Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

Rightish ideologues are complacent about individuals' innate ability for morally civilised behaviour. Look around, GEMorton, and see how much selfishness and cruelty individual men are capable of. Individuals can't be trusted to be altruistic without top-down coercion from the collective's moral consensus.

Well, you seem to be equating "civilised behavior" with altruism. The former has nothing to do with the latter. And, of course, civilized societies are not collectives, and there is no moral consensus among their members (that lack is what gives rise to politics). There are only majorities who may possess sufficient power to impose their will on the rest. And, historically, the moral sense and actions of majorities can be just as wicked as those of individuals (those majorities do, after all, consist of nothing but individuals). E.g., slavery, the Crusades, the subordination of women, endless oppressive laws, and numerous aggressive wars were favored by majorities in various times and places.

[mystery]

overall this appears a conflict of emotion vs logic.

On one side we see clear cause/effect/and boundaries. on the other, we see feelings and wishes that the others side will be forced to break boundaries.

The old, I want to force you to do what I want to be done at YOUR expense. This is anti-freedom and against the core values that lead to the creation of places like the United States of America. The ppl literally had to leave and find a new place where they are not SUBJECTS of other person whims and desires. Establish and enforce laws to prevent others from infringing, and not to create laws to force others to have taxation without representation.

[Belindi]

Rightish ideologues are complacent about individuals' innate ability for morally civilised behaviour. Look around, GEMorton, and see how much selfishness and cruelty individual men are capable of. Individuals can't be trusted to be altruistic without top-down coercion from the collective's moral consensus.

Well, you seem to be equating "civilised behavior" with altruism. The former has nothing to do with the latter. And, of course, civilized societies are not collectives, and there is no moral consensus among their members (that lack is what gives rise to politics). There are only majorities who may possess sufficient power to impose their will on the rest. And, historically, the moral sense and actions of majorities can be just as wicked as those of individuals (those majorities do, after all, consist of nothing but individuals). E.g., slavery, the Crusades, the subordination of women, endless oppressive laws, and numerous aggressive wars were favored by majorities in various times and places.

What other marker of civilisation could there possibly be, GEMorton, apart from altruism?

Collectives are ruled by laws. A civilised collective has altruistic laws.

[Belindi]

Most folks I know don't have a problem with the homeless, they have a problem with what some of the homeless do that negatively impacts them directly. Crazy acting people threatening folks should be illegal regardless of the living arrangements of the perpetrators. Piling up trash in your front yard is illegal for renters and homeowners, it should be illegal for public property campers.

Piling up trash is mostly the prerogative of profit based industries which are much much much much worse for making a mess than are poor people.

[Steve3007]

But what real rights people have is a matter of fact, not of anyone's opinion, including "public opinion."

It seems to me that statements like this are where you tend to get into arguments with people like TS as to the objective/subjective status of morality, and the concept of rights. Statements like this appear to indicate that you regard natural rights as real as opposed to abstract. i.e. as existing independently of human minds. Even if the things to which we have the natural right (e.g. the things we bring with us into the world) are real, the right to them is not. It is (in my view) an opinion. The statement "People have a natural right to the things which they bring with them into the world because they acquired them without inflicting loss or injury on other moral agents" contains an opinion. It is not a pure statement of fact as something like "People normally have two legs" is. Maybe you agree. But statements like the one quoted above, and particularly the use of the word "real", appear to suggest that you don't.

[chewybrian]

GE

Gertie wrote: ↑August 30th, 2021, 6:09 pm
This is how I read it - Each person capable of making moral decisions (moral agents) is given freedom to maximise their own welfare, right? I am allowed to maximise mine, you yours?

Correct, but you're certainly allowed to maximize anyone else's you wish as well.

Yes I wasn't assuming you're forbidding people from helping others if they wish. Rather there is no moral ought involved as far as you're concerned. Your only axiomatic ought is to allow each agent to maximise their own interests. It seems you agree with this?

If that's your axiom, I doubt many would agree it's self-evident that's what morality is about. It's the morality of dog eat dog GE.

How about the wellbeing of children, peeps with learning disabilities, other species btw? They aren't ''moral agents'' as the term is usually used.

I assume you've seen Steve's response to that question. When I mention "moral agents," keep in mind that moral subjects (in most contexts) are also included. Yes, the rules should allow the latter's welfare to be maximized as well (though assessing animal welfare is problematic). No person's (agent or subject) welfare overrides anyone else's, however.

OK but google says the meaning of ''moral subject'' is essentially the same as ''moral agent'', but nevermind, can you just clarify what you mean?

Your axiom makes sense if you're talking about moral agents with the ability to make moral choices and the ability to act on them, but not so much if you include eg children or dogs (or conscious beings/subjects generally). An axiom which says children and dogs should be allowed to maximise their wellbeing seems silly. Anyway I want to know what you mean in your axiom?

This is an important distinction. Because if you are including subjects (conscious beings) who don't have moral agency, isn't there a prob then with the notion that eg children, dogs, and peeps with severe learning disabilities have equal agency when it comes to maximising their wellbeing?

If you agree that's a problem, then I'd say there's actually a spectrum we all fall on re our ability to maximise our own wellbeing. We all have strengths and weaknesses, and we all have different starting positions in life. If I inherit a fortune, my agency in practice is more far reaching than if I was born into a skint homeless family, with **** schools and healthcare, etc.

So theoretical equal agency sounds fine, but isn't based in reality.

OK, explain what the ought Duty to Aid is? And how is it generated, what is it conditional on?

One has a duty to aid another in distress when the victim will suffer a substantial loss in welfare (serious injury or significant loss of property) which the rescuer can prevent or mitigate at a relatively small cost (loss of his own welfare). So, yes, I have a duty to prevent the blind man from wandering into a busy street, to save a child drowning in a shallow pond, to render CPR to an apparent heart attack victim, to help a neighbor escape a burning house and extinguish the fire, to intervene if I witness a theft, mugging, rape, assault, etc., to the extent I can do so without risking my own life or limb.

That duty is conditioned upon several factors:

1. The victim did not bring the distress upon himself by some wilful and intentional act when he "knew or should have known" what the consequences would be;

2. The victim has done all in his power, in the circumstances, to save himself or his property;

3. The rescuer has no reason to believe the victim would not reciprocate, were their roles reversed. I.e., Alfie has no duty to save Bruno if he knows Bruno has shirked or would shirk that same duty.

That duty, to the extent it is honored, advances the goal of the axiom by reducing risks of welfare losses for all agents, but only when the three conditions apply.

A couple of other points: the duty only requires action when the cost to the rescuer is "relatively small." But since welfare consists in securing what one values, and values are subjective and idiosyncratic, only the rescuing agent can decide how large that loss will be. Hence the Duty to Aid must be discretionary, not mandatory.

Also, the person rescued incurs a debt to the rescuer (who may choose to forgive it, of course).

Finally, since in many cases whether a victim satisfies the three conditions will be unknown to the rescuer, the benefit of the doubt goes to the victim.

Yeah but you're just making all this up tho right? It makes sense for Singer to act altruistically, to sacrifice his shoes to save a drowning toddler, but I don't see how they are derived from your axiom. Or how you decide where the lines are drawn. Further, a drowning toddler would struggle to pass any of your three conditions. Because toddlers aren't moral agents or in a position to reciprocate.

You have to begin from morally neutral premises and a morally relevant goal, and let logic take you where it will.

No I don't. I can make a case for a justified moral foundation, which as it happens is similar to yours - ''promote the wellbeing of conscious creatures''. Then identify rule of thumb oughts which will hopefully achieve the foundational goal. By having a consequentialist foundation, I can revise my approach to oughts in the light of their observed consequences in practice. I can compromise and balance competing goods in terms of the overall foundation. I don't have to pretend they are somehow objective, or that the foundation, or morality itself is somehow logical or objective - rather that it is justified.

That is probably circular, Gertie. It is unquantified, and thus ambiguous. How do you decide whether an "ought" is justified? If it is justified IFF it promotes the well-being of conscious creatures, you have to spell out WHICH conscious creatures --- all of them, or only some of them?

All conscious creatures ought to be afforded moral consideration, as appropriate (eg giving dogs the vote would result in mayhem and sausage shortages).

If all of them, then you face the problem of the subjectivity of values --- what may promote Alfie's well-being may not promote Bruno's.

Yes this is an important point. There are inherent difficulties with this foundation, it's not tidy and quantifiable. If we accept promoting the welfare of conscious creatures is the appropriate foundation for morality, then we have to accept we're dealing with subjects who are unique individuals with their own ideas of what flourishing and harm means to them. (And with different species we have to try to work out as best we can what their wellbeing entails).

There's an irritating irony in the qualiative nature of being an experiencing subject providing the moral foundation, but then meaning we can't tidily quantify wellbeing and harm, calibrate competing goods/harms against each other, etc. It's inevitably going to be complicated, messy and an ongoing process of trying to do better. (Considering the po-mo limbo we're currently in, that sounds pretty good to me). Harris talks about a ''moral landscape'', and Goldstein about ''mattering maps'', which I think rightly reflects this difficulty.

And it means a large element of freedom has to be written in, so individuals aren't constrained by what I or some government believes to be for the best for every individual. Weighed against this, it also justifies notions like a duty of care, communal welfare provision for the basics anyone needs to flourish (like a home!), and tools like rights based on needs as well as autonomy. But there is no perfect objective formula. We can only try and keep referring back to our foundational touchstone.

This is the bind contemporary morality is in. In the absence of God, philosophy feels it has to find some other ''objective'', ''logical'' or ''reasoned'' route to justify the concept of oughts. As if morality is a fact ''out there'' to be discovered. But morality isn't like that.

Morality is not a "fact," but if it is to be rational it must take cognizance of relevant facts. And, of course, it must be reasoned and logical, because those are what distinguish philosophy from religion, superstition, fantasy, prejudice, passions, and whims.

I'm saying morality is a category unto itself. The objective v subjective debate is an anachronism in the modern global/secular/multicultural world. It leaves philosophy trying to invent unconvincing ways to call it objective to justify it, or saying no it's just how we feel about things (as a result of the happenstance of our species evolution and then nurture/cultural influences). Hopeless. So why not think afresh - what is morality for, what makes it meaningful and worth worrying about - why does it matter. Why isn't philosophy on the case!
And fair play to you, you've established a moral foundation and taken it on, with rigour.

You and I have identified the wellbeing of experiencing subjects as the reality which should ground thinking about right and wrongs, and oughts. I think most people naturally get that, even if they don't explicitly philosophically examine it. The nature of what it is to be an experiencing subject is the relevant fact for grounding morality. And of course reason can help you implement your goals.

Morality and oughts are all about what it means to be an experiencing subject with interests, a quality of life, well-being. That's what makes value, meaning, purpose, harm, flourishing, needs, desires, etc the appropriate qualiative language of morality. That's why it's at the heart of your own theory too. It's about mattering. It matters how we treat each other, because you have a quality of life, like me.

I agree with all of that. Now you have to take the Equal Agency postulate and the subjectivity of values and their implications seriously --- or reject them and settle for some form of egoism or moral tribalism.

What do you mean by egoism here? And why do you think it would lead to moral tribalism? I think it provides a bullwark against tribalism, because moral consideration is granted simply by being a conscious creature, no matter who you are.

I think if we accept the basic foundation, we've moved into the territory of woollier appropriateness to some extent, because no two subjects are identical. Hence the need for a balance between providing for basic needs for all to flourish, and providing the freedom to do so. There is no perfect formula, because that's the nature of the subject beast. Pretending there is some quantifiable equation or somesuch doesn't help, we just have to try to do our best.

So for example the overall notion of wellbeing will take into account inherent and pre-existing inequalities, to try to even the playing field somewhat. Rather than simply say we're all equal agents so leave me to get on with my agenting and you look out for yourself. It will say even if I don't find you deserving or appealing enough to hand you some of my money if I happen across you sleeping on the street, you should still have a right to somewhere safe and warm to sleep, and we who can afford it ought to chip in for that. Because your and my wellbeing matters, simply by dint of being an experiencing subject.

Thank you for taking the time to lay all that out. It doesn't seem that it should be necessary to lay out the reality of the human condition, but evidently it is not obvious to some folks. More likely, they can see it just fine, but wish to ignore it so that they can pretend to be objective by proceeding as if everyone has the same chance to look out for themselves, and that they are somehow on the high moral ground by only caring about themselves.

I think your conclusion in bold is the obvious implication of everything that precedes it, which is simply a description of the world as we find it. It's a big mess. It's never been fair and never will be. Further, we should not be so conceited to think that we could not get the short end tomorrow, even if we seem to be on top today. If we are honest we should see that any advantage we do have can never be perfectly earned and deserved in a system full of inequalities and unfairness built on shifting ground. We cannot and should not try to make everyone equal. But we need some safety valves and some methods of taking care of those who fall through the cracks. A warm, safe place to sleep falls into that category.

[LuckyR]

What employers pay for separate from income, falls under the term "benefits" which is universally considered part of the employee's compensation (often the most important part).

Any benefit paid by employers pursuant to a government edict, rather than pursuant to a bargain voluntarily reached between employer and employee, is forced charity.

Changing a benefit to a mandated benefit doesn't magically transform it into "charity", it remains a mandated benefit.

Only the most naive wouldn't be able to figure out that employers incorporate mandated costs in their total compensation package (which remains fixed since their competitors pay them also), so they aren't out any money, so no tears of sympathy required.

[GE Morton]

What other marker of civilisation could there possibly be, GEMorton, apart from altruism?

A "civilization," or "civilized" society, is a society characterized by cities ("Civitas" being the Latin term for "city"). A city is a community so large that most of its inhabitants do not know most of the others (in contrast to tribal villages). I.e., civilized societies are societies of strangers. The essential virtue for civilized societies is tolerance, for people who may not look like you, worship your gods, observe your customs, share your interests or values, or even speak your language --- because in cities you will encounter such persons regularly.

Collectives are ruled by laws. A civilised collective has altruistic laws.

Civilized societies are collec-tions, but not collec-tives. A collective is a group of people working cooperatively at a common task or in pursuit of a common goal or interest. There is no such common goal or task or interest in which all members of civilized societies are cooperatively pursuing.

A civilized society may have some altruistic laws, because some lawgiver (including majorities in democratic societies) at one time or another decreed them. They may also have oppressive laws, for the same reason. Brutal dictatorships and theocracies are also civilized societies.

[LuckyR]

Most folks I know don't have a problem with the homeless, they have a problem with what some of the homeless do that negatively impacts them directly. Crazy acting people threatening folks should be illegal regardless of the living arrangements of the perpetrators. Piling up trash in your front yard is illegal for renters and homeowners, it should be illegal for public property campers.

Piling up trash is mostly the prerogative of profit based industries which are much much much much worse for making a mess than are poor people.

Uummm... profit based companies are hired to perform services. They are available to but not required for homeowners to address the trash in their yards that are putting the homeowners in conflict with the city. If someone makes the decision to camp on public land commonly they are seeking (among other things) to avoid certain responsibilities, unfortunately that is not realistic. We are ALL subject to the law. Folks see the homeless getting a pass and naturally complain about it.

[GE Morton]

But what real rights people have is a matter of fact, not of anyone's opinion, including "public opinion."

It seems to me that statements like this are where you tend to get into arguments with people like TS as to the objective/subjective status of morality, and the concept of rights. Statements like this appear to indicate that you regard natural rights as real as opposed to abstract. i.e. as existing independently of human minds.

Hmmm. This is proving to be an exceedingly difficult concept to get across.

Yes, natural (and common) rights are "real." But being "real" cannot be taken to mean "existing independently of human minds." "Rights" is a concept, and no concept exists independently of human minds (or perhaps the minds of some other sentient creatures). Countless things are "real," but are not independent of human minds, e.g., laws, theories, thoughts, desires, emotions, and endless other things are surely real, though not independent of minds. "Real" embraces many more things than physical entities with mass and spatio-temporal loci.

"Rights" is a concept, a term, which --- as it is classically understood --- denotes a particular relationship between a person and some thing, the thing which the person claims a right. It is an historical claim, to the effect that the claimant was the first possessor of that thing, and therefore acquired it without inflicting loss or injury on anyone else. That claim (e.g., "P has a right to x") is either true or false, and the truth conditions for it are publicly verifiable (in most cases). Hence whether P has a right to x is objective.

Whether P has a right to x is not even a moral question. It is a strictly empirical, factual one. The relevant moral question is whether we ought, if P's claim is true, to respect that right.

The statement "People have a natural right to the things which they bring with them into the world because they acquired them without inflicting loss or injury on other moral agents" contains an opinion.

Of course it contains an opinion. It is also my opinion that 2+2 = 4, and that Paris is the capital of France. Opinions are not contraries of "facts." That the (classical) meaning of "having a right" is as given above is an historical fact, as is whether P is the first possessor of x.

One may, of course, hold an opinion that we ought to understand the term "right" differently; that we ought to assign "rights" based on needs, or someone's desires, or popular opinion, or some other ground that can change with the political winds, or on whim. But those are just verbal shenanigans, sophistry. The moral question will always remain--- whether we ought to inflict loss or injury on others by taking something of value to them which they acquired without inflicting loss or injury --- and so will the obligation to morally justify an affirmative answer.

[Belindi]

Most folks I know don't have a problem with the homeless, they have a problem with what some of the homeless do that negatively impacts them directly. Crazy acting people threatening folks should be illegal regardless of the living arrangements of the perpetrators. Piling up trash in your front yard is illegal for renters and homeowners, it should be illegal for public property campers.

Piling up trash is mostly the prerogative of profit based industries which are much much much much worse for making a mess than are poor people.

Uummm... profit based companies are hired to perform services. They are available to but not required for homeowners to address the trash in their yards that are putting the homeowners in conflict with the city. If someone makes the decision to camp on public land commonly they are seeking (among other things) to avoid certain responsibilities, unfortunately that is not realistic. We are ALL subject to the law. Folks see the homeless getting a pass and naturally complain about it.

Lucky, I meant all pollution.Corporate pollution is worse for health and the environment than untidy individuals.This drum needs beating.

I'd not like messy squatters in my neighbourhood .

[GE Morton]

Changing a benefit to a mandated benefit doesn't magically transform it into "charity", it remains a mandated benefit.

Those terms are not mutually exclusive.

Only the most naive wouldn't be able to figure out that employers incorporate mandated costs in their total compensation package (which remains fixed since their competitors pay them also), so they aren't out any money, so no tears of sympathy required.

Of course they "out money." So are their customers, who will pay higher prices to cover those costs. That their competitors also pay them doesn't make the costs disappear.

[Ecurb]

Of course it contains an opinion. It is also my opinion that 2+2 = 4, and that Paris is the capital of France. Opinions are not contraries of "facts." That the (classical) meaning of "having a right" is as given above is an historical fact, as is whether P is the first possessor of x.

One may, of course, hold an opinion that we ought to understand the term "right" differently; that we ought to assign "rights" based on needs, or someone's desires, or popular opinion, or some other ground that can change with the political winds, or on whim. But those are just verbal shenanigans, sophistry. The moral question will always remain--- whether we ought to inflict loss or injury on others by taking something of value to them which they acquired without inflicting loss or injury --- and so will the obligation to morally justify an affirmative answer.

Speaking of sophistry and verbal shenanigans, one need only read GE's endless posts to be well versed in those concepts. Yes, we ought to take things of value from people (whether or not they have "acquired them without inflicting loss or injury"). That's because we think that taking these things creates a better society, and is conducive to human happiness and well-being. The only reason GE thinks otherwise is an addled, sophistic, and un"merited" notion of what constitutes "rights", and what SHOULD constitute rights.

People own things not (as Morton suggests) because they have been "first discoverers" or "acquirers without loss or injury" (what a concept!) but because the laws and mores of the societies in which they live so declare. These laws and mores are determined and enforced by the state, which enforces them only through the use of the resources that have been forcibly extracted from their citizens. Without said extraction, there would be no "ownership" (or, at least, it would be very different than it is now).

(I apologize for not following Elinor Dashwood's advice to agreee with everything Morton said because I don't think he deserves the compliment of rational opposition, but I got bored.)

[GE Morton]

Yes, we ought to take things of value from people (whether or not they have "acquired them without inflicting loss or injury"). That's because we think that taking these things creates a better society, and is conducive to human happiness and well-being.

Every thief, tyrant, Crusader, marauder, warmonger, Inquistioner, witch-burner, and slaver in history has so thought, from Genghis Khan to Stalin and Hitler to Mao and Pol Pot.

[Sculptor1]

One believer would be chiefly impressed by the blue optic plates, through which he saw other believers; another by the mending apparatus, which sinful Kuno had compared to worms; another by the lifts, another by the Book. And each would pray to this or to that, and ask it to intercede for him with the Machine as a whole. Persecution - that also was present. It did not break out, for reasons that will be set forward shortly. But it was latent, and all who did not accept the minimum known as "undenominational Mechanism" lived in danger of Homelessness, which means death, as we know.

E M Forster The Machine Stops