Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Ecurb]

Well, you said, “I think rights concerning property are more ‘legal’ than ‘moral’.” Appeals to justice are appeals to morality. It is only if you hold to some kind of morality or system which precedes the legal sphere that you would be logically permitted to say that a law is good or bad. If rights are merely legal, and not a function of pre-legal justice, then what I said follows.


But if this is your approach to rights then how could you say that they are more legal than moral? You are proposing a moral principle which grounds and judges the legal sphere.

Things that are objective and rationally defensible are not necessarily circular.

But isn’t that morality derived from a principle? The principle is simply “WWJD”. Aristotle said we should do something very similar, “What would the virtuous man do?” I don’t find either of these to be non-objective. I realize there is a very strong bias on this forum against objective morality, but I haven’t seen anyone defend the bias.

Every first year law student studies "property law." That's because the legalities involved with property rights are complicated. Perhaps I didn't make myself clear: my point was that there could be many approaches to property rights which would be equally morally sound, including communism. It seems to me that Morton thinks that "first possession or discovery" confers some moral right to ownership. I disagree (if that's his point -- I've stopped reading his endless posts). Like other laws, property laws can potentially be cruel, or unfair. Nonetheless, the laws of any land confer some degree of moral responsibility. "Thou shalt not steal," suggests property rights, and also suggests that if we live in a society that honors some particular property rights, we shouldn't abuse them. That doesn't meant that I can't morally object to cutting thieves' hands off. So, yes, there are moral grounds on which the legal realm can be judged. This is true not only of property laws, but of all laws. What I was objecting to is the notion that taxation constitutes theft or slavery, which would be the case only if there was some NATURAL or UNIVERSAL right to property. If there is not, then taxes are merely a part of the legal system that confers property in the first place. If "theft" invloves illegally taking someone else's property, clearly taxation cannot be theft. It is theft ONLY if property exists in the moral, not the legal, world.

I agree that "objective and rationally defensible" does not necessarily mean "logically defensible". However, I don't think the Christian WWJD is "objective". It is specifically designed to be subjective. The True Believer is meant to allow his Faith to take over his life; to ask for God's help in intuiting what Jesus would do; and then to do it. So although it is based on a moral principle, the manner in which the principle is enacted is specifically supposed to be subjective. It is (perhaps) an aesthetic principle: always do the beautiful thing. This is also a principle -- but beauty, surely, is subjective.

Finally, from the Christian perspective, morality is subjective (I suggest). God (supposedly) knows what's in a man's heart. Let's posit two rapists: they are both in solitary confinement, so neither can commit rape. One is truly repentant. If he were released, he would no longer commit crimes. The other is not repentant at all. He still longs to rape and pillage. Is one more evil than the other? If so, doesn't that suggest that morality is subjective? From the Christian perspective (with which, in this case, I agree) the unrepentant sinner is still evil, even though his sins are "subjective".

[Belindi]

Utilitarian ethics are based on a psychology of happiness. It seems to be instinctive that humans feel sympathy for other humans (at least). Therefore it is not conducive to happiness that some people are very much richer than others in worldly goods .

Rich people, so that they can be happy, have to deny instinctive feelings of sympathy for others or for some others as more often happens.

A rigorous utilitarian will insist that it is not possible for someone to be happy and good unless they do their utmost to ensure that others are happy. This is not practicable , however as such an altruist would exhaust herself or become embittered.

Usually utilitarians are not as rigorous as that, but are as altruistic as they can be without damaging their ability to maintain what good they can do.

[GE Morton]

Utilitarian ethics are based on a psychology of happiness. It seems to be instinctive that humans feel sympathy for other humans (at least). Therefore it is not conducive to happiness that some people are very much richer than others in worldly goods .

Well, Belindi, I fail to see how that follows. (You said, "Therefore," so I assume you're making some sort of argument). There is no connection, that I can see, between feeling sympathy and being unhappy that some are richer than others. Unhappiness over that fact would spring from envy, not sympathy.

Rich people, so that they can be happy, have to deny instinctive feelings of sympathy for others or for some others as more often happens.

That doesn't follow either.

A rigorous utilitarian will insist that it is not possible for someone to be happy and good unless they do their utmost to ensure that others are happy.

I don't know of any utilitarians who would so argue. Do you have an example?

Most contemporary utilitarians, BTW, have abandoned happiness as the quantity to be maximized, due to the interpersonal comparison problem and the "paradox of hedonism." The paradox is that happiness can't be pursued directly; it can only be obtained by successfully pursuing something else. It is a side effect of goal attainment or desire fulfillment. So "welfare" is the quantity to be maximized, and is defined in those latter terms.

[GE Morton]

Perhaps I didn't make myself clear: my point was that there could be many approaches to property rights which would be equally morally sound, including communism.

Well, please present the moral theory per which communism (or any other basis for property rights you favor) is morally sound.

It seems to me that Morton thinks that "first possession or discovery" confers some moral right to ownership.

Yes, first possession confers a right to ownership, by definition and throughout the history of common law.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ... t_id=60957

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/view ... xt=facpubs

That basis is morally right because it entails that the thing to which the right is claimed was acquired without inflicting loss or injury on others. That judgment depends, of course, upon a moral theory which forbids inflicting loss or injury on others. Not everyone, of course, accepts such a theory --- murderers, thieves, rapists, plunderers and pillagers, warmongers, etc.

[Pattern-chaser]

I believe I understand your argument on this. If I extend it into practice worldwide both you and I will be in the bucket considered rich. In this model you suggest...

Sorry, I didn't suggest any model, I only commented in general terms on your introduction of the concept of fairness, which is an important part of this discussion. All I said was it's very difficult to be fair to all, and so a compromise is probably the only practical way forward.

Haha, you clearly suggested that it is not fair for the rich to be rich and that if we fail to interfere that the problem will continue. You specifically suggested those that who have yachts are the blame. I countered that and suggested that it is actually common people that fail to share with the less wealthy. Perhaps those like us.

I did not intend to place the blame solely with yacht-owners. However, I do not disagree with your conclusion, except inasmuch as it seems to say that the blame lies only with the "common people", and might exclude those richer than we are.

[Ecurb]

Well, please present the moral theory per which communism (or any other basis for property rights you favor) is morally sound.

It seems to me that Morton thinks that "first possession or discovery" confers some moral right to ownership.

Yes, first possession confers a right to ownership, by definition and throughout the history of common law.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ... t_id=60957

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/view ... xt=facpubs

That basis is morally right because it entails that the thing to which the right is claimed was acquired without inflicting loss or injury on others. That judgment depends, of course, upon a moral theory which forbids inflicting loss or injury on others. Not everyone, of course, accepts such a theory --- murderers, thieves, rapists, plunderers and pillagers, warmongers, etc.

First possession may confer a legal right to ownership in common law, but we cannot infer from that that it confers a moral right to ownership. First of all, we know that there are many legal and pre-legal systems in which first possession does NOT confer right to ownership. Communism, for one. Hunting and gathering societies, for two. Many, many others.

All property rights inflict a loss or injury on others -- the "others" now have a duty to avoid using the property without the owners permission. If there were no property rights, one could drive any car one found. It might be a good system. Right now, 95% of the cars are parked. If any licensed driver could drive any car, we would need (on a guess) 25% of the cars we have now, and there would always (or almost always) be cars available. It would be more efficient and use fewer limited natural resources.

In addition, although you may argue that people came into "first possession" of a thing without inflicting loss (and I may disagree), property rights definitely inflict losses and injuries. Think of all those thieves rotting away in prison simply for taking a loaf of bread to eat (Jean Valjean comes to mind). Isn't being restrained from walking where one wants to walk a "loss or injury"? If there was no property, we'd have more freedom. Property causes us to "lose' that freedom.

This is all obvious, and we've been over it dozens of times. I'm not going to offer an argument from first principles in support of my position, because I don't feel like doing so. It's irrelevant to pointing out the weaknesses of your position.

Finally, Marx reasonably argued that the "owners' of the means of production are able to control (enslave?) the proletariat. I don't agree, but it's certainly a more reasonable argument than that taxation is like slavery or thievery (for reasons I've pointed out repeatedly). For one thing, in a democracy at least one is controlled (in part at least) by oneself in the case of taxation, but by someone else in the case of limited "ownership"of the means of production.

Finally, I don't buy that avoiding causing loss or injury is the be all and end all of morality. Certainly that's not the standard, Western, Christian view, in which positive moral values, like love, are emphasized. If the rich folks (like me) practice "agape" ("love" or "charity", see Paul's letter to the Corinthians), they wouldn't whine about paying taxes to support medical care, food and housing for those less fortunate. As I wrote in an earlier post, if billionaires paid half of their money in taxes, it would have almost no effect on their well-being, while improving the lot of others dramatically. Greatest good for the greatest number is one principle this would honor.

I will say this, every time Morton mentions "agents" (moral or otherwise), I imagine prefacing the word with "secret" or "real estate". Are secret agents moral agent if they have a double ought number? There's a question worthy of consideration!

[Leontiskos]

Consider Crusoe alone on his island. He finds a coconut. Does he have a right to it?

Per my definition of the term, he does. But obviously no one has any obligations related to it, since there is no one else to have them (and rights impose no obligations their holders). Does that mean he does not have a right to the coconut, on your analysis?

Yes, Crusoe has a right to the coconut, for he has "the power to invoke existing obligations to which one is justly entitled," and this power is at the very least a necessary condition of a right.

I take it that you're agreeing that Crusoe has a right to the coconut, based solely on the fact that was the first possessor of it. Correct?

(BTW, P's first possession of x is a sufficient, though not strictly necessary, for his having a right to x, as there is an alternate means of gaining that right --- acquiring it via a "chain of consent" from the first possessor. A complete statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing a right would include that alternative).

If so, then any obligations that may be thought to follow from it, or that it may connote, are not necesssary for its existence. Correct? (I think you've already agreed with that).

Even if Crusoe is the only person in existence, any right he is thought to have would be contingent on potential or counterfactual obligations (e.g. "If or when there is another rational agent out there, then they are obligated in such-and-such a way"). Granted, if he is the only existing rational being then my definition would need to be tweaked, but the general point is that rights still presuppose obligations.

Well, now you're being inconsistent. His right is contingent upon there being obligations? Didn't we agree that first possession is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a right?

I don’t think I am being inconsistent. I think I have consistently claimed that obligations are a necessary part of the meaning of rights, and that one cannot understand what a right is without understanding the obligations that a right establishes. Everything I have written to you revolves around this claim.

I have argued that if someone does not see that a right entails obligations then they do not know what a right is. Whether first possession is a sufficient condition for the existence of a right then depends on whether first possession logically entails rights-obligations. In our conversation I have tended to agree with you that first possession is sufficient, but this is because I see first possession as logically entailing the necessary obligations. Since I have defined rights in terms of obligations I naturally do not think a right can arise without obligations arising. Apparently you see first possession as establishing the existence of a non-moral right, and I see it as establishing the existence of a moral right, and I do not think a non-moral right is a right at all.

Perhaps this will help. Earlier I made reference to marriage as an analogy. We could teach someone to verify the existence of a marriage, even if that person has no idea what marriage actually means. All they would have to do is verify some factual conditions about whether certain vows were made. The idea revolves around the possibility of verifying the existence of some thing when one only understands that thing in a superficial way. Similarly, a parent might teach a small child to recognize and fear poisonous snakes even before the child has a real understanding of what a snake is.

My contention is that if someone leverages your definition to recognize rights while failing to perceive obligations, then they are like the child with the snake, for they have only a superficial understanding of that which they recognize. Apparently we disagree on whether that pre-obligation notion is sufficient to be called a right.

I grant that there is an interesting sense of right as entitlement as seen in the case of Crusoe. When Crusoe discovers the coconut we might colloquially be apt to say that he has a right to it regardless of his social isolation, in the sense that he is entitled to the coconut. But I don't think entitlement makes any sense apart from a social context, for to say that one is entitled to some thing is at the same thing to say that others are not, or are less entitled to it (i.e. subtle obligations again arise). So if we really want to conceive of the situation as non-social, then there are no obligations, rights, or entitlements. Then there is just a guy harvesting a coconut in much the same way that a wild animal would harvest a coconut.

It would seem that your understanding requires a similar sort of social context, for without a social context acquisition could never be righteous or unrighteous.

That does indeed get us a bit closer to the issue here. Yes, rights imply entitlements, just as they imply obligations. And both of those terms presuppose a social context (as do all moral terms). My claim is that those implications, however, do not derive from the definitive properties of rights, i.e., the necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence. They derive, instead, from a moral premise assumed by the rights claimant, which he also assumes is held by those to whom he directs the claim.

This disagreement arises from the fact that we use a morally-laden term, "rights," to denote a non-moral, empirical fact. By using that term we automatically invoke moral assumptions. So a factual claim and a moral one are asserted simultaneously when we claim a right, or impute one to someone else. But I think it prudent, for logical reasons, to keep in mind that those claims are distinct, and that only the factual claim, if confirmed, establishes the truth of "P has a right to x."

Agree?

I agree with some of that, but I think we disagree on whether the moral premise is intrinsic to rights, for it is the moral premise that results in obligations. I think the common opinion is that we do not have a right to an object if no one is obligated to respect the unique relation we claim to have with the object. Apparently you think this is a coherent claim, “Crusoe has a right to this coconut despite the fact that no one has any obligations to Crusoe with respect to the coconut.” That strikes me as a misuse of the word “right”. One difficulty is that we are disagreeing about a logical relation, not a temporal one. You are arguing for a concept of rights which has no necessary relation to respect for rights (obligation). Or at the very least, you judge the logical connection between first possession and the moral premise to be a looser connection than I do.

I appreciate the value and prudence of emphasizing the factual aspect of rights, but I don’t think the factual aspect itself constitutes a right when it is separated from the moral obligations.

Further, I haven't yet raised the question of whether righteousness is a moral notion, but I tend to think it is.

Indeed it is; it means (as I understand it) "morally acceptable."

Okay, I agree. Let me quote your previous post on this point:

There may well be good use for a term that denotes something like first possession apart from obligations, but I don’t think “right” is the proper term.

That particular term reflects the moral implications of first possession --- that P acquired x righteously (without inflicting loss or injury), and thus is now rightfully in possession of it, or has a rightful claim to it.

If the term itself reflects moral implications, then why would it make sense to use it in a non-moral way?

This is exactly what I have been emphasizing: understanding the conditions for the existence of some thing does not necessarily give one an understanding of that thing (particularly at the beginning of this post). First possession gives the factual conditions needed for the existence of a right, but it does not provide us with an understanding of rights. I take it that your last sentence proves my point. If one can know the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of rights and yet not understand what rights are, then there must be something about the concept that is not provided by the existential conditions. I would suggest that the missing thing is obligation.

I agree. Do the comments above cover that?

I don’t know. Maybe I’m not being clear enough. I think understanding obligation is necessary for understanding the meaning of rights, and that without obligation one’s understanding of rights will be insufficient. I knew I was doing a dangerous dance when I started affirming that one could know that a thing exists without knowing what that thing is, and maybe it is coming back to bite me. The key is that the person who “knows” that X exists and that X is a Y, but does not fully know what a Y is, is partially working on the basis of faith or convention. The child’s beliefs about whether the slithering, shiny reptile is a snake and is something to be feared are things they hold on their parents’ authority. They don’t actually have a robust understanding of what a snake is. In our case the person who fails to perceive obligations does not even have a sufficient understanding of what a right is.

This disagreement arises from the fact that we use a morally-laden term, "rights," to denote a non-moral, empirical fact.

Are you claiming that there are two equivocal uses of “right”, one moral and one non-moral? Could you give me an example of when the concept of rights is used in a way that does not merely prescind from obligations, but altogether fails to presuppose obligations?

I suppose my question for you is fairly simple: Why isn't the goal itself considered moral? Usually we would consider the goals of one's moral actions to be moral. Concrete acts which attempt to maximize welfare are moral, but so is the goal itself (i.e. maximizing welfare). The means participates in the quality of the end. For example, the nature of traffic laws will be determined by the goal you outline. I find it odd to call the means moral and the end non-moral.

The goal itself is based on the observation that all sentient creatures strive to preserve and improve their own welfare (which often includes the welfare of others), and that for most traditional moral systems and codes that is the central aim ("Thou shalt not murder," "Thous shalt not steal," etc.). Those are matters of fact.

But adopting that as a goal, as the aim of a moral theory, is certainly a value decision, and thus subjective (as are all goals). It then provides the normative premise from which all subsequent "oughts" can be derived --- and we need one of those to bridge the "is-ought" gap. No one is logically bound to adopt that goal, of course, but someone who does not will be using the term "morality" somewhat unconventionally.

I grant that adopting the goal is a value decision, and is thus subjective, but I don’t see why it isn’t moral. Is the claim that value decisions are not moral decisions, or that subjective decisions are not moral decisions? Most people would just say that we are morally obliged to adopt the goal, and that adopting the goal is a moral act.

Apparently your approach is to say that morality is objective because morality is instrumental and instrumental things are objective. Thus the instrumentality of morality is really subservient to the premise that morality is objective (and the underlying is-ought premise). This also explains why adopting the goal is not a moral act. Is that right? For moral philosophers like Kant morality is the exact opposite of instrumental, so I’m trying to understand why you are using the word in such a different way.

[Ecurb]

I don’t think I am being inconsistent. I think I have consistently claimed that obligations are a necessary part of the meaning of rights, and that one cannot understand what a right is without understanding the obligations that a right establishes. Everything I have written to you revolves around this claim.

I have argued that if someone does not see that a right entails obligations then they do not know what a right is.

This has been precisely my point as well. In addition, an obilgation is a "loss" of freedom to do what one is obliged not to do. Therefore all rights involve losses on the part of other people. (This does not mean that rights are a bad thing, it just means we should see them for what they are.)

[Leontiskos]

Well, you said, “I think rights concerning property are more ‘legal’ than ‘moral’.” Appeals to justice are appeals to morality. It is only if you hold to some kind of morality or system which precedes the legal sphere that you would be logically permitted to say that a law is good or bad. If rights are merely legal, and not a function of pre-legal justice, then what I said follows.


But if this is your approach to rights then how could you say that they are more legal than moral? You are proposing a moral principle which grounds and judges the legal sphere.

Every first year law student studies "property law." That's because the legalities involved with property rights are complicated. Perhaps I didn't make myself clear: my point was that there could be many approaches to property rights which would be equally morally sound, including communism. It seems to me that Morton thinks that "first possession or discovery" confers some moral right to ownership. I disagree (if that's his point -- I've stopped reading his endless posts). Like other laws, property laws can potentially be cruel, or unfair. Nonetheless, the laws of any land confer some degree of moral responsibility. "Thou shalt not steal," suggests property rights, and also suggests that if we live in a society that honors some particular property rights, we shouldn't abuse them. That doesn't meant that I can't morally object to cutting thieves' hands off. So, yes, there are moral grounds on which the legal realm can be judged. This is true not only of property laws, but of all laws.

What I was objecting to is the notion that taxation constitutes theft or slavery, which would be the case only if there was some NATURAL or UNIVERSAL right to property. If there is not, then taxes are merely a part of the legal system that confers property in the first place. If "theft" invloves illegally taking someone else's property, clearly taxation cannot be theft. It is theft ONLY if property exists in the moral, not the legal, world.

But it seems like everyone (you, I, and Morton) agrees that there is natural justice which governs property. Sure, the idea that certain forms of taxation constitute theft presupposes a pre-legal moral right to property, but in the sentence prior to that one you wrote, "So, yes, there are moral grounds on which the legal realm can be judged." If you can affirm moral grounds that judge the legal realm, why can't Morton?

I agree that "objective and rationally defensible" does not necessarily mean "logically defensible". However, I don't think the Christian WWJD is "objective". It is specifically designed to be subjective. The True Believer is meant to allow his Faith to take over his life; to ask for God's help in intuiting what Jesus would do; and then to do it. So although it is based on a moral principle, the manner in which the principle is enacted is specifically supposed to be subjective. It is (perhaps) an aesthetic principle: always do the beautiful thing. This is also a principle -- but beauty, surely, is subjective.

Okay, fair enough. I can see the subjective element, despite the fact that there is also an objective element (i.e. the written accounts of Jesus' life and actions).

Finally, from the Christian perspective, morality is subjective (I suggest). God (supposedly) knows what's in a man's heart. Let's posit two rapists: they are both in solitary confinement, so neither can commit rape. One is truly repentant. If he were released, he would no longer commit crimes. The other is not repentant at all. He still longs to rape and pillage. Is one more evil than the other? If so, doesn't that suggest that morality is subjective? From the Christian perspective (with which, in this case, I agree) the unrepentant sinner is still evil, even though his sins are "subjective".

This strikes me as a clear principle. "The repentant are less evil than the unrepentant." The problem is that humans can never know if someone is truly repentant or not. But God can. The principle on which they are judged can only be applied by someone who has knowledge of whether they have repented, and this someone is God. Now when God judges them it will be on factual, objective grounds. That is, they will be judged on whether or not they have, in truth, repented. At the judgment their private and subjective act will be objectively known.

[GE Morton]

First possession may confer a legal right to ownership in common law, but we cannot infer from that that it confers a moral right to ownership. First of all, we know that there are many legal and pre-legal systems in which first possession does NOT confer right to ownership. Communism, for one. Hunting and gathering societies, for two. Many, many others.

Well, first, I've never claimed that people have "moral rights" to things because they have legal rights to them. I'm not even sure what a "moral right" would be; that is an awkward term, probably due to confusion over what rights are.

A "right" is pseudo-property we impute to persons to mark a specific historical fact about them, namely, that they were the first possessors of some thing they are claiming as their property. It is not, per se, a moral term; it is a factual one, though the fact that validates it has moral import.

And there is something you should understand about common law. Unlike statutory law, it does not codify the will (or whims) of legislators or despots. Instead, it reflects and codifies rules, practices, and decision-making principles commonly understood and followed in the community before any laws are enacted. The first possession principle for determining property ownership is observed nearly everywhere, whether or not there is any local law codifying it.

So your comment about what is or is not recognized in other legal systems is irrelevant.

You're mistaken, BTW, about property ownership in hunter-gatherer societies. Those societies typically don't recognize private ownership of land, and hunting and gathering is often a collective endeavor. But many other things are private property --- the spear one has fashioned, a basket or blanket someone has woven, garments one has sewn and fitted, a knife one has chipped and honed, a necklace or bracelet one has fashioned, etc., are private property, and ownership determined by the first possession rule.

All property rights inflict a loss or injury on others -- the "others" now have a duty to avoid using the property without the owners permission. If there were no property rights, one could drive any car one found.

Er, no. Being unable to use property you've never been able to use, because it didn't exist or wasn't known to exist before being produced or discovered, does not constitute a loss or an injury. You can't "lose" something you never had, and if your health and welfare after someone builds a car is the same as before he built it, you haven't been injured, either. That is leftist sophistry.

You need to apply the "non-existence test" in these cases. Alfie builds a house (or catches a fish, or captures and trains a wild horse, etc.), and refuses to share them with Bruno. Is Bruno any worse off than had Alfie never existed? If not, then Alfie has inflicted no loss or injury on Bruno.

In addition, although you may argue that people came into "first possession" of a thing without inflicting loss (and I may disagree), property rights definitely inflict losses and injuries. Think of all those thieves rotting away in prison simply for taking a loaf of bread to eat (Jean Valjean comes to mind).

More sophistry. No, "property rights" have not inflicted any loss or injury. The jailed thieves have inflicted their losses and injuries on themselves, as a consequence of their infliction of losses on someone else. Inflicting losses and injuries in order to resist attempts by others to inflict them, to prevent an imminent infliction of them, or to secure restitution for a prior infliction, is justified. It is not justified for any other reason. That is the "law of self-defense," another rule recognized in virtually all cultures and legal systems.

This is all obvious, and we've been over it dozens of times. I'm not going to offer an argument from first principles in support of my position, because I don't feel like doing so.

Ah. I rather suspect it is because you have no first principles you're able to articulate or are prepared to defend.

. . . I don't agree, but it's certainly a more reasonable argument than that taxation is like slavery or thievery . . .

I've never claimed that taxation per se is thievery or slavery. It is only thievery when the taxes are extracted to pay for goods or services from which the taxpayer receives no benefit. I.e., you get what you pay for and pay for what you get. If you're forced to pay for anything else, the person forcing you is a robber.

Finally, I don't buy that avoiding causing loss or injury is the be all and end all of morality. Certainly that's not the standard, Western, Christian view, in which positive moral values, like love, are emphasized.

That may be true. But, alas, not all members of Western societies are Christians, or adherents of any other supernatural mythology. They are all moral agents, however. A rational moral system must be applicable universally. Christians are, of course, perfectly free to adhere to the tenets of their religion, to any extent they wish. They're just not free to impose them on others. I'd have thought that pogroms, witch-burnings, Inquisitions, and Crusades were generally seen as embarrassments of the past, never to be repeated.

[Belindi]

Utilitarian ethics are based on a psychology of happiness. It seems to be instinctive that humans feel sympathy for other humans (at least). Therefore it is not conducive to happiness that some people are very much richer than others in worldly goods .

Well, Belindi, I fail to see how that follows. (You said, "Therefore," so I assume you're making some sort of argument). There is no connection, that I can see, between feeling sympathy and being unhappy that some are richer than others. Unhappiness over that fact would spring from envy, not sympathy.

Rich and poor, we are all at risk from envy. The connection between instinctual sympathy and the unhappiness of the very rich is that the very rich have had to subdue their instinctual sympathy for the very poor. There is seldom insight into alienation from ordinary human sympathy.

Rich people, so that they can be happy, have to deny instinctive feelings of sympathy for others or for some others as more often happens.

That doesn't follow either.

There is seldom any insight into alienation from instinctive behaviour.

A rigorous utilitarian will insist that it is not possible for someone to be happy and good unless they do their utmost to ensure that others are happy.

I don't know of any utilitarians who would so argue. Do you have an example?

I could and would have to look up the info, which you could as easily do.

Most contemporary utilitarians, BTW, have abandoned happiness as the quantity to be maximized, due to the interpersonal comparison problem and the "paradox of hedonism." The paradox is that happiness can't be pursued directly; it can only be obtained by successfully pursuing something else. It is a side effect of goal attainment or desire fulfillment. So "welfare" is the quantity to be maximized, and is defined in those latter terms.

There is certainly a discussion as to what constitutes happiness. Bentham , and Mill, discusses poles and constituents of happiness/absence of suffering.
Welfare includes not only shelter, food, water, health care, and clean air but also freedom to express basic instincts (Child care, sex, fairness, and so forth) and human aspirations to the good, beautiful , and true ; all within reason(utilitarian reason or some other basis of reason). I say "reason" as we as philosophers looking to the title of the thread seek rational foundations for the morality of universal provision for shelter.

[chewybrian]

Welfare includes not only shelter, food, water, health care, and clean air but also freedom to express basic instincts (Child care, sex, fairness, and so forth) and human aspirations to the good, beautiful , and true ; all within reason(utilitarian reason or some other basis of reason). I say "reason" as we as philosophers looking to the title of the thread seek rational foundations for the morality of universal provision for shelter.

While I don't see a truly objective basis for morality, I do see rational reasons to take care of our fellow man in this way. We can see that perhaps we won the lottery of birth and have access to everything we need to control our own destiny. But, some others were not so lucky. The odds are drastically stacked against them, and the situation is not fair. We should act because that could have been us. Further, our situation demands humility if we are as honest as philosophers claim to be or should be. We may be able to control our destiny at the moment, but tomorrow we may be in a hospital bed due to an accident, we may be the victim of a terrible illness, or we may lose control of our faculty of choice through dementia or other means. We should act to help those in need because we can see that could be us at any time.

We should also act as a means of self-preservation, to remove the threat that the poor will rise up and take away our advantage by theft or revolt because we have effectively left them no choice. But you also alluded to (I think) a more important reason. We need to get those people out of the bottom levels of Maslow's hierarchy so that they can have a chance to self-actualize, both for their benefit and the benefit of society. When people are secure in their basic needs, they are free to pursue higher goals and to eventually make contributions to the greater good. The downtrodden man or woman might cure cancer or discover some new form of energy or write a great play or prove some important philosophical truth. We don't want to waste the chance by leaving them trapped in an animal existence rather than allowing them to discover their humanity.

[Ecurb]

.....


Ah. I rather suspect it is because you have no first principles you're able to articulate or are prepared to defend.


I've never claimed that taxation per se is thievery or slavery. It is only thievery when the taxes are extracted to pay for goods or services from which the taxpayer receives no benefit. I.e., you get what you pay for and pay for what you get. If you're forced to pay for anything else, the person forcing you is a robber.


That may be true. But, alas, not all members of Western societies are Christians, or adherents of any other supernatural mythology. They are all moral agents, however. A rational moral system must be applicable universally. Christians are, of course, perfectly free to adhere to the tenets of their religion, to any extent they wish. They're just not free to impose them on others. I'd have thought that pogroms, witch-burnings, Inquisitions, and Crusades were generally seen as embarrassments of the past, never to be repeated.

We're beating a dead horse, Morton. The carousel goes round and round. You think "first possession" creates a right; I think (like L) that rights and obligations cannot exist without each other. All obligations create "harm or loss". Before anyone "owned" the lot on which your house is built, I could walk right through it, breathing the free air and smelling the green, growing earth. In any event, we've hashed this issue to death, and I call "truce".

You did write some newish things, to which I have a response. First, being force to pay for something you don't want to pay for is not "robbery". Robbery is a legal term, not a moral term. If you think demand for such payments (say, traffic tickets) is unethical, perhaps you would be better off just saying so, instead of making a claim that is clearly false.

It is true, of course, that we are not all Christians. I'm not a Chrstian, for one. However, if you can cite "common law" to support your position being ethically correct, I can cite standard Western morality (i.e. Christianity). "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you," is part of the Tao of many cultures and religions. You asked me for principles -- so, generous soul that I am -- I'm giving you one. Here's another: "love your neighbor as yourself." I concede that the problem with these principles (from your perspective) is that they are clearly not "objective". "Love" is subjective; so is how you would like your neighbor to treat you. Although you claim that morality should be objective -- I disagree. I think, "Do as you would be done by" is a better moral principle than, "If I have first possession I can control other people however I want (within limits) with regard to that possession." I think it is more conducive to human joy, well-being and happiness. Perhaps I'm wrong -- but perhaps you are wrong, too.

Here's a moral question: if you were destitute and starving, would you want a billionaire to share of his plenty and offer you food and shelter? You might argue that you would not want the billionaire to be FORCED to do so -- but all laws (including tax laws) are ENFORCED. Anarchy or bust (as I've said before). I agree that utopia must be an anarchy -- but that's a different issue from how we can best muddle through in our imperfect society.

p.s. I agree with you that the modern, progressive obsession with INEQUALITY of wealth is silly. I don't care how much money billionaires have (as long as they don't pollute the atmosphere in their private jets). Instead, I care about a safety net for the very poor. I think providing food, shelter and medical care for them creates a more stable society, which, in turn, benefits the rich. Who benefits more from the status quo than the elite? I would argue that the rich are being forced to pay for something from which they DO benefit (if I were inclined to argue on your terms). Of course as a practical matter, you can't get blood from a turnip, so if we want our government to pay for things, we must get the money from those who have it.

[Belindi]

Welfare includes not only shelter, food, water, health care, and clean air but also freedom to express basic instincts (Child care, sex, fairness, and so forth) and human aspirations to the good, beautiful , and true ; all within reason(utilitarian reason or some other basis of reason). I say "reason" as we as philosophers looking to the title of the thread seek rational foundations for the morality of universal provision for shelter.

While I don't see a truly objective basis for morality, I do see rational reasons to take care of our fellow man in this way. We can see that perhaps we won the lottery of birth and have access to everything we need to control our own destiny. But, some others were not so lucky. The odds are drastically stacked against them, and the situation is not fair. We should act because that could have been us. Further, our situation demands humility if we are as honest as philosophers claim to be or should be. We may be able to control our destiny at the moment, but tomorrow we may be in a hospital bed due to an accident, we may be the victim of a terrible illness, or we may lose control of our faculty of choice through dementia or other means. We should act to help those in need because we can see that could be us at any time.

We should also act as a means of self-preservation, to remove the threat that the poor will rise up and take away our advantage by theft or revolt because we have effectively left them no choice. But you also alluded to (I think) a more important reason. We need to get those people out of the bottom levels of Maslow's hierarchy so that they can have a chance to self-actualize, both for their benefit and the benefit of society. When people are secure in their basic needs, they are free to pursue higher goals and to eventually make contributions to the greater good. The downtrodden man or woman might cure cancer or discover some new form of energy or write a great play or prove some important philosophical truth. We don't want to waste the chance by leaving them trapped in an animal existence rather than allowing them to discover their humanity.

Nice one, ChewyBrian!

[Leontiskos]

For those who may be interested - Ecurb, chewybrian, Belindi -

Today Public Discourse published an article by Martin Rhonheimer entitled, "The Universal Destination of Goods and Private Property: Is the Right to Private Property a “Second-Tier” Natural Right?" It is the abridged version of a longer article (link).

Rhonheimer is responding to part of Pope Francis' latest encyclical where he implied that the right to private property is a "secondary right" which ought not displace the "primary right" of the universal destination of goods. Rhonheimer looks at the history of Christianity (and Catholicism) in order to argue that the right to private property is an integral part of Christian tradition and is not overridden by the universal destination of goods, which is a principle rather than a right.

In all likelihood this article will give birth to some internecine Christian debates over the legitimacy of a right to private property.