impossible' by the fundamental canons of science, philosophy, and common sense. Either the proposition, therefore, is false, or it entails the most searching scientific revolution ever envisioned, not merely in psychology but in all human concept-systems and all logical and scientific methodology. Such revision, although not impossible, is greater than any attempted by a Plato, a Darwin, or an Einstein. Its positive nature I cannot conjecture, and the behaviorists themselves have shown small interest or aptitude for it. Finally, even if it were accomplished, it must be so complex that no conceivable psychological advantage would warrant its substitution for the current scheme. No living man, I think, ever seriously thought through so recondite a possibility."

(Williams, Donald Cary. "The Existence of Consciousness." In Principles of Empirical Realism: Philosophical Essays, 23-40. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1966. p. 30)

Consul! Thanks for your contribution.

You said: But then how do I know that I do so when that belief never manifests itself in my consciousness, because there is no such consciousness?


I think the best way to answer that is through the belief system of the materialist who might say something like this: 'I believe consciousness is an illusion. And, illusion itself (the thing-in-itself) is something that I experience and see as an object (in my mind) but it's not really a real object. Yet, I still believe in its 'existence'. In other words, it's real but I don't believe it's 'physically real.'

That self-refuting part in-turn begs such questions about that (materialist/physicalist) belief system. Hence the questions: its existence becomes what then? What kind of existence is that, and is this 'image or existence' of an image non-material 'stuff' in and of itself (an illusion)? How can this be; how is that possible? How does one even know it's real or an illusion? And what's considered 'real' anyway? Materialists believe only that which is real is solely physical matter.

Accordingly, in the Op, I alluded to the infamous driving while daydreaming, crashing and surviving scenario/example. As such, did the driver know he was physically on the beach or physically driving and crashing? Of course, all he 'apparently' knew was that he was somewhere else on the beach instead of actually driving. His mind was at the beach, his body somewhere else. And by all accounts, the beach was real to him; certainly not as real as driving the car and navigating the roadway.


On the other hand, the Idealist say's, see I told you so, what you experienced was just an 'idea' in your mind and nothing else. That idea was not physically real because objects only exist to the extent that they are perceived by someone. And so you have conflicting 'ideas' about where you 'physically' were based upon your conscious, subconscious and unconscious mind's behavior. Your stream of consciousness, which you couldn't control, caused you to crash the car. Or did it?

Philosophical questions: How can we control our stream of consciousness? Are ideas themselves physically real or metaphysically real, or both? Can our Will, somehow be controlled to circumvent this phenomenon of double-mindedness? And finally, is the Will itself, physical or meta-physical (Qualia)?

[Consul]

You said: But then how do I know that I do so when that belief never manifests itself in my consciousness, because there is no such consciousness?

I think the best way to answer that is through the belief system of the materialist who might say something like this: 'I believe consciousness is an illusion. And, illusion itself (the thing-in-itself) is something that I experience and see as an object (in my mind) but it's not really a real object. Yet, I still believe in its 'existence'. In other words, it's real but I don't believe it's 'physically real.'

Strictly speaking, in the case of a perceptual illusion, there is something real which is perceived (perceptually experienced), but it is different from the way it perceptually appears or seems. If illusionism is the view that experiences exist, are real, but they are different from the way they introspectively appear or seem, because they do not really have any phenomenal ("what-it-is-like") qualities (qualia), then it is a realistic error theory of experience or consciousness rather than an antirealistic or nihilistic one denying the very existence of experience or consciousness.

However, Frankish's description of illusionism is pretty abstruse, because on the one hand it is described as a denial of phenomenal consciousness aka subjective experience, and on the other hand it is described as a denial not of consciousness or experience simpliciter, but only of consciousness or experience with phenomenal properties. And if consciousness only involves "quasi-phenomenal" properties instead of phenomenal ones, then illusionism is said not to be a form of eliminativism about it. But the question is whether "quasi-phenomenal consciousness" is still properly called "consciousness", with the latter term being used synonymously with "subjective experience" rather than with "cognition" or "perception". I don't think so, because those quasi-phenomenal properties seem to be some kind of purely dispositional or functional properties rather than genuinely experiential ones in the phenomenological sense. If quasi-phenomenal consciousness is what phenomenally nonconscious zombies or robots can have, which subjectively experience nothing, then illusionism is doubtless a form of eliminativism.

QUOTE>
"A quasi-phenomenal property is a non-phenomenal, physical property (perhaps a complex, gerrymandered one) that introspection typically misrepresents as phenomenal. For example, quasi-phenomenal redness is the physical property that typically triggers introspective representations of phenomenal redness. There is nothing phenomenal about such properties—nothing 'feely' or qualitative—and they present no special explanatory problem. Strong illusionists hold that the introspectable properties of experience are merely quasi-phenomenal ones."
(p. 15)

"Does illusionism entail eliminativism about consciousness? Is the illusionist claiming that we are mistaken in thinking we have conscious experiences? It depends on what we mean by 'conscious experiences'. If we mean experiences with phenomenal properties, then illusionists do indeed deny that such things exist. But if we mean experiences of the kind that philosophers characterize as having phenomenal properties, then illusionists do not deny their existence. They simply offer a different account of their nature, characterizing them as having mere quasi-phenomenal properties. Similarly, illusionists deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness properly so-called, but do not deny the existence of a form of consciousness (perhaps distinct from other kinds, such as access consciousness) which consists in the possession of states with quasi-phenomenal properties and is commonly mischaracterized as phenomenal. Henceforth, I shall use 'consciousness' and 'conscious experience' without qualification in an inclusive sense to refer to states that might turn out to be either genuinely phenomenal or only quasi-phenomenal. In this sense realists and illusionists agree that consciousness exists."
(p. 21)

(Frankish, Keith. "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness." In Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, edited by Keith Frankish, 11-39. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2017.)
<QUOTE

[3017Metaphysician]

You said: But then how do I know that I do so when that belief never manifests itself in my consciousness, because there is no such consciousness?

I think the best way to answer that is through the belief system of the materialist who might say something like this: 'I believe consciousness is an illusion. And, illusion itself (the thing-in-itself) is something that I experience and see as an object (in my mind) but it's not really a real object. Yet, I still believe in its 'existence'. In other words, it's real but I don't believe it's 'physically real.'

Strictly speaking, in the case of a perceptual illusion, there is something real which is perceived (perceptually experienced), but it is different from the way it perceptually appears or seems. If illusionism is the view that experiences exist, are real, but they are different from the way they introspectively appear or seem, because they do not really have any phenomenal ("what-it-is-like") qualities (qualia), then it is a realistic error theory of experience or consciousness rather than an antirealistic or nihilistic one denying the very existence of experience or consciousness.

However, Frankish's description of illusionism is pretty abstruse, because on the one hand it is described as a denial of phenomenal consciousness aka subjective experience, and on the other hand it is described as a denial not of consciousness or experience simpliciter, but only of consciousness or experience with phenomenal properties. And if consciousness only involves "quasi-phenomenal" properties instead of phenomenal ones, then illusionism is said not to be a form of eliminativism about it. But the question is whether "quasi-phenomenal consciousness" is still properly called "consciousness", with the latter term being used synonymously with "subjective experience" rather than with "cognition" or "perception". I don't think so, because those quasi-phenomenal properties seem to be some kind of purely dispositional or functional properties rather than genuinely experiential ones in the phenomenological sense. If quasi-phenomenal consciousness is what phenomenally nonconscious zombies or robots can have, which subjectively experience nothing, then illusionism is doubtless a form of eliminativism.

QUOTE>
"A quasi-phenomenal property is a non-phenomenal, physical property (perhaps a complex, gerrymandered one) that introspection typically misrepresents as phenomenal. For example, quasi-phenomenal redness is the physical property that typically triggers introspective representations of phenomenal redness. There is nothing phenomenal about such properties—nothing 'feely' or qualitative—and they present no special explanatory problem. Strong illusionists hold that the introspectable properties of experience are merely quasi-phenomenal ones."
(p. 15)

"Does illusionism entail eliminativism about consciousness? Is the illusionist claiming that we are mistaken in thinking we have conscious experiences? It depends on what we mean by 'conscious experiences'. If we mean experiences with phenomenal properties, then illusionists do indeed deny that such things exist. But if we mean experiences of the kind that philosophers characterize as having phenomenal properties, then illusionists do not deny their existence. They simply offer a different account of their nature, characterizing them as having mere quasi-phenomenal properties. Similarly, illusionists deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness properly so-called, but do not deny the existence of a form of consciousness (perhaps distinct from other kinds, such as access consciousness) which consists in the possession of states with quasi-phenomenal properties and is commonly mischaracterized as phenomenal. Henceforth, I shall use 'consciousness' and 'conscious experience' without qualification in an inclusive sense to refer to states that might turn out to be either genuinely phenomenal or only quasi-phenomenal. In this sense realists and illusionists agree that consciousness exists."
(p. 21)

(Frankish, Keith. "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness." In Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, edited by Keith Frankish, 11-39. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2017.)
<QUOTE

Consul!

Before we loose site of this point (to your first paragraph about Qualia including how that might relate to the OP/Materialism), my view would be that in either or ANY case, one could not preclude Qualia itself, from the experience, itself. That notion of 'material things-in-themselves', (as I'll phrase it) being perceived as images (illusions), and those images being produced by consciousness which produces immaterial phenomena (the Will and other forms of sentient existence that is apperceived), implies a 'quality' (Qualia) of consciousness and not just a material 'quantity' per se. I think Kant spoke to an analogous 'medium' of the mind (a hard drive) that is fixed and innate (a priori) which fixes everything in our abilities to perceive (apperception) objects/things. To me, a similar analogy to a simple camera design being limited to its own design parameters determines the 'quality' of images, hence the reality that one perceives. A 35mm camera generally takes a better image than an old polaroid, or a black and white movie camera is different from a digital medium, analogue audio quality v. digital quality ('Qualia' metaphor), ad nauseum.

And so in many ways, one could embrace the old philosophical/metaphysical axiom of Subjective Idealism as a starting point/method of describing the nature of reality, since consciousness itself cannot be removed from the apperception process. In other words, the design or make-up of the 'camera' is not known (yet logically necessary), much less any objects that are being perceived by it, thus making the concept of illusion real. Actually, in deconstructionism, one can always ask how the initial or 'creation' or development of the original term/concept of illusion was first conceived(?). And that takes us back to the self-refuting part, among other things... .


This would be a good reference point to Apperception in the Kantian tradition:

Immanuel Kant distinguished transcendental apperception from empirical apperception. The first is the perception of an object as involving the consciousness of the pure self as subject – "the pure, original, unchangeable consciousness that is the necessary condition of experience and the ultimate foundation of the unity of experience". The second is "the consciousness of the concrete actual self with its changing states", the so-called "inner sense" (Otto F. Kraushaar in Runes[2]). Transcendental apperception is almost equivalent to self-consciousness; the existence of the ego may be more or less prominent, but it is always involved.[1] See Kantianism.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apperception

I think regardless of how we apperceive things-themselves viz the concept of illusion, this sense of one's 'ego', Freudian ID, or Schopenhauer Will, remains a quality of consciousness that can't be adequately described/explained physically or materially (its quantity). Yet, in itself, is logically necessary for any perception to take place at all since it is always involved. Perhaps that is another part of the 'quasi-phenomenal property' of conscious existence that you mention... (?).

[3017Metaphysician]

Allow me to add this to the database of info (from cognitive science):

Alfred Adler used the notion of apperception to explain certain principles of perception in child psychology. A child perceives different situations not as they actually exist, but by means of the biases prism of their personal interests, in other words, according to their personal apperception scheme.[5]

Are those 'biases' another form of an 'illusion', I wonder?

[Consul]

Before we loose site of this point (to your first paragraph about Qualia including how that might relate to the OP/Materialism), my view would be that in either or ANY case, one could not preclude Qualia itself, from the experience, itself. That notion of 'material things-in-themselves', (as I'll phrase it) being perceived as images (illusions), and those images being produced by consciousness which produces immaterial phenomena (the Will and other forms of sentient existence that is apperceived), implies a 'quality' (Qualia) of consciousness and not just a material 'quantity' per se. I think Kant spoke to an analogous 'medium' of the mind (a hard drive) that is fixed and innate (a priori) which fixes everything in our abilities to perceive (apperception) objects/things. To me, a similar analogy to a simple camera design being limited to its own design parameters determines the 'quality' of images, hence the reality that one perceives. A 35mm camera generally takes a better image than an old polaroid, or a black and white movie camera is different from a digital medium, analogue audio quality v. digital quality ('Qualia' metaphor), ad nauseum.

And so in many ways, one could embrace the old philosophical/metaphysical axiom of Subjective Idealism as a starting point/method of describing the nature of reality, since consciousness itself cannot be removed from the apperception process. In other words, the design or make-up of the 'camera' is not known (yet logically necessary), much less any objects that are being perceived by it, thus making the concept of illusion real. Actually, in deconstructionism, one can always ask how the initial or 'creation' or development of the original term/concept of illusion was first conceived(?). And that takes us back to the self-refuting part, among other things... .

This would be a good reference point to Apperception in the Kantian tradition:

Immanuel Kant distinguished transcendental apperception from empirical apperception. The first is the perception of an object as involving the consciousness of the pure self as subject – "the pure, original, unchangeable consciousness that is the necessary condition of experience and the ultimate foundation of the unity of experience". The second is "the consciousness of the concrete actual self with its changing states", the so-called "inner sense" (Otto F. Kraushaar in Runes[2]). Transcendental apperception is almost equivalent to self-consciousness; the existence of the ego may be more or less prominent, but it is always involved.[1] See Kantianism.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apperception

I think regardless of how we apperceive things-themselves viz the concept of illusion, this sense of one's 'ego', Freudian ID, or Schopenhauer Will, remains a quality of consciousness that can't be adequately described/explained physically or materially (its quantity). Yet, in itself, is logically necessary for any perception to take place at all since it is always involved. Perhaps that is another part of the 'quasi-phenomenal property' of conscious existence that you mention... (?).

* First of all, I agree with those who think that qualia aren't qualities of subjective experiences (experiential events/states) but of subjects of experience: For me to be a subject of experience is for me to have qualia = experiential/phenomenal qualities ("secondary qualities").

* I don't think the nonmental physical world is full of quantities but devoid of qualities; so I don't think the qualia of consciousness are the only qualities in the world. The "primary qualities" physics deals with are qualities just like the "secondary qualities" psychology deals with. Anyway, what is a quantity if not a "mathematizable", numerically representable, or measurable quality?

* Phenomenal consciousness is the medium of sensory perception, so there can be no conscious perception without it.

* Subjective idealism is certainly not "illusionistic" or "eliminativistic" about phenomenal consciousness itself (= the sphere of appearance). Extreme non-Kantian idealism denies the existence of a world of (mentally irreducible) physical noumena, but it doesn't deny the existence of a world of mental phenomena. However, if there is nothing physical or nonmental behind or beyond appearances, these are illusory or hallucinatory, because it does seem to me that there is a physical or nonmental world which is perceived by me through my sensory appearances.

* Apperception is self-consciousness, and according to Kant…

"There are two kinds of consciousness of self: consciousness of oneself and one’s psychological states in inner sense and consciousness of oneself and one’s states via performing acts of apperception.

Kant’s term for the former was ‘empirical self-consciousness’. A leading term for the latter was ‘transcendental apperception’ (TA). (Kant used the term ‘TA’ in two very different ways, as the name for a faculty of synthesis and as the name for what he also referred to as the ‘I think’, namely, one’s consciousness of oneself as subject.) Here is a passage from the Anthropology in which Kant distinguishes the two kinds of consciousness of self very clearly:

… the “I” of reflection contains no manifold and is always the same in every judgment … Inner experience, on the other hand, contains the matter of consciousness and a manifold of empirical inner intuition: … [1798, Ak. VII:141–2, emphases in the original].

The two kinds of consciousness of self have very different sources.

The source of empirical self-consciousness is what Kant called inner sense.…"

Kant’s View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/