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[Gertie]

GE

Sorry about the long posts, untangling your meanings and implications is laborious for me.

This is what I have so far. You have a set of criteria for which sentient beings are/aren't due moral consideration -


* Those who understand right and wrong and can act on it (moral agents).

* Those who understand right and wrong but can't act on it [b](moral subjects)[/b]

Those who can act on it, but don't understand right and wrong. (not included for moral consideration in your foundational axiom)

Those who can't act on it, but do understand right and wrong. (not included for moral consideration in your foundational axiom).

Your axiom, from which moral rules and principles are to be derived, only covers the first two categories. Of course there are sentient beings, including millions of people, who don't fit in any of these four categories, nevermind the first two, and so aren't granted any moral consideration in your axiom. Including a drowning toddler.


Your definition of ''Equal Agency'' just means the rules you derive from your axiom apply equally to all moral agents, not that they actually have equal agency. Their actual capacity for agency is irrelevant, they just have to be defined as having it. This is plain and simple a recipe for the more privileged/powerful to take advantage of the less privileged/powerful, further widening the gap. An exploiters' charter.

And the foundational axiom itself, the generator of rules and principles which apply to the first two of the above categories, is that Moral Agents ought to allow each other and Moral Subjects to maximise their interests. There is no ought to help them do so, merely to allow it, and not impede it.

That's it.

Your moral Principle of Freedom clearly derives from your axiomatic foundation, it's almost a tortology. And to impede another moral agent or subject maximising their own wellbeing is the clearly derivable Moral Wrong.


You also have a Duty to Aid, but that doesn't derive from your axiom. That's an ungrounded add-on.

There is no moral duty to aid which is derivable from allowing someone to maximise their welfare (even if they fit in your categories for moral consideration), you just shouldn't get in their way. It's at your discretion if you want to help a drowning toddler, there is no moral reason to do so. So your Duty to Aid must be grounded in something other than your foundational axiom. What?


So lets apply this to a few homeless peeps you might pass on the street.

- An able bodied and able-minded adult who lost their job. (moral agent)

- A severely physically disabled person who can't support themselves. (moral subject)

- An abandoned baby left on a doorstep. (neither/not included for moral consideration).


Your axiom gives provides no moral obligation to help any of them based on their circumstances or needs, only to allow them to maximise their own welfare in the first two cases. The third case of the abandoned baby isn't covered by your categories for moral consideration.


Let's see if your so far ungrounded ''Duty to Aid'' add-on makes a difference.

Well the most vulnerable, the baby and severely physically disabled woman, can't offer much in return, but maybe it isn't their fault they're homeless, maybe the woman is disabled through no fault of her own, so they qualify for a bit of help if it isn't too onerous on you. At your discretion once you've run through your checklist.

But not by the state, only by someone who qualifies as a moral agent who might pass by. And once they've offered that bit of help, which obviously isn't going to be a long term solution, the baby and severely disabled woman are no better off. But pooling our bits of aid communally as a society (via taxes) to offer long term help to actually allow them to flourish, is immoral. It goes against the very foundation of your morality which is to be allowed to maximise your own welfare without interference.


What kind of morality is this GE? What's it for except letting the more advantaged further flourish at the expense of those less so?

[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote:

Societies are formed of people who cooperate. For cooperation to happen individuals have to feel pity.

Oh, surely not. People cooperate because it is in the individual interests of each of them to do so. Cooperation doesn't presume or require any emotional attachments among the parties, and in most cases there aren't any.

What I actually wrote was For cooperation to happen individuals have to feel pity. or feel they need reciprocal services in the community.

I agree these motives are present in tribal and in animal societies.

Then why call societies in in which they're less frequent "less civilized?" If anything, they're less tribal.

Because tribal societies may have cultures that permit individuals quite a lot of freedom to display pity and cooperative ingenuity.

We say that sort of society is "less civilised" by which we imply that particular society has regressed from a norm that is based in altruism and freely -given cooperation.

Well, that is a spurious norm, no doubt the product of wishful thinking. It is not the actual norm in real civilized societies.

Nevertheless it is what people frequently say, notably but not entirely in post-Christian cultures.

You seem to be using "civilized" as an honorific, i.e., to describe societies which approach certain moral ideals you embrace. But literally the term just denotes societies characterized by cities.


My usage of the word is not eccentric. My usage of the word is actually hopeful as it shows an ethical way ahead. Your usage of the word, while it is common(and I too like etymology ) is not ethically helpful.
The term 'civilisation' has several frequent connotations, as have other sociological terms such as 'culture'.

[Ecurb]

Societies are formed of people who cooperate. For cooperation to happen individuals have to feel pity.

Oh, surely not. People cooperate because it is in the individual interests of each of them to do so. Cooperation doesn't presume or require any emotional attachments among the parties, and in most cases there aren't any.

In civilizations -- as in tribal societies -- people often cooperate because of family ties. Kinship is complicated -- it involves both normative duties and empathetic affection. Nonetheless, it's silly to suggest that mothers (mammals) nurse their children, feed them, clothe them, change their diapers and care for them because " it is in the individual interests of each of them to do so." Yet the family is the most important economic and social relationship most of us maintain.

Parents are bound by duty, cultural norms, and affection to feed and care for their children. Citizens in civilized societes may not feel the bonds of affection for homeless strangers -- but they can still be bound by duty and cultural norms to offer some aid. In fact, they ARE so bound. When they take jobs that offer a paycheck the money is not "theirs" -- it is divied up. They get to keep some -- some goes to taxes (which are spent according to the will of the majority), some goes to social security (in the U.S.), some goes to unemployment insurance, etc. If we refrain from calling the duty of a parent to support his or her children "robbery", neither can we call the duty of a citizen to pay his taxes "robbery". The money is not "his property" -- it is, like the animal the hunter kills in the tribal society -- divided by law, custom, and cultural mores.

If Morton objects, he can work outside the Government controlled economy -- bartering instead of using Caesar's coins.

[GE Morton]

Neither people nor other mammals help others only for "mutual benefit". Female mammals routinely donate to their children scarce resources which they could use for themselves . They do not expect (nor do they receive) any tangible benefit in return.

Also, from a later post,

In civilizations -- as in tribal societies -- people often cooperate because of family ties. Kinship is complicated -- it involves both normative duties and empathetic affection. Nonetheless, it's silly to suggest that mothers (mammals) nurse their children, feed them, clothe them, change their diapers and care for them because " it is in the individual interests of each of them to do so." Yet the family is the most important economic and social relationship most of us maintain.

I didn't say people help others only for mutual benefit. I said they usually do, i.e., most cooperation in civilized societies is done for the mutual benefit of the cooperating parties.

Nor did I say or imply that "mothers (mammals) nurse their children, feed them, clothe them, change their diapers and care for them because it is in the individual interests of each of them to do so." I said people (usually) cooperate out of self-interest. Maternal care is not "cooperation," as that term is commonly understood, there being no reciprocity from the child. It is, however, most certainly done (in most cases) from self-interest --- the welfare of the child being a priority interest of the mother. "Self-interest" is not limited to securing benefits for oneself; it extends to benefits to others if the welfare of those others is important to you.

Most examples of cooperation found in civilized societies are those which occur in a workplace. E.g., the workers on an automobile assembly line are cooperating to build cars; the cooks, waiters, maitre'ds, etc., in a restaurant are cooperating to prepare and deliver meals to customers; the carpenters, masons, electricians, plumbers on a construction crew are cooperating to build a house. All of those workers are working to earn a paycheck; they are not doing so pursuant to any acknowledged duty or sense of "social obligation," or because they have some emotional attachments to one another, or even because they have an interest in the products of their work. People may cooperate for any of those latter reasons, but they are not the motives for most cooperation in civilized societies.

I'll agree that in small, tribal societies where everyone is related to everyone else, cooperation occurs more naturally. Nonetheless, although laws are neither written nor codified, the responsibilities of the societies' members are clear -- expressed in the mores of the society and sanctioned (positively and negatively) by its members. The hunter who kills an animal is expected to share the bounty with other members of the group -- just as the rich xecutive is expected to pay his taxes in civilized societies.

Well, I'm not sure cooperation occurs any more "naturally" in tribal societies, but what you say there is true for many of them (though not all). The features you mention distinguish tribal societies from civilized societies. Expecting members of the latter to behave like members of the former is the "organic fallacy," and that fallacy underlies all contemporary political ideologies and much political philosophy, from Plato to the present. I've outlined this fallacy in several other threads. Here is is again:

Homo sapiens, if the anthropologists are right, has been on Earth for about 200,000 years. Until the last 10,000 or so of those years, he lived in small tribal villages, consisting of a few dozen to a few hundred members — small enough that all of its members knew all of the others; indeed, had known each other all of their lives. They midwifed one another’s births, tended one another’s illnesses, shared one another’s possessions, and married one another’s cousins. They knew and trusted one another, and had dense, intimate relationships among one another. They needed no formal ethics nor any political structure to govern their affairs, simply because each was and had always been a part of every other’s life.

The organic model is a good approximation of the structure of such societies. But with the rise of civilization — societies characterized by cities — that model began to break down. People found themselves living in communities in which most of the people around them were strangers, with whom they had no familial or other personal ties, and often very little in common. People began to take notice of the differences among them — differences in coloration and bone structure, in choices of dress, in temperament and mannerisms, in interests and tastes, in the habits and practices of daily life, and eventually even in religion and language. They acquired individuality.

In tribal societies there is no free will, and no individuality. All the myriad choices we today are constantly obliged to make are prescribed by the tribe; they’re part of the tribal consciousness, codified in tribal tradition, the “folkways” of the tribe. How one dresses, what one eats, where one lives, how one earns a living, the choosing of mates, the Gods to be worshipped and the rituals for worshipping them, all the petty rules governing the tasks of daily life and the “standard methods” for performing them, are absorbed from the tribe, without question and without the need for thought.

There is no individuality to speak of in these groups because all members have known and interacted only with each other since birth, and they are locked into a resonance. There is no politics, no debate, no alternate point of view on any matter — and as a result, almost no innovation. Tribal cultures can remain all but static for thousands of years, with only a slight refinement in spear points to indicate any time has passed at all. Australian Aborigines, for example, when encountered by Europeans in the 18th century, were making didgeridoos indistinguishable from those made 2000 years earlier. In 40,000 years they never added another instrument to their musical technology.

That resonance, however, cannot be maintained in larger groups, because the required intimacy is impossible. The group becomes too large for everyone to know and interact constantly with everyone else; hence one soon finds oneself in the company of strangers — individuals with whom they’ve had no prior contact and whose habits, preferences, and beliefs cannot be predicted in advance. And because they’ve all been subject to different combinations of influences, they begin to differ in all the ways indicated above.

The breakdown of that resonance represented a huge transformation, not merely of the social structure, but of the human psyche. The traditional tribal control mechanisms, based on age and personal stature, gave way to formal systems of governance — politics. The tribesman’s intuitive sense of right and wrong, which derived primarily from his personal ties to and commonality with his fellows, gave way to formal systems of ethics. Indeed, ethics, like law, is a code for regulating behavior among strangers — among people who have no personal interest in one another’s welfare. As Jared Diamond pointed out in Guns, Germs, and Steel, “With the rise of chiefdoms around 7,500 years ago, people had to learn, for the first time in history, how to encounter strangers regularly without attempting to kill them.”

Every utopia conceived in the last 5000 years has been an attempt to recapture the tribal consciousness. The Garden of Eden story embodies this “fall from Grace” — the loss of mankind’s oneness with God and Nature, his “alienation,” his exile into a world of strife and temptation, where he seems to have free will and must constantly choose between good and evil, between this course of action or that, relying only on his own judgement, and must suffer the consequences when his judgments go awry.

All these laments of lost innocence and alienation are atavisms, psychic echoes of our tribal heritage, the social form honed over the course of our 3 million year primate history. All of our fellow primates still practice that form, and until the rise of civilization, so did all humans. It would be surprising were our brains not adapted to that social form. They have evolved syncronously with that form, and thus may be expected to function optimally in that environment, in many ways. So it is not surprising that we miss that form, or that we long to regain it. We are ducks out of water, trying to find our way back to the pond.

We remain “wired” for tribal life. We long for it, unattainable though it may be. And often we try to recreate or or substitute for it, by immersing ourselves in cults or joining in totalitarian movements. The cult seeks to insulate itself from the “society of strangers;” the totalitarian movement seeks to subdue it and impose a tribal-like conformity, a synthetic common identity and purpose — usually resulting in much bloodshed.

But civilized humans are individuated; they are no longer interchangeable instances or exemplars of a tribal identity, and cannot be forced into that mold. That individuality is what drives the dynamism of civilized societies; what enables it to change more in 100 years than tribal societies might in 10,000. It is what has permitted humans to overcome the famines, diseases, disasters, and other idiosyncrasies of Nature which beset them and all their primate cousins for millions of years, and to transform the natural world to better meet their needs and better satisfy their ever-evolving and proliferating desires.

What worked for pre-civilized societies never worked very well, and cannot work at all for the unrelated, individuated members of civilized societies. There is no longer a collective consciousness, and in communities of more than a few hundred members, not even any common goals. Modern societies are meta-communities — public venues for personal interactions. They provide opportunities for individuals to forge relationships with others, but supply no content for those relationships. They are like public playing fields; they offer space and seating, but each team brings its own gear, its own personnel, and its own game with its own rules. The house rules are few and general: “No reservations accepted: first-come, first served,” “Do not intrude on others’ games,” and “Pick up your litter.”

The organic society that continues to beckon from our long primate ancestry is lost to history. It is irrecoverable. Contemporary social theorists need to let it go, and craft theories applicable to societies and to persons as we find them today.

I'll further agree (I think) with Morton that there are certain moral principles which (although culturally constituted themselves) supercede the laws of the State. We all recognize potentially state sponsored activities which would lead us to withhold our tax dollars. However, most participants in this thread would not include food stamps, medicare, national healh care, or government supported housing among these activities.

Well, good to see that you acknowledge a basis for rights more fundamental than the decrees of the State. But what "most participants in this thread" believe is an ad populum argument and thus fallacious.

Property exists only because of the laws of the state and its existence is enforced by the minions of the state. If we look at tribal societies (in which the concept of "property" is very different) we see the distinction. The dead animal is not the "property" of the hunter -- by custom it "belongs" to the group. Similarly, in civilized societies the money one earns belongs (in part) to the group. Everyone who pays his taxes must agree in principle. The group is NOT forcibly taking something from someone else; it is collecting its fair share, just as the children in the tribe partake of the meat.

Again, the organic fallacy. Civilized societies are not tribal societies, and are not "similar," in structure, customs, or the relationships among their members.

All laws (including both property laws and tax laws) are violent and coersive. If we agree that violent coersion is (ipso facto) a bad thing, we can agree that utopia must be an anarchy.

Violence and coercion are not ipso facto bad things. They are sometimes justified. They are justified:
1. In order to resist infliction of harm or loss on oneself or another moral agent;
2. In order to prevent such infliction of harm or loss;
3. In order to secure restitution for the victims of unjustified infliction of harm or loss.

[Ecurb]

As usual, Morton, you equivocate and dissemble. In addition your lectures are repetitive and unpersuasive. For example, Morton avers:

In tribal societies there is no free will, and no individuality.

Huh? Since when? It is true, of course, that simpler societies provide less diversity of employment, movement, and education -- but to derive from that fact the notion that there is "no free will, and no individuality" is both asinine and bigotted.

I'll agree with MOrton here, though:

Contemporary social theorists need to let it go, and craft theories applicable to societies and to persons as we find them today.

Social theorists have crafted such theories, and one of them is a system of taxation that provides a safety net for members of the society. In the past, when there was less mobility from both an economic and geographic standpoint, children often lived with their aging parents. Now we've crafted new methods of care -- fair taxes that every wage earner understands are a contractual part of his employment. If he doesn't like it, he can find other means of supporting himself. Finally, Morton's objection to my comparison between taxes and the sharing of the kill with the group is simply silly. The "organic fallacy"? A comparison is not a logical argument, and MOrton's other complaint about my statement of fact (ad populum fallacy) is equally silly. Of course laws and societal norms are determined (partly at least) by "majority rule" -- so it's reasonable to wonder what the majority wants.

Violence and coersion ARE (I suggest) ipso facto bad things. If they weren't, they wouldn't need to be "justified" as Morton suggests they sometimes are. Things that are ipso facto bad are often justified as the lesser of two evils. I'm surprised Mr. Logical Fallacy (Morton) doesn't understand this.

By the way, Morton, although i have been using "civilization" in the sense you suggest, "civility" suggests (among other things): "Proper to or befitting a citizen (paying taxes?) or "polite, observing social amenities". Perhaps members of civilization would benefit from more civility (don't look to Morton or me as an example.).

[Steve3007]

viewtopic.php?p=393660#p393660

It seems to me that statements like this are where you tend to get into arguments with people like TS as to the objective/subjective status of morality, and the concept of rights. Statements like this appear to indicate that you regard natural rights as real as opposed to abstract. i.e. as existing independently of human minds. Even if the things to which we have the natural right (e.g. the things we bring with us into the world) are real, the right to them is not. It is (in my view) an opinion. The statement "People have a natural right to the things which they bring with them into the world because they acquired them without inflicting loss or injury on other moral agents" contains an opinion. It is not a pure statement of fact as something like "People normally have two legs" is. Maybe you agree. But statements like the one quoted above, and particularly the use of the word "real", appear to suggest that you don't.

Yes, natural (and common) rights are "real." But being "real" cannot be taken to mean "existing independently of human minds." "Rights" is a concept, and no concept exists independently of human minds (or perhaps the minds of some other sentient creatures). Countless things are "real," but are not independent of human minds, e.g., laws, theories, thoughts, desires, emotions, and endless other things are surely real, though not independent of minds. "Real" embraces many more things than physical entities with mass and spatio-temporal loci.

OK, so this is where clear mutual understanding of terms helps. People talking at cross purposes so often seems to lead to disagreement where perhaps no disagreement needs to exist. In the case of your brief argument with Terrapin Station, which started here and, as far as I can see ended here, one of those terms was "ontological fact". In this case it's "real". (And the fact that you were only disagreeing over terminology was hidden by the immediately antagonistic start to the conversation, which was presumably a result of disagreements in previous conversations.)

If we use "real" as an antonym for "abstract", to refer to things that exist independently of human brains, then clearly no rights are real. They're all abstract concepts. But if we use "real" to mean existing in any sense, then clearly rights do exist. So we agree. We're just using words differently. I think it was a similar situation in the discussion between you and Terrapin Station. You both immediately started arguing, essentially, over the definition of the term "ontological fact":

viewtopic.php?p=392418#p392418

Whether P is the first possessor of X, or acquired it via a chain of consent from the first possessor, are "ontological facts." The meaning of the word "rights" (and every other valid word in a natural language) is determined by how that word is actually used, currently and historically, in that speech community. Those are also an "ontological facts."

I doubt whether you actually disagree with each other substantively on the definition of rights, even though obviously you disagree about some other things.

[Steve3007]

Looking again at the post which started the argument (or rather this branch of a longer argument) between TS and GE. (This is not to criticize these posters, but just to look at how arguments sometimes go.)

Shouldn't be a crime to be homeless, but it should be a "crime" for someone to be homeless when they don't want to be. In other words, no one should be homeless if they'd like to have a home. As a society, we should guarantee that anyone who wants a home has one. It should be a basic human right, along with having food, clothing, absolutely any health care you need, education as far as you'd like to take it, transportation, at least basic entertainment options, etc.

Oh, my. That answer reveals a startling ignorance of what a "right" is.

First, there is no "should be" with respect to (real) rights; they are intrinsic, universal, and self-evident. They can't be conjured into existence by the decrees of popes, potentates or legislatures. Legal rights may be so created, but they have no moral significance.

To say that someone has a (real) right to something is simply to say that he is rightfully in possession of it, that he acquired righteously, which means he acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on any other person. No person can have a "right" to the services of other persons or to the products of others' labor; others are not your slaves or chattel. All of the phony "rights" you list violate that moral constraint.

How ironic, though of course completely expected from you. Your comment rather reveals a startling ignorance of what a "right" is.

Rights are solely a way that individuals think--namely they're ethical stances that the individual feels should be inviolable, regardless of local laws, customs, etc.

Obviously, due to previous disagreements in previous topics, the "you're revealing your ignorance..." comments, from both sides, came early, which always tends to entrench views and rarely leads to a meeting of minds.

TS starts by stating a political view. Clearly it's a view that GE strongly disagrees with as anyone who has spoken to him would know. It's what you might call a socialist view. (TS has stated several times previously that he used to be a minarchist libertarian but now sees himself still as libertarian in some respects but also socialist in other respects). But the conversation immediately turns into one not of rival political opinions but of what is factually true (about the nature of rights) as GE appears to state that some kinds of rights (which he refers to as real rights) exist independently of human minds. Obviously it's when the conversation seems to be about what is factually true that each side accuses the other of ignorance, in a way that tends to happen less when the disagreement is mutually acknowledged to be one of opinion. And, just as it's clear from GE's past words that he's not going to agree with TS's political views as stated here, it's clear from TS's previous usages of words like "real", as an antonym for "abstract" (and as meaning extra-mental), and from his frequent complaints about people reifying abstractions, that he's going to immediately conclude that GE is reifying an abstraction by calling rights "real".

And so it goes on from there. And will no doubt flare up again later, probably in a different but related topic.

All interesting stuff.

[Belindi]

The main and most interesting theme is "Natural Rights".

In order for there to be rights there has to be someone or something that confers rights. Natural selection does not 'aim for' final causes such as rights. Neither do any other workings of nature aim for final causes.Therefore there are no natural rights.

If nature is not the originator of rights we are left with 1. human cultures of belief or 2. God.

[Steve3007]

My two previous posts were sort of meta-comments. This one is my actual reply (containing my own views on the subject) to this post:

It seems to me that statements like this are where you tend to get into arguments with people like TS as to the objective/subjective status of morality, and the concept of rights. Statements like this appear to indicate that you regard natural rights as real as opposed to abstract. i.e. as existing independently of human minds.

Hmmm. This is proving to be an exceedingly difficult concept to get across.

Yes, natural (and common) rights are "real." But being "real" cannot be taken to mean "existing independently of human minds." "Rights" is a concept, and no concept exists independently of human minds (or perhaps the minds of some other sentient creatures). Countless things are "real," but are not independent of human minds, e.g., laws, theories, thoughts, desires, emotions, and endless other things are surely real, though not independent of minds. "Real" embraces many more things than physical entities with mass and spatio-temporal loci.

OK, so we agree that rights exist. We agree that they don't exist in the same sense that, for example, material objects exist (i.e. continuing to exist in the absence of minds) but they do exist in the same sense that other abstract concepts exist - as ideas in human minds. But (in my view) they are not in the same class as, for example, the abstract concept of natural laws. Natural laws, in my usage at least, means descriptions of patterns in what has been observed of the material world, the law of gravitation being an example. Although that description is an abstract concept which does not exist in the absence of minds and their observations, it purports to describe a relationship between matter which (it proposes) would exist in the absence of those minds. That is not the case with natural rights.

For example, we might describe "people are usually born with two legs" as a statement of natural law and "people have the right to keep the two legs with which they were born" as a statement of natural rights. As laws/principles they're both abstract concepts. But (in my view) the former purports to describe a fact about the extramental world whereas the latter purports to describe an opinion as to what people ought to do.

"Rights" is a concept, a term, which --- as it is classically understood --- denotes a particular relationship between a person and some thing, the thing which the person claims a right. It is an historical claim, to the effect that the claimant was the first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else. That claim (e.g., "P has a right to x") is either true or false, and the truth conditions for it are publicly verifiable (in most cases). Hence whether P has a right to x is objective.

The relationship between the person and the thing (e.g. "I have two legs") is not the right. The statement "I have the right to my legs" has a truth condition that is publicly verifiable only because it is the logical conclusion from the two statements "I was born with two legs" (empirical proposition) and "I have a right to the things with which I was born" (expression of what I think ought to be done if somebody tried to take my legs away).

Whether P has a right to x is not even a moral question. It is a strictly empirical, factual one. The relevant moral question is whether we ought, if P's claim is true, to respect that right.

In my view the ought is inextricably connected to the right because if it isn't then the right is meaningless. Therefore the question of whether P has a natural or common right to x is a moral question.

The statement "People have a natural right to the things which they bring with them into the world because they acquired them without inflicting loss or injury on other moral agents" contains an opinion.

Of course it contains an opinion. It is also my opinion that 2+2 = 4, and that Paris is the capital of France. Opinions are not contraries of "facts." That the (classical) meaning of "having a right" is as given above is an historical fact, as is whether P is the first possessor of x.

I disagree. In my usage, "2 + 2 = 4" and "Paris is the capital of France" are not opinions. They are statements of linguistic or logical conventions. The statement "People have a natural right to the things which they bring with them into the world..." is a statement as to what one believes ought to be done by various humans in various circumstances, as a result of some empirical facts.

I don't think 2 + 2 ought to be 4. I don't think Paris ought to be the capital of France. I don't think I ought to have two legs. I don't think I ought to have brought them with me into the world. Those are not oughts. They are statements of what is the case either conventionally or empirically. As soon as I attach rights I introduce the ought, because, if my statement about rights is to have any meaning above and beyond the bare physical facts about my legs, it must be about what various people ought to do if various other people try to deprive me of my legs.

One may, of course, hold an opinion that we ought to understand the term "right" differently; that we ought to assign "rights" based on needs, or someone's desires, or popular opinion, or some other ground that can change with the political winds, or on whim. But those are just verbal shenanigans, sophistry. The moral question will always remain--- whether we ought to inflict loss or injury on others by taking something of value to them which they acquired without inflicting loss or injury --- and so will the obligation to morally justify an affirmative answer.

Yes, we may hold different opinions as to how rights ought to be assigned. Different opinions on that subject may be based on different goals or on disagreements as to the chains of cause and effect in the world or on different opinions as to how much the effects of our actions on others, directly or indirectly, should be taken into account. Or, of course, they can also be based on immediate emotional reactions.

I think we've discussed previously that my view as to how much the effects of our actions ought to be taken into account differs from yours, and possibly my goals differ from yours. Hence I believe in such things as taxpayer funded healthcare and education (though not unlimited as Terrapin Station seemed to be advocating) whereas you don't.

[Steve3007]

The main and most interesting theme is "Natural Rights".

In order for there to be rights there has to be someone or something that confers rights. Natural selection does not 'aim for' final causes such as rights. Neither do any other workings of nature aim for final causes.Therefore there are no natural rights.

If nature is not the originator of rights we are left with 1. human cultures of belief or 2. God.

Personally I'm fine with the notion of natural rights so long as we don't confuse them with descriptive natural laws, as they have been in the past. In my view they're statements about what one group of people ought to do with respect to another group of people in order to put in place motives for a particular state of affairs to come to pass.

So, for example, the statement "I have the natural right to the things I brought into the world" is a statement as to what a particular group of people ought to do to a person who tries to take those things from me in order to motivate that person or others to not try to do that in the future. If we strip it of those statements about what actions, in our opinion, ought to be carried out/encouraged/discouraged then it's meaningless in my view.

[Belindi]

The main and most interesting theme is "Natural Rights".

In order for there to be rights there has to be someone or something that confers rights. Natural selection does not 'aim for' final causes such as rights. Neither do any other workings of nature aim for final causes.Therefore there are no natural rights.

If nature is not the originator of rights we are left with 1. human cultures of belief or 2. God.

Personally I'm fine with the notion of natural rights so long as we don't confuse them with descriptive natural laws, as they have been in the past. In my view they're statements about what one group of people ought to do with respect to another group of people in order to put in place motives for a particular state of affairs to come to pass.

So, for example, the statement "I have the natural right to the things I brought into the world" is a statement as to what a particular group of people ought to do to a person who tries to take those things from me in order to motivate that person or others to not try to do that in the future. If we strip it of those statements about what actions, in our opinion, ought to be carried out/encouraged/discouraged then it's meaningless in my view.

"Natural" to refer to moral rights like possessions, clean enough air, shelter, or water, is expressive but not explicit. There are occasions when it is good to use the word expressively however a debate on a philosophy forum is an occasion for explicit language.
Nature is not the sort of thing that can be aware of rights. Rights are cultural constructs. Some cultures are better than others at human and animal rights; other cultures these rights are irrelevant. There is no overall authority or Authority on rights. The United Nations' consensus is the most ultimate authoritative we can have.

[chewybrian]

The main and most interesting theme is "Natural Rights".

In order for there to be rights there has to be someone or something that confers rights. Natural selection does not 'aim for' final causes such as rights. Neither do any other workings of nature aim for final causes.Therefore there are no natural rights.

If nature is not the originator of rights we are left with 1. human cultures of belief or 2. God.

Personally I'm fine with the notion of natural rights so long as we don't confuse them with descriptive natural laws, as they have been in the past. In my view they're statements about what one group of people ought to do with respect to another group of people in order to put in place motives for a particular state of affairs to come to pass.

So, for example, the statement "I have the natural right to the things I brought into the world" is a statement as to what a particular group of people ought to do to a person who tries to take those things from me in order to motivate that person or others to not try to do that in the future. If we strip it of those statements about what actions, in our opinion, ought to be carried out/encouraged/discouraged then it's meaningless in my view.

"Natural" to refer to moral rights like possessions, clean enough air, shelter, or water, is expressive but not explicit. There are occasions when it is good to use the word expressively however a debate on a philosophy forum is an occasion for explicit language.
Nature is not the sort of thing that can be aware of rights. Rights are cultural constructs. Some cultures are better than others at human and animal rights; other cultures these rights are irrelevant. There is no overall authority or Authority on rights. The United Nations' consensus is the most ultimate authoritative we can have.

This is a direct quote from the UN declaration of rights:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

I do agree with the sentiment and the specific rights laid out there. I also agree that this is as close as we can get to a consensus among humans. Some will disagree due to cultural differences (brainwashing, if you like...).

It also says:

Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

They don't see these ideas as mutually exclusive, or that one is important and one is not (and neither do I). There is no need to create a false dichotomy to try to force people toward your position (not accusing you of this, Belindi). Neither should we be accusing someone of (necessarily) ignoring one of these rights simply because they also value the other one.

[GE Morton]

The main and most interesting theme is "Natural Rights".

In order for there to be rights there has to be someone or something that confers rights.

Why do you think so? You seem to be viewing rights as some sort of gift, which implies a giver. But they're not. A right is just a pseudo-property we impute to persons when a certain historical fact about that person obtains. The term denotes that a particular relationship exists between the person and the thing to which he has a right --- namely, that he acquired that thing without inflicting loss or injury on any other person. Rights are not bestowed or conferred by anything or anybody; they attach to the person "automatically" when that historical event occurs. Many other pseudo-properties also attach to persons "automatically," when some fact is true about them. E.g., "Doctor" and "M.D." attach automatically to a person who graduates from medical school; "husband" attaches automatically to a man who marries; etc.

Natural selection does not 'aim for' final causes such as rights. Neither do any other workings of nature aim for final causes.Therefore there are no natural rights.

Natural rights have nothing to do with natural selection. I've explained what is a "natural right" several times --- it is simply a right to things you naturally possess, things you brought with you into the world, such as your life, your body, your various natural talents and abilities. I.e., to your natural assets. You have rights to them for the same reason you may gain rights ("common rights") to other things --- because you acquired them righteously, that is, without inflicting harms or losses on anyone else.

[Steve3007]

In order for there to be rights there has to be someone or something that confers rights.

A right is just a pseudo-property we impute to persons when a certain historical fact about that person obtains. The term denotes that a particular relationship exists between the person and the thing to which he has a right --- namely, that he acquired that thing without inflicting loss or injury on any other person. Rights are not bestowed or conferred by anything or anybody; they attach to the person "automatically" when that historical event occurs. Many other pseudo-properties also attach to persons "automatically," when some fact is true about them. E.g., "Doctor" and "M.D." attach automatically to a person who graduates from medical school; "husband" attaches automatically to a man who marries; etc.

In my view, to have any meaning/use these properties and pseudo-properties have to be observable. The property of an object being red, for example, is observable. If we're talking about pseudo-properties such as "doctor" or "husband" then they're given meaning by the observable behaviours of doctors and husbands. If we were to propose the existence of an entirely unobservable property (or pseudo-property) we'd be counting the fairies dancing on the head of a pin.

If we're saying that a right is a pseudo-property then, as with the pseudo-property "doctor", the observables are human behaviours. In the case of rights, they are the behaviours which we, as the believers in the rights, think people ought to perform to protect those rights. That, in my view, is what inextricably connects rights to oughts - to our opinions as to what actions are right and what actions are wrong. And that is why I disagree with you when you say "Whether P has a right to x is not even a moral question.". If we say that it's not a moral question then we're saying that it can exist but be unobservable.

If we say "I have a right to the things I brought into the world" and I propose that this right is a pseudo-property then we have to ask "How can I observe that property?". We can't just observe those things that were brought into the world. That's not observing the right. It's just observing those things. We have to observe the human behaviours that happen as a result of that right; the human behaviours which the right (being a statement of moral opinion) advocates.

So I agree with Belindi.

[Pattern-chaser]

"Self-interest" is not limited to securing benefits for oneself; it extends to benefits to others if the welfare of those others is important to you.

This is a remarkable extension of the meaning of "self". If we go just one tiny step farther, it would say that "self" includes one's entire community. And thereby we convert selfishness into altruism, or into communism (community-ism). I don't think this particular extension of meaning is useful; I think it's misleading and confusing.