Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[LuckyR]

Let's say you are a typical 20 year old single, childless man, your tax dollars are going towards public education. You are moderately to highly likely to have children who would have access to public education. It is logical to pay taxes towards public education (potential benefit).

If I were a 20 year-old childless man who intended/desired to have children, while those children may have access to public schools, I certainly wouldn't send them there. Nor would I pay for them, if given a choice. I'd spend that money to send them to a private school whose programs, focus, faculty qualifications, and curriculum I approved. There would be no potential benefit for me in supporting those public schools.

Say you are a 55 year old single, childless man, you are almost certainly not going to have children, though if public education collapses, there is likely to be huge class based unrest, which is likely to have a negative effect on the market, where your retirement funds are located, thus you benefit (indirectly) from public education.

Sorry, but that is a version of the ad baculum argument ("your money or your life"). It is paying protection money under threat or duress from the person demanding payment, i.e., ransom.

In addition as a child you had access to public education and since the costs of your education were not covered by your parent's taxes for the few years you attended ie it is amortized over the long-term, it is logical to pay taxes towards public education.

Well, yes, they were covered by my parents' taxes; they have to be (on average). That debt is paid in full.

It is folly to propose that we are unconnected islands in Modern society. Almost no one nowadays possessed the skils, or frankly the interest to be able to go it alone, though some like to engage in that fantasy.

Oh, I agree. No one who lives in a social setting "goes it alone." But the "Get what you pay for, pay for what you get" principle doesn't assume or entail that.

Well, you are free to send your kids anywhere you want, you're not paying for education per se', you are paying for the option to send them to public school, since if it is unpaid for before you have kids, it won't be available when you do. In addition, tax dodging 20 year old single you may imagine you'll send your future kids to private school, but your currently non-existent wife will have a say, likely more of a say than you will.

As to your call of ad baculum, my description isn't a classic example of it. It would be if I stated that if you don't agree to pay taxes I'm going to punish you for disagreeing with me by using my magic powers to make your investments worth less. I'm merely pointing out one (of the many) indirect benefits to you of educating other people's children.

If one denies these indirect benefits, it is a way of limiting what one has to pay for. Most agree they benefit from having the Fire Department available to fight possible future fires and to keep their property values high, somehow other benefits elude detection by those who seek to be blinded to them. Basically, everything could be privatized. Taxes would go down to almost zero, but fees would go up dramatically (as would bankrupsies). Do you save up to pay a Fire Fighting corporation to come save your home? Or a snow plowing company to clear a path to your job site? Mass transit would collapse since fare costs would go up dramatically, ridership would fall, followed by revenue. Traffic would therefore soar, until tolls on roadways (to pay for their maintenance) made driving cars reflect it's true cost. Long story short, the cost of unusual, expensive events would be borne by the unlucky individuals who experienced them. A minority of folks are devastated, most save a few bucks but live in fear of what's around the corner.

[GE Morton]

Well, you are free to send your kids anywhere you want, you're not paying for education per se', you are paying for the option to send them to public school, since if it is unpaid for before you have kids, it won't be available when you do. In addition, tax dodging 20 year old single you may imagine you'll send your future kids to private school, but your currently non-existent wife will have a say, likely more of a say than you will.

Huh? May my local Ford dealer force me to pay for a new Ford that I don't want, because I'll thereby have the option to take it if I change my mind in the future? How about a local travel agent forcing me to buy a 30-year time share in Bali --- just in case my future wife insists on annual vacations in Bali?

You're stretching pretty far there, Lucky.

As to your call of ad baculum, my description isn't a classic example of it.

Correct, it isn't the classic example. As I said, it's a version of it. It is the "torches and pitchforks" version --- "If we don't give them what they want they'll storm the castle with torches and pitchforks."

If one denies these indirect benefits, it is a way of limiting what one has to pay for.

In fact, I agree with Madison, Jefferson, et al, that there are public benefits (and therefore indirect benefits) to universal education. So there is a case to be made for collecting taxes for that purpose. Most of the benefits of education, however, are direct, enjoyed only by the educated person. So the costs should be apportioned accordingly.

Most agree they benefit from having the Fire Department available to fight possible future fires and to keep their property values high, somehow other benefits elude detection by those who seek to be blinded to them.

There is a direct benefit to having a fire department --- it reduces the risk that your house will burn. Fire departments are rarely able to save a house on fire from serious damage, if not total loss. But they are usually able to keep a structure fire from spreading to neighboring properties. Many American cities established professional fire departments only after disastrous fires that burned dozens of square blocks.

For most government programs in this Nanny State era, however, the "indirect benefits" are hypothetical, i.e., imaginary. They exist to provide direct benefits to constituent groups whose votes some politician covets.

[Leontiskos]

It seems that Locke is there arguing for investment of labor rather than first possession. The next sentence shows that he sees the gathering as a form of labor. I think Locke's theory is important. A right to some thing seems to be more fully realized when labor has been invested.

The problems with Locke's "mixing labor" theory of property ownership have been pointed out by many philosophers.

I have never studied this issue, but these objections don't look to be very good. Locke’s theory apparently has the power to introduce a level of nuance not possible with the simple theory of first possession, and I would want to use them in tandem.

Robert Nozick asks, "If I mix my labor with your silverware by stealing it, does it become my property?"

No, because the silverware is already (privately) owned.

Or, if only natural goods "owned in common by all mankind" is meant, "If I stir a glass of my tomato juice into the ocean, does the ocean become my property, or have I just wasted a glass of tomato juice?"

No more than by pouring your tomato juice on the earth would the entire Earth become yours. You are apparently entitled to the red mud at your feet, or the liquid mixture that exists before the juice is diluted into non-existence by the ocean. On any reasonable definition labor modifies the thing it is applied to. Someone might think that their tomato juice has modified the entire ocean, but they would be wrong. In any case, it is generally admitted that there are limits on the degree to which one can own public goods like water or air. That question has nothing especially to do with Locke’s theory.

Then there is the problem of fortuitous finds. I stop for a drink of water in a clear creek, and notice a shiny stone beneath the ripples. It proves to be a 4 oz gold nugget. Does the trivial labor I invest to pluck it from the creek merit the $5000 I can get for it?

This strikes me as more of a problem for first possession than for mixing labor, for the one who labors for a thing apparently has more right to it than the one who does not. Locke’s theory is precisely what helps us make sense of the intuitive idea that someone is more entitled to a knife they have forged than to a deposit of iron ore, even if they are the first possessor of both. We could simply say that labor has the general effect of increasing one’s claim on a thing. Whether simple acquisition counts as labor is another question that could be raised.

Others have defended Locke's theory by arguing that by "labor," Locke meant "productive labor," i.e., labor that produces new wealth or adds value to a natural good. But that has problems of its own: labor which produces new wealth or adds value to a natural good would seem to entitle the laborer only to the the new wealth and added value,...

But this is an important principle. For example, it is at play when a landowner leases his land to a farmer who has a right to the crop but not to the land. Locke’s theory makes better sense of this than simple first possession.

...leaving the original question --- how does one become entitled to natural goods --- unanswered. And, of course, if the natural good is indeed owned by all in common, then the permission of all of those owners would be required before you could do anything to add value to it --- the very problem Locke was trying to solve.

Do you think that the farmer has more right to his crop or his land? Does he have an equal right to both? I know you are thinking in terms of legality, but I think we have to look at the metaphysics of human relations that go beyond binary legal categorizations. The binary legal categorization by which something is either owned or not owned is apparently not strictly entailed by the underlying premises. That binary categorization is in part a product of convenience rather than reason.

For example, suppose two friends start a business together with 50-50 ownership, and one friend puts in a great deal of work to grow the business while the other sits around doing nothing. If they decide to sell the business the lazy friend could claim his 50% stake by law, but he could also settle for a lesser share, and it would be reasonable for him to do so. Apparently he owns less of the improved business because the labor that improved it was not his. Put differently, proportionally shared ownership assumes proportionally shared labor.

Many Enlightenment era philosophers, no doubt to avoid being persecuted or at least shunned for heresy, sought work-arounds for the problems posed by religious dogmas without seeming to challenge them.

Perhaps, but as the article notes, the principle of the universal destination of goods preceded Christianity and Christian dogma.

I also think the investment of labor question is helpful for looking at the universal destination of goods. Presumably the less labor invested, the more the good falls under that principle. One way to see this is to use your "existence test," where you ask whether the existence of the owner has harmed the person who goes without. The answer to the existence test tends to change with respect to labor invested.

I'm not following you there. Why would the lack of a labor investment in a natural good tend to affirm the OCO? It would seem only to affirm that a claim to it would be dubious, and that the good remained unowned. And whether I invested much or a little labor to secure some good, how would my non-existence change the welfare of anyone else?

There is a parallel between the universal destination of goods and first possession, but I think you’re taking it too far. It’s certainly not original common ownership. That was the conclusion of Rhonheimer’s article: the universal destination of goods does not establish a property right.

I am not competent to speak for Locke, but the universal destination of goods (UDG) in Catholic social theory is something like a teleological doctrine which says that goods are destined for mankind, not owned by mankind. As Rhonheimer notes, ownership is different and is not necessarily in tension with UDG. The principle is invoked with respect to surplus because it is not merely an appeal to charity. It is the idea that the unused surplus good is meant for some purpose that is not currently being achieved. “Grain is not meant to rot, it is meant to feed people.” It’s basically a teleological principle about the purpose of goods.

One common answer to the non-existence test is, "Well, had Alfie not taken x Bruno would have had an opportunity to take it. Had Alfie not existed he would not have taken x, thereby depriving Bruno of that opportunity." That answer is, of course, self-defeating. An opportunity is something to be seized. If Alfie cannot take x for that reason, then neither can Bruno, since he will thereby deprive Chauncey of that opportunity. So no one may pick the apple, and everyone starves. (This problem also applies to Locke's "enough, and as good" proviso).

It isn’t self-defeating if we are talking about how much Alfie can take rather than whether he can take any. If Alfie is taking an exorbitant amount and Bruno is taking his fair share, then Chauncey is harmed much more by Alfie’s existence than by Bruno’s.

I think it is a close parallel to the universal destination principle. Food is a good that is destined for consumption, namely by those who consume (humans or perhaps animals). "God created wheat and gave it to mankind in common," and, "wheat is meant to be eaten," are saying similar things.

Oh, no! What use something has and who owns it are entirely different questions.

I suppose I am also assuming the premise that one ought to help his fellow human being who is starving (particularly when the stored wheat is close to rotting away).

I agree. But that help should be given doesn't establish a right of the beneficiary to it.

I agree. The UDG does not establish property rights.

[GE Morton]

Robert Nozick asks, "If I mix my labor with your silverware by stealing it, does it become my property?"

No, because the silverware is already (privately) owned.

But so are natural goods, according to the OCO. They are owned in common, which imposes the same moral constraints as ownership by an individual.

You argue below that the universal destination of goods doctrine "does not establish property rights." I'm certainly no authority on Catholic theology or social theory, but what I've been able to learn on that subject in the last couple hours strongly suggests that it does:

"“God destined the earth and all it contains for all men and all peoples so that all created things would be shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice tempered by charity" (Gaudium et Spes, 69). This principle is based on the fact that 'the original source of all that is good is the very act of God, who created both the earth and man, and who gave the earth to man so that he might have dominion over it by his work and enjoy its fruits' (Gen 1:28-29)" . . .

"The universal right to use the goods of the earth is based on the principle of the universal destination of goods. Each person must have access to the level of well-being necessary for his full development. The right to the common use of goods is the 'first principle of the whole ethical and social order' . . ."

http://www.catholicceo.net/universal-destination-of-goods

Creating something establishes a property right, and giving the thing created conveys that right to the donee.

“This right (emphasis added) applies to both 'the necessities of life and the tools for…progress'. (Pope St. Paul VI, 22)"

https://capp-usa.org/universal-destination-of-goods/

That God's creation established a property right, which was then conveyed to "Mankind in common," was certainly Locke's belief (or, perhaps, a common belief he thought it best not to challenge) and was the impetus for his labor theory of property.

This strikes me as more of a problem for first possession than for mixing labor, for the one who labors for a thing apparently has more right to it than the one who does not. Locke’s theory is precisely what helps us make sense of the intuitive idea that someone is more entitled to a knife they have forged than to a deposit of iron ore, even if they are the first possessor of both. We could simply say that labor has the general effect of increasing one’s claim on a thing. Whether simple acquisition counts as labor is another question that could be raised.

What is the basis for that view? Property laws make no such distinction in any jurisdiction I know of. A thief who steals $1000 from a man who labored for a week to earn it will receive the same punishment as one who steals it from a lottery winner. I do agree that we'd have more sympathy for the former victim than the latter, but their rights to the lost $1000 are the same.

Others have defended Locke's theory by arguing that by "labor," Locke meant "productive labor," i.e., labor that produces new wealth or adds value to a natural good. But that has problems of its own: labor which produces new wealth or adds value to a natural good would seem to entitle the laborer only to the the new wealth and added value,...

But this is an important principle. For example, it is at play when a landowner leases his land to a farmer who has a right to the crop but not to the land. Locke’s theory makes better sense of this than simple first possession.

But it doesn't solve the problem Locke set out to solve. Yes, the farmer has a right to his crops, and the landlord the right to the land. But the farmer may only use that land with the permission of the landlord. Did he not have that permission, any crops he harvested from it would be the landlord's property. Locke was trying to find a way to justify private appropriations that did not require the "consent of all mankind," who were the "landlords" here.

Do you think that the farmer has more right to his crop or his land? Does he have an equal right to both?

The farmer has a right to his crop, being its first possessor. He only has a right to the land if he is the first possessor of that as well. If he is not, then he requires the permission of the actual first possessor, or his successor in title, in order the use the land. The same would be true for any other good the farmer required to plant and nurture and harvest his crop --- seed, fertilizer, irrigation equipment, plows, etc. He must either buy them or rent them from their first possessors.

For example, suppose two friends start a business together with 50-50 ownership, and one friend puts in a great deal of work to grow the business while the other sits around doing nothing. If they decide to sell the business the lazy friend could claim his 50% stake by law, but he could also settle for a lesser share, and it would be reasonable for him to do so. Apparently he owns less of the improved business because the labor that improved it was not his. Put differently, proportionally shared ownership assumes proportionally shared labor.

I agree. At the time of sale the diligent partner could sue the lazy one, arguing that difference between the initial investment and the current market value was due to his efforts alone, and that his lazy partner breached his agreement by not putting 50% of the work. A jury might buy it.

Labor certainly does create value. The problem for Locke, however, was that one may not exert labor on someone else's property without their permission, and per the OCO, that permission would be impossible to obtain. His labor theory does not solve that problem.

I am not competent to speak for Locke, but the universal destination of goods (UDG) in Catholic social theory is something like a teleological doctrine which says that goods are destined for mankind, not owned by mankind.

Do the quotes above change your mind about that?

As Rhonheimer notes, ownership is different and is not necessarily in tension with UDG. The principle is invoked with respect to surplus because it is not merely an appeal to charity. It is the idea that the unused surplus good is meant for some purpose that is not currently being achieved. “Grain is not meant to rot, it is meant to feed people.” It’s basically a teleological principle about the purpose of goods.

Well, on its own that has a Platonic, essentialist, ring. Things don't have purposes in themselves; the only purpose anything has is the purpose to which some sentient creature applies it. For Catholics and other theists the purposes of things are whatever God decrees them to be. That interpretation of the UDG rests on the same supernatural premise as the OCO interpretation.

But it is for the owner of the grain to decide what purpose it will serve, not God or his clerics.

It isn’t self-defeating if we are talking about how much Alfie can take rather than whether he can take any. If Alfie is taking an exorbitant amount and Bruno is taking his fair share, then Chauncey is harmed much more by Alfie’s existence than by Bruno’s.

There is a constraint on the first possession principle which limits takings to the amount that the taker can put to productive use, i.e., a "no waste" constraint. I may not pick all the apples from a tree if 90% of them will rot. But if I have a way to preserve them --- e.g., by making cider or applesauce which will feed me for a year, then I may. Or if I make applesauce for sale to the public.

In speaking of commons, we shouldn't overlook that there are, indeed, natural commons, "owned by all mankind." Or at least by large numbers of them. But the criterion for identifying such property is not that they were presumed "gifts from God," but the fact that they have been used in common by everyone in their vicinity since time immemorial, such as the oceans (for fishing and navigation), for most large rivers and lakes, for the atmosphere, and for some lands. Thus no one can claim to be a first possessor of such things.

[Leontiskos]

Robert Nozick asks, "If I mix my labor with your silverware by stealing it, does it become my property?"

No, because the silverware is already (privately) owned.

But so are natural goods, according to the OCO. They are owned in common, which imposes the same moral constraints as ownership by an individual.

What reason do you have to think that Locke would impose the same moral constraints on natural goods as privately owned goods? Is there something in his writings that indicates this? It seems obvious to me that he wouldn’t impose the same constraints.

You argue below that the universal destination of goods doctrine "does not establish property rights." I'm certainly no authority on Catholic theology or social theory, but what I've been able to learn on that subject in the last couple hours strongly suggests that it does:

“God destined the earth and all it contains for all men and all peoples so that all created things would be shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice tempered by charity" (Gaudium et Spes, 69). This principle is based on the fact that 'the original source of all that is good is the very act of God, who created both the earth and man, and who gave the earth to man so that he might have dominion over it by his work and enjoy its fruits' (Gen 1:28-29)" . . .

http://www.catholicceo.net/universal-destination-of-goods

Creating something establishes a property right, and giving the thing created conveys that right to the donee.

You are assuming “first possession,” which is the very thing in question. The text itself says nothing about a property right.

"The universal right to use the goods of the earth is based on the principle of the universal destination of goods. Each person must have access to the level of well-being necessary for his full development. The right to the common use of goods is the 'first principle of the whole ethical and social order' . . ."

http://www.catholicceo.net/universal-destination-of-goods

This is a quote from Bill Bowman, a Catholic businessman. It’s not a quote from any official document of the Catholic Church. Within his quote he references two official documents, neither of which support his claim that there is a “universal right.”

“This right (emphasis added) applies to both 'the necessities of life and the tools for…progress'. (Pope St. Paul VI, 22)"

https://capp-usa.org/universal-destination-of-goods/

This is an odd one because the website is misquoting the source (link to source). The quote given is simply not found in the source at all. In contrast, the source at #22 says, “All other rights, whatever they may be, including the rights of property and free trade, are to be subordinated to this principle.” (emphasis added)

I would recommend reading Rhonheimer's article rather than digging around the websites of Catholic businessmen. He is a Catholic priest with a doctorate in philosophy who has taught Ethics and Political Philosophy at a Catholic university in Rome, and his quotes are accurate.

That God's creation established a property right, which was then conveyed to "Mankind in common," was certainly Locke's belief (or, perhaps, a common belief he thought it best not to challenge) and was the impetus for his labor theory of property.

Moving back to Locke from Catholicism, your assumption that Locke understood there to be a universal right that imposes the same constraints as the private right established by mixture of labor is quite strange. Locke clearly did not believe that. His whole purpose was to distinguish private property from the universal donation:

“Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.” (Second Treatise on Government, Chapter V, Section 25, emphasis mine)

Do you think that the farmer has more right to his crop or his land? Does he have an equal right to both?

The farmer has a right to his crop, being its first possessor. He only has a right to the land if he is the first possessor of that as well. If he is not, then he requires the permission of the actual first possessor, or his successor in title, in order the use the land. The same would be true for any other good the farmer required to plant and nurture and harvest his crop --- seed, fertilizer, irrigation equipment, plows, etc. He must either buy them or rent them from their first possessors.

Okay, but I asked whether you think he has more right to his crop or his land, which you did not answer. The point is to call into question your binary legal approach, lest we fall into legal positivism. I omitted some parts of your reply that assume that the binary, legal approach is sufficient or irreducible. That is one of the main questions.

For example, suppose two friends start a business together with 50-50 ownership, and one friend puts in a great deal of work to grow the business while the other sits around doing nothing. If they decide to sell the business the lazy friend could claim his 50% stake by law, but he could also settle for a lesser share, and it would be reasonable for him to do so. Apparently he owns less of the improved business because the labor that improved it was not his. Put differently, proportionally shared ownership assumes proportionally shared labor.

I agree. At the time of sale the diligent partner could sue the lazy one, arguing that difference between the initial investment and the current market value was due to his efforts alone, and that his lazy partner breached his agreement by not putting 50% of the work. A jury might buy it.

Labor certainly does create value. The problem for Locke, however, was that one may not exert labor on someone else's property without their permission, and per the OCO, that permission would be impossible to obtain. His labor theory does not solve that problem.

But again, I am not arguing for Locke’s position in isolation. I am claiming that his concept adds a useful nuance to first possession. This particular criticism of Locke that you keep reverting to is beside the point.

As Rhonheimer notes, ownership is different and is not necessarily in tension with UDG. The principle is invoked with respect to surplus because it is not merely an appeal to charity. It is the idea that the unused surplus good is meant for some purpose that is not currently being achieved. “Grain is not meant to rot, it is meant to feed people.” It’s basically a teleological principle about the purpose of goods.

Well, on its own that has a Platonic, essentialist, ring. Things don't have purposes in themselves; the only purpose anything has is the purpose to which some sentient creature applies it.

I grant that yours is an interesting opinion that became common in the late Medieval period, but it's a modern assumption, not a matter of fact. Here is part of a draft where I address some of your misconceptions of Aristotle:

Having purposes presumes a sentient creature. A purpose is a future goal believed to be attainable through present actions. That requires an entity capable of holding beliefs, envisioning or imagining future states of affairs, and performing deliberate, directed actions --- i.e., a sentient creature. There is no evidence that "nature," or any natural system other than some animals, possesses any of those capabilities.

Moreover, we're entitled to impute a purpose to an agent when we can observe the agent's actions and know from prior experience that the observed actions often lead to a certain end. We may then infer that end to be the agent's purpose in acting. But we have no prior experience with the ultimate ends of natural processes, having never yet reached them. So we have no grounds for assuming observable natural phenomena have any particular purpose.

For Aristotle a purpose or end does not presuppose sentience. He would say everything has a final cause or an intrinsic teleology, and we can learn what this is by investigation. For example, the end of an acorn is an oak tree. That is what it aims at or is oriented towards. If we want we can aid it, for we know what conditions are favorable to it. We can water it and provide it with sunlight or rich soil, etc. When we walk through a forest we can identify good and bad oak trees. The same goes for fish and dogs and cats and centipedes. It is also true for humans, even if we are a great deal more complicated.

For Catholics and other theists the purposes of things are whatever God decrees them to be.

This is not true, and is a misunderstanding of Catholicism, which is rooted in Aristotelian essentialism. You're thinking of theological voluntarists.

That interpretation of the UDG rests on the same supernatural premise as the OCO interpretation.

No, teleological propositions are not supernatural propositions.

It isn’t self-defeating if we are talking about how much Alfie can take rather than whether he can take any. If Alfie is taking an exorbitant amount and Bruno is taking his fair share, then Chauncey is harmed much more by Alfie’s existence than by Bruno’s.

There is a constraint on the first possession principle which limits takings to the amount that the taker can put to productive use, i.e., a "no waste" constraint. I may not pick all the apples from a tree if 90% of them will rot. But if I have a way to preserve them --- e.g., by making cider or applesauce which will feed me for a year, then I may. Or if I make applesauce for sale to the public.

But why? How does that follow from first possession? Apparently it doesn’t, and that’s the point. First possession is incomplete and therefore must be supplemented by other principles, such as the universal destination of goods.

In speaking of commons, we shouldn't overlook that there are, indeed, natural commons, "owned by all mankind." Or at least by large numbers of them. But the criterion for identifying such property is not that they were presumed "gifts from God," but the fact that they have been used in common by everyone in their vicinity since time immemorial, such as the oceans (for fishing and navigation), for most large rivers and lakes, for the atmosphere, and for some lands. Thus no one can claim to be a first possessor of such things.

If you are going to nitpick Locke, then the same scrutiny should be applied to your own theories. That many people use something does not mean that ownership is common (that is a Lockean notion which relates to use or labor). As far as I can see, the only valid point here that relates to first possession is the idea that the first possessor cannot be determined, and therefore the “natural common” is unowned until the possession can be verified. It would exist in a state of property-limbo until that happens.

(Out for a few days)

[Leontiskos]

GE Morton -

I should clarify that not all teleological propositions are natural in the way that Aristotle's claim about the acorn is natural. Presumably the universal destination of goods principle involves a moral aspect as well. Nevertheless, it does not require supernatural aid to perceive that grain should be given to a fellow human being who is starving before it rots, and first possession in itself is not sufficient to justify such a claim.

[GE Morton]

What reason do you have to think that Locke would impose the same moral constraints on natural goods as privately owned goods? Is there something in his writings that indicates this? It seems obvious to me that he wouldn’t impose the same constraints.

A couple of reasons. First, no moral distinction is made between the two in common law or common usage and understanding, and, second, because he goes to some length in the 2nd Essay to overcome that "lack of consent" objection. It is not up to Locke to decide what obligations ownership imposes; the concept itself imposes them (as we've agreed earlier).

There are many kinds of common ownerships --- partnerships, corporations, various types of clubs and co-ops, municipal property such as parks and streets, even marriages. All require the consent of the owners or their representatives before an individual, even a member of the group, may use the group's property for a private purpose.

You argue below that the universal destination of goods doctrine "does not establish property rights." I'm certainly no authority on Catholic theology or social theory, but what I've been able to learn on that subject in the last couple hours strongly suggests that it does:

“God destined the earth and all it contains for all men and all peoples so that all created things would be shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice tempered by charity" (Gaudium et Spes, 69). This principle is based on the fact that 'the original source of all that is good is the very act of God, who created both the earth and man, and who gave the earth to man so that he might have dominion over it by his work and enjoy its fruits' (Gen 1:28-29)" . . .

http://www.catholicceo.net/universal-destination-of-goods

Creating something establishes a property right, and giving the thing created conveys that right to the donee.

You are assuming “first possession,” which is the very thing in question. The text itself says nothing about a property right.

I don't understand. If God is the creator of the Earth, he is it's first possessor and therefore has a property right to it, does he not? And having that right he may convey that property to someone else, who will then have the right to it. No?

The text states the necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing a property right. It doesn't have to explicitly mention "property right."

“This right (emphasis added) applies to both 'the necessities of life and the tools for…progress'. (Pope St. Paul VI, 22)"

https://capp-usa.org/universal-destination-of-goods/

This is an odd one because the website is misquoting the source (link to source). The quote given is simply not found in the source at all. In contrast, the source at #22 says, “All other rights, whatever they may be, including the rights of property and free trade, are to be subordinated to this principle.” (emphasis added)

#22 does say, "Now if the earth truly was created to provide man with the necessities of life and the tools for his own progress, it follows that every man has the right to glean what he needs from the earth" (emphasis added).

That is certainly a property right, and the "other rights" you quote above are those other than this stated right.

Moving back to Locke from Catholicism, your assumption that Locke understood there to be a universal right that imposes the same constraints as the private right established by mixture of labor is quite strange. Locke clearly did not believe that. His whole purpose was to distinguish private property from the universal donation:

“Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.” (Second Treatise on Government, Chapter V, Section 25, emphasis mine)

Yes, that was indeed his purpose. My argument is that he failed to accomplish it. Laboring upon someone else's property, whether under a common or individual ownership, without the consent of the owner(s) does not confer any rights upon that laborer, either to the portion of the property labored upon or to the products of that labor, in any other situation. E.g., if I knowingly plant an apple tree on your property without your permission it, and all the apples it produces, instantly become your property. I have forfeited the labor exerted to plant it.

Here is Blackstone's take on Locke's labor theory:

"Mr. Locke says 'that the labour of a man’s body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.' On Govt. c. 5.

"But this argument seems to be a petitio principii; for mixing labour with a thing can signify only to make an alteration in its shape or form; and if I had a right to the substance before any labour was bestowed upon it, that right still adheres to all that remains of the substance, whatever changes it may have undergone. If I had no right before, it is clear that I have none after; and we have not advanced a single step by this demonstration."

Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. 1 - Books I & II. Chapter 1

https://oll.libertyfund.org/page/blacks ... perty-1753

The farmer has a right to his crop, being its first possessor. He only has a right to the land if he is the first possessor of that as well. If he is not, then he requires the permission of the actual first possessor, or his successor in title, in order the use the land. The same would be true for any other good the farmer required to plant and nurture and harvest his crop --- seed, fertilizer, irrigation equipment, plows, etc. He must either buy them or rent them from their first possessors.

Okay, but I asked whether you think he has more right to his crop or his land, which you did not answer. The point is to call into question your binary legal approach, lest we fall into legal positivism. I omitted some parts of your reply that assume that the binary, legal approach is sufficient or irreducible. That is one of the main questions.

I thought I did answer that. He has no right to the land, by hypothesis (he is, by hypothesis, leasing it from someone else). He has only a right to use the land for the period and purposes set forth in the lease. He has a right to his crops, however, provided they were produced in accordance with the terms of the lease.

But again, I am not arguing for Locke’s position in isolation. I am claiming that his concept adds a useful nuance to first possession. This particular criticism of Locke that you keep reverting to is beside the point.

Well, I won't try to analyze or evaluate nuances. I don't think Locke was trying to add a nuance to the first possession criterion; he was trying to find a way around the original common ownership dogma so that the first possession criterion could apply.

Well, on its own that has a Platonic, essentialist, ring. Things don't have purposes in themselves; the only purpose anything has is the purpose to which some sentient creature applies it.

For Aristotle a purpose or end does not presuppose sentience. He would say everything has a final cause or an intrinsic teleology, and we can learn what this is by investigation. For example, the end of an acorn is an oak tree. That is what it aims at or is oriented towards. If we want we can aid it, for we know what conditions are favorable to it. We can water it and provide it with sunlight or rich soil, etc. When we walk through a forest we can identify good and bad oak trees. The same goes for fish and dogs and cats and centipedes. It is also true for humans, even if we are a great deal more complicated.

You seem to be equating ends and purposes. I agree (some) ends don't require sentience (such as your acorn/oak example), but purposes do; they imply an intention. Many natural processes have ends --- or milestones or waypoints we may treat as ends for some reason or our own --- but the termination point of a natural process is not a purpose. To return to the grain example, the Aristotelian "end," telos, or final cause of a kernel of wheat is to seed a new wheat plant; it is not to feed anyone. That it can be used for the latter is a purpose we sentient creatures give it.

Now I agree that "purpose" is often used as a synonym for "end." I find those uses to be somewhat loose and metaphorical. That use makes sense, however, IF one assumes that natural processes are elements of a system or design created by a Supreme Being. Then we have someone to whom we can properly attribute intents and purposes.

The other salient point concerning the telos of a natural process or entity is that (absent the Supreme Being) it has no moral import; it is morally irrelevant. It only becomes morally relevant if the end of that process is given a purpose and value by some moral agent.

The upshot here is that you can't construe the UDG principle as embodying the Aristotelian telos of a silo of grain. As I said, the telos of wheat kernals is the seeding of new wheat plants. Feeding humans is a purpose we give it.

No, teleological propositions are not supernatural propositions.

I agree, provided the propositions are not statements of divine purposes in disguise. But when that is the case they have no moral import.

There is a constraint on the first possession principle which limits takings to the amount that the taker can put to productive use, i.e., a "no waste" constraint. I may not pick all the apples from a tree if 90% of them will rot. But if I have a way to preserve them --- e.g., by making cider or applesauce which will feed me for a year, then I may. Or if I make applesauce for sale to the public.

But why? How does that follow from first possession? Apparently it doesn’t, and that’s the point. First possession is incomplete and therefore must be supplemented by other principles, such as the universal destination of goods.

Again, I agree. That constraint is universally recognized in common law, and though it doesn't follow from the first possession principle, it follows from the theory I've been presenting. The moral significance of property is that it contributes to the welfare of its holder. So a rights claimnant may not claim more than he can derive benefit from, and has a duty, the Duty to Aid --- "another principle" --- to transfer any excess he may acquire to others who will benefit from it.

If you are going to nitpick Locke, then the same scrutiny should be applied to your own theories. That many people use something does not mean that ownership is common (that is a Lockean notion which relates to use or labor).

Of course it does. If no first possessor can be identified or title chain traced, then the property belongs to the current possessors ("possession is nine tenths of the law"). And, no, the notion of common property far predates Locke's theories.

"Although the principle is an oversimplification, it can be restated as: 'In a property dispute (whether real or personal), in the absence of clear and compelling testimony or documentation to the contrary, the person in actual, custodial possession of the property is presumed to be the rightful owner. The rightful owner shall have their possession returned to them; if taken or used. The shirt or blouse you are currently wearing is presumed to be yours, unless someone can prove that it is not.'"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possessio ... of_the_law

[Belindi]

Has the farmer a moral right to his land if he is inefficient about 1. getting the best yield and 2. providing well paid work , and maybe benefits such as accommodation, for employees?

Has the farmer a moral right to the entire crop if his employees have done all the hard work to grow and harvest it?

In democratic Euro-America laws originate in public views on morality, which are themselves rooted partly in Judeo-Christian morality.

The law, like everything we do and
like everything we say, is a heritage from the past.
Sir Francis Bacon long ago said, "The law of England
is not taken out of Amadis de Gaul, nor the Book of Palmerin, but out of the Scripture, out of the laws of the
Romans and Grecians." And again he said, "Our laws are
as mixed as our language."
So just as our English language has sprung fro

The Lawyer in Literatue. Gest.

[GE Morton]

Has the farmer a moral right to his land if he is inefficient about 1. getting the best yield and 2. providing well paid work , and maybe benefits such as accommodation, for employees?

Well, I'm not sure what is a "moral right." The only two types of rights I know of which are well-defined are natural and common rights (which, for convenience, may be lumped together as "natural rights"), and legal rights. Natural rights do have moral import, however, since they are based on an empirical fact that has moral import. Legal rights have no moral import, unless they merely codify a natural or common right.

But, yes, the farmer has a common right to his land regardless of how efficient he is, what yields he produces, whether or not he employs anyone, or what he pays them. His right to the land imposes no duty upon him to produce anything for anyone else's benefit. He may plant whatever crop he decides will give him the best return, develop the land into a subdivision, or just leave it fallow.

You questions seem to presume that the farmer has some duties to devote his property and efforts to others' benefit, and that his rights depend upon him doing that. But he has no such duties.

Has the farmer a moral right to the entire crop if his employees have done all the hard work to grow and harvest it?

Assuming he has paid them what they agreed to accept when taking that job, then yes, he has a right to the crop, and whatever revenue from its sale is left over after those payments are made.

In democratic Euro-America laws originate in public views on morality, which are themselves rooted partly in Judeo-Christian morality.

The law, like everything we do and
like everything we say, is a heritage from the past.
Sir Francis Bacon long ago said, "The law of England
is not taken out of Amadis de Gaul, nor the Book of Palmerin, but out of the Scripture, out of the laws of the
Romans and Grecians." And again he said, "Our laws are
as mixed as our language."
So just as our English language has sprung fro

That's true. The first possession criterion for determining property ownership is recognized by most religions and legal systems, as are many other laws.

[LuckyR]

Has the farmer a moral right to his land if he is inefficient about 1. getting the best yield and 2. providing well paid work , and maybe benefits such as accommodation, for employees?

Well, I'm not sure what is a "moral right." The only two types of rights I know of which are well-defined are natural and common rights (which, for convenience, may be lumped together as "natural rights"), and legal rights. Natural rights do have moral import, however, since they are based on an empirical fact that has moral import. Legal rights have no moral import, unless they merely codify a natural or common right.

But, yes, the farmer has a common right to his land regardless of how efficient he is, what yields he produces, whether or not he employs anyone, or what he pays them. His right to the land imposes no duty upon him to produce anything for anyone else's benefit. He may plant whatever crop he decides will give him the best return, develop the land into a subdivision, or just leave it fallow.

You questions seem to presume that the farmer has some duties to devote his property and efforts to others' benefit, and that his rights depend upon him doing that. But he has no such duties.

Has the farmer a moral right to the entire crop if his employees have done all the hard work to grow and harvest it?

Assuming he has paid them what they agreed to accept when taking that job, then yes, he has a right to the crop, and whatever revenue from its sale is left over after those payments are made.

In democratic Euro-America laws originate in public views on morality, which are themselves rooted partly in Judeo-Christian morality.

The law, like everything we do and
like everything we say, is a heritage from the past.
Sir Francis Bacon long ago said, "The law of England
is not taken out of Amadis de Gaul, nor the Book of Palmerin, but out of the Scripture, out of the laws of the
Romans and Grecians." And again he said, "Our laws are
as mixed as our language."
So just as our English language has sprung fro

That's true. The first possession criterion for determining property ownership is recognized by most religions and legal systems, as are many other laws.

In your mind is there such a thing as inheritance rights? Heirs of course don't have first possession, right?

[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote:

Has the farmer a moral right to his land if he is inefficient about 1. getting the best yield and 2. providing well paid work , and maybe benefits such as accommodation, for employees?

Well, I'm not sure what is a "moral right." The only two types of rights I know of which are well-defined are natural and common rights (which, for convenience, may be lumped together as "natural rights"), and legal rights. Natural rights do have moral import, however, since they are based on an empirical fact that has moral import. Legal rights have no moral import, unless they merely codify a natural or common right.

A moral right is right by consensus or by diktat depending on the ruling regime. As philosophers our thoughts are free so 'moral rights' means rights by consensus. we are arguing about what ought to be moral rights i.e. rights by consensus.

But, yes, the farmer has a common right to his land regardless of how efficient he is, what yields he produces, whether or not he employs anyone, or what he pays them. His right to the land imposes no duty upon him to produce anything for anyone else's benefit. He may plant whatever crop he decides will give him the best return, develop the land into a subdivision, or just leave it fallow.

I don't know what you mean by "common right", unless you mean a Conservative status quo that favours inherited wealth over merit.
I am not a farmer but I do have a garden and I have a duty to grow as much as I can to support ecologically diverse species so I keep long grass and an oak tree.

You questions seem to presume that the farmer has some duties to devote his property and efforts to others' benefit, and that his rights depend upon him doing that. But he has no such duties.

Rights have implied duties, including negative duties, since Magna Carta.

Has the farmer a moral right to the entire crop if his employees have done all the hard work to grow and harvest it?

Assuming he has paid them what they agreed to accept when taking that job, then yes, he has a right to the crop, and whatever revenue from its sale is left over after those payments are made.

But what if there is no other paid work available? Should the law not reflect labourers' need for freedom from coercion? Because it is coercion when an employer can say and says in effect " take it or leave it".

In democratic Euro-America laws originate in public views on morality, which are themselves rooted partly in Judeo-Christian morality.

The law, like everything we do and
like everything we say, is a heritage from the past.
Sir Francis Bacon long ago said, "The law of England
is not taken out of Amadis de Gaul, nor the Book of Palmerin, but out of the Scripture, out of the laws of the
Romans and Grecians." And again he said, "Our laws are
as mixed as our language."
So just as our English language has sprung fro

That's true. The first possession criterion for determining property ownership is recognized by most religions and legal systems, as are many other laws.

How far back in the story of man do you want to go? Who owned the land before it was inhabited by humans? Who owned the land when it was used by peoples who did not have the Gatling gun?

[GE Morton]

In your mind is there such a thing as inheritance rights? Heirs of course don't have first possession, right?

The full statement of the first possession principle is, "P has a right to x if P is the first possessor of x and has not subsequently freely conveyed it to another, or P acquired x via a chain of consent from the first possessor."

[GE Morton]

A moral right is right by consensus or by diktat depending on the ruling regime. As philosophers our thoughts are free so 'moral rights' means rights by consensus. we are arguing about what ought to be moral rights i.e. rights by consensus.

Well, that sounds like a legal right. Whether it is moral or not would depend upon whether the criterion for assigning the right has a moral basis, and that, in turn, would depend upon the moral theory you hold, and whether that theory is rationally defensible. If the so-called "right" does not have such a moral basis, then the assignment is arbitrary. It certainly does not become moral merely by virtue of enjoying a consensus; that is the ad populum fallacy. There have been countless policies favored by consensus which were profoundly immoral, some of them absurdly (and inaccurately) called "rights" (e.g., the "right" to own slaves).

I don't know what you mean by "common right", unless you mean a Conservative status quo that favours inherited wealth over merit.

I've given those definitions several times. A "natural right" is one's right to one's natural possessions, such as one's life, body, and innate talents and abilities --- the things you brought with you into the world, of which you are therefore the first possessor. A "common right" is a right to anything you acquired after arriving, by creating or discovering it, and are therefore, again, the first possessor. Those rights have a moral basis, because being the first possessor entails that you acquired those things without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else, i.e., your acquisition of them was innocent.

Rights have implied duties, including negative duties, since Magna Carta.

What duties do you have in mind? Everyone has a duty not to exercise his rights in ways that inflict loss or injury on others, but that duty doesn't derive from the right; it applies to everyone, regardless of what rights he may have.

Assuming he has paid them what they agreed to accept when taking that job, then yes, he has a right to the crop, and whatever revenue from its sale is left over after those payments are made.

But what if there is no other paid work available? Should the law not reflect labourers' need for freedom from coercion? Because it is coercion when an employer can say and says in effect " take it or leave it".

No, Belindi, that is not "coercion." The farmer is not coercing anyone. He is not responsible for forces beyond his control, such as the general lack of work. Nor is he responsible a priori for anyone else's welfare. You need to apply the non-existence test in these cases: all other things being equal, would the workers be any better off if the farmer didn't exist? And if you believe the farmer is responsible for others' welfare you need to derive that duty from some rationally defensible moral theory.

How far back in the story of man do you want to go? Who owned the land before it was inhabited by humans? Who owned the land when it was used by peoples who did not have the Gatling gun?

The concept of "rights," understood as ownership of and an entitlement to things one has first possessed, is as old as mankind, and even observed (if not conceptualized and articulated) in many animal communities. Many animals, for example, stake out a territory for themselves, mark it, and drive off other members of their species who trespass upon it.

[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote:

A moral right is right by consensus or by diktat depending on the ruling regime. As philosophers our thoughts are free so 'moral rights' means rights by consensus. we are arguing about what ought to be moral rights i.e. rights by consensus.

Well, that sounds like a legal right. Whether it is moral or not would depend upon whether the criterion for assigning the right has a moral basis, and that, in turn, would depend upon the moral theory you hold, and whether that theory is rationally defensible. If the so-called "right" does not have such a moral basis, then the assignment is arbitrary. It certainly does not become moral merely by virtue of enjoying a consensus; that is the ad populum fallacy. There have been countless policies favored by consensus which were profoundly immoral, some of them absurdly (and inaccurately) called "rights" (e.g., the "right" to own slaves).

The moral theory you hod is the theory that guides your culture of belief. Thus in a post-Christian culture the received moral
theory is Christian.

I don't know what you mean by "common right", unless you mean a Conservative status quo that favours inherited wealth over merit.

I've given those definitions several times. A "natural right" is one's right to one's natural possessions, such as one's life, body, and innate talents and abilities --- the things you brought with you into the world, of which you are therefore the first possessor. A "common right" is a right to anything you acquired after arriving, by creating or discovering it, and are therefore, again, the first possessor. Those rights have a moral basis, because being the first possessor entails that you acquired those things without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else, i.e., your acquisition of them was innocent.

But all living things have always struggled for survival. Struggle for survival means that there is invariably loss or injury.There is no such thing in nature as a first possessor .

Rights have implied duties, including negative duties, since Magna Carta.

What duties do you have in mind? Everyone has a duty not to exercise his rights in ways that inflict loss or injury on others, but that duty doesn't derive from the right; it applies to everyone, regardless of what rights he may have.

Rights or duties are two ends of a continuum.

Assuming he has paid them what they agreed to accept when taking that job, then yes, he has a right to the crop, and whatever revenue from its sale is left over after those payments are made.(GEM)

But what if there is no other paid work available? Should the law not reflect labourers' need for freedom from coercion? Because it is coercion when an employer can say and says in effect " take it or leave it".(B)

No, Belindi, that is not "coercion." The farmer is not coercing anyone. He is not responsible for forces beyond his control, such as the general lack of work. Nor is he responsible a priori for anyone else's welfare. You need to apply the non-existence test in these cases: all other things being equal, would the workers be any better off if the farmer didn't exist? And if you believe the farmer is responsible for others' welfare you need to derive that duty from some rationally defensible moral theory.

Employers, landowners, and other members of the elite of society often can and do control general lack of work. Where there is lack of work the governing elite should make work available. They can do so by public projects such as training people to fill useful roles in new projects, and by giving tax concessions to small employers so they are solvent enough to pay employees. Some large industries too may be aided by government concessions if by doing so there might be work opportunities and benefit to tax payers.

In a capitalist society the 'farmer' always exists.The moral theory which is rationally defensible is traceable to Christianity. "Who is my neighbour?"

How far back in the story of man do you want to go? Who owned the land before it was inhabited by humans? Who owned the land when it was used by peoples who did not have the Gatling gun?

The concept of "rights," understood as ownership of and an entitlement to things one has first possessed, is as old as mankind, and even observed (if not conceptualized and articulated) in many animal communities. Many animals, for example, stake out a territory for themselves, mark it, and drive off other members of their species who trespass upon it.

[/quote]

We are humans not dinosaurs.

[GE Morton]

The moral theory you hod is the theory that guides your culture of belief.

Yes.

Thus in a post-Christian culture the received moral theory is Christian.

I asume that by "received" you mean "dominant." It may be, but unless it can be rationally defended it is not binding on anyone. Theories which depend upon supernatural assumptions are very difficult to rationally defend.

But all living things have always struggled for survival. Struggle for survival means that there is invariably loss or injury. There is no such thing in nature as a first possessor.

Of course there is. A bird who builds a nest is the first possessor of that nest. Moralities, however, are not natural --- they are human constructs --- and they only address the behaviors of moral agents, not the rest of the natural world.

Rights or duties are two ends of a continuum.

Well, you seem to have some different understanding of what constitutes a "right." As understood in the common law and in the liberal tradition, rights entail no duties on the holder --- they only impose constraints on everyone else with respect to the thing to which the holder has the right. Perhaps you can set forth your conception of what a "right" is.

Employers, landowners, and other members of the elite of society often can and do control general lack of work. Where there is lack of work the governing elite should make work available. They can do so by public projects such as training people to fill useful roles in new projects, and by giving tax concessions to small employers so they are solvent enough to pay employees. Some large industries too may be aided by government concessions if by doing so there might be work opportunities and benefit to tax payers.

Well, I agree that politicians can create economic conditions that discourage investment, stifle innovation, restrict trade, suppress production, and thus reduce employment opportunities. But employers (including farmers) don't, and cannot, do any of those things. You have to place the blame where it belongs.

The moral theory which is rationally defensible is traceable to Christianity. "Who is my neighbour?"

I've never seen a rational defense of Christian (or any other religion-based) ethics. Can you cite one that does not depend upon supernatural premises?