Gertie wrote: ↑September 2nd, 2021, 5:47 pm
Yes I wasn't assuming you're forbidding people from helping others if they wish. Rather there is no moral ought involved as far as you're concerned. Your only axiomatic ought is to allow each agent to maximise their own interests. It seems you agree with this?
Yikes, long post. I'll have to respond in segments.
You're ignoring the language of the axiom, Gertie, and also your own first sentence above. The Axiom, again, is, "Develop principles and rules (of interaction) which allow all agents to maximize their welfare." There is no "ought" that anyone maxmimize anyone's welfare; there is only an "ought" to develop (and then obey) rules which
allow everyone to maximize welfare. Moreoever, the welfare in question is anyone's welfare, not just the acting agent's.
The presumption underlying the axiom is that everyone desires to maximize welfare, his own and (usually) that of (at least) certain others close to him. The aim of "morality" --- moral principles and rules --- is enable everyone to do that, insofar as that ability is facilitated or impaired by actions of other moral agents. But it doesn't
obligate anyone to advance anyone's welfare, even one's own. The mendicant monk who lives in an unheated hovel and subsists on boiled millet and water is not behaving immorally. He would only be acting immorally if he impaired anyone else's ability to maximize welfare (their own or anyone else's).
A sound, workable moral theory will not presume to prescribe what people "ought" to do to live a more rewarding or satisfying life. It will only be concerned with how they interact, with whether and how their efforts to improve their welfare, however they may define it, interfere with others' efforts to do the same.
OK but google says the meaning of ''moral subject'' is essentially the same as ''moral agent'', but nevermind, can you just clarify what you mean?
Well, if Google says that, they're mistaken. I gave a formal definition of those two terms in another thread, some time ago. It is:
A
Moral Agent is a sentient creature who
a) has interests and some capacity for pursuing them, and
b) is capable of recognizing other qualifying creatures as moral agents who likewise have interests, which may differ from his own, and
c) is capable of understanding and formulating moral principles and rules and acknowledges the need for them in a moral field.
A
Moral Subject is a sentient creature for whom a), but not b) nor c) is true.
A
Moral Imbecile is a sentient creature for whom a) and b), but not c), are true.
Here is a fairly decent discussion of that subject:
https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/ ... ontext=bts
I agree with that author that who are to count as moral subjects (also called "moral patients") is a question "extrordinarily difficult to answer." I suspect my own definition of "moral subject" above is not sufficiently informative, and will require that finer distinctions be made within that category.
This is an important distinction. Because if you are including subjects (conscious beings) who don't have moral agency, isn't there a prob then with the notion that eg children, dogs, and peeps with severe learning disabilities have equal agency when it comes to maximising their wellbeing?
There is no problem with the postulate of Equal Agency
per se. The theorems of a moral theory are binding only upon moral agents, since only agents (by definition) are capable of understanding them. But we do need principles which apply to other morally signifcant or "morally considerable" creatures. That they are sentient creatures who have interests and some ability to act on them by itself makes them morally significant, and requires moral agents to take those interests into account when pondering their own actions. Precisely what obligations we have to moral subjects is (as mentioned) a difficult question and (in my view) best left to a separate thread.
If you agree that's a problem, then I'd say there's actually a spectrum we all fall on re our ability to maximise our own wellbeing. We all have strengths and weaknesses, and we all have different starting positions in life. If I inherit a fortune, my agency in practice is more far reaching than if I was born into a skint homeless family, with **** schools and healthcare, etc.
So theoretical equal agency sounds fine, but isn't based in reality.
Well, now you're confusing Equal Agency with material equality. Equal Agency does not presume that everyone has equal "ability to maximize their well-being." That is not true of the members of any living species. Some tadpoles swim faster than others, some leopards are better hunters than others, some fir trees grow taller and sow more seeds than others. Equal Agency is not "theoretical." It just means that anyone who qualifies as a moral agent (per the above definition) is subject to the same moral rules. There is no morally relevant basis for demarcating classes among them.
Again, there is no obligation to maximize anyone's welfare. There is only a presumption that that most people seek to maximize welfare (their own a certain others') and an obligation not to act in ways that impair others' ability to do so.
(more later . . .)