Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

The climate crisis is proving that economies are limited to zero growth if they are to survive. It so happens that some people do not care whether or not foreign economies collapse as long as the one they partake of is okay.

Well, first, there is no "climate crisis." There is a climate problem, but it falls far short of a "crisis." Nor does solving that problem require zero growth. What foreign economies are you expecting to collapse?

Zero growth, BTW, has nothing to do with the zero-sum game I mentioned.

But think you, Nature , like the covid virus, is not concerned about whatever nationality, social class, race, or political ideology . Nature does not recognise who deserves and who does not deserve.

That's quite true, but what Nature recognizes or cares about is not relevant to a discussion of morality, which is concerned with human actions. And who does and does not deserve something is highly relevant to those discussions.

[Gertie]

GE

Lets try some back to basics thinking.

You're inserting in your moral axiom distinctions between sentient creatures based on the having of interests, and the agency to follow their interests and to understand and follow moral rules. These are useful distinctions, but the oughts, the morality of the moral foundation, derives solely from the having of interests. This is your Is-Ought bridge, and I agree.

So this interests/wellbeing foundation for deciding what's right and wrong, and oughts, is the basis for justifying moral principles, rules and rights. We don't have to worry about notions of objective/subjective, or classical and moral approaches which might have used a different foundation, we are saying it's this well-being/interests foundation which justifies oughts.

Some sentient creatures have the capacity to understand and follow this, but pretty much all qualify for moral consideration (simply by dint of being sentient), commensurate with the nature of their interests.


Agree so far?


If so, then it strikes me that an important role for Rights in particular, is to establish basic welfare needs are met and give sentient creatures the opportunity to flourish and pursue their interests. If this is what morality is all about, and if we're going to accept the concept of rights which aren't subject to even democratic government whim and inevitable compromises, Rights should be our bottom line benchmark defence of interests/wellbeing.

If we are consequentialists, this means we can't just assume The Right to Absolute Freedom in All Things for Each Individual covers this, for obvious reasons. If I'm free to kill or harm you at will, I'm not just curtailing your Right to Freedom, I'm not taking into account your interests/wellbeing - the basis for the Right. And it's the foundational basis for morality which should be our touchstone for whether the Right is justified.

So rights regarding Freedom isn't the only thing we have to consider, and it can't be absolute. Rather freedom is one of the aspects which go into being able to pursue interests and flourish.

What other Rights seem appropriate for humans to achieve wellbeing and flourish? Basic needs like food, healthcare, education and a home look like obvious contenders to me. If people don't have those, their wellbeing is likely to be severely affected and their ability to pursue their interests buggered, no matter how much theoretical freedom they have.


This is where you and I start to significantly diverge, right? So why do you think I'm wrong? I think I'm following the foundational justification we agree on.

[Belindi]

The climate crisis is proving that economies are limited to zero growth if they are to survive. It so happens that some people do not care whether or not foreign economies collapse as long as the one they partake of is okay.

Well, first, there is no "climate crisis." There is a climate problem, but it falls far short of a "crisis." Nor does solving that problem require zero growth. What foreign economies are you expecting to collapse?

Zero growth, BTW, has nothing to do with the zero-sum game I mentioned.

But think you, Nature , like the covid virus, is not concerned about whatever nationality, social class, race, or political ideology . Nature does not recognise who deserves and who does not deserve.

That's quite true, but what Nature recognizes or cares about is not relevant to a discussion of morality, which is concerned with human actions. And who does and does not deserve something is highly relevant to those discussions.

I expect there will be more and more economic refugees from Africa and the Middle East into Northern Europe. Afghanistan is one particularly poor country which is now in a humanitarian crisis due to misgovernment and its lack of natural resources.I do not think it is worth my time to try to inform you since you seem not to take any interest in foreign countries, so I won't provide you with example after example.

The climate crisis is real indeed. Much of what affluent people take for granted is unsustainable, for example animal protein food due to the climate crisis and associated pollution of natural resources. Can you cook vegetarian? Or are you so rich that you can grow your own animal protein for the sole use of yourself and your family?

Regarding who deserves what, the big question is "Who are the bosses?" For it is the bosses who will arbitrate on who deserves what, and that is a political question.

It is reasonable to presume the people who have the power and the wealth at this time will want to keep their power and wealth and try their best to conserve what they have and hold. This applies to people who have personally worked hard and saved and been decently frugal as well as those who have inherited wealth and power, or gained wealth and power by depriving other people, and also to the fortunate few who have been lucky investors.

Obviously it is to everyone's advantage to provide cash and other incentives towards hard work and frugality. You don't even need to feel pity or sympathy for poor people to see that enlightened altruism includes providing for a happy, creative, population of workers.

-----what Nature recognizes or cares about is not relevant to a discussion of morality, which is concerned with human actions. And who does and does not deserve something is highly relevant to those discussions.

Indeed! Morality is a large part of culture. Cultures are maintained and changed by people. There is a clash of cultures within free liberal societies between the haves and the have-nots. In the absence of civil war the best bet for ethical moral change is democracy.

[Ecurb]

Thanks for your post. I won’t be able to have a long conversation, but here are some points in response.


Okay, so apparently you affirm the right to life in contractual terms. Not killing each other is a sort of truce between citizens, no?

If your principle of human well being is instantiated via consent then it would seem that your view is very similar to Morton’s, for his view is based on a principle of well being that must be agreed to.

The question of taxation has to do with whether the rights you confer are merely legal. If a right is moral—as you suggest it could be—then it would exist independent of the legal sphere, in which case certain forms of taxation could well be contrary to this moral right. That is, certain forms of taxation could be theft if a moral right is admitted. Apparently on your contractual model the right would arise by consensual agreement between people.

I certainly don't think that any system of taxation to which the public agrees is morally justified. There is a principle of "justice" (fair play) that overrides the will of the majority, or of the king. So if (for example) a government taxed minority groups more than those in the majority, that would contitute an injustice. (By the way, this has happened regularly in history. In liberal, inclusive 10th century Cordoba, where a Jew was once a Grand Vizier, Jews and Christians paid taxes from which Moslems were exempt. I'm sure there are other examples.)

I certainly haven't worked out a comprehensive system of what I think "rights" should be. I just haven't thought about it as much as Morton seems to have. One need not have written novels to be a literary critic -- my talents (such as they are) are critical rather than creative.

Where I disagree with Morton (I think, I haven't read all of his long posts carefully) is that he thinks that the "right" precedes the "obligation". How can it? It's a distinction without a difference. The "right" exists only when the "obligation" exists. If anything, the obligation precedes the right. The right consists of nothing BUT the obligation.

In addition, I think rights conerning property are more "legal" than "moral". I'm an advocate, for example, of the right to free speech (which, of course is an obligation not to prevent free speech). However, this right is limited by patent laws and copyright laws. We institute those laws not (as Morton might suggest) because the "first discoverer" of a novel or an invention has some sort of intrinsic "right" to prevent others from using it, but because we want to encourage novelists, poets and inventors by allowing them to make money from their work. It's a practical (not a moral) decision. So I think that intellectual property rights (obligations) should be limited to the economic milieu. When JK Rowling sued to stop people from writing fan fiction using her characters, I disapproved (I don't know the result of the suits). In my opinon, her "ownership" of her characters could legitimately prevent others from making money using her characters, but should not justify stopping fan fiction (or readers, who have bought and read the books from talking about the characters).

On this principle, taxing rich people more than poor people makes sense. The "right" to housing, food, and medical care may be controversial -- but it involves nothing more or less than an obilgaiton on the part of those with money to help supply food, housing and medical care, just as the right to all that property the rich people own involves nothing more or less than an obligaion on the part of poor people not to sleep in the manisons of the welathy. JUst as the right to free speech can be limited in the economic sphere, so can property rights. Since property "rights" exist only by the rule of law, obligations deriving from ownership should also exist based on the rule of law. We can, of course, quibble about the details.

[Pattern-chaser]

The idea of the trickle-down effect was to leave the masses just enough to keep them quiet (nine meals from anarchy).

Yes, but I'm still wondering why they continue to support it when we can all see that wealth trickles up, to the billionaires, not down...?

The idea of the trickle down effect is that while wealth gushes upwards, the the wealthy allow a portion to trickle down to the masses. Decades of this policy has logically produced ever greater wealth inequality. In this, the news media is most responsible. For years they were told that the right wing governments they were told to vote for would do the right thing by the people, even when it seemed they were not, and they were told that left wing governments (who may have tried to balance the scales even a little) were evil communists who wanted to take away people's freedoms.

Yet, after several decades of mostly right wing governments, the people have never felt less free. Sucked in. As the song goes:

Is it any wonder you've got no power
When you pay a thief to keep it for you?
Is it a surprise that your wine is sour
When you let a liar choose the brew he pours you?

I'm not familiar with the song, but long familiar with the sentiment.

[Pattern-chaser]

The climate crisis is proving that economies are limited to zero growth if they are to survive. It so happens that some people do not care whether or not foreign economies collapse as long as the one they partake of is okay.

Well, first, there is no "climate crisis." There is a climate problem, but it falls far short of a "crisis." Nor does solving that problem require zero growth. What foreign economies are you expecting to collapse?

I would address this with you, if I thought you would listen. But you casually assert things that the vast majority of informed humans believe to be false, without justification. So I see no point in addressing these issues, which is a shame. They need discussing, but not only that: They need immediate action. Zero-growth is nowhere near enough.

[GE Morton]

Well, first, there is no "climate crisis." There is a climate problem, but it falls far short of a "crisis." Nor does solving that problem require zero growth. What foreign economies are you expecting to collapse?

I would address this with you, if I thought you would listen. But you casually assert things that the vast majority of informed humans believe to be false, without justification. So I see no point in addressing these issues, which is a shame. They need discussing, but not only that: They need immediate action. Zero-growth is nowhere near enough.

The vast majority of humans have believed many silly things. They weren't as informed as they thought.

But surely that is a topic for another thread.

[Leontiskos]

GE, thanks for another productive post. Let me just say at the outset that nothing I say should be construed as an argument against first possession as the way to establish property rights. I have no qualms with first possession.

(This post is a little long, but much of it is redundant. Feel free to cut out whatever you like.)

To be clear, we are arguing about the definition of "right". I would build on this definition, "the power or privilege to which one is justly entitled" (MW 2a). I am thinking specifically of the power to invoke existing obligations. So a right is the power to invoke existing obligations to which one is justly entitled. For example, to say that I have a property right to a car means that I have the power to invoke another's obligation to not steal it. The right-holder has this power whether or not it is exercised.

What is your definition of a right? I tried to attempt your definition, but I find that doing so looks like a strawman. This is because I think you are giving a way to establish or verify the existence of a right rather than giving the definition of a right. For example, we could give conditions for establishing or verifying the existence of a marriage: a couple exchanges lifelong vows of fidelity. But this tells us whether a marriage exists and how to find out. It doesn't tell us what marriage is. The truth condition for "John and Jane are married" is different from the definition of marriage.

Heh. Part of this disagreement arises from the fact that there are different types of definitions. The one I gave, "A pseudo-property assigned to a person when a paticular relationship between the person and some particular thing exists, that relationship being that the person is the first possessor of the thing," is an intensional definition. Intensional definitions give the necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular x to qualify as a y.

Okay, I admit that it has been some time since I last looked at these terms. I did attempt to give a kind of Aristotelian definition, but I think my argument can be situated happily within your terms. I will end up arguing for the idea that obligations are necessary conditions of rights.

"An intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for when the term should be used. In the case of nouns, this is equivalent to specifying the properties that an object needs to have in order to be counted as a referent of the term.”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extension ... efinitions

Both types are useful for explaining the meaning of a word, but only the intensional definition determines whether a claimed right exists, and thus whether the claim is valid and the moral obligation implied exists.

Fair enough, but it is worth noting that my critique of your approach is slightly different from a critique of an intensional definition. My critique was based on existence rather than reference. I said, “I think you are giving a way to establish or verify the existence of a right…” It seems to me that such an approach omits the condition related to obligation, and that this condition is necessary for the object to be counted as a referent of the term.

The reason I think P2 involves an "ought" is because on my definition rights and "oughts" go hand in hand. That is, if the definition of rights I gave is correct then P2 moves from an "is" to an "ought" due to the fact that the meaning of rights involves obligations and "oughts".

Another important distinction to make with regard to definition is that between the denotation and connotation of a word. The denotative meaning picks out the things in the world to which the term is properly applied. The connotative meaning consists of the various other concepts that may be associated with it in some minds, or even many minds. The connotative meanings of words, however, are subjective; they differ from person to person, depending upon their personal experiences with the thing denoted. The connotations of the word "hammer" will differ for someone once beaten with one, from someone whose only experience with one has been to drive nails.

To be sure, some connotations of some words are nearly universal, and the moral connotations of "a right" is one of those words. So I will concede that term "involves" an "ought," and is part of its meaning. But only of its connotative meaning. It's denotative meaning does not include or entail an "ought."

On my understanding obligations are a necessary condition of rights, and thus are universal (rather than “nearly universal”). Further, it seems to me that obligation would then be denotative rather than connotative. This is similar to your claim that rights would "seldom be asserted without [a moral context]" and my rejoinder that they would never be asserted without a moral context. There you said that, "[Rights] propositions are not meaningless without a moral context." It seems like they would be meaningless.

For the most part. Tx is not temporally separated from Sub2, but it is logically separated. First possession establishes a right (by definition), but it does not logically imply any obligations. That P first possessed x is just a non-moral historical fact. To get from there to obligations you need some more premises: that first possession entails acquisition without inflicting loss or injury, that violating a right inflicts loss or injury, and that people have an obligation to refrain from inflicting loss or injury.

I agree that there are a number of different premises, but I am questioning which premises are necessary before we have warrant to claim that a right exists. You seem to think that someone who acknowledges that first possession has occurred but does not acknowledge that obligations exist would affirm that a right exists.

Oh, no. As evidenced by many posts in this thread, some people would not affirm that a right exists merely because first possession does. They hold that rights have some other basis entirely. That view is not consistent, however, with the historical understanding of that term or with the criteria common law courts, to this day, apply in resolving disputes about rights. Those who hold that view are proposing that the word be re-defined.

My point was a bit different. What I was trying to do was take the set of premises you gave, shear away those that are required to derive obligations, and show that once those are sheared away the right is also sheared away. Suppose someone who has never heard of rights comes up to you and asks what a right is. Suppose you begin by explaining what first possession is, and then you explain that first possession entails acquisition without inflicting loss or injury, etc. On my view they will not have a correct understanding of what a right is until they perceive obligations towards the right-holder, for this is a necessary condition of a right.

In this post I tried to get away from the word “right” since our discussion is about how that word should be used. So I talked about the factual and normative aspects instead. You seem to think that the pre-obligatory factual aspect is already a right, and that it should therefore be recognized as a right even by someone who does not perceive the “connotation” of obligation.

I think someone would admit that a right exists once they have reasoned all the way to obligations, and not before that.

"Reasoned all the way to obligations" . . . from what? What are the premises from which this reasoning begins?

Reasoned from your premises: first possession.

The actual sequence typically followed by those who so use the term is to begin from some "intuited" obligations assumed a priori, for which no arguments are offered, and then confer the pseudo-property "rights" on the intended beneficiaries of those presumed obligations.

I agree. That’s why I said earlier, "Of course, when P3 is isolated from P1 we tend to run into the problem of pseudo-rights, but I still think the semantic meaning of rights is best illustrated by P3."

It doesn't make sense to say that we have a right to some thing before obligations are perceived.

Heh. I would argue the opposite --- that it doesn't make sense to say we have an obligation before a right is perceived --- at least, not an obligation to respect a right. Rights invoke obligations via a coherent moral theory. There are no obligations (of that kind) until a right is established, and what establishes it is an empirically verifiable state of affairs.

I don’t disagree with this. I think rights-obligations are involved in the definition of rights, so we can’t have one without the other. But you seem to think that we can have rights before we have obligations, or that we can have rights apart from obligations. That doesn’t make sense to me.

There may well be good use for a term that denotes something like first possession apart from obligations, but I don’t think “right” is the proper term.

I agree with this, but I would add that the meaning of the concept is found in the "power" that my definition elaborates.

Answered above (I think). Here's another example: Alfie buys the winning ticket for the State Lottery grand prize. We now apply the pseudo-property "Winner" to him. That he is a "winner" is an empirical fact, evidenced by his possession of the winning ticket. That tag, of course, also connotes certain things, i.e., that he indulges in gambling to some extent, that he has had some good luck, and that he will soon be a wealthy fellow, among other things. All of those may be considered part of the "meaning" of being a lottery winner. He then goes to the lottery office and declares, "I am the winner of this week's lottery." His reason for so declaring, of course, is to invoke the State's obligation to pay him his winnings. But whether he is indeed the winner is an empirical fact, which he must prove to trigger that obligation. Until that is done the State is under no obligation to pay anyone anything; its obligation is contingent upon a certain objective state of affairs.

Yes, this is a good example. We establish that he is the winner by verifying an objective state of affairs, but it is a logical necessity that the winner has won something. That is part of what the term means.

Yes. As will be the case with any moral argument. Those who don't accept the premises will not be bound by the conclusions. What would bind them?

Rather than lengthen this post further I will just point to a place where I argued against the no-ought-from-is claim. In this post (link) I argued that truth binds belief, so to speak. Admittedly, that question is simpler: whether those who accept the premises are bound by the conclusions, but presumably a bridge could be built so long as your premises are demonstrable.

Read the linked post. "Ought" can be derived from "is," but only if some additional premise is added or implicit. E.g., your " . . . those who accept the premises are bound by the conclusions" example relies on an implicit agreement to adhere to the rules of logic.

I’m not sure we should have this argument in this thread, but what I would say is that rational beings are intrinsically bound by the law of non-contradiction, apart from consent. Those who deny the conclusion of an argument they affirm to be sound have failed a rational obligation, even if they have not explicitly or implicitly agreed to the law of non-contradiction. Put differently, everyone has implicitly agreed to the law of non-contradiction.

I agree, of course, with your claim there that "moral oughts" are just intrumental "oughts." "You ought to get a hammer" and "You ought not steal" only differ in the goals sought, i.e., driving a nail v. allowing all agents to maximize welfare.

Well, for clarity's sake I should say that I do not believe morality is merely instrumental (nor that all moral "oughts" are instrumental "oughts"). But I haven't argued that position anywhere on this forum. I pressed you a little bit on the topic here:

Can I ask why you define moral 'oughts' in instrumental terms? Is it just because you think categorical 'oughts' don't exist, and so every goal of human action must be subjective, leaving the means as the only possible "objectively moral" candidate? The goals seem moral in the common sense of the word, so it strikes me as odd to exclude them from being called moral. I don't find anything in the definitions or etymologies of 'moral' that would restrict it to an instrumental concept.

[GE Morton]

Lets try some back to basics thinking.

You're inserting in your moral axiom distinctions between sentient creatures based on the having of interests, and the agency to follow their interests and to understand and follow moral rules. These are useful distinctions, but the oughts, the morality of the moral foundation, derives solely from the having of interests. This is your Is-Ought bridge, and I agree.

So this interests/wellbeing foundation for deciding what's right and wrong, and oughts, is the basis for justifying moral principles, rules and rights. We don't have to worry about notions of objective/subjective, or classical and moral approaches which might have used a different foundation, we are saying it's this well-being/interests foundation which justifies oughts.

Some sentient creatures have the capacity to understand and follow this, but pretty much all qualify for moral consideration (simply by dint of being sentient), commensurate with the nature of their interests.

Agree so far?

Pretty much, but you left out a crucial qualification: Moral obligations only arise in social settings. Crusoe alone on his island may be under some instrumental obligations, e.g., if he wants to keep warm in winter he ought to cut some firewood in the fall --- but that is not a "moral" obligation. So we can't say that moral "oughts" derive solely from the fact that we have interests. The social context is also required.

Yet even that is not quite sufficient, so perhaps some elaboration is necessary here. Humans, like all primates, are social animals. Most of us are born into communities of others of our kind and are naturally disposed to remain in them, even though nothing compels us to do so (a few people choose not to do so, and prefer a hermetic existence, having minimal contact with other humans). All humans, and all other animals as well, strive throughout their lives to preserve and improve their welfare, whatever may constitute that for a particular species, or in the case of humans, for a particular individual. Living in a social settings confers great advantages in that pursuit, by enabling people to cooperate with others at tasks in which they have a common interest, and by allowing a division of labor, which enables individuals to develop expertise at particular tasks and partake of the efficiencies which ensue from that. The other great advantage of living in a social setting is the opportunity it affords to easily share information, so what is learned by one can be communicated to others. A bear, a solitary anmial, cannot tell other bears in the area that a fallen log which they've all used as a bridge to cross a river has washed away; they'll all have to discover that fact, and find an alternate crossing, for themselves. But one human can make that discovery and pass it on to everyone else, sparing them much time and effort. And, of course, the humans can also cooperate to find another suitable tree on the riverbank and cut it so that it falls across the river, thus making a new bridge.

But there is a downside to that social setting also: the efforts of one person to improve his welfare may interfere with others' efforts to do the same, whether by accident or intent. And since humans in civilized social settings are individualized, having differing interests, talents, strengths, motives, emotional responses, and personal mores, some of them will choose to be parasites or predators, preferring to subsist on the efforts and talents of others, by force or stealth. Humans in social settings are much more vulnerable to pilfery and predation by other members of their species than are bears or other solitary animals.

So some rules governing interactions among members are necessary: "Thou shalt not murder;" "Thou shalt not steal," "Though shalt not covet," etc. Such systems of rules are called a morality.

If so, then it strikes me that an important role for Rights in particular, is to establish basic welfare needs are met and give sentient creatures the opportunity to flourish and pursue their interests. If this is what morality is all about, and if we're going to accept the concept of rights which aren't subject to even democratic government whim and inevitable compromises, Rights should be our bottom line benchmark defence of interests/wellbeing.

Well, that would not be a "role for Rights," unless you're proposing, as have others here, to re-define that word. The role of rights as classically understood has been to identify what belongs to whom (as determined by the first possession criterion) and forbid others from taking those things. The term carries no implication of a duty of charity --- to see that anyone's "basic welfare needs are met." Nor does it entail an obligation upon anyone to give anyone an "opportunity to flourish and pursue their interests." There may be some other way to derive such duties from the axiom, but it would not be via rights. No one has a "right" to the services of other people or to the products of their labor, whatever their needs may be. Rights impose constraints, but no duties.

If we are consequentialists, this means we can't just assume The Right to Absolute Freedom in All Things for Each Individual covers this, for obvious reasons. If I'm free to kill or harm you at will, I'm not just curtailing your Right to Freedom, I'm not taking into account your interests/wellbeing - the basis for the Right. And it's the foundational basis for morality which should be our touchstone for whether the Right is justified.

Well, I agree there is no "Right to Absolute Freedom in All Things for Each Individual." Nor do I know of any classical liberal philosopher who would so claim (though some moral anarchists might). All rights are constrained by others' like rights, and each person's "sphere of freedom" extends only to the point where it impinges upon others' spheres.

I agree promoting welfare, or well-being, is the "touchstone," or aim, of the axiom. But each agent must promote it by means consistent with the Equal Agency postulate. That means an act must be a "Pareto improvement" --- it will make at least one person better of without making anyone else worse off.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency

What other Rights seem appropriate for humans to achieve wellbeing and flourish? Basic needs like food, healthcare, education and a home look like obvious contenders to me. If people don't have those, their wellbeing is likely to be severely affected and their ability to pursue their interests buggered, no matter how much theoretical freedom they have.

Well, those would not be rights (unless you're proposing to re-define that term), but they are worthy goals.

This is where you and I start to significantly diverge, right? So why do you think I'm wrong? I think I'm following the foundational justification we agree on.

Where we differ is in your apparent willingness to disregard the Equal Agency postulate and allow some agents to improve their own welfare by reducing someone else's, by force.

[GE Morton]

I expect there will be more and more economic refugees from Africa and the Middle East into Northern Europe. Afghanistan is one particularly poor country which is now in a humanitarian crisis due to misgovernment and its lack of natural resources.I do not think it is worth my time to try to inform you since you seem not to take any interest in foreign countries, so I won't provide you with example after example.

The climate crisis is real indeed. Much of what affluent people take for granted is unsustainable, for example animal protein food due to the climate crisis and associated pollution of natural resources. Can you cook vegetarian? Or are you so rich that you can grow your own animal protein for the sole use of yourself and your family?

I'll pass on those points, since they are way off topic.

Regarding who deserves what, the big question is "Who are the bosses?" For it is the bosses who will arbitrate on who deserves what, and that is a political question.

Well, no. Who deserves what is not a political question with an arbitrary answer proffered by any "bosses" (or by populist majorities). P deserves x IFF he has produced it or done something else to earn it, which is a matter of fact. That is what the term "deserve" means.

It is reasonable to presume the people who have the power and the wealth at this time will want to keep their power and wealth and try their best to conserve what they have and hold. This applies to people who have personally worked hard and saved and been decently frugal as well as those who have inherited wealth and power, or gained wealth and power by depriving other people, and also to the fortunate few who have been lucky investors.

That's all true. However, those who have gained whatever wealth they may have "by depriving other people" may not deserve that wealth --- depending on what you mean by "deprived." If it means "stolen from other people," then those who have so gained their wealth certainly don't deserve it. But if it means "didn't give any to other people," then unless those other people themselves deserved it, those who have it may still deserve it (if they produced it or did something else to earn it).

Most investors who make a profit, BTW, did not do so by luck. They will have invested much time and effort studying the market and the companies in which they invest their money.

Obviously it is to everyone's advantage to provide cash and other incentives towards hard work and frugality. You don't even need to feel pity or sympathy for poor people to see that enlightened altruism includes providing for a happy, creative, population of workers.

A worker's wage or salary is his incentive to work, and also the incentive to acquire new skills that will enable him to earn more. No altruism is involved or needed; on the contrary, it reduces the aforementioned incentives.

Morality is a large part of culture. Cultures are maintained and changed by people. There is a clash of cultures within free liberal societies between the haves and the have-nots. In the absence of civil war the best bet for ethical moral change is democracy.

Are you suggesting that a sound morality is a matter of popular opinion? You realize that is the ad populum fallacy, don't you? Popular opinion has never been a reliable source of truth on any subject I can think of.

[Gertie]

GE

Gertie wrote: ↑Yesterday, 11:24 am
Lets try some back to basics thinking.

You're inserting in your moral axiom distinctions between sentient creatures based on the having of interests, and the agency to follow their interests and to understand and follow moral rules. These are useful distinctions, but the oughts, the morality of the moral foundation, derives solely from the having of interests. This is your Is-Ought bridge, and I agree.

So this interests/wellbeing foundation for deciding what's right and wrong, and oughts, is the basis for justifying moral principles, rules and rights. We don't have to worry about notions of objective/subjective, or classical and moral approaches which might have used a different foundation, we are saying it's this well-being/interests foundation which justifies oughts.

Some sentient creatures have the capacity to understand and follow this, but pretty much all qualify for moral consideration (simply by dint of being sentient), commensurate with the nature of their interests.

Agree so far?

Pretty much, but you left out a crucial qualification: Moral obligations only arise in social settings. Crusoe alone on his island may be under some instrumental obligations, e.g., if he wants to keep warm in winter he ought to cut some firewood in the fall --- but that is not a "moral" obligation. So we can't say that moral "oughts" derive solely from the fact that we have interests. The social context is also required. ..... But there is a downside to that social setting also: the efforts of one person to improve his welfare may interfere with others' efforts to do the same, whether by accident or intent. And since humans in civilized social settings are individualized, having differing interests, talents, strengths, motives, emotional responses, and personal mores, some of them will choose to be parasites or predators, preferring to subsist on the efforts and talents of others, by force or stealth. Humans in social settings are much more vulnerable to pilfery and predation by other members of their species than are bears or other solitary animals.

So some rules governing interactions among members are necessary: "Thou shalt not murder;" "Thou shalt not steal," "Though shalt not covet," etc. Such systems of rules are called a morality.

[/quote]

Right. Agreed.

So we've broadly sorted our justification for morality, what it's for in principle - promoting interests/wellbeing in social settings. We've noted the roles different categories of sentient creatures may play (temporarily/permanently in relation to our foundational justification. And we've acknowledged this moral foundation confers moral consideration on all, and duties/obligations/oughts on some. That's a solid place to start thinking about what sort of oughts will be derived, and how we might codify them.


That about right?

If so, then it strikes me that an important role for Rights in particular, is to establish basic welfare needs are met and give sentient creatures the opportunity to flourish and pursue their interests. If this is what morality is all about, and if we're going to accept the concept of rights which aren't subject to even democratic government whim and inevitable compromises, Rights should be our bottom line benchmark defence of interests/wellbeing.

Well, that would not be a "role for Rights," unless you're proposing, as have others here, to re-define that word. The role of rights as classically understood has been to identify what belongs to whom (as determined by the first possession criterion) and forbid others from taking those things. The term carries no implication of a duty of charity --- to see that anyone's "basic welfare needs are met." Nor does it entail an obligation upon anyone to give anyone an "opportunity to flourish and pursue their interests." There may be some other way to derive such duties from the axiom, but it would not be via rights. No one has a "right" to the services of other people or to the products of their labor, whatever their needs may be. Rights impose constraints, but no duties.

I'm suggesting we use Rights based on our moral foundation, we don't need to be bound by others in the past who made up rights based on a different foundation or conception of morality. But OK, we don't have to call them Rights, we can call them Foundational Entitlements - or .... something better lol. The point is to establish a means of ensuring that basic welfare needs are met and sentient creatures have the opportunity to flourish. Regardless of the whims and compromises of governments/authorities. It's about establishing a baseline all sentient creatures should in principle be accorded, before the societal trade-offs involved with competing interests is addressed.

I think this logically follows from our foundation. We know there will inevitably be trade-offs because of the nature of being an experiencing subject with individual interests. And there will be difficulties quantifying the qualiative nature of interests and weighing them against each other. A baseline will ensure that these trade offs never go so far that the foundational basis of morality is traded away for anyone. (I think of LeGuin's Omelas short story when my utilitarian instincts get out of hand https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B4BbL7 ... 8qMHzUTzJw ). That every sentient creature is ensured their basic welfare needs are met, and they have the opportunity to flourish and pursue their interests.

It seems a logical first step to me when we're starting to look at what oughts arise from our foundation, and how we might codify them. You have your Equal Agency Postulate, Duty of Care and so on. I'm suggesting lets get a our moral safety net in place first.

I think this is our first potential substantial disagreement, and might illustrate different understandings or biases re our foundation... or maybe not. So shall we thrash this one out and see where it leaves us? I think both our biases are firmly ingrained, but I respect your knowledge, intelligence and rigour, so ya never know!

So why isn't this an appropriate moral baseline to strive for in your view, and/or if I propose to give it this special right-like status, what are the problems?

[Belindi]

I expect there will be more and more economic refugees from Africa and the Middle East into Northern Europe. Afghanistan is one particularly poor country which is now in a humanitarian crisis due to misgovernment and its lack of natural resources.I do not think it is worth my time to try to inform you since you seem not to take any interest in foreign countries, so I won't provide you with example after example.

The climate crisis is real indeed. Much of what affluent people take for granted is unsustainable, for example animal protein food due to the climate crisis and associated pollution of natural resources. Can you cook vegetarian? Or are you so rich that you can grow your own animal protein for the sole use of yourself and your family?

I'll pass on those points, since they are way off topic.

Economic refugees also need to be housed.

Regarding who deserves what, the big question is "Who are the bosses?" For it is the bosses who will arbitrate on who deserves what, and that is a political question.

Well, no. Who deserves what is not a political question with an arbitrary answer proffered by any "bosses" (or by populist majorities). P deserves x IFF he has produced it or done something else to earn it, which is a matter of fact. That is what the term "deserve" means.

You are addressing ethics whereas I am more interested in the practicalities of our nations' morals. Please note the title of the discussion refers to crime. A society's laws are based on the prevailing and'or traditional morals.

It is reasonable to presume the people who have the power and the wealth at this time will want to keep their power and wealth and try their best to conserve what they have and hold. This applies to people who have personally worked hard and saved and been decently frugal as well as those who have inherited wealth and power, or gained wealth and power by depriving other people, and also to the fortunate few who have been lucky investors.

That's all true. However, those who have gained whatever wealth they may have "by depriving other people" may not deserve that wealth --- depending on what you mean by "deprived." If it means "stolen from other people," then those who have so gained their wealth certainly don't deserve it. But if it means "didn't give any to other people," then unless those other people themselves deserved it, those who have it may still deserve it (if they produced it or did something else to earn it).

I tried to think of a more neutral term than "deprived" .

Most investors who make a profit, BTW, did not do so by luck. They will have invested much time and effort studying the market and the companies in which they invest their money.

I agree.

Regarding the balance between rewards and incentives there is only short term profit (if that) in not housing workers so as to maintain their physical and mental health and their education.

Morality is a large part of culture. Cultures are maintained and changed by people. There is a clash of cultures within free liberal societies between the haves and the have-nots. In the absence of civil war the best bet for ethical moral change is democracy.

Are you suggesting that a sound morality is a matter of popular opinion? You realize that is the ad populum fallacy, don't you? Popular opinion has never been a reliable source of truth on any subject I can think of.

Popular morals of a society originate in both power structures and economic necessity. Sometimes a charismatic leader or a demagogue can change morals, and sometimes the process is one of slower cultural evolution.

As you will know morals have differed very much according to times and places. Aztecs' morals seem to us to be unethical : Judeo-Christian morals seem to us to be ethical.

[GE Morton]

Okay, I admit that it has been some time since I last looked at these terms. I did attempt to give a kind of Aristotelian definition, but I think my argument can be situated happily within your terms. I will end up arguing for the idea that obligations are necessary conditions of rights.

"An intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for when the term should be used. In the case of nouns, this is equivalent to specifying the properties that an object needs to have in order to be counted as a referent of the term.”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extension ... efinitions

Both types are useful for explaining the meaning of a word, but only the intensional definition determines whether a claimed right exists, and thus whether the claim is valid and the moral obligation implied exists.

Fair enough, but it is worth noting that my critique of your approach is slightly different from a critique of an intensional definition. My critique was based on existence rather than reference. I said, “I think you are giving a way to establish or verify the existence of a right…” It seems to me that such an approach omits the condition related to obligation, and that this condition is necessary for the object to be counted as a referent of the term.

Consider Crusoe alone on his island. He finds a coconut. Does he have a right to it?

Per my definition of the term, he does. But obviously no one has any obligations related to it, since there is no one else to have them (and rights impose no obligations their holders). Does that mean he does not have a right to the coconut, on your analysis?

Obligations, like all other moral concepts, arise only in social settings, via some moral theory or code devised to govern interactions between members of that social group. They may involve external objects or other non-moral states of affairs, but they aren't properties of those objects or states of affairs, or derive from any property of them. Obligations are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the existence of a right, but rights may invoke such obligations given some moral theory.

A right is a pseudo-property assigned to a person to mark an historical fact about that person. That fact has moral import, however, and that moral import becomes a connotation of the pseudo-property --- but not a necessary or sufficient condition for assigning it.

On my understanding obligations are a necessary condition of rights, and thus are universal (rather than “nearly universal”). Further, it seems to me that obligation would then be denotative rather than connotative. This is similar to your claim that rights would "seldom be asserted without [a moral context]" and my rejoinder that they would never be asserted without a moral context. There you said that, "[Rights] propositions are not meaningless without a moral context." It seems like they would be meaningless.

Since they denote the historical event that warrants assigning them they are not meaningless. But they would be functionally vacuous. Similarly, assigning the pseudo-property "doctor" denotes that the person graduated from medical school. But if he never actually practices medicine the label would be functionally vacuous.

My point was a bit different. What I was trying to do was take the set of premises you gave, shear away those that are required to derive obligations, and show that once those are sheared away the right is also sheared away. Suppose someone who has never heard of rights comes up to you and asks what a right is. Suppose you begin by explaining what first possession is, and then you explain that first possession entails acquisition without inflicting loss or injury, etc. On my view they will not have a correct understanding of what a right is until they perceive obligations towards the right-holder, for this is a necessary condition of a right.

Well, I agree with that, except for the last clause. True, the newbie would not have a complete, or even adequate, understanding of what "rights" are without understanding the obligations they impose. But understanding something often requires more than knowing what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence. E.g., understanding "water" requires more than knowing that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen; it would also include knowing that it is the clear, colorless liquid that fills the oceans, lakes, and rivers and falls as rain, and is essential for life. What may be necessary for understanding something is not the same as what is necessary for the existence of something.

In this post I tried to get away from the word “right” since our discussion is about how that word should be used. So I talked about the factual and normative aspects instead. You seem to think that the pre-obligatory factual aspect is already a right, and that it should therefore be recognized as a right even by someone who does not perceive the “connotation” of obligation.

Yes. That would merely be an acknowledgement of the historical meaning of the term. Your wording there is a bit vague, however. "Perceived" the connotation? Does that mean this person is unaware that it connotes an obligation, or that he is aware of it but renounces it?

I think someone would admit that a right exists once they have reasoned all the way to obligations, and not before that.

"Reasoned all the way to obligations" . . . from what? What are the premises from which this reasoning begins?

Reasoned from your premises: first possession.

You can't get to an obligation from first possession alone. Some moral premise is required as well.

I think rights-obligations are involved in the definition of rights, so we can’t have one without the other. But you seem to think that we can have rights before we have obligations, or that we can have rights apart from obligations. That doesn’t make sense to me.

There may well be good use for a term that denotes something like first possession apart from obligations, but I don’t think “right” is the proper term.

That particular term reflects the moral implications of first possession --- that P acquired x righteously (without inflicting losss or injury), and thus is now rightfully in possession of it, or has a rightful claim to it. But those implications only follow if a broader moral premise is assumed in addition to the empirical, historical one, e.g., "one ought not inflict loss or injury on other moral agents." Some such principle is taken as axiomatic by most moral systems and theories.

I’m not sure we should have this argument in this thread, but what I would say is that rational beings are intrinsically bound by the law of non-contradiction, apart from consent. Those who deny the conclusion of an argument they affirm to be sound have failed a rational obligation, even if they have not explicitly or implicitly agreed to the law of non-contradiction. Put differently, everyone has implicitly agreed to the law of non-contradiction.

I'd qualify that a bit: everyone who purports to be presenting a logical argument. There is no shortage of rhetoric in which the law of non-contradiction and the other rules of logic are ignored (demagoguery) or subtly distorted (sophistry).

Can I ask why you define moral 'oughts' in instrumental terms? Is it just because you think categorical 'oughts' don't exist, and so every goal of human action must be subjective, leaving the means as the only possible "objectively moral" candidate? The goals seem moral in the common sense of the word, so it strikes me as odd to exclude them from being called moral. I don't find anything in the definitions or etymologies of 'moral' that would restrict it to an instrumental concept.

They can be categorical in Kant's sense, as synthetic a priori concepts, like time and space, wired into our brains (so to speak), intrinsic to reasoning itself, and inescapable in any cognitive undertaking. His Categorical Imperative commands, "Always so act so that the principle upon which you acted could be made a universal law." But it is painfully obvious that no such imperative is operative in many brains, and it is difficult to get from the CI to any specific moral "oughts."

But perhaps you have a different understanding of "categorical." What would that be?

I take a "morality" to be a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, the aim of which is to allow all agents in that "moral field" to maximize their welfare, however they may define it. So valid "oughts" are those behaviors which further that aim, and "ought nots" those which thwart it. I.e., they are instrumental. Previously I've analogized moralities to traffic laws and controls --- rules for use of public roads aimed to assure that all drivers get wherever they're going without crashes, roadblocks, or avoidable delays, i.e., as quickly and safely as possible.

I agree that the notion of "rights" carries a strong implication of imposing an obligation. But it is not a logical implication, deriving from the necessary and sufficient conditions establishing a right. It derives from a widely shared moral assumption tacitly lurking in the background.

[Belindi]

Leontiskos wrote:

On my understanding obligations are a necessary condition of rights, and thus are universal (rather than “nearly universal”).

But despots decide for themselves what rights and obligations, if any, they have.
When a despot's rights are reined in by his subjects or another authority then moral and legal rights change as happened with Magna Carta. Taliban for instance are despots who arbitrate on rights and obligations. They have the power so they can and do.

Rights and obligations are each subject to who is the boss, and are neither universal nor nearly universal. It is for this reason that one should fight if necessary to protect one's democratic rights and obligations.

[GE Morton]

But despots decide for themselves what rights and obligations, if any, they have.

Any rights and obligations someone arbitrarily (i.e., not grounded in first possession) claims for himself are fiat rights ("frights"). They have no moral significance.