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[GE Morton]

OK, so we agree that rights exist. We agree that they don't exist in the same sense that, for example, material objects exist (i.e. continuing to exist in the absence of minds) but they do exist in the same sense that other abstract concepts exist - as ideas in human minds. But (in my view) they are not in the same class as, for example, the abstract concept of natural laws. Natural laws, in my usage at least, means descriptions of patterns in what has been observed of the material world, the law of gravitation being an example. Although that description is an abstract concept which does not exist in the absence of minds and their observations, it purports to describe a relationship between matter which (it proposes) would exist in the absence of those minds. That is not the case with natural rights.

For example, we might describe "people are usually born with two legs" as a statement of natural law and "people have the right to keep the two legs with which they were born" as a statement of natural rights. As laws/principles they're both abstract concepts. But (in my view) the former purports to describe a fact about the extramental world whereas the latter purports to describe an opinion as to what people ought to do.

Well, you've complicated the issue with your "People have a right to keep their two legs . . ." That is a derivative right, a moral conclusion drawn from a natural right premise via a moral theory. The underlying premise is, "Alfie has a right to his two legs." That proposition, unlike your "Right to keep" premise, is strictly empirical --- it is true IFF Alfie was the first possessor of his two legs. If we then introduce a moral premise or theory which says, "People ought not take things from other people which they have acquired righteously," we can derive your "Right to keep" statement.

Propositions in the form "P has a right to x," where x is some particular tangible or intangible thing (property rights) or to take some action (liberty rights) are true-or-false statements with publicly verifiable truth conditions. And, yes, the relationship asserted would exist in the absence of minds, just as would "P lives in Chicago." But such propositions do indeed also have moral import, and can serve as premises in moral arguments.

The relationship between the person and the thing (e.g. "I have two legs") is not the right. The statement "I have the right to my legs" has a truth condition that is publicly verifiable only because it is the logical conclusion from the two statements "I was born with two legs" (empirical proposition) and "I have a right to the things with which I was born" (expression of what I think ought to be done if somebody tried to take my legs away).

Your second statement, "I have a right to the things with which I was born" is derived from, "I was the first possessor of my two legs," and the definition of a "right."

Whether P has a right to x is not even a moral question. It is a strictly empirical, factual one. The relevant moral question is whether we ought, if P's claim is true, to respect that right.

In my view the ought is inextricably connected to the right because if it isn't then the right is meaningless. Therefore the question of whether P has a natural or common right to x is a moral question.

Ooops, non sequitur. "Inextricably connected," yes. "IS a moral question," no. The truth conditions for "P has a right to x" neither include nor require any moral assumptions or inquiries. But the proposition does have moral import, and is typically asserted to evoke moral reflection. Such propositions are not meaningless without a moral context, but would seldom be asserted without one. Crusoe alone on his island still has a right to the coconut he found, but would have no occasion to assert it.

The statement "People have a natural right to the things which they bring with them into the world because they acquired them without inflicting loss or injury on other moral agents" contains an opinion.

Of course it contains an opinion. It is also my opinion that 2+2 = 4, and that Paris is the capital of France. Opinions are not contraries of "facts." That the (classical) meaning of "having a right" is as given above is an historical fact, as is whether P is the first possessor of x.

I disagree. In my usage, "2 + 2 = 4" and "Paris is the capital of France" are not opinions. They are statements of linguistic or logical conventions.

They're both. The two characterizations are not mutually exclusive. An opinion is merely a belief that proposition P is the case. "It is Alfie's opinion that P" is equivalent to, "Alfie believes that P." P may be true or false, and if true, we say that P is a "fact." Whether P is true is decided by verifying its truth conditions; deciding whether Alfie believes that P involves an entirely different set of truth conditions.

"1. COUNTABLE NOUN [oft poss NOUN, NOUN that]
Your opinion about something is what you think or believe about it.

"3. UNCOUNTABLE NOUN
You can refer to the beliefs or views that people have as opinion."

https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dicti ... sh/opinion

The statement "People have a natural right to the things which they bring with them into the world..." is a statement as to what one believes ought to be done by various humans in various circumstances, as a result of some empirical facts.

No. That statement is merely the definition of "natural right." It does, of course, have moral import, as do most assertions or claims of rights.

I don't think 2 + 2 ought to be 4. I don't think Paris ought to be the capital of France. I don't think I ought to have two legs. I don't think I ought to have brought them with me into the world. Those are not oughts. They are statements of what is the case either conventionally or empirically. As soon as I attach rights I introduce the ought, because, if my statement about rights is to have any meaning above and beyond the bare physical facts about my legs, it must be about what various people ought to do if various other people try to deprive me of my legs.

You're equating what a proposition asserts with some "ought" which may follow from it, given some moral theory. Rights statements don't assert "oughts;" they assert empirical facts. No "oughts" are implied by them without an intervening moral premise or theory. "Steve has a right to his legs" is an empircal statement. "Depriving Steve of his legs would injure him" is an empirical statement. "One ought not deprive Steve of his legs" is a moral statment, which can be derived if a moral premise is added to those empirical statements, i.e., "one ought not inflict injuries on other moral agents."

I argued elsewhere that moral "oughts" are merely instrumental "oughts" --- assertions about what one ought to do if one seeks a certain goal. E.g., "If you want to drive a nail you ought to get a hammer." The "ought" there simply proposes that doing X will enable you to reach some goal Y, or at least get you closer to it. Such "ought" statements are also factual; either doing X will get you closer to Y or it won't. If the goal of morality, or a moral theory, is to devise rules which allow all agents in a social setting to maximize their welfare, then a rule to the effect that "one ought not inflict injuries on other moral agents" is an instrumental "ought," and either will or will not get us closer to that goal.

Thanks for post, Steve. Refreshing to see one that actually addresses the arguments, rather than spouting epithets and ad hominems.

[Leontiskos]

"Self-interest" is not limited to securing benefits for oneself; it extends to benefits to others if the welfare of those others is important to you.

This is a remarkable extension of the meaning of "self". If we go just one tiny step farther, it would say that "self" includes one's entire community. And thereby we convert selfishness into altruism, or into communism (community-ism). I don't think this particular extension of meaning is useful; I think it's misleading and confusing.

In this thread you seemed to say just the opposite: How is it possible to have self-interest and to be able to form moral judgements?

[Pattern-chaser]

"Self-interest" is not limited to securing benefits for oneself; it extends to benefits to others if the welfare of those others is important to you.

This is a remarkable extension of the meaning of "self". If we go just one tiny step farther, it would say that "self" includes one's entire community. And thereby we convert selfishness into altruism, or into communism (community-ism). I don't think this particular extension of meaning is useful; I think it's misleading and confusing.

In this thread you seemed to say just the opposite: How is it possible to have self-interest and to be able to form moral judgements?

That's because I'm not arguing a point here, but only expressing surprise at a most unusual, and misleading, use of the term "self".

[Leontiskos]

"Self-interest" is not limited to securing benefits for oneself; it extends to benefits to others if the welfare of those others is important to you.

This is a remarkable extension of the meaning of "self". If we go just one tiny step farther, it would say that "self" includes one's entire community. And thereby we convert selfishness into altruism, or into communism (community-ism). I don't think this particular extension of meaning is useful; I think it's misleading and confusing.

In this thread you seemed to say just the opposite: How is it possible to have self-interest and to be able to form moral judgements?

That's because I'm not arguing a point here, but only expressing surprise at a most unusual, and misleading, use of the term "self".

But I don't see why you would be surprised that GE Morton thinks self-interest extends to the benefits of others. You yourself claimed that altruism is bound up with self-interest (link). As of May 6th you agreed with Morton.

[Belindi]

The main and most interesting theme is "Natural Rights".

In order for there to be rights there has to be someone or something that confers rights.

Why do you think so? You seem to be viewing rights as some sort of gift, which implies a giver. But they're not. A right is just a pseudo-property we impute to persons when a certain historical fact about that person obtains. The term denotes that a particular relationship exists between the person and the thing to which he has a right --- namely, that he acquired that thing without inflicting loss or injury on any other person. Rights are not bestowed or conferred by anything or anybody; they attach to the person "automatically" when that historical event occurs. Many other pseudo-properties also attach to persons "automatically," when some fact is true about them. E.g., "Doctor" and "M.D." attach automatically to a person who graduates from medical school; "husband" attaches automatically to a man who marries; etc.

Natural selection does not 'aim for' final causes such as rights. Neither do any other workings of nature aim for final causes.Therefore there are no natural rights.

Natural rights have nothing to do with natural selection. I've explained what is a "natural right" several times --- it is simply a right to things you naturally possess, things you brought with you into the world, such as your life, your body, your various natural talents and abilities. I.e., to your natural assets. You have rights to them for the same reason you may gain rights ("common rights") to other things --- because you acquired them righteously, that is, without inflicting harms or losses on anyone else.

But the titles of Doctor and MD are given to individuals by established institutions. Rights tend to be enshrined in a society's laws. Such titles are given for specific skills and knowledge, not for

"acquired them righteously, that is, without inflicting harms or losses on anyone else.

The designation of husband is not legally enforced in any case as far as I am aware.

Your description of what natural rights means may be popular, but it is not a description that stands opposed to man-made rights. It is obvious that societies arbitrate on what man shall be permitted to live and what man shall not be permitted to live e.g. wars, human sacrifices, the death penalty, leaving poor people to starve to death, lethal conditions issuing from trade in human beings.

I can produce examples that rebut each of your other claims about "natural" rights. There is no natural right to one's body in Texas, half the population of Texas now the property of the State of Texas.

[Leontiskos]

Personally I'm fine with the notion of natural rights so long as we don't confuse them with descriptive natural laws, as they have been in the past.

I find this to be a curious statement. At what point in the past do you believe natural rights and natural laws were conflated?

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Rights statements don't assert "oughts;" they assert empirical facts. No "oughts" are implied by them without an intervening moral premise or theory.

This seems to be an important ambiguity of terminology among posters. Here is an example where you define rights apart from "oughts":

"Rights" is a concept, a term, which --- as it is classically understood --- denotes a particular relationship between a person and some thing, the thing which the person claims a right. It is an historical claim, to the effect that the claimant was the first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else. That claim (e.g., "P has a right to x") is either true or false, and the truth conditions for it are publicly verifiable (in most cases). Hence whether P has a right to x is objective.

Whether P has a right to x is not even a moral question. It is a strictly empirical, factual one. The relevant moral question is whether we ought, if P's claim is true, to respect that right.

Your claim is that the concepts of private property and theft involve a factual and normative aspect. The factual aspect asks whether "the claimant was the first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else." The normative aspect asks whether others "ought... to respect that [factual aspect]." That is, the normative aspect is about whether theft is permissible.

I myself am not convinced that rights are separable from the normative aspect (and if they are not would we then have non-instrumental moral "oughts"?). It seems to me that we have a right to private property and the factual aspect is a necessary condition of that right. To ask whether we ought to "respect that right" would apparently mean that normativity is already instilled into the right itself, and therefore it is not merely factual. This is because respecting a right entails "oughts", and we are here assuming that respect for a fact cannot entail "oughts."

Such propositions are not meaningless without a moral context, but would seldom be asserted without one. Crusoe alone on his island still has a right to the coconut he found, but would have no occasion to assert it.

It seems to me that rights would never be asserted without a moral context, and that Crusoe's right to his coconut is bound up with "oughts"/normativity even if he never has occasion to assert it. On my view a right establishes a normative relation between the right-holder and all other rational agents. If I have a right to a coconut then everyone else has an obligation not to take it away from me. I don't see what the meaning of the factual aspect would be apart from a moral context.

The moral question will always remain--- whether we ought to inflict loss or injury on others by taking something of value to them which they acquired without inflicting loss or injury --- and so will the obligation to morally justify an affirmative answer.

Yes, and your phrasing of the factual aspect is already cultivated for the yield of the moral principle. I almost wonder if a formulation which states the moral principle outright would be more straightforward, "Acquisition by way of loss or injury is impermissible." From this principle the difference between discovered property and stolen property is clear.

Great posts, by the way. You are an excellent exception to the shoddy moral philosophy found on this forum.

[GE Morton]

In my view, to have any meaning/use these properties and pseudo-properties have to be observable.

No; most, if not all of them, are not. What is observable is the historical fact that warrants imputing the pseudo-property. That is what distinguishes them from "real" (or "local") properties --- you can't confirm them by observing the thing alleged to have them; you have to observe something else, beyond the subject. We can't observe "husbandhood" by looking at a husband. Instead, we have to verify that he exchanged a particular set of vows and participated in a certain ritual sometime in the past. Nationality is another pseudo-property. We can't verify that Alfie is a Scot by looking at him. We'll need to examine some birth records.

The property of an object being red, for example, is observable. If we're talking about pseudo-properties such as "doctor" or "husband" then they're given meaning by the observable behaviours of doctors and husbands.

Yes, "red" is a real (local) property. But no, we can't confirm that Alfie is a husband or doctor by observing his behavior (do husbands behave any differently from long-term, live-in boyfriends?) Similarly, people may acquire medical skills in several ways, but unless Alfie graduated from an accredited medical school it would be inaccurate to call him an "M.D." And to confirm the latter we'd need to examine some school records.

If we're saying that a right is a pseudo-property then, as with the pseudo-property "doctor", the observables are human behaviours.

Often, but not always. Nationality is a pseudo-property not evidenced by behavior (unless you count being born as a behavior). When it is behavior, it is some past behavior that warrants assigning the pseudo-property.

In the case of rights, they are the behaviours which we, as the believers in the rights, think people ought to perform to protect those rights. That, in my view, is what inextricably connects rights to oughts - to our opinions as to what actions are right and what actions are wrong. And that is why I disagree with you when you say "Whether P has a right to x is not even a moral question.". If we say that it's not a moral question then we're saying that it can exist but be unobservable.

Does the above clear that up? It is not the desired or expected behaviors of third parties which warrant assigning rights to people; it is a particular past behavior of the assignee. Moral considerations do account for the choice of the term "rights" to mark those properties, of course --- the belief that the things to which the right attaches were acquired by the rights holder righteously.

[Ecurb]

This seems to be an important ambiguity of terminology among posters. Here is an example where you define rights apart from "oughts":

"Rights" is a concept, a term, which --- as it is classically understood --- denotes a particular relationship between a person and some thing, the thing which the person claims a right. It is an historical claim, to the effect that the claimant was the first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else. That claim (e.g., "P has a right to x") is either true or false, and the truth conditions for it are publicly verifiable (in most cases). Hence whether P has a right to x is objective.

Whether P has a right to x is not even a moral question. It is a strictly empirical, factual one. The relevant moral question is whether we ought, if P's claim is true, to respect that right.

Your claim is that the concepts of private property and theft involve a factual and normative aspect. The factual aspect asks whether "the claimant was the first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else." The normative aspect asks whether others "ought... to respect that [factual aspect]." That is, the normative aspect is about whether theft is permissible.

I myself am not convinced that rights are separable from the normative aspect (and if they are not would we then have non-instrumental moral "oughts"?). It seems to me that we have a right to private property and the factual aspect is a necessary condition of that right. To ask whether we ought to "respect that right" would apparently mean that normativity is already instilled into the right itself, and therefore it is not merely factual. This is because respecting a right entails "oughts", and we are here assuming that respect for a fact cannot entail "oughts."

This is precisely where I think Morton is prevaricating. "Rights: -- as classically understood -- are NOT a relationship between a person and some thing. Instead, they are a relationship between two (or more) people. This seems so obvious to me that I find it difficult to understand how anyone can disagree.

Let's look at the "Bill of Rights". The first amendment states:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Now I know that the U.S. constitution is not "classical" (i.e. neither Greek nor Roman), but when we talk about how rights are classically (or historically) understood, this amendment is regularly referred to as protecting the "right to free speech" or the "right to freedom of religion" or the "right of assembly". These "rights" have nothing to do with whether anyone was the "first possessor of some thing". Instead, they involve relationshps between people. People (i.e. the government) are prohibited from making laws abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. One person's "right" is simply another person's "obligation". That's all any rights are and all they can be.

If Morton wants to JUSTIFY property rights with some silly argument about "first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else" fine. That may (or may not) be relevant to property rights, but it certainly is irrelevant to the right to free speech, or freedom of assembly, or freedom of religion. In addition, Morton's silly notion that we are "possessors" of our lives, bodies, and talents twists the normal meaning of "possess" in a vain attempt to equate the "right to life" with "property rights".

It seems, Leontiskos, that we agree about this. I have claimed that "rights' inevitably involve "obligations" on the part of people. My "obligations" and your "oughts" are essentially the same thing -- the obligations to which I refer can be either moral obligations ("oughts") or legal obligations. The First Amendment specifically spells this out: the government is obliged (legally and morally) to pass no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. I'll grant this isn't Classical (as in Greek or Roman), but it seems like the normal understanding of "rights".

[Leontiskos]

I myself am not convinced that rights are separable from the normative aspect...

It seems, Leontiskos, that we agree about this. I have claimed that "rights' inevitably involve "obligations" on the part of people. My "obligations" and your "oughts" are essentially the same thing...

I do agree with you that rights involve obligations. In my previous post I said, "If I have a right to a coconut then everyone else has an obligation not to take it away from me."

I also think GE Morton is right that property rights involve a relation between a person and a thing, and I am guessing he is also right that the classical understanding focuses on that relation. But it seems to me that property rights must at the same time involve relations between rational agents. Perhaps this corollary is being downplayed due to the fact that this forum is highly distrustful of moral claims.

If Morton wants to JUSTIFY property rights with some silly argument about "first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else" fine.

Oh, but that strikes me as a very good argument, not a silly argument.

In addition, Morton's silly notion that we are "possessors" of our lives, bodies, and talents twists the normal meaning of "possess" in a vain attempt to equate the "right to life" with "property rights".

Self-ownership is a fairly well-established notion in the Anglo world that goes back at least to John Locke. It also seems like a pertinent rebuttal when slave-owners claim to possess the bodies and labor of slaves.

I don't know whether the First Amendment could be justified entirely on the basis of notions of possession. I haven't really looked at that question.

Do you think that the right to life exists and is rationally justifiable? If so, how would you justify it?

[GE Morton]

Your claim is that the concepts of private property and theft involve a factual and normative aspect. The factual aspect asks whether "the claimant was the first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else." The normative aspect asks whether others "ought... to respect that [factual aspect]." That is, the normative aspect is about whether theft is permissible.

Well, those are two different concepts. The concept of private property has no normative aspect; that term merely distinguishes property held by one or a few persons from public property, or common property, which is held by the community as a whole. Theft, of course, obviously has a moral aspect; it means "the wrongful taking of property."

I myself am not convinced that rights are separable from the normative aspect (and if they are not would we then have non-instrumental moral "oughts"?). It seems to me that we have a right to private property and the factual aspect is a necessary condition of that right. To ask whether we ought to "respect that right" would apparently mean that normativity is already instilled into the right itself, and therefore it is not merely factual. This is because respecting a right entails "oughts", and we are here assuming that respect for a fact cannot entail "oughts."

You're right; rights do indeed have a "moral aspect." Whether a right exists is strictly an empirical question, a question of fact. The truth condition for, "P has a right to x" is a publicly verifiable state-of-affairs-in-the-world. But that state of affairs itself has moral import --- it is that P acquired x without inflicting loss or injury on another moral agent. That is a fact, but one that has moral significance --- assuming one agrees that inflicting loss or injury upon other moral agents must always be morally justified.

Many factual, empirically verifiable states of affairs have moral import. E.g., "Alfie's house is on fire and he is trapped inside!", "That man is stealing Alfie's horse!" Etc. They are states of affairs that morally demand some action or at least some moral reflection.

It seems to me that rights would never be asserted without a moral context, and that Crusoe's right to his coconut is bound up with "oughts"/normativity even if he never has occasion to assert it.

That is true. The concept is only useful in a social setting, as is morality itself. In such a setting the purpose of making a rights claim is to put others on notice that taking Crusoe's coconut will require moral justification.

On my view a right establishes a normative relation between the right-holder and all other rational agents. If I have a right to a coconut then everyone else has an obligation not to take it away from me. I don't see what the meaning of the factual aspect would be apart from a moral context.

Yes, it does establish such a relationship between the right holder and everyone else. As Blackstone put it, "There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."

But those relationships only spring into existence after the right itself does. They are subsequent and consequent to the act which created the right, namely, an act of first possession.

[Leontiskos]

I myself am not convinced that rights are separable from the normative aspect (and if they are not would we then have non-instrumental moral "oughts"?). It seems to me that we have a right to private property and the factual aspect is a necessary condition of that right. To ask whether we ought to "respect that right" would apparently mean that normativity is already instilled into the right itself, and therefore it is not merely factual. This is because respecting a right entails "oughts", and we are here assuming that respect for a fact cannot entail "oughts."

You're right; rights do indeed have a "moral aspect." Whether a right exists is strictly an empirical question, a question of fact. The truth condition for, "P has a right to x" is a publicly verifiable state-of-affairs-in-the-world. But that state of affairs itself has moral import --- it is that P acquired x without inflicting loss or injury on another moral agent. That is a fact, but one that has moral significance --- assuming one agrees that inflicting loss or injury upon other moral agents must always be morally justified.

Many factual, empirically verifiable states of affairs have moral import. E.g., "Alfie's house is on fire and he is trapped inside!", "That man is stealing Alfie's horse!" Etc. They are states of affairs that morally demand some action or at least some moral reflection.

Okay, I think I understand your position. A few points:

• P1: If someone has a right to some thing then that thing was acquired without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else.
• P2: If someone has acquired some thing without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else then they have a right to that thing.
• P3: If someone has a right to some thing then others have property obligations towards the right-holder.
• 4: Therefore, if someone has acquired some thing without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else, then others have property obligations towards the right-holder. {From P2 & P3}

Regarding the terminological question, P1 and P2 describe what you refer to as the truth conditions for verifying the existence of a right. Yet the meaning of rights seems to be elucidated by P3, which is to say that when we commonly speak about rights we are generally speaking about P3 rather than P1 (or P2). It seems like this has been a confusion in the thread, for talking about how rights are established or verified (P1 & P2) is different from talking about rights themselves (P3). Apparently the establishment and verification of rights is a factual matter while the concept and assertion of rights is a normative (or moral) matter. Further evidence of this lies in the fact that the no-ought-from-is crowd will complain about P2 rather than P3, for the "ought" comes onto the scene when the right comes onto the scene.

(Of course, when P3 is isolated from P1 we tend to run into the problem of pseudo-rights, but I still think the semantic meaning of rights is best illustrated by P3)

Secondly, 4 is clearly a violation of the so-called "is-ought principle." That's fine with me; I think 4 is sound. But lots of folks around here are going to be squeamish about such a "violation." Do you think it is a violation of that principle, and if so, is it justified?

Thirdly, it is not clear to me how 4 jibes with your theory of morality as instrumental. If not everyone has adopted the goal that the instrumental moral precept is aiming at, then can the moral obligation apply to them?

On my view a right establishes a normative relation between the right-holder and all other rational agents. If I have a right to a coconut then everyone else has an obligation not to take it away from me. I don't see what the meaning of the factual aspect would be apart from a moral context.

Yes, it does establish such a relationship between the right holder and everyone else. As Blackstone put it, "There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."

Hah, very good.

But those relationships only spring into existence after the right itself does. They are subsequent and consequent to the act which created the right, namely, an act of first possession.

It seems to me that the relationships are subsequent and consequent to the act of first possession which created the right, but not to the right itself. They are co-terminus with the right itself. (That said, I'm not sure if this distinction is important)

[Pattern-chaser]

This is a remarkable extension of the meaning of "self". If we go just one tiny step farther, it would say that "self" includes one's entire community. And thereby we convert selfishness into altruism, or into communism (community-ism). I don't think this particular extension of meaning is useful; I think it's misleading and confusing.

But I don't see why you would be surprised that GE Morton thinks self-interest extends to the benefits of others. You yourself claimed that altruism is bound up with self-interest (link). As of May 6th you agreed with Morton.

There is a difference between recognising a link between altruism and self-interest, and extending the meaning of the term "self" to include others. [Especially as the concept of "self" specifically excludes others, by definition.] Your suggestion of agreement is unfounded and incorrect. Your objections to my simple observation are fabricated for personal reasons, it seems. If you have a point to offer, then please do so. Thanks.

[Steve3007]

Well, you've complicated the issue with your "People have a right to keep their two legs . . ." That is a derivative right, a moral conclusion drawn from a natural right premise via a moral theory. The underlying premise is, "Alfie has a right to his two legs." That proposition, unlike your "Right to keep" premise, is strictly empirical --- it is true IFF Alfie was the first possessor of his two legs. If we then introduce a moral premise or theory which says, "People ought not take things from other people which they have acquired righteously," we can derive your "Right to keep" statement.

In my view, there really is no significant difference between "Alfie has a right to keep his legs" and "Alfie has a right to his legs". As I said, if you're going to call such rights pseudo-properties and are going to say that, like properties such as colour, they are proposed to exist in the absence of minds (because they are properties of things that exist outside of minds) then you have to show evidence for them. You have to state what observation could, at least in principle, be used as evidence for their presence. To me, at least, it would make no sense to propose the existence of a property (or pseudo-property) that is undetectable.

As I said, with rights, as far as I can see, that evidence only exists in the form of the human behaviours that the rights-believer thinks it morally right for various people to do or refrain from doing. Therefore it makes no sense to talk of rights as existing without that moral opinion. Alfie's legs exist outside of any mind. They are not simply abstract concepts in minds (unless we're solipsists). His right to his legs does not. It's an abstract concept, in my view.

Propositions in the form "P has a right to x," where x is some particular tangible or intangible thing (property rights) or to take some action (liberty rights) are true-or-false statements with publicly verifiable truth conditions. And, yes, the relationship asserted would exist in the absence of minds, just as would "P lives in Chicago." But such propositions do indeed also have moral import, and can serve as premises in moral arguments.

I disagree. Show me how the proposition "P has a right to x" is publicly verifiable. That doesn't mean simply showing me that the existence of x is publicly verifiable. It doesn't mean simply asserting that "everybody has a right to the things they brought into the world" or some such thing. If you're claiming that rights are pseudo-properties which exist independently of the way that we think about them (in the absence of minds) then it also doesn't mean referring to what we think people ought to do due to our belief in those rights.

"P lives in Chicago" is publicly verifiable by anybody who is capable of physically locating P's home and noting the name that is conventionally given to that location. That's not the same as "P has a right to x", unless you're saying that rights are a matter of linguistic convention, as the names we give to various points on the surface of the Earth are.

Your second statement, "I have a right to the things with which I was born" is derived from, "I was the first possessor of my two legs," and the definition of a "right."

I see it as simply a statement of a human preference. "Rights" are not something that was discovered existing in nature, like rocks. They are a codification of some of our moral preferences.

Ooops, non sequitur. "Inextricably connected," yes. "IS a moral question," no. The truth conditions for "P has a right to x" neither include nor require any moral assumptions or inquiries.

Describe to me the publicly accessible truth condition of "P has a right to x" then. As I said, it isn't simply something like "P is the first possessor of X" or "P brought X with him into the world". That would be a tautological syllogism. It would be something like: "I declare that we have a right to class of objects C. X is a member of C. Therefore we have a right to x."

But the proposition does have moral import, and is typically asserted to evoke moral reflection. Such propositions are not meaningless without a moral context, but would seldom be asserted without one. Crusoe alone on his island still has a right to the coconut he found, but would have no occasion to assert it.

It's fine for you to assert that, in your view, Crusoe has the right to the coconut he found even if he has no occasion to assert it. Your problem comes when you try to say that this right somehow exists as a publicly verifiable pseudo-property of Crusoe and the coconut.

I'll leave it there for now and address the rest of the post later.

[Belindi]

Alfie has two legs doesn't imply Alfie has the right to his two legs.or Alfie has the right to have two legs like most other people

I eat does not imply I have the right to eat

There is no Authority that stipulates rights of any sort. Moreover some philosophers claim there is no Authority that stipulates normal human anatomy (or normal human psyche)

[Steve3007]

Alfie has two legs doesn't imply Alfie has the right to his two legs.or Alfie has the right to have two legs like most other people

I eat does not imply I have the right to eat

A distinction between those two examples of possible rights would be that continued possession of the things I brought into the world (e.g. parts of my body) can happen with no injury or loss to others. Whereas if we were to simply say:

"I have the right to eat."

as opposed to saying something like:

"I have the right to grow or gather food so I can eat it or negotiate a freely entered agreement with somebody else to grow/gather it for me. (Possibly involving me doing something in return. Possibly using money as a means of exchange.)"

then we'd be implying that someone else has the obligation to do work in order to provide me with that food. So "I have the right to eat" implies forced loss to others. I think that's why a true libertarian would say that we have a natural right to the things we brought into the world but we don't simply have a natural right to eat. Just as (they would say) we have the right to "the pursuit of happiness" but we don't simply have the right to be happy. We have the right to pursue our desires. We don't have the right to have someone else be forced to work to deliver them. That's the line.

But yes, I agree that "Alfie has two legs" doesn't imply "Alfie has the right to his two legs", unless we prepend the assertion "We all have the right to what we were born with" as a premise. Obviously we might almost all of us agree that people should be afforded the right to the things they were born with. But that just makes it a very popular moral principle, not an empirical truth about the extra-mental world.