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[Ecurb]

Sorry, Belinda, but there is no "pot" with $10 in it. That $10 doesn't exist until someone creates it, by producing a good or service worth $10 to someone. The $10 belongs to whoever created it.

The notion that an economy is a zero-sum game with a fixed amount of wealth that belongs to "the people as a whole," or to the State, is ubiquitous among among the Left, and it is utter nonsense. Wealth is not manna from Heaven, a gift from God to be shared by all his children. It is all produced by particular people.

Sometimes there is a fixed pot, sometimes there isn't. Whaling was a huge part of the economy back when the streets of London and New York were lit by whale oil. The whales, however, were limited in number, as were the Bison that constituted a major part of the economy for some Native American groups. So (of course) is the reserve of oil and other fossil fuels. One need not be politically left wing to recognize this. Neither the whales nor the oil reserves were "produced by particular people". They were (metaphorically) "manna from heaven" (which did take some effort to harvest).

Hunters and gatherers (that's how humans survived for most of our history) collect. They do not "produce".

I'm surprised Morton didn't know this.

[Ecurb]

Sorry, Belinda, but there is no "pot" with $10 in it. That $10 doesn't exist until someone creates it, by producing a good or service worth $10 to someone. The $10 belongs to whoever created it.

The notion that an economy is a zero-sum game with a fixed amount of wealth that belongs to "the people as a whole," or to the State, is ubiquitous among among the Left, and it is utter nonsense. Wealth is not manna from Heaven, a gift from God to be shared by all his children. It is all produced by particular people.

Sometimes there is a pot -- sometimes there isn't. When whaling was a major industry, lighting the streets of London and New York, people may have thought there was an endless supply of whales. But there wasn't. The Bison that constituted a large portion of Plains Indians' economy also represented a "fixed amount of wealth", that was wiped out. Of course fossil fuels are also a fixed "pot" -- as with whales and bison the pot can be depleted more quickly than it can be replaced.

Hunters and gatherers (that's how humans survived for most of our existance) collected "manna from heaven" (metaphorically). This took some effort -- but the wealth was collected, not "produced".

I'm surprised Morton didn't know this.

[GE Morton]

• P1: If someone has a right to some thing then that thing was acquired without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else.
• P2: If someone has acquired some thing without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else then they have a right to that thing.
• P3: If someone has a right to some thing then others have property obligations towards the right-holder.
• 4: Therefore, if someone has acquired some thing without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else, then others have property obligations towards the right-holder. {From P2 & P3}

Okay. Let's hold off on the no-ought-from-is issue for the time being. The first thing to do is to look at the ongoing question of where the "ought" enters the argument. You seem to think that it enters at P3, whereas I and some others think it enters at P2. On my view P3 is a tautology. This question was the purpose of the primary section of my last post which began, "Regarding the terminological question..." The term in question is "right", and the question is about how obligations relate to rights, namely whether P1 or P3 better captures the meaning of rights.

I agree that is an important point to clear up.

Yes, my claim is that the "ought" enters at P3. It only enters because some moral premise has been added to the argument, e.g., "one ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents," or, "everyone has an obligation to refrain from inflicting losses or injuries on others."

No "ought" or obligation is mentioned in P2. That statement is merely the definition of a right; it asserts the warrant for assigning that pesudo-property to someone, the truth condition for "P has a right to x" being that P acquired x without inflicting loss or injury. It is true, of course, that the term "right" (as used in P2) has a moral connotation. But it only has that because most people view inflicting losses or injuries as immoral; i.e., they're adding that unstated premise to what P2 actually states, and because they believe violations of rights usually inflict losses or injuries. But a connotation is not a logical implication.

I agree with you that there is no real right until it is created, and that before its creation there is only the concept of rights which imposes no obligations. Let's look at a timeline:

• t1: The concept of rights exists, but not real rights.
• t2: An act of first possession begins.
• t3₁: The act of first possession completes.
• t3₂: A right exists.
• tx: Property obligations towards the right-holder exist.

Now I grant that t3₁ and t3₂ are simultaneous events. The question is whether tx is temporally or logically removed from t3₂. I don't think it is. It seems like you think it is at least logically consequent to t3₂ in the sense that P3 would not be a tautology. That is, you think P2 is an easier premise to defend than P3, and that the "ought" comes onto the scene with P3. I think P3 is easier to defend, and I think that the "ought" comes onto the scene with P2. When we use the word "rights" we generally mean P3, not P1. I do not agree that rights can be separated from "oughts" or obligations (and it seems like others in this thread are also at odds with you on this terminological question). In Aristotelian terms I would say that t3₁ is the efficient cause of rights whereas tx is the formal cause (and assertion of rights is the final cause).

Have I at least captured your view?

For the most part. Tx is not temporally separated from Sub2, but it is logically separated. First possession establishes a right (by definition), but it does not logically imply any obligations. That P first possessed x is just a non-moral historical fact. To get from there to obligations you need some more premises: that first possession entails acquisition without inflicting loss or injury, that violating a right inflicts loss or injury, and that people have an obligation to refrain from inflicting loss or injury.

Yes, I think P2 is much easier to defend, it being only a definition, a recitation of how the word is actually understood in most routine disputes about who has a right to what, and how those disputes are resolved --- which is by applying the first possession criterion. But of course when anyone asserts or claims a right, it is to invoke the moral obligations he believes ensue from it, given the moral premises just mentioned.

So the purpose of the concept, and the usual reason for invoking it, is indeed to invoke a moral obligation others have. But whether that obligation ensues from a particular claim depends upon a matter of fact.

It is instrumental because all of the obligations, "oughts" and "ought nots," generated by the theory are aimed at attaining the goal declared in its axiom, (which I call the "Fundamental Principle"). And you're right; none of those obligations apply to persons who don't accept the Fundamental Principle. But those who don't will need to tell us what they think morality is.

Okay, so you wouldn't see the obligation as binding on all? It binds only those who agree to the moral premise?

Yes. As will be the case with any moral argument. Those who don't accept the premises will not be bound by the conclusions. What would bind them?

[Pattern-chaser]

How can someone act on something he can't understand, other than by accident?

This question does not seem to mesh well with empirical observations of actual human behaviour. We act on things we don't understand all the time...?

[Pattern-chaser]

How can someone act on something he can't understand, other than by accident?

This question does not seem to mesh well with empirical observations of actual human behaviour. We act on things we don't understand all the time...?

Sorry: "don't and can't" is what I should've written.

[Leontiskos]

Thanks for your response and clarifications.

To be clear, we are arguing about the definition of "right". I would build on this definition, "the power or privilege to which one is justly entitled" (MW 2a). I am thinking specifically of the power to invoke existing obligations. So a right is the power to invoke existing obligations to which one is justly entitled. For example, to say that I have a property right to a car means that I have the power to invoke another's obligation to not steal it. The right-holder has this power whether or not it is exercised.

What is your definition of a right? I tried to attempt your definition, but I find that doing so looks like a strawman. This is because I think you are giving a way to establish or verify the existence of a right rather than giving the definition of a right. For example, we could give conditions for establishing or verifying the existence of a marriage: a couple exchanges lifelong vows of fidelity. But this tells us whether a marriage exists and how to find out. It doesn't tell us what marriage is. The truth condition for "John and Jane are married" is different from the definition of marriage.

• P1: If someone has a right to some thing then that thing was acquired without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else.
• P2: If someone has acquired some thing without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else then they have a right to that thing.
• P3: If someone has a right to some thing then others have property obligations towards the right-holder.
• 4: Therefore, if someone has acquired some thing without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else, then others have property obligations towards the right-holder. {From P2 & P3}

Okay. Let's hold off on the no-ought-from-is issue for the time being. The first thing to do is to look at the ongoing question of where the "ought" enters the argument. You seem to think that it enters at P3, whereas I and some others think it enters at P2. On my view P3 is a tautology. This question was the purpose of the primary section of my last post which began, "Regarding the terminological question..." The term in question is "right", and the question is about how obligations relate to rights, namely whether P1 or P3 better captures the meaning of rights.

I agree that is an important point to clear up.

Yes, my claim is that the "ought" enters at P3. It only enters because some moral premise has been added to the argument, e.g., "one ought not inflict losses or injuries on other moral agents," or, "everyone has an obligation to refrain from inflicting losses or injuries on others."

No "ought" or obligation is mentioned in P2. That statement is merely the definition of a right; it asserts the warrant for assigning that pesudo-property to someone, the truth condition for "P has a right to x" being that P acquired x without inflicting loss or injury. It is true, of course, that the term "right" (as used in P2) has a moral connotation. But it only has that because most people view inflicting losses or injuries as immoral; i.e., they're adding that unstated premise to what P2 actually states, and because they believe violations of rights usually inflict losses or injuries. But a connotation is not a logical implication.

Yes, I think P2 is much easier to defend, it being only a definition, a recitation of how the word is actually understood in most routine disputes about who has a right to what, and how those disputes are resolved --- which is by applying the first possession criterion.

Well, P2 is an implication, not a definition. It does not define what a right is, but rather gives the sufficient conditions for the existence of a right. As noted previously, P1 and P3 reflect our two different definitions (which is why I included the unused P1). Obviously since I think P3 reflects the definition of rights I think P3 is a tautology, and since you think P1/P2 reflects the definition of rights you think P2 is a tautology.

The reason I think P2 involves an "ought" is because on my definition rights and "oughts" go hand in hand. That is, if the definition of rights I gave is correct then P2 moves from an "is" to an "ought" due to the fact that the meaning of rights involves obligations and "oughts".

I agree with you that there is no real right until it is created, and that before its creation there is only the concept of rights which imposes no obligations. Let's look at a timeline:

• t1: The concept of rights exists, but not real rights.
• t2: An act of first possession begins.
• t3₁: The act of first possession completes.
• t3₂: A right exists.
• tx: Property obligations towards the right-holder exist.

Now I grant that t3₁ and t3₂ are simultaneous events. The question is whether tx is temporally or logically removed from t3₂. I don't think it is. It seems like you think it is at least logically consequent to t3₂ in the sense that P3 would not be a tautology. That is, you think P2 is an easier premise to defend than P3, and that the "ought" comes onto the scene with P3. I think P3 is easier to defend, and I think that the "ought" comes onto the scene with P2. When we use the word "rights" we generally mean P3, not P1. I do not agree that rights can be separated from "oughts" or obligations (and it seems like others in this thread are also at odds with you on this terminological question). In Aristotelian terms I would say that t3₁ is the efficient cause of rights whereas tx is the formal cause (and assertion of rights is the final cause).

Have I at least captured your view?

For the most part. Tx is not temporally separated from Sub2, but it is logically separated. First possession establishes a right (by definition), but it does not logically imply any obligations. That P first possessed x is just a non-moral historical fact. To get from there to obligations you need some more premises: that first possession entails acquisition without inflicting loss or injury, that violating a right inflicts loss or injury, and that people have an obligation to refrain from inflicting loss or injury.

I agree that there are a number of different premises, but I am questioning which premises are necessary before we have warrant to claim that a right exists. You seem to think that someone who acknowledges that first possession has occurred but does not acknowledge that obligations exist would affirm that a right exists. I disagree. I think someone would admit that a right exists once they have reasoned all the way to obligations, and not before that. It doesn't make sense to say that we have a right to some thing before obligations are perceived. (Granted, the formalized argument I gave above does not agree with my view, but in my defense I was trying to capture your argument. )

You are apparently talking about "how the word is actually understood in most routine disputes about who has a right to what, and how those disputes are resolved." I just want to repeat the point that verifying the existence of something and understanding what that thing is are two different questions. If there is a dispute about which farmer has a right to a piece of land we can look at the factual history of possession to determine who has the right to the land, but this does not tell us what it means to have a right to a piece of land. It means having the power to invoke existing obligations that one is entitled to. Just because we can prescind from the meaning of rights while adjudicating disputes does not mean that obligations are logically separable from the meaning of rights.

So the purpose of the concept, and the usual reason for invoking it, is indeed to invoke a moral obligation others have. But whether that obligation ensues from a particular claim depends upon a matter of fact.

I agree with this, but I would add that the meaning of the concept is found in the "power" that my definition elaborates.

It is instrumental because all of the obligations, "oughts" and "ought nots," generated by the theory are aimed at attaining the goal declared in its axiom, (which I call the "Fundamental Principle"). And you're right; none of those obligations apply to persons who don't accept the Fundamental Principle. But those who don't will need to tell us what they think morality is.

Okay, so you wouldn't see the obligation as binding on all? It binds only those who agree to the moral premise?

Yes. As will be the case with any moral argument. Those who don't accept the premises will not be bound by the conclusions. What would bind them?

Ha, that's a can of worms. Rather than lengthen this post further I will just point to a place where I argued against the no-ought-from-is claim. In this post (link) I argued that truth binds belief, so to speak. Admittedly, that question is simpler: whether those who accept the premises are bound by the conclusions, but presumably a bridge could be built so long as your premises are demonstrable.

[Sy Borg]

GEMorton wrote:

If Alfie spends $10 he's earned for a meal, it is not "at the expense" of Bruno. It would only be at Bruno's expense if Alfie had taken the $10 from Bruno.

If
a) the whole pot contains no more than $10
and

b)the pot is available only to Bruno and Alfie

Then if either Alfie or Bruno take the whole pot one of them has deprived the other.

Sorry, Belinda, but there is no "pot" with $10 in it. That $10 doesn't exist until someone creates it, by producing a good or service worth $10 to someone. The $10 belongs to whoever created it.

The notion that an economy is a zero-sum game with a fixed amount of wealth that belongs to "the people as a whole," or to the State, is ubiquitous among among the Left, and it is utter nonsense. Wealth is not manna from Heaven, a gift from God to be shared by all his children. It is all produced by particular people.

But should that mean homelessness is effectively criminalised, as Brian described? Surely if people are free to be filthy rich they also have the right to be dirt poor. It's not as though people become destitute because they enjoy poverty. Punishing the homeless is akin to sentencing a person with shingles to thirty lashes. Isn't failing in life and living rough punishment enough?

The practical issue with wealth inequality is instability. This is not a notion created by "the left". What is the the left these days? I can't see complainants parse Stalin and North Korea from the nationalised health services of western democracies that are MUCH more solid and committed democracies than the US's flawed democracy (https://www.economist.com/graphic-detai ... y-bad-year).

Instability happens when the masses feel they have nothing to lose. The idea of the trickle-down effect was to leave the masses just enough to keep them quiet (nine meals from anarchy). For whatever reasons (it's not just one), that balance is being lost, resulting in many more people falling into deep financial trouble. If the masses are left out to dry, those with nothing to lose will create mayhem. The Capitol is very likely not the end of outrageous unrest this decade, and quite possibly worse is to come.

That leaves two extreme governance options and, one hopes, in-between options. On one hand, either leaders let the mayhem happen and hope the wealthy weather the storm. On the other extreme, govts introduce a UBI, thus essentially controlling the people. Both extreme options are obviously sub-optimal, but the challenges of governing huge populations drives ever more extreme positions.

[Steve3007]

Instability happens when the masses feel they have nothing to lose...

This, I think, is the basis of one of the arguments against minimal government libertarianism. It's the idea that in considering the consequences of various moral agents' actions we should go further than just considering whether those actions constitute a deliberate and immediate threat to the liberties of other moral agents or subjects.

In deciding when governments ought to have the right to infringe on individual liberties, using punishments or taxes, the libertarian thinks that only those kinds of deliberate and immediate threats should be considered. Hence "My right to swing my fist ends at your face". Metaphorical fist-swinging is to be allowed in all circumstances except where there is an immediate and obvious metaphorical face present!

But if, for the sake of argument, we organize a society along those lines, and if, for the sake of argument, a consequence of that is such high levels of inequality that the successful have to do things like hiding in gated communities to protect them from those who, as you put it, feel they have nothing to lose, then everybody is worse off. So the non-libertarian argues that a bit of forced wealth distribution in various forms (taxation funded welfare, healthcare, education, etc) is generally beneficial. The libertarian doesn't accept these "greater good" arguments and there is also a lot of argument as to whether those really would be the consequences.

That leaves two extreme governance options and, one hopes, in-between options. On one hand, either leaders let the mayhem happen and hope the wealthy weather the storm. On the other extreme, govts introduce a UBI, thus essentially controlling the people. Both extreme options are obviously sub-optimal, but the challenges of governing huge populations drives ever more extreme positions.

That's why I've always tended to favour pragmatic political compromise and the middle-ground political position. Although obviously the question of whether it is regarded by others as the middle-ground depends on where they think the political centre of gravity is. Different in different societies.

[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote:

The notion that an economy is a zero-sum game with a fixed amount of wealth that belongs to "the people as a whole," or to the State, is ubiquitous among among the Left, and it is utter nonsense. Wealth is not manna from Heaven, a gift from God to be shared by all his children. It is all produced by particular people.

The climate crisis is proving that economies are limited to zero growth if they are to survive. It so happens that some people do not care whether or not foreign economies collapse as long as the one they partake of is okay.

The latter was the old fashioned traditional belief. But think you, Nature , like the covid virus, is not concerned about whatever nationality, social class, race, or political ideology . Nature does not recognise who deserves and who does not deserve.

[Pattern-chaser]

The idea of the trickle-down effect was to leave the masses just enough to keep them quiet (nine meals from anarchy).

Yes, but I'm still wondering why they continue to support it when we can all see that wealth trickles up, to the billionaires, not down...?

[Sy Borg]

The idea of the trickle-down effect was to leave the masses just enough to keep them quiet (nine meals from anarchy).

Yes, but I'm still wondering why they continue to support it when we can all see that wealth trickles up, to the billionaires, not down...?

The idea of the trickle down effect is that while wealth gushes upwards, the the wealthy allow a portion to trickle down to the masses. Decades of this policy has logically produced ever greater wealth inequality. In this, the news media is most responsible. For years they were told that the right wing governments they were told to vote for would do the right thing by the people, even when it seemed they were not, and they were told that left wing governments (who may have tried to balance the scales even a little) were evil communists who wanted to take away people's freedoms.

Yet, after several decades of mostly right wing governments, the people have never felt less free. Sucked in. As the song goes:

Is it any wonder you've got no power
When you pay a thief to keep it for you?
Is it a surprise that your wine is sour
When you let a liar choose the brew he pours you?

[GE Morton]

Thanks for your response and clarifications.

To be clear, we are arguing about the definition of "right". I would build on this definition, "the power or privilege to which one is justly entitled" (MW 2a). I am thinking specifically of the power to invoke existing obligations. So a right is the power to invoke existing obligations to which one is justly entitled. For example, to say that I have a property right to a car means that I have the power to invoke another's obligation to not steal it. The right-holder has this power whether or not it is exercised.

What is your definition of a right? I tried to attempt your definition, but I find that doing so looks like a strawman. This is because I think you are giving a way to establish or verify the existence of a right rather than giving the definition of a right. For example, we could give conditions for establishing or verifying the existence of a marriage: a couple exchanges lifelong vows of fidelity. But this tells us whether a marriage exists and how to find out. It doesn't tell us what marriage is. The truth condition for "John and Jane are married" is different from the definition of marriage.

Heh. Part of this disagreement arises from the fact that there are different types of definitions. The one I gave, "A pseudo-property assigned to a person when a paticular relationship between the person and some particular thing exists, that relationship being that the person is the first possessor of the thing," is an intensional definition. Intensional definitions give the necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular x to qualify as a y.

"An intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for when the term should be used. In the case of nouns, this is equivalent to specifying the properties that an object needs to have in order to be counted as a referent of the term.

"For example, an intensional definition of the word "bachelor" is "unmarried man". This definition is valid because being an unmarried man is both a necessary condition and a sufficient condition for being a bachelor: it is necessary because one cannot be a bachelor without being an unmarried man, and it is sufficient because any unmarried man is a bachelor."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extension ... efinitions

But there are several other types of definitions, all of which are sometimes useful. Common dictionary definitions may be any of these types, depending upon what the compliers consider to be the most informative for a particular word. An extensional definition gives examples of the definiendum:

CAT (N): A member of a family of mammals in the order carnivora, embracing lions, tigers, bobcats, leopards, servals, and house cats, among others."

A functional definition describes the use or function of the definiendum in some familiar context:

HAMMER (N): A tool used by carpenters to drive nails, or any tool designed for pounding or beating something.

The definition of "right" you suggest is a functional definition --- it sets forth the purpose for which rights are assigned and claimed. Both types are useful for explaining the meaning of a word, but only the intensional definition determines whether a claimed right exists, and thus whether the claim is valid and the moral obligation implied exists.

Yes, I think P2 is much easier to defend, it being only a definition, a recitation of how the word is actually understood in most routine disputes about who has a right to what, and how those disputes are resolved --- which is by applying the first possession criterion.

Well, P2 is an implication, not a definition. It does not define what a right is, but rather gives the sufficient conditions for the existence of a right. As noted previously, P1 and P3 reflect our two different definitions (which is why I included the unused P1). Obviously since I think P3 reflects the definition of rights I think P3 is a tautology, and since you think P1/P2 reflects the definition of rights you think P2 is a tautology.

The reason I think P2 involves an "ought" is because on my definition rights and "oughts" go hand in hand. That is, if the definition of rights I gave is correct then P2 moves from an "is" to an "ought" due to the fact that the meaning of rights involves obligations and "oughts".

Another important distinction to make with regard to definition is that between the denotation and connotation of a word. The denotative meaning picks out the things in the world to which the term is properly applied. The connotative meaning consists of the various other concepts that may be associated with it in some minds, or even many minds. The connotative meanings of words, however, are subjective; they differ from person to person, depending upon their personal experiences with the thing denoted. The connotations of the word "hammer" will differ for someone once beaten with one, from someone whose only experience with one has been to drive nails.

To be sure, some connotations of some words are nearly universal, and the moral connotations of "a right" is one of those words. So I will concede that term "involves" an "ought," and is part of its meaning. But only of its connotative meaning. It's denotative meaning does not include or entail an "ought."

For the most part. Tx is not temporally separated from Sub2, but it is logically separated. First possession establishes a right (by definition), but it does not logically imply any obligations. That P first possessed x is just a non-moral historical fact. To get from there to obligations you need some more premises: that first possession entails acquisition without inflicting loss or injury, that violating a right inflicts loss or injury, and that people have an obligation to refrain from inflicting loss or injury.

I agree that there are a number of different premises, but I am questioning which premises are necessary before we have warrant to claim that a right exists. You seem to think that someone who acknowledges that first possession has occurred but does not acknowledge that obligations exist would affirm that a right exists.

Oh, no. As evidenced by many posts in this thread, some people would not affirm that a right exists merely because first possession does. They hold that rights have some other basis entirely. That view is not consistent, however, with the historical understanding of that term or with the criteria common law courts, to this day, apply in resolving disputes about rights. Those who hold that view are proposing that the word be re-defined.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ... t_id=60957

I think someone would admit that a right exists once they have reasoned all the way to obligations, and not before that.

"Reasoned all the way to obligations" . . . from what? What are the premises from which this reasoning begins? The actual sequence typically followed by those who so use the term is to begin from some "intuited" obligations assumed a priori, for which no arguments are offered, and then confer the pseudo-property "rights" on the intended beneficiaries of those presumed obligations.

You can't get to a (moral) obligation without some sort of moral argument.

It doesn't make sense to say that we have a right to some thing before obligations are perceived.

Heh. I would argue the opposite --- that it doesn't make sense to say we have an obligation before a right is perceived --- at least, not an obligation to respect a right. Rights invoke obligations via a coherent moral theory. There are no obligations (of that kind) until a right is established, and what establishes it is an empirically verifiable state of affairs.

You are apparently talking about "how the word is actually understood in most routine disputes about who has a right to what, and how those disputes are resolved." I just want to repeat the point that verifying the existence of something and understanding what that thing is are two different questions. If there is a dispute about which farmer has a right to a piece of land we can look at the factual history of possession to determine who has the right to the land, but this does not tell us what it means to have a right to a piece of land.

Did my comments above answer that?

So the purpose of the concept, and the usual reason for invoking it, is indeed to invoke a moral obligation others have. But whether that obligation ensues from a particular claim depends upon a matter of fact.

I agree with this, but I would add that the meaning of the concept is found in the "power" that my definition elaborates.

Answered above (I think). Here's another example: Alfie buys the winning ticket for the State Lottery grand prize. We now apply the pseudo-property "Winner" to him. That he is a "winner" is an empirical fact, evidenced by his possession of the winning ticket. That tag, of course, also connotes certain things, i.e., that he indulges in gambling to some extent, that he has had some good luck, and that he will soon be a wealthy fellow, among other things. All of those may be considered part of the "meaning" of being a lottery winner. He then goes to the lottery office and declares, "I am the winner of this week's lottery." His reason for so declaring, of course, is to invoke the State's obligation to pay him his winnings. But whether he is indeed the winner is an empirical fact, which he must prove to trigger that obligation. Until that is done the State is under no obligation to pay anyone anything; its obligation is contingent upon a certain objective state of affairs.

Yes. As will be the case with any moral argument. Those who don't accept the premises will not be bound by the conclusions. What would bind them?

Ha, that's a can of worms.

Yes. It raises the question of what to do with/about "outlaws."

Rather than lengthen this post further I will just point to a place where I argued against the no-ought-from-is claim. In this post (link) I argued that truth binds belief, so to speak. Admittedly, that question is simpler: whether those who accept the premises are bound by the conclusions, but presumably a bridge could be built so long as your premises are demonstrable.

Read the linked post. "Ought" can be derived from "is," but only if some additional premise is added or implicit. E.g., your " . . . those who accept the premises are bound by the conclusions" example relies on an implicit agreement to adhere to the rules of logic.

I agree, of course, with your claim there that "moral oughts" are just intrumental "oughts." "You ought to get a hammer" and "You ought not steal" only differ in the goals sought, i.e., driving a nail v. allowing all agents to maximize welfare.

[Leontiskos]

Thanks for your post. I won’t be able to have a long conversation, but here are some points in response.

Do you think that the right to life exists and is rationally justifiable? If so, how would you justify it?

The right to life is culturally constituted. As is obvious from a mere glance at history, it has changed dramatically through the centuries. It involves nothing more or less than an obligation ("ought") on the part of other people not to kill you. I would justify it by saying, "I am happy to oblige myself not to kill other people, and I expect them to oblige themselves not to kill me." I do this because I think if everyone in society agrees to this principle, we will all live longer and happier lives.

Okay, so apparently you affirm the right to life in contractual terms. Not killing each other is a sort of truce between citizens, no?

Rather than Morton's (silly, in my opinion) notion that property rights (and the right to life) are the result of "first possession", I would suggest that they are also culturally constituted and conditional. If we think obliging people to limit their own freedom vis a vis other people's "property" will conduce human well-being, we confer a legal (and possibly moral) "right". Because these rights are conditional and culturally constituted, the notion that taxation is akin to robbery or slavery is ridiculous.

If your principle of human well being is instantiated via consent then it would seem that your view is very similar to Morton’s, for his view is based on a principle of well being that must be agreed to.

The question of taxation has to do with whether the rights you confer are merely legal. If a right is moral—as you suggest it could be—then it would exist independent of the legal sphere, in which case certain forms of taxation could well be contrary to this moral right. That is, certain forms of taxation could be theft if a moral right is admitted. Apparently on your contractual model the right would arise by consensual agreement between people.

[GE Morton]

Instability happens when the masses feel they have nothing to lose...

This, I think, is the basis of one of the arguments against minimal government libertarianism. It's the idea that in considering the consequences of various moral agents' actions we should go further than just considering whether those actions constitute a deliberate and immediate threat to the liberties of other moral agents or subjects.

In deciding when governments ought to have the right to infringe on individual liberties, using punishments or taxes, the libertarian thinks that only those kinds of deliberate and immediate threats should be considered. Hence "My right to swing my fist ends at your face". Metaphorical fist-swinging is to be allowed in all circumstances except where there is an immediate and obvious metaphorical face present!

But if, for the sake of argument, we organize a society along those lines, and if, for the sake of argument, a consequence of that is such high levels of inequality that the successful have to do things like hiding in gated communities to protect them from those who, as you put it, feel they have nothing to lose, then everybody is worse off. So the non-libertarian argues that a bit of forced wealth distribution in various forms (taxation funded welfare, healthcare, education, etc) is generally beneficial. The libertarian doesn't accept these "greater good" arguments and there is also a lot of argument as to whether those really would be the consequences.

Yes, that is the "pragmatic" argument, or the "torches and pitchforks" argument: "If we don't give them what they want they will storm the castle with torches and pitchforks."

It is an advisory to submit to mob rule, and thus a form of the ad baculum argument. And therefore fallacious.

Mob behaviors have, or course, occurred many times in US history --- the labor riots in the early 20th century, the "civil rights" disorders in the 1960s, and last summer's widespread "Black Lives Matter" riots, for example. All of those disorders were prompted by particular, substantive grievances, however; they were not rebellions against (material) inequalities per se. That the latter presents a threat is a Mencken hobgoblin conjured by leftist ideologues: "The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by an endless series of hobgoblins, most of them imaginary.”

https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/34764- ... o-keep-the

[GE Morton]

In the post above, "Read the linked post" should have been, "I read the linked post."