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[Belindi]

But despots decide for themselves what rights and obligations, if any, they have.

Any rights and obligations someone arbitrarily (i.e., not grounded in first possession) claims for himself are fiat rights ("frights"). They have no moral significance.

As I wrote to you earlier, morals are cultural values; ethics are culture free. Homelessness in a wealthy country is unethical. There are those who support laws' moral underpinnings of Judeo -Christian morality and those who defy that Judeo-Christian moral code. There is now deep differences between the haves and the have-nots which signifies the haves can and so they do. Power, Mr Morton, does more than signify an operating moral system; power makes an operating moral system.

There are ethical ways to power, and the Gatling gun nor the lies of Rupert Murdoch are not ethical ways.


There are moral systems which you yourself would deplore and also deem very significant.

Much of the Taliban's moral system is not shared by you and it signifies evil to you.

The large part of the moral system of slave-owning cotton growers in the American South, long ago, were not shared by you and also signify evil to you.

The morals of the fairly despotic Henry VIII of England may not be known to you, but you would find them significantly horrific as a free citizen of a democratic nation.

You don't want morals to include the moral systems that govern unfree peoples such as Afghan people under Taliban rule, but they do so , whether you like it or not. Until the regimes of US and UK give more power of choice to the poor and powerless our respective moral systems are ethically rotten.

[GE Morton]

So we've broadly sorted our justification for morality, what it's for in principle - promoting interests/wellbeing in social settings. We've noted the roles different categories of sentient creatures may play (temporarily/permanently in relation to our foundational justification. And we've acknowledged this moral foundation confers moral consideration on all, and duties/obligations/oughts on some. That's a solid place to start thinking about what sort of oughts will be derived, and how we might codify them.

That about right?

Yes. The obligations falling upon those capable of understanding them (moral agents). A terminological point: I use "obligation" to refer to both duties (things one must do --- actions one must take in certain circumstances), and constraints (things one must not do).

Well, that would not be a "role for Rights," unless you're proposing, as have others here, to re-define that word. The role of rights as classically understood has been to identify what belongs to whom (as determined by the first possession criterion) and forbid others from taking those things. The term carries no implication of a duty of charity --- to see that anyone's "basic welfare needs are met." Nor does it entail an obligation upon anyone to give anyone an "opportunity to flourish and pursue their interests." There may be some other way to derive such duties from the axiom, but it would not be via rights. No one has a "right" to the services of other people or to the products of their labor, whatever their needs may be. Rights impose constraints, but no duties.

I'm suggesting we use Rights based on our moral foundation, we don't need to be bound by others in the past who made up rights based on a different foundation or conception of morality. But OK, we don't have to call them Rights, we can call them Foundational Entitlements - or .... something better lol. The point is to establish a means of ensuring that basic welfare needs are met and sentient creatures have the opportunity to flourish. Regardless of the whims and compromises of governments/authorities. It's about establishing a baseline all sentient creatures should in principle be accorded, before the societal trade-offs involved with competing interests is addressed.

I think this logically follows from our foundation . . .

Well, there is the rub --- to SHOW how it logically follows, given the Equal Agency postulate (which I assume you accept).

We know there will inevitably be trade-offs because of the nature of being an experiencing subject with individual interests. And there will be difficulties quantifying the qualiative nature of interests and weighing them against each other.

That is more than difficult --- it is logically impossible. That is the classical problem of welfare economics --- the lack of a cardinal measure of utility. Here is one brief summary:

"Cardinal utility is an attempt to quantify an abstract concept because it assigns a numerical value to utility. Models that incorporate cardinal utility use the theoretical unit of utility, the util, in the same way that any other measurable quantity is used. For example, a basket of bananas might give a consumer a utility of 10, while a basket of mangoes might give a utility of 20.

"The downside to cardinal utility is that there is no fixed scale to work from. The idea of 10 utils is meaningless in and of itself, and the factors that influence the number might vary widely from one consumer to the next. If another consumer gives bananas a util value of 15, it doesn't necessarily mean that the individual likes bananas 50% more than the first consumer. The implication is that there is no way to compare utility between consumers."

https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answer ... nomics.asp

Here is a more thorough discussion:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardinal_utility

From the above: "During the second half of the 19th century many studies related to this fictional magnitude—utility—were conducted, but the conclusion was always the same: it proved impossible to definitively say whether a good is worth 50, 75, or 125 utils to a person, or to two different people. Moreover, the mere dependence of utility on notions of hedonism led academic circles to be skeptical of this theory."

This problem ensues directly from the subjectivity of values. The value of x can only be defined relative to some valuer, and only measured by observing what that valuer is willing to give up to secure x. There is a "hierarchy of values" attached to every moral agent (and subject); we can discern its structure --- how different things rank within it -- for a given agent by observing his behavior, what x he will give up to secure y. That allows an ordinal ranking of utility, but only within a given agent's hierarchy. To make things more complicated, value hierarchies are volatile. The value P assigns to x today may not be the same tomorrow. The rankings of things within the hierarchy shift over time, new items are added and others dropped, their value becoming zero for that agent (hence discarded items and abandoned property).

The closest we can come to making interpersonal comparisons of utility is by observing behavior in a market. If Alfie will trade a record album to Bruno for book, we will know that Alfie values the book more than the album, and Bruno the album more than the book. Both of them acquire something they value more than the thing they gave up. At least, at that moment. But that observation tells us nothing about how those items rank within each agent's hierarchy.

If your approach depends on those trade-offs you mentioned you have set yourself a formidable problem.

A baseline will ensure that these trade offs never go so far that the foundational basis of morality is traded away for anyone . . . It seems a logical first step to me when we're starting to look at what oughts arise from our foundation, and how we might codify them. You have your Equal Agency Postulate, Duty of Care and so on. I'm suggesting lets get a our moral safety net in place first.

Well, we can't do that, Gertie, not logically. You're proposing to build to build moral obligations into the postulates of the theory. But that is question-begging. They have to be derived from the axiom and from postulates that are morally neutral.

The Equal Agency postulate is morally neutral; it derives from the definition of "moral agent," which is purely descriptive of a certain category of beings. The Duty to Aid (a theorem) is derived from the Axiom.

So why isn't this an appropriate moral baseline to strive for in your view, and/or if I propose to give it this special right-like status, what are the problems?

Does the above answer that?

[Leontiskos]

Leontiskos wrote:

On my understanding obligations are a necessary condition of rights, and thus are universal (rather than “nearly universal”).

But despots decide for themselves what rights and obligations, if any, they have.
When a despot's rights are reined in by his subjects or another authority then moral and legal rights change as happened with Magna Carta. Taliban for instance are despots who arbitrate on rights and obligations. They have the power so they can and do.

Rights and obligations are each subject to who is the boss, and are neither universal nor nearly universal. It is for this reason that one should fight if necessary to protect one's democratic rights and obligations.

What I was saying is that rights are universally held to entail obligations. Even despots agree with that. When the despot asserts a fiat right they are attempting to impose obligations on others.

[Leontiskos]

I will end up arguing for the idea that obligations are necessary conditions of rights.

Consider Crusoe alone on his island. He finds a coconut. Does he have a right to it?

Per my definition of the term, he does. But obviously no one has any obligations related to it, since there is no one else to have them (and rights impose no obligations their holders). Does that mean he does not have a right to the coconut, on your analysis?

Obligations, like all other moral concepts, arise only in social settings, via some moral theory or code devised to govern interactions between members of that social group. They may involve external objects or other non-moral states of affairs, but they aren't properties of those objects or states of affairs, or derive from any property of them. Obligations are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the existence of a right, but rights may invoke such obligations given some moral theory.

Yes, Crusoe has a right to the coconut, for he has "the power to invoke existing obligations to which one is justly entitled," and this power is at the very least a necessary condition of a right. I don't think it matters that he is alone on the island. Those who are obligated to recognize my property rights need not be notified that I have acquired a piece of property. When I buy a car all humans immediately have an obligation to not steal what is rightfully mine. It doesn't matter how isolated I am. Even if Crusoe is the only person in existence, any right he is thought to have would be contingent on potential or counterfactual obligations (e.g. "If or when there is another rational agent out there, then they are obligated in such-and-such a way"). Granted, if he is the only existing rational being then my definition would need to be tweaked, but the general point is that rights still presuppose obligations.

A right is a pseudo-property assigned to a person to mark an historical fact about that person. That fact has moral import, however, and that moral import becomes a connotation of the pseudo-property --- but not a necessary or sufficient condition for assigning it.

I grant that there is an interesting sense of right as entitlement as seen in the case of Crusoe. When Crusoe discovers the coconut we might colloquially be apt to say that he has a right to it regardless of his social isolation, in the sense that he is entitled to the coconut. But I don't think entitlement makes any sense apart from a social context, for to say that one is entitled to some thing is at the same thing to say that others are not, or are less entitled to it (i.e. subtle obligations again arise). So if we really want to conceive of the situation as non-social, then there are no obligations, rights, or entitlements. Then there is just a guy harvesting a coconut in much the same way that a wild animal would harvest a coconut.

It would seem that your understanding requires a similar sort of social context, for without a social context acquisition could never be righteous or unrighteous.

On my understanding obligations are a necessary condition of rights, and thus are universal (rather than “nearly universal”). Further, it seems to me that obligation would then be denotative rather than connotative. This is similar to your claim that rights would "seldom be asserted without [a moral context]" and my rejoinder that they would never be asserted without a moral context. There you said that, "[Rights] propositions are not meaningless without a moral context." It seems like they would be meaningless.

Since they denote the historical event that warrants assigning them they are not meaningless. But they would be functionally vacuous. Similarly, assigning the pseudo-property "doctor" denotes that the person graduated from medical school. But if he never actually practices medicine the label would be functionally vacuous.

But my definition of rights focuses on a power, not function. It is a power to carry out a function, true, but it is still not identical with the function. A doctor is someone who has the capacity to practice medicine, whether or not he does.

Further, I haven't yet raised the question of whether righteousness is a moral notion, but I tend to think it is.

My point was a bit different. What I was trying to do was take the set of premises you gave, shear away those that are required to derive obligations, and show that once those are sheared away the right is also sheared away. Suppose someone who has never heard of rights comes up to you and asks what a right is. Suppose you begin by explaining what first possession is, and then you explain that first possession entails acquisition without inflicting loss or injury, etc. On my view they will not have a correct understanding of what a right is until they perceive obligations towards the right-holder, for this is a necessary condition of a right.

Well, I agree with that, except for the last clause. True, the newbie would not have a complete, or even adequate, understanding of what "rights" are without understanding the obligations they impose.

But if the omission of obligation results in an inadequate understanding of rights then obligation must be a necessary part of the meaning of rights, no?

But understanding something often requires more than knowing what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence. E.g., understanding "water" requires more than knowing that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen; it would also include knowing that it is the clear, colorless liquid that fills the oceans, lakes, and rivers and falls as rain, and is essential for life. What may be necessary for understanding something is not the same as what is necessary for the existence of something.

These are my lines, not yours!

This is exactly what I have been emphasizing: understanding the conditions for the existence of some thing does not necessarily give one an understanding of that thing (particularly at the beginning of this post). First possession gives the factual conditions needed for the existence of a right, but it does not provide us with an understanding of rights. I take it that your last sentence proves my point. If one can know the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of rights and yet not understand what rights are, then there must be something about the concept that is not provided by the existential conditions. I would suggest that the missing thing is obligation.

In this post I tried to get away from the word “right” since our discussion is about how that word should be used. So I talked about the factual and normative aspects instead. You seem to think that the pre-obligatory factual aspect is already a right, and that it should therefore be recognized as a right even by someone who does not perceive the “connotation” of obligation.

Yes. That would merely be an acknowledgement of the historical meaning of the term. Your wording there is a bit vague, however. "Perceived" the connotation? Does that mean this person is unaware that it connotes an obligation, or that he is aware of it but renounces it?

It means just simple lack of perception or unawareness.

I think rights-obligations are involved in the definition of rights, so we can’t have one without the other. But you seem to think that we can have rights before we have obligations, or that we can have rights apart from obligations. That doesn’t make sense to me.

There may well be good use for a term that denotes something like first possession apart from obligations, but I don’t think “right” is the proper term.

That particular term reflects the moral implications of first possession --- that P acquired x righteously (without inflicting loss or injury), and thus is now rightfully in possession of it, or has a rightful claim to it. But those implications only follow if a broader moral premise is assumed in addition to the empirical, historical one, e.g., "one ought not inflict loss or injury on other moral agents." Some such principle is taken as axiomatic by most moral systems and theories.

Yes, I think I am beginning to understand your view. There is a usage of the word "right" that prescinds from the aspect of obligation. The primary referent in that case is a relation between the subject and the righteously acquired object rather than relations between persons. It is tempting to say that obligations attach to this usage merely as non-necessary connotations. Nevertheless, I would still say that obligation attaches to that use as a necessary aspect. "He has righteously acquired it," does not require obligation, but as soon as there is a valid inference to a right the obligations also arise, even if the particular usage is meant to highlight the subject-object relation rather than the interpersonal obligations. The import of the subject-object relation is precisely to ground the obligation relations. If there were only one rational agent in existence who had never encountered other rational beings, there would be no obligations or rights (or entitlements).

I’m not sure we should have this argument in this thread, but what I would say is that rational beings are intrinsically bound by the law of non-contradiction, apart from consent. Those who deny the conclusion of an argument they affirm to be sound have failed a rational obligation, even if they have not explicitly or implicitly agreed to the law of non-contradiction. Put differently, everyone has implicitly agreed to the law of non-contradiction.

I'd qualify that a bit: everyone who purports to be presenting a logical argument. There is no shortage of rhetoric in which the law of non-contradiction and the other rules of logic are ignored (demagoguery) or subtly distorted (sophistry).

Okay, sure.

Can I ask why you define moral 'oughts' in instrumental terms? Is it just because you think categorical 'oughts' don't exist, and so every goal of human action must be subjective, leaving the means as the only possible "objectively moral" candidate? The goals seem moral in the common sense of the word, so it strikes me as odd to exclude them from being called moral. I don't find anything in the definitions or etymologies of 'moral' that would restrict it to an instrumental concept.

They can be categorical in Kant's sense, as synthetic a priori concepts, like time and space, wired into our brains (so to speak), intrinsic to reasoning itself, and inescapable in any cognitive undertaking. His Categorical Imperative commands, "Always so act so that the principle upon which you acted could be made a universal law." But it is painfully obvious that no such imperative is operative in many brains, and it is difficult to get from the CI to any specific moral "oughts."

But perhaps you have a different understanding of "categorical." What would that be?

Well, a categorical "ought" can't be necessitated, because "oughts" can't be necessitated. A categorical "ought" is something that ought to be done, period. Regardless of one's goals. So yes, the CI is an example of a categorical "ought".

I take a "morality" to be a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, the aim of which is to allow all agents in that "moral field" to maximize their welfare, however they may define it. So valid "oughts" are those behaviors which further that aim, and "ought nots" those which thwart it. I.e., they are instrumental. Previously I've analogized moralities to traffic laws and controls --- rules for use of public roads aimed to assure that all drivers get wherever they're going without crashes, roadblocks, or avoidable delays, i.e., as quickly and safely as possible.

I suppose my question for you is fairly simple: Why isn't the goal itself considered moral? Usually we would consider the goals of one's moral actions to be moral. Concrete acts which attempt to maximize welfare are moral, but so is the goal itself (i.e. maximizing welfare). The means participates in the quality of the end. For example, the nature of traffic laws will be determined by the goal you outline. I find it odd to call the means moral and the end non-moral.

[Belindi]

But despots decide for themselves what rights and obligations, if any, they have.

Any rights and obligations someone arbitrarily (i.e., not grounded in first possession) claims for himself are fiat rights ("frights"). They have no moral significance.

When Adam delved and Eve span,

Who was then a gentleman?

[GE Morton]

As I wrote to you earlier, morals are cultural values; ethics are culture free.

Well, we seem to have entirely disjoint notions of what morality is, what purpose it serves, and how and where it arises.

First, I consider "morals" and "ethics" to be synonymous terms, in the context of moral philosophy. Some philosophers have titled their works "Ethics" and others "Morals." But they're all addressing essentially the same subject matter.

Secondly, morals (ethics, moralities) are not values, "cultural" or otherwise. They are sets of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, the purpose of which is to allow all of them to maximize their welfare. A moral rule either does or does not further that purpose, and whether it does or not is objective. Values, however, are subjective and idiosyncratic, varying from agent to agent. Because of this, moral rules must be value-neutral; they can embody nobody's idiosyncratic values.

No moral system is "culture-free," since they are, by definition, rules governing interactions between agents in a social setting, and every social setting has some "culture." But since a sound moral system must be universal, applicable to all moral agents in all social settings, the peculiarities of a particular culture can have no role in the system.

Homelessness in a wealthy country is unethical.

Moralities are rules governing interactions between moral agents. "Homelessness" is not an action of a moral agent, but a living condition or circumstance of some moral agents. As such it is outside the scope of morality. But perhaps you wish to say that ALLOWING homelessness in a wealthy country is unethical. If so, then you need some argument showing that if Alfie allows Bruno to be homeless, he violates some moral rule derivable from the axiom and postulates of the system.

Power, Mr Morton, does more than signify an operating moral system; power makes an operating moral system.

I certainly agree that many "operating moral systems" throughout history have had no basis other than the whims of some despot or cabal holding sufficient power to impose them. But as philosophers it is our job to devise a morality that has an objective, rationally defensible basis.

[chewybrian]

...as philosophers it is our job to devise a morality that has an objective, rationally defensible basis.

There is no objective basis for morality. You've simply accepted your chosen basis of a system of morality, which appears to be "finders keepers". It certainly might appear to be the best system if you already have the most stuff, or you assume you will always come out on top and never need the help of your fellow man. It might make sense to you if you have no regard for the welfare of your fellow man or no (rational) fear that he might club you in the head and take your kill some day if you never share.

Sharing (at least some of) the spoils of the hunt with the tribe is no less defensible a system. It has a rational basis if you concede that one day you might miss your game or break your leg, and be glad to have your share of the group's kill rather than starving to death. There is nothing irrational about willingly giving up part of your kill when you get something in exchange for a rather secure shot at a meal each evening, is there? Extend that argument out to health care or housing and it still holds up just as well.

Of course, that is only my opinion of how we should proceed, and I don't claim it to be objective. THAT would be irrational, wouldn't it?

[Belindi]

G E Morton wrote:

as philosophers it is our job to devise a morality that has an objective, rationally defensible basis.

I heartily agree;

My own concern with usages of 'morality' and 'ethics' matters because it helps in the differentiation between cultural values and rational values.

[GE Morton]

There is no objective basis for morality.

Well, I've outlined such a system at some length. Whether a given action or rule advances a given goal is usually an objective matter. But perhaps you disagree that the goal I've given constitutes "morality." If not, then please tell us what you think "morality" is, or what purpose it serves.

You've simply accepted your chosen basis of a system of morality, which appears to be "finders keepers".

Er, no. I've given the basis --- the axiom --- for the moral theory several times. If you check the back thread I'm sure you can find it.

Sharing (at least some of) the spoils of the hunt with the tribe is no less defensible a system.

It may well be, for kinship-based tribes. Modern civilized societies are not tribes, however. There are no "family obligations" among their members.

It has a rational basis if you concede that one day you might miss your game or break your leg, and be glad to have your share of the group's kill rather than starving to death.

Whether such sharing is rational depends upon the risk to which each agent is exposed and the alternatives available to him to mitigate it, which vary from agent to agent. In civilized societies people buy insurance to mitigate risks they see as serious enough to justify the premiums.

[Leontiskos]

I certainly don't think that any system of taxation to which the public agrees is morally justified. There is a principle of "justice" (fair play) that overrides the will of the majority, or of the king.

I agree.

Where I disagree with Morton (I think, I haven't read all of his long posts carefully) is that he thinks that the "right" precedes the "obligation". How can it? It's a distinction without a difference. The "right" exists only when the "obligation" exists. If anything, the obligation precedes the right. The right consists of nothing BUT the obligation.

As I've argued with Morton, I do think obligation is a necessary aspect of a right. I agree with you there.

In addition, I think rights conerning property are more "legal" than "moral". I'm an advocate, for example, of the right to free speech (which, of course is an obligation not to prevent free speech). However, this right is limited by patent laws and copyright laws. We institute those laws not (as Morton might suggest) because the "first discoverer" of a novel or an invention has some sort of intrinsic "right" to prevent others from using it, but because we want to encourage novelists, poets and inventors by allowing them to make money from their work. It's a practical (not a moral) decision. So I think that intellectual property rights (obligations) should be limited to the economic milieu. When JK Rowling sued to stop people from writing fan fiction using her characters, I disapproved (I don't know the result of the suits). In my opinon, her "ownership" of her characters could legitimately prevent others from making money using her characters, but should not justify stopping fan fiction (or readers, who have bought and read the books from talking about the characters).

I don't know much about copyright law, but what you say makes some sense to me as far as it goes. On the other hand, I would think that the prohibitions regarding plagiarism are more than a societal convention or practicality.

On this principle, taxing rich people more than poor people makes sense. The "right" to housing, food, and medical care may be controversial -- but it involves nothing more or less than an obilgaiton on the part of those with money to help supply food, housing and medical care, just as the right to all that property the rich people own involves nothing more or less than an obligaion on the part of poor people not to sleep in the manisons of the welathy. JUst as the right to free speech can be limited in the economic sphere, so can property rights. Since property "rights" exist only by the rule of law, obligations deriving from ownership should also exist based on the rule of law. We can, of course, quibble about the details.

One big difference is that the first obligation is positive (it defines what the rich must do) and the second is negative (it defines what the poor must not do).

If property rights exist only by rule of law then your "principle of justice which overrides the will of the majority or the king" is not applicable to property rights. It means that whatever the legislator decides is right is right. In that case a law that says the rich must give money to the poor is no more just or unjust than a law that says the poor must give money to the rich. When it comes down to it, I doubt you would want to go the route of legal positivism with respect to property rights.

[Sy Borg]

Well, I've outlined such a system at some length. Whether a given action or rule advances a given goal is usually an objective matter. But perhaps you disagree that the goal I've given constitutes "morality." If not, then please tell us what you think "morality" is, or what purpose it serves.

Very few agree with you. Your attempts at creating an objective moral system have not convinced others due to the inherent biases. A reasonable system for middle-class, right-wing anthropocentric Americans, but not so good for the poor, the charitable, animals and animal lovers or those from different cultures.

Obligation obviously does not precede rights. How could it? Every baby and child would would be euthanased or left to die slowly after failing to contribute to the community.

[GE Morton]

Well, I've outlined such a system at some length. Whether a given action or rule advances a given goal is usually an objective matter. But perhaps you disagree that the goal I've given constitutes "morality." If not, then please tell us what you think "morality" is, or what purpose it serves.

Very few agree with you.

Agree with what? With the aim/purpose of I've given for moralities/moral systems? On the contrary, I think most commenting here do agree with that. But if you think it has a different purpose, please spell it out.

What some don't agree with are some of the conclusions which logically follow from it. But they follow, nonetheless.

Your attempts at creating an objective moral system have not convinced others due to the inherent biases. A reasonable system for middle-class, right-wing anthropocentric Americans, but not so good for the poor, the charitable, animals and animal lovers or those from different cultures.

A sound --- i.e., rationally defensible --- moral theory applies to all moral agents, in all times and places. It is value-neutral and culture-independent.

Obligation obviously does not precede rights. How could it? Every baby and child would would be euthanased or left to die slowly after failing to contribute to the community.

I never claimed they did. Rights give rise to obligations, but some obligations arise from other facts/events. They all ensue from some moral theory.

[Sy Borg]

Well, I've outlined such a system at some length. Whether a given action or rule advances a given goal is usually an objective matter. But perhaps you disagree that the goal I've given constitutes "morality." If not, then please tell us what you think "morality" is, or what purpose it serves.

Very few agree with you.

Agree with what?

That there is such a thing as objective morality. That an objective and universal basis for morality can be devised.

Life is inherently not moral. In order to survive, one needs to kill, steal from, exploit or displace others. That's locked in. Thus, someone will be the victim, the one excluded from any moral model. Usually it's the vulnerable - people or other species.

Any attempt to construct an objective basis for morality will necessarily be skewed to some extent, usually in an anthropocentric way, and will therefore not be truly objective.

If lions could develop their own "objective" morality, it would be felicentric. Large groups effectively become self-focused, somewhat separate "worlds" within the wider environment. In philosophy, one will ideally needs to parse the limited reality of an in-group , eg. species, local populations, and the broader reality in which the clique exists.

[Belindi]

Well, I've outlined such a system at some length. Whether a given action or rule advances a given goal is usually an objective matter. But perhaps you disagree that the goal I've given constitutes "morality." If not, then please tell us what you think "morality" is, or what purpose it serves.

Very few agree with you.

Agree with what?

That there is such a thing as objective morality. That an objective and universal basis for morality can be devised.

Life is inherently not moral. In order to survive, one needs to kill, steal from, exploit or displace others. That's locked in. Thus, someone will be the victim, the one excluded from any moral model. Usually it's the vulnerable - people or other species.

Any attempt to construct an objective basis for morality will necessarily be skewed to some extent, usually in an anthropocentric way, and will therefore not be truly objective.

If lions could develop their own "objective" morality, it would be felicentric. Large groups effectively become self-focused, somewhat separate "worlds" within the wider environment. In philosophy, one will ideally needs to parse the limited reality of an in-group , eg. species, local populations, and the broader reality in which the clique exists.

Sy Borg is right about nature's power struggle, as I call the fact of red in tooth and claw.

An ethic of how power should be distributed, or alternatively not distributed, is what we need to create a rational foundation of ethics. The rational foundation would have to be practicable, so instincts need to be catered for.

In order for instincts to be catered for we need to try to find out what human nature is. Lion nature, and oak tree nature, not to mention the nature of computers, is easy as compared with human nature.

It's not as if human nature were defined by biological evolution like we can define canine or feline nature or the nature of coronavirus. True, humans have some instincts which are like instincts of other mammals and other predators, but human nature is largely shaped by culture not biology. It would help in the search for a rational foundation for ethics if we gave a lot of attention to human instincts which have been neglected more and more especially since men became confined to urban and intellectual environments. Even coal miners , poorly rewarded for their work in dreadful conditions , knew their own bodies as middle class people in offices do not. There are specifiable occupations that help people to learn the nature of their own instincts, e.g. gardening, small farms, medicine, cooking, teaching, psychology, art in the Romantic tradition, the human sciences (perhaps especially social anthropology) .

I am not disparaging the middle class, which is about to disappear in the coming struggle for survival, and which has been the repository of reason since early modern times. However the time has come for human instincts to be honoured by intellectuals ; because no foundational ethics can be applied unless instincts, the remnants of biological inheritance in humans, are included. Only after that can we reasonably create the foundational system.

[Gertie]

GE

Gertie wrote: ↑September 12th, 2021, 4:00 am
So we've broadly sorted our justification for morality, what it's for in principle - promoting interests/wellbeing in social settings. We've noted the roles different categories of sentient creatures may play (temporarily/permanently in relation to our foundational justification. And we've acknowledged this moral foundation confers moral consideration on all, and duties/obligations/oughts on some. That's a solid place to start thinking about what sort of oughts will be derived, and how we might codify them.

That about right?

Yes. The obligations falling upon those capable of understanding them (moral agents). A terminological point: I use "obligation" to refer to both duties (things one must do --- actions one must take in certain circumstances), and constraints (things one must not do).

Agreed (tho at this point I'd say we're talking about ''should'' and ''ought'' do/not do).

We have a decent, moral foundation in place we agree on then, which we agree is the appropriate justification for oughts. Imo this is crucial, and one of the biggest probs we face philosophically re morality. It doesn't matter if we call it subjective or objective, it's universal and solves the problem of moral relativism. And it gives us a foundation to build Oughts from. Which can be in various forms, such as rights, laws, social norms, institutional good practice, education, etc.

So lets get get to thinking how we do that. I've suggested the logical place to start is to establish basic Rights/Entitlements which are so necessary to promoting the welfare of sentient creatures and the ability to persue their interests that no government or authority should over-rule them. I don't claim to have a complete list, but some are obvious. The in principle, where conditions allow, right to life, the right to safe shelter, sustenance, healthcare and education. Justified by our specific moral foundation.

Well, that would not be a "role for Rights," unless you're proposing, as have others here, to re-define that word. The role of rights as classically understood has been to identify what belongs to whom (as determined by the first possession criterion) and forbid others from taking those things. The term carries no implication of a duty of charity --- to see that anyone's "basic welfare needs are met." Nor does it entail an obligation upon anyone to give anyone an "opportunity to flourish and pursue their interests." There may be some other way to derive such duties from the axiom, but it would not be via rights. No one has a "right" to the services of other people or to the products of their labor, whatever their needs may be. Rights impose constraints, but no duties.

I'm suggesting we use Rights based on our moral foundation, we don't need to be bound by others in the past who made up rights based on a different foundation or conception of morality. But OK, we don't have to call them Rights, we can call them Foundational Entitlements - or .... something better lol. The point is to establish a means of ensuring that basic welfare needs are met and sentient creatures have the opportunity to flourish. Regardless of the whims and compromises of governments/authorities. It's about establishing a baseline all sentient creatures should in principle be accorded, before the societal trade-offs involved with competing interests is addressed.

I think this logically follows from our foundation . . .

Well, there is the rub --- to SHOW how it logically follows, given the Equal Agency postulate (which I assume you accept).

(As I understand it, your Equal Agency Postulate simply states all agents are equally obligated to follow the oughts resulting from our foundation, yes? That makes sense to me in principle ).

See above. It logically follows because it strives to ensure each sentient creature has the necessary and sufficient conditions for well-being/persuing their interests - our moral foundation. What comprises basic necessary and sufficient conditions might be blurry, but it shouldn't be hard to agree on things like food, shelter, education, healthcare.

We know there will inevitably be trade-offs because of the nature of being an experiencing subject with individual interests. And there will be difficulties quantifying the qualiative nature of interests and weighing them against each other.

That is more than difficult --- it is logically impossible. That is the classical problem of welfare economics --- the lack of a cardinal measure of utility. Here is one brief summary:

"Cardinal utility is an attempt to quantify an abstract concept because it assigns a numerical value to utility...
If your approach depends on those trade-offs you mentioned you have set yourself a formidable problem.

I agree! It's the one serious problem I think we have with this moral foundation. But it's a problem inherent to a wellbeing/interests based moral foundation. We're stuck with it. So we either ditch the foundation for something tidier, or do our best. I don't believe ditching it or pretending wellbeing is tidily quantifiable is the answer, so we should do our best to weigh competing interests regardless of there being no objective, quantifiable formula for doing so. (And of course economics is only one aspect of this problem of quantifying qualiative well-being/interests).

One failsafe is recognising the importance of freedom, which allows individuals to make their own calculations for themselves. But then we have to assess where the consequences of freedom leave us - what it means in practice for the well-being of all sentient creatures. Singer's example of a pair of shoes vs a toddler's life is a no brainer, how much tax I ought to pay to ensure homeless people have safe, warm shelter is much blurrier. But I'd say the two are on a spectrum.

I think you'd say there is a right not to pay taxes at all unless voluntarily. Because there is a right to freedom or property (eg tax money) which over-rides the right/entitlement to have basic welfare needs met.

So what is our touchstone for settling such disputes? Our moral foundation of promoting the well-being/interests of sentient creatures. You need to justify your position in the terms of the foundation.

A baseline will ensure that these trade offs never go so far that the foundational basis of morality is traded away for anyone . . . It seems a logical first step to me when we're starting to look at what oughts arise from our foundation, and how we might codify them. You have your Equal Agency Postulate, Duty of Care and so on. I'm suggesting lets get a our moral safety net in place first.

Well, we can't do that, Gertie, not logically. You're proposing to build to build moral obligations into the postulates of the theory. But that is question-begging. They have to be derived from the axiom and from postulates that are morally neutral.

The Equal Agency postulate is morally neutral; it derives from the definition of "moral agent," which is purely descriptive of a certain category of beings. The Duty to Aid (a theorem) is derived from the Axiom.

You're more familiar with such technicalities than me GE, but what I'm doing is looking at what oughts logically derive from our foundation, which strikes me as the logical approach.

Morality is an odd thing, in a category of its own, it's about Right and Wrong and subsequent Oughts. it's not like we can come up with a scientific type of theory which ties together the available observable and measurable facts in a way which explains them, is third person falsifiable and makes predictions. Our foundation in particular is rooted in the qualiative aspects of being an experiencing, sentient creature - value, meaning, purpose, harm, flourishing, quality of life. Interests and wellbeing. As Goldstein puts it ''mattering''.

This is the Is, the fact about about sentient creatures which justifies our foundation, and Oughts. We can specify your Equal Agency Postulate which I think is implicit in the foundation, but we don't need to add your Duty to Aid, because some of the Oughts logically deriving from the foundation will be duties to aid.

So why isn't this an appropriate moral baseline to strive for in your view, and/or if I propose to give it this special right-like status, what are the problems?

Does the above answer that?

Not yet!