Leontiskos wrote: ↑September 14th, 2021, 8:06 pm
GE Morton wrote: ↑September 13th, 2021, 12:47 pm
Leontiskos wrote: ↑September 10th, 2021, 7:33 pmI will end up arguing for the idea that obligations are necessary conditions of rights.
Consider Crusoe alone on his island. He finds a coconut. Does he have a right to it?
Per my definition of the term, he does. But obviously no one has any obligations related to it, since there is no one else to have them (and rights impose no obligations their holders). Does that mean he does not have a right to the coconut, on your analysis?
Obligations, like all other moral concepts, arise only in social settings, via some moral theory or code devised to govern interactions between members of that social group. They may involve external objects or other non-moral states of affairs, but they aren't properties of those objects or states of affairs, or derive from any property of them. Obligations are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the existence of a right, but rights may invoke such obligations given some moral theory.
Yes, Crusoe has a right to the coconut, for he has "the power to invoke existing obligations to which one is justly entitled," and this power is at the very least a necessary condition of a right.
I take it that you're agreeing that Crusoe has a right to the coconut,
based solely on the fact that was the first possessor of it. Correct?
(BTW, P's first possession of
x is a sufficient, though not strictly necessary, for his having a right to
x, as there is an alternate means of gaining that right --- acquiring it via a "chain of consent" from the first possessor. A complete statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing a right would include that alternative).
If so, then any obligations that may be thought to follow from it, or that it may connote, are not necesssary for its existence. Correct? (I think you've already agreed with that).
I don't think it matters that he is alone on the island. Those who are obligated to recognize my property rights need not be notified that I have acquired a piece of property. When I buy a car all humans immediately have an obligation to not steal what is rightfully mine. It doesn't matter how isolated I am.
You're right on that point, of course. My example would only work if Crusoe were the only moral agent in the universe.
Even if Crusoe is the only person in existence, any right he is thought to have would be contingent on potential or counterfactual obligations (e.g. "If or when there is another rational agent out there, then they are obligated in such-and-such a way"). Granted, if he is the only existing rational being then my definition would need to be tweaked, but the general point is that rights still presuppose obligations.
Well, now you're being inconsistent. His right is
contingent upon there being obligations? Didn't we agree that first posession is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a right?
I grant that there is an interesting sense of right as entitlement as seen in the case of Crusoe. When Crusoe discovers the coconut we might colloquially be apt to say that he has a right to it regardless of his social isolation, in the sense that he is entitled to the coconut. But I don't think entitlement makes any sense apart from a social context, for to say that one is entitled to some thing is at the same thing to say that others are not, or are less entitled to it (i.e. subtle obligations again arise). So if we really want to conceive of the situation as non-social, then there are no obligations, rights, or entitlements. Then there is just a guy harvesting a coconut in much the same way that a wild animal would harvest a coconut.
It would seem that your understanding requires a similar sort of social context, for without a social context acquisition could never be righteous or unrighteous.
That does indeed get us a bit closer to the issue here. Yes, rights imply entitlements, just as they imply obligations. And both of those terms presuppose a social context (as do all moral terms). My claim is that those implications, however, do not derive from the definitive properties of rights, i.e., the necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence. They derive, instead, from a moral premise assumed by the rights claimant, which he also assumes is held by those to whom he directs the claim.
This disagreement arise from the fact that we use a morally-laden term, "rights," to denote a non-moral, empirical fact. By using that term we automatically invoke moral assumptions. So a factual claim and a moral one are asserted simultaneously when we claim a right, or impute one to someone else. But I think it prudent, for logical reasons, to keep in mind that those claims are distinct, and that only the factual claim, if confirmed, establishes the truth of "P has a right to
x."
Agree?
GE Morton wrote: ↑September 13th, 2021, 12:47 pm
Since they denote the historical event that warrants assigning them they are not meaningless. But they would be functionally vacuous. Similarly, assigning the pseudo-property "doctor" denotes that the person graduated from medical school. But if he never actually practices medicine the label would be functionally vacuous.
But my definition of rights focuses on a power, not function. It is a power to carry out a function, true, but it is still not identical with the function. A doctor is someone who has the capacity to practice medicine, whether or not he does.
We have no way of knowing that someone has the power to do something other than by observing him doing it.
Further, I haven't yet raised the question of whether righteousness is a moral notion, but I tend to think it is.
Indeed it is; it means (as I understand it) "morally acceptable."
This is exactly what I have been emphasizing: understanding the conditions for the existence of some thing does not necessarily give one an understanding of that thing (particularly at the beginning of this post). First possession gives the factual conditions needed for the existence of a right, but it does not provide us with an understanding of rights. I take it that your last sentence proves my point. If one can know the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of rights and yet not understand what rights are, then there must be something about the concept that is not provided by the existential conditions. I would suggest that the missing thing is obligation.
I agree. Do the comments above cover that?
I suppose my question for you is fairly simple: Why isn't the goal itself considered moral? Usually we would consider the goals of one's moral actions to be moral. Concrete acts which attempt to maximize welfare are moral, but so is the goal itself (i.e. maximizing welfare). The means participates in the quality of the end. For example, the nature of traffic laws will be determined by the goal you outline. I find it odd to call the means moral and the end non-moral.
The goal itself is based on the observation that all sentient creatures strive to preserve and improve their own welfare (which often includes the welfare of others), and that for most traditional moral systems and codes that is the central aim ("Thou shalt not murder," "Thous shalt not steal," etc.). Those are matters of fact.
But adopting that as a goal, as the aim of a moral theory, is certainly a value decision, and thus subjective (as are all goals). It then provides the normative premise from which all subsequent "oughts" can be derived --- and we need one of those to bridge the "is-ought" gap. No one is logically bound to adopt that goal, of course, but someone who does not will be using the term "morality" somewhat unconventionally.