Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

What constitutes "merited"? Isn't it reasonable to claim that by virtue of being a human being in a rich society a person merits food, housing and health care? You may disagree -- but surely some people might think that all people merit (i.e. deserve) food, housing and health care.

That is an excellent question, one which gets close to the heart of this debate.

No, it is not at all reasonable to claim that one deserves, or merits, or is due, something merely because he exists, or is a member of a certain species or a certain society. That is more Newspeak, and an especially odious example of it.

The concepts of merit and deserts apply to and are contingent on actions, deeds, not status. That is how those terms are applied in all other contexts: the Olympic Gold Medal is awarded to the winner of the event, not to everyone who shows up. The gold star is presented to the student who aced her spelling test, not to every kid in the class. Promotions are given to workers whose work is superior, not to every employee. A reward is given to the bounty hunter who captures the fugitive, not to everyone in the town. Per the definition previously given,

" . . . the assignment of merited rewards or punishments."

We reward people who have done something laudable, beneficial, productive, or difficult. We punish people who have done something harmful, foolish, or immoral. I.e., in all cases, for something they've done. Construing those terms to apply to everyone merely because of some benign property they may have (their race or sex or nationality or species) --- factors over which they had no control --- destroys the utility of those terms for distinguishing between praiseworthy and condemnable actions and renders them morally vacuous (morality being concerned with human actions).

To those people an "unjust" society might be one in which food, housing and health care are not guaranteed. This has nothing to do with "equality". Poor people would still be poorer than rich people. But at least they would receive that level of care their humanity deserves.

Thanks to the sustained sophistry of leftist ideologues, some people may well so misunderstand and misuse those terms, to their own detriment, for it disposes them to wait for government to solve their problems instead of doing something themselves to solve them.

[Ecurb]

What constitutes "merited"? Isn't it reasonable to claim that by virtue of being a human being in a rich society a person merits food, housing and health care? You may disagree -- but surely some people might think that all people merit (i.e. deserve) food, housing and health care.

That is an excellent question, one which gets close to the heart of this debate.

No, it is not at all reasonable to claim that one deserves, or merits, or is due, something merely because he exists, or is a member of a certain species or a certain society. That is more Newspeak, and an especially odious example of it.

The concepts of merit and deserts apply to and are contingent on actions, deeds, not status. That is how those terms are applied in all other contexts: the Olympic Gold Medal is awarded to the winner of the event, not to everyone who shows up. The gold star is presented to the student who aced her spelling test, not to every kid in the class. Promotions are given to workers whose work is superior, not to every employee. A reward is given to the bounty hunter who captures the fugitive, not to everyone in the town. Per the definition previously given,

" . . . the assignment of merited rewards or punishments."

We reward people who have done something laudable, beneficial, productive, or difficult. We punish people who have done something harmful, foolish, or immoral. I.e., in all cases, for something they've done. Construing those terms to apply to everyone merely because of some benign property they may have (their race or sex or nationality or species) --- factors over which they had no control --- destroys the utility of those terms for distinguishing between praiseworthy and condemnable actions and renders them morally vacuous (morality being concerned with human actions).

To those people an "unjust" society might be one in which food, housing and health care are not guaranteed. This has nothing to do with "equality". Poor people would still be poorer than rich people. But at least they would receive that level of care their humanity deserves.

Thanks to the sustained sophistry of leftist ideologues, some people may well so misunderstand and misuse those terms, to their own detriment, for it disposes them to wait for government to solve their problems instead of doing something themselves to solve them.

And yet you think "moral agents" deserve (i.e. merit) certain "natural rights". Doesn't this contradict your stated position here?

IN addition, you once again try to claim that what should be a matter of argument is a matter of definition. People "merit" certain rights by virtue of their humanity, but not other benefits. This is not a matter that can be settled by parsing the defintion of the word "merit". It can be settled only by deciding what kind of society we want to live in and create.

By the way, if you think that promotions are given only to workers whose work is superior I can only assume that you have never held a job in the private sector. I have, and I know that "time and chance happeneth to it all", per Ecclesiastes.

One more thing: we don't "reward (only) people who have done something laudable." We reward our children (for example) for simply being born. We feed them, clothe them, shelter them and care for them. We do this not because they have done anything laudable, but because WE want to do something laudable. We can do the same for unfortunate people who are not our children. For parents, this "charity" is not strictly voluntary; it is a "duty" of parenthood. Perhaps it is a duty of those living in rich societies to help the homeless, ill and starving. It is true that taxes are collected under the threat of the jails, billy clubs and pistols of the state minions. It is also true that this is unfortunate (if not evil). Nonetheless, it's reasonable to force people to do their duty (especially when the duty is so little onerous as paying taxes).

[Gertie]

How about the wellbeing of children, peeps with learning disabilities, other species btw? They aren't ''moral agents'' as the term is usually used.

I believe they're often referred to as "moral subjects". A moral agent is afforded rights and held to obligations. A moral subject is just afforded rights.

You'd think, but it seems ''moral subjects'' has a similar meaning to ''moral agents'', neither seem to take account of people (or other species) who can't make moral choices.

That's one of the ways GE's position looks to have a more transactional/conditional bent imo, it's about a certain subgroup agreeing to play by the same rules for mutual benefit as I understand it. Rather than giving moral consideration on the basis of wellbeing, which has a different type of justification and would automatically include children, etc. But I might have misunderstood.

[LuckyR]

True, except that isn't the situation here. Everyone who gets a paycheck pays towards unemployment insurance (or to use your vernacular, Alfie pays for Alfie and Bruno pays for Bruno). Welfare is similar in that everyone pays into the tax pot from which welfare benefits come, even the unemployed.

That is not so, in 47 of the 50 US states. In those states employers, not the employees who are beneficiaries, pay for employees' unemployment insurance. The beneficiaries pay nothing. In the other 3 states the employees pay a portion of the cost of the premiums.

"UI is structured as a partnership between the federal government and states and territories. States and territories set the parameters of their unemployment programs within federal guidelines, including payroll tax rates and wage bases for covered workers. State unemployment insurance taxes are paid by employers and remitted to the federal UI trust fund, where each state has a separate account for covering normal unemployment insurance benefits.

"In addition, a 6 percent federal payroll tax, known as the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax, is levied on the first $7,000 of covered workers’ earnings. Employers remit the tax but can claim credits against 5.4 percentage points of FUTA taxes paid in states with unemployment programs that meet federal standards (currently all states) The effective FUTA tax rate thus shrinks to 0.6 percent, or a maximum of $42 per worker."

https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefin ... t-financed

You're losing the forest for the trees. What employers pay for separate from income, falls under the term "benefits" which is universally considered part of the employee's compensation (often the most important part). Thus while the tax (premiums), often flow from the employer to the government, there is not a substantive difference between that and it flowing from the employer to the employee to the government.

[Sy Borg]

Ok, let's say it's illegal to be homeless. So the homeless are issued fines because they broke the law. Since they cannot pay, then they are put in prison.

Does that achieve anything useful for society? It would get the homeless off the streets, although most don't bother anyone. It would add to taxpayer bills. It would add much stress to the circumstances of those who lose their jobs and cannot afford to pay rent.

I see nothing to be gained for society by outlawing homelessness. With all due respect, it's a barmy idea IMO.

[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote:

Thanks to the sustained sophistry of leftist ideologues, some people may well so misunderstand and misuse those terms, to their own detriment, for it disposes them to wait for government to solve their problems instead of doing something themselves to solve them.

Rightish ideologues are complacent about individuals' innate ability for morally civilised behaviour. Look around, GEMorton, and see how much selfishness and cruelty individual men are capable of. Individuals can't be trusted to be altruistic without top-down coercion from the collective's moral consensus.

As long as the society has a moral culture of altruism i.e. post-Xian societies, the society as a whole is more to be trusted to be altruistic than are many perhaps most individuals. The converse is also true; see the prevailing morality of ISIS or North Korea.

[chewybrian]

Ok, let's say it's illegal to be homeless. So the homeless are issued fines because they broke the law. Since they cannot pay, then they are put in prison.

Does that achieve anything useful for society? It would get the homeless off the streets, although most don't bother anyone. It would add to taxpayer bills. It would add much stress to the circumstances of those who lose their jobs and cannot afford to pay rent.

I see nothing to be gained for society by outlawing homelessness. With all due respect, it's a barmy idea IMO.

Just to be clear, I was making the point at the start of the thread that there is a de facto state of affairs that makes homelessness a crime indirectly by carefully creating categories of criminal activity that mostly apply to the homeless. We got rid of vagrancy laws and replaced them with laws that have the same effect of punishing homelessness:

Untold numbers of Americans were arrested for living their lives outdoors before vagrancy laws were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1972. But that did not, of course, stop municipalities from instituting laws that punished the same statuses and behaviors under different categories. Since then, statutes punishing loitering, panhandling, and camping on public land filled the void left by vagrancy laws. Towns and cities found new ways to move the subsistence activities of people experiencing poverty out of the view of the public, while some even pawned the fiscal responsibility for poor transients off on other municipalities by issuing “move along” warnings and bussing people across town, county, and state lines. A study conducted by the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty found that, as of 2016, about half of 187 cities they studied prohibited loitering, a quarter had laws that prohibited sleeping in public places, and more than a third prohibited living in vehicles. Between 2006 and 2016, bans on sleeping in public increased by 31%.

https://www.fromthesquare.org/the-unite ... elessness/

Of course I agree with you. But, it is important that we not declare victory simply because homelessness itself is not illegal. We need to be careful that laws are not written such that it is all but impossible for the homeless to break them, whether that was the intent when the laws were written or not. And, we should provide some relief in the form of public transportation, places to sleep, shower, and use the restroom, if we expect people without a home to steer clear of the law.

There is nothing fair or wise about declaring that it is not illegal to be homeless, while saying the homeless have no right to take care of the necessities of life in public spaces, and not giving them a place to do those things.

[Sy Borg]

Ok, let's say it's illegal to be homeless. So the homeless are issued fines because they broke the law. Since they cannot pay, then they are put in prison.

Does that achieve anything useful for society? It would get the homeless off the streets, although most don't bother anyone. It would add to taxpayer bills. It would add much stress to the circumstances of those who lose their jobs and cannot afford to pay rent.

I see nothing to be gained for society by outlawing homelessness. With all due respect, it's a barmy idea IMO.

Just to be clear, I was making the point at the start of the thread that there is a de facto state of affairs that makes homelessness a crime indirectly by carefully creating categories of criminal activity that mostly apply to the homeless. We got rid of vagrancy laws and replaced them with laws that have the same effect of punishing homelessness:

Untold numbers of Americans were arrested for living their lives outdoors before vagrancy laws were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1972. But that did not, of course, stop municipalities from instituting laws that punished the same statuses and behaviors under different categories. Since then, statutes punishing loitering, panhandling, and camping on public land filled the void left by vagrancy laws. Towns and cities found new ways to move the subsistence activities of people experiencing poverty out of the view of the public, while some even pawned the fiscal responsibility for poor transients off on other municipalities by issuing “move along” warnings and bussing people across town, county, and state lines. A study conducted by the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty found that, as of 2016, about half of 187 cities they studied prohibited loitering, a quarter had laws that prohibited sleeping in public places, and more than a third prohibited living in vehicles. Between 2006 and 2016, bans on sleeping in public increased by 31%.

https://www.fromthesquare.org/the-unite ... elessness/

Of course I agree with you. But, it is important that we not declare victory simply because homelessness itself is not illegal. We need to be careful that laws are not written such that it is all but impossible for the homeless to break them, whether that was the intent when the laws were written or not. And, we should provide some relief in the form of public transportation, places to sleep, shower, and use the restroom, if we expect people without a home to steer clear of the law.

There is nothing fair or wise about declaring that it is not illegal to be homeless, while saying the homeless have no right to take care of the necessities of life in public spaces, and not giving them a place to do those things.

I'm fine with that, Brian. Well said.

[GE Morton]

This is how I read it - Each person capable of making moral decisions (moral agents) is allowed to maximise their own welfare, right? I am allowed to maximise mine, you yours?

Correct, but you're certainly allowed to maximize anyone else's you wish as well.

How about the wellbeing of children, peeps with learning disabilities, other species btw? They aren't ''moral agents'' as the term is usually used.

I assume you've seen Steve's response to that question. When I mention "moral agents," keep in mind that moral subjects (in most contexts) are also included. Yes, the rules should allow the latter's welfare to be maximized as well (though assessing animal welfare is problematic). No person's (agent or subject) welfare overrides anyone else's, however.

OK, explain what the ought Duty to Aid is? And how is it generated, what is it conditional on?

One has a duty to aid another in distress when the victim will suffer a substantial loss in welfare (serious injury or significant loss of property) which the rescuer can prevent or mitigate at a relatively small cost (loss of his own welfare). So, yes, I have a duty to prevent the blind man from wandering into a busy street, to save a child drowning in a shallow pond, to render CPR to an apparent heart attack victim, to help a neighbor escape a burning house and extinguish the fire, to intervene if I witness a theft, mugging, rape, assault, etc., to the extent I can do so without risking my own life or limb.

That duty is conditioned upon several factors:

1. The victim did not bring the distress upon himself by some wilful and intentional act when he "knew or should have known" what the consequences would be;

2. The victim has done all in his power, in the circumstances, to save himself or his property;

3. The rescuer has no reason to believe the victim would not reciprocate, were their roles reversed. I.e., Alfie has no duty to save Bruno if he knows Bruno has shirked or would shirk that same duty.

That duty, to the extent it is honored, advances the goal of the axiom by reducing risks of welfare losses for all agents, but only when the three conditions apply.

A couple of other points: the duty only requires action when the cost to the rescuer is "relatively small." But since welfare consists in securing what one values, and values are subjective and idiosyncratic, only the rescuing agent can decide how large that loss will be. Hence the Duty to Aid must be discretionary, not mandatory.

Also, the person rescued incurs a debt to the rescuer (who may choose to forgive it, of course).

Finally, since in many cases whether a victim satisfies the three conditions will be unknown to the rescuer, the benefit of the doubt goes to the victim.

You have to begin from morally neutral premises and a morally relevant goal, and let logic take you where it will.

No I don't. I can make a case for a justified moral foundation, which as it happens is similar to yours - ''promote the wellbeing of conscious creatures''. Then identify rule of thumb oughts which will hopefully achieve the foundational goal. By having a consequentialist foundation, I can revise my approach to oughts in the light of their observed consequences in practice. I can compromise and balance competing goods in terms of the overall foundation. I don't have to pretend they are somehow objective, or that the foundation, or morality itself is somehow logical or objective - rather that it is justified.

That is probably circular, Gertie. It is unquantified, and thus ambiguous. How do you decide whether an "ought" is justified? If it is justified IFF it promotes the well-being of conscious creatures, you have to spell out WHICH conscious creatures --- all of them, or only some of them? If all of them, then you face the problem of the subjectivity of values --- what may promote Alfie's well-being may not promote Bruno's. If in the end you choose "oughts" which promote only the well-being of agents who share YOUR values, your argument is circular and not universal.

This is the bind contemporary morality is in. In the absence of God, philosophy feels it has to find some other ''objective'', ''logical'' or ''reasoned'' route to justify the concept of oughts. As if morality is a fact ''out there'' to be discovered. But morality isn't like that.

Morality is not a "fact," but if it is to be rational it must take cognizance of relevant facts. And, of course, it must be reasoned and logical, because those are what distinguish philosophy from religion, superstition, fantasy, prejudice, passions, and whims.

Morality and oughts are all about what it means to be an experiencing subject with interests, a quality of life, well-being. That's what makes value, meaning, purpose, harm, flourishing, needs, desires, etc the appropriate qualiative language of morality. That's why it's at the heart of your own theory too. It's about mattering. It matters how we treat each other, because you have a quality of life, like me.

I agree with all of that. Now you have to take the Equal Agency postulate and the subjectivity of values and their implications seriously --- or reject them and settle for some form of egoism or moral tribalism.

[GE Morton]

And yet you think "moral agents" deserve (i.e. merit) certain "natural rights". Doesn't this contradict your stated position here?

Now, why would you suppose I think that? I've never said any such thing. No, no one "deserves" rights (any rights), though they can be said to deserve some of the things to which rights attach --- but not all of them. You have two arms, and you have a natural right to them because Nature provided you with them, but do you "deserve" them?

Deserts, merit, etc., apply to the fruits of human actions. Rights (natural and common rights, not legal rights) are not themselves fruits of human action; they are simply pseudo-properties --- a kind of tag --- assigned to persons to denote a particular historical fact about them: the fact that they acquired the thing to which they claim a right without inflicting loss or injury on other moral agents. Rights are not honorifics or rewards.

IN addition, you once again try to claim that what should be a matter of argument is a matter of definition.

Sorry, but the meaning of the terms "merit," deserves," etc., like the meanings of all other terms, is a matter of definition. Any argument about that is gratuitous and vacuous, and invariably intended to obfuscate, befuddle, and rationalize predatory behaviors.

People "merit" certain rights by virtue of their humanity, but not other benefits.

No one "merits" any rights. They only merit (some) of the things to which rights attach.

This is not a matter that can be settled by parsing the defintion of the word "merit". It can be settled only by deciding what kind of society we want to live in and create.

I'm not sure of what matter you speak. Do you mean what rights people have? You may, of course, create legal rights to anything you wish, but such rights, being arbitrary, have no moral significance. But what real rights people have is a matter of fact, not of anyone's opinion, including "public opinion."

One more thing: we don't "reward (only) people who have done something laudable." We reward our children (for example) for simply being born. We feed them, clothe them, shelter them and care for them.

Now you're trying to re-define (or just mis-using) another common word. No, feeding our kids is not rewarding them for anything. Not all gifts or boons we bestow upon others are "rewards."

"1: something that is given in return for good or evil done or received or that is offered or given for some service or attainment."

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reward

[LuckyR]

Most folks I know don't have a problem with the homeless, they have a problem with what some of the homeless do that negatively impacts them directly. Crazy acting people threatening folks should be illegal regardless of the living arrangements of the perpetrators. Piling up trash in your front yard is illegal for renters and homeowners, it should be illegal for public property campers.

[Pattern-chaser]

That is probably circular, Gertie. It is unquantified, and thus ambiguous.

Don't get carried away! A statement that is unquantified is only less constrained, and thereby more general. I think it's a mistake to brand more generality as being ambiguous, although it can sometimes be; sometimes.

[GE Morton]

What employers pay for separate from income, falls under the term "benefits" which is universally considered part of the employee's compensation (often the most important part).

Any benefit paid by employers pursuant to a government edict, rather than pursuant to a bargain voluntarily reached between employer and employee, is forced charity.

[Gertie]

GE

Gertie wrote: ↑August 30th, 2021, 6:09 pm
This is how I read it - Each person capable of making moral decisions (moral agents) is given freedom to maximise their own welfare, right? I am allowed to maximise mine, you yours?

Correct, but you're certainly allowed to maximize anyone else's you wish as well.

Yes I wasn't assuming you're forbidding people from helping others if they wish. Rather there is no moral ought involved as far as you're concerned. Your only axiomatic ought is to allow each agent to maximise their own interests. It seems you agree with this?

If that's your axiom, I doubt many would agree it's self-evident that's what morality is about. It's the morality of dog eat dog GE.

How about the wellbeing of children, peeps with learning disabilities, other species btw? They aren't ''moral agents'' as the term is usually used.

I assume you've seen Steve's response to that question. When I mention "moral agents," keep in mind that moral subjects (in most contexts) are also included. Yes, the rules should allow the latter's welfare to be maximized as well (though assessing animal welfare is problematic). No person's (agent or subject) welfare overrides anyone else's, however.

OK but google says the meaning of ''moral subject'' is essentially the same as ''moral agent'', but nevermind, can you just clarify what you mean?

Your axiom makes sense if you're talking about moral agents with the ability to make moral choices and the ability to act on them, but not so much if you include eg children or dogs (or conscious beings/subjects generally). An axiom which says children and dogs should be allowed to maximise their wellbeing seems silly. Anyway I want to know what you mean in your axiom?

This is an important distinction. Because if you are including subjects (conscious beings) who don't have moral agency, isn't there a prob then with the notion that eg children, dogs, and peeps with severe learning disabilities have equal agency when it comes to maximising their wellbeing?

If you agree that's a problem, then I'd say there's actually a spectrum we all fall on re our ability to maximise our own wellbeing. We all have strengths and weaknesses, and we all have different starting positions in life. If I inherit a fortune, my agency in practice is more far reaching than if I was born into a skint homeless family, with **** schools and healthcare, etc.

So theoretical equal agency sounds fine, but isn't based in reality.

OK, explain what the ought Duty to Aid is? And how is it generated, what is it conditional on?

One has a duty to aid another in distress when the victim will suffer a substantial loss in welfare (serious injury or significant loss of property) which the rescuer can prevent or mitigate at a relatively small cost (loss of his own welfare). So, yes, I have a duty to prevent the blind man from wandering into a busy street, to save a child drowning in a shallow pond, to render CPR to an apparent heart attack victim, to help a neighbor escape a burning house and extinguish the fire, to intervene if I witness a theft, mugging, rape, assault, etc., to the extent I can do so without risking my own life or limb.

That duty is conditioned upon several factors:

1. The victim did not bring the distress upon himself by some wilful and intentional act when he "knew or should have known" what the consequences would be;

2. The victim has done all in his power, in the circumstances, to save himself or his property;

3. The rescuer has no reason to believe the victim would not reciprocate, were their roles reversed. I.e., Alfie has no duty to save Bruno if he knows Bruno has shirked or would shirk that same duty.

That duty, to the extent it is honored, advances the goal of the axiom by reducing risks of welfare losses for all agents, but only when the three conditions apply.

A couple of other points: the duty only requires action when the cost to the rescuer is "relatively small." But since welfare consists in securing what one values, and values are subjective and idiosyncratic, only the rescuing agent can decide how large that loss will be. Hence the Duty to Aid must be discretionary, not mandatory.

Also, the person rescued incurs a debt to the rescuer (who may choose to forgive it, of course).

Finally, since in many cases whether a victim satisfies the three conditions will be unknown to the rescuer, the benefit of the doubt goes to the victim.

Yeah but you're just making all this up tho right? It makes sense for Singer to act altruistically, to sacrifice his shoes to save a drowning toddler, but I don't see how they are derived from your axiom. Or how you decide where the lines are drawn. Further, a drowning toddler would struggle to pass any of your three conditions. Because toddlers aren't moral agents or in a position to reciprocate.

You have to begin from morally neutral premises and a morally relevant goal, and let logic take you where it will.

No I don't. I can make a case for a justified moral foundation, which as it happens is similar to yours - ''promote the wellbeing of conscious creatures''. Then identify rule of thumb oughts which will hopefully achieve the foundational goal. By having a consequentialist foundation, I can revise my approach to oughts in the light of their observed consequences in practice. I can compromise and balance competing goods in terms of the overall foundation. I don't have to pretend they are somehow objective, or that the foundation, or morality itself is somehow logical or objective - rather that it is justified.

That is probably circular, Gertie. It is unquantified, and thus ambiguous. How do you decide whether an "ought" is justified? If it is justified IFF it promotes the well-being of conscious creatures, you have to spell out WHICH conscious creatures --- all of them, or only some of them?

All conscious creatures ought to be afforded moral consideration, as appropriate (eg giving dogs the vote would result in mayhem and sausage shortages).

If all of them, then you face the problem of the subjectivity of values --- what may promote Alfie's well-being may not promote Bruno's.

Yes this is an important point. There are inherent difficulties with this foundation, it's not tidy and quantifiable. If we accept promoting the welfare of conscious creatures is the appropriate foundation for morality, then we have to accept we're dealing with subjects who are unique individuals with their own ideas of what flourishing and harm means to them. (And with different species we have to try to work out as best we can what their wellbeing entails).

There's an irritating irony in the qualiative nature of being an experiencing subject providing the moral foundation, but then meaning we can't tidily quantify wellbeing and harm, calibrate competing goods/harms against each other, etc. It's inevitably going to be complicated, messy and an ongoing process of trying to do better. (Considering the po-mo limbo we're currently in, that sounds pretty good to me). Harris talks about a ''moral landscape'', and Goldstein about ''mattering maps'', which I think rightly reflects this difficulty.

And it means a large element of freedom has to be written in, so individuals aren't constrained by what I or some government believes to be for the best for every individual. Weighed against this, it also justifies notions like a duty of care, communal welfare provision for the basics anyone needs to flourish (like a home!), and tools like rights based on needs as well as autonomy. But there is no perfect objective formula. We can only try and keep referring back to our foundational touchstone.

This is the bind contemporary morality is in. In the absence of God, philosophy feels it has to find some other ''objective'', ''logical'' or ''reasoned'' route to justify the concept of oughts. As if morality is a fact ''out there'' to be discovered. But morality isn't like that.

Morality is not a "fact," but if it is to be rational it must take cognizance of relevant facts. And, of course, it must be reasoned and logical, because those are what distinguish philosophy from religion, superstition, fantasy, prejudice, passions, and whims.

I'm saying morality is a category unto itself. The objective v subjective debate is an anachronism in the modern global/secular/multicultural world. It leaves philosophy trying to invent unconvincing ways to call it objective to justify it, or saying no it's just how we feel about things (as a result of the happenstance of our species evolution and then nurture/cultural influences). Hopeless. So why not think afresh - what is morality for, what makes it meaningful and worth worrying about - why does it matter. Why isn't philosophy on the case!
And fair play to you, you've established a moral foundation and taken it on, with rigour.

You and I have identified the wellbeing of experiencing subjects as the reality which should ground thinking about right and wrongs, and oughts. I think most people naturally get that, even if they don't explicitly philosophically examine it. The nature of what it is to be an experiencing subject is the relevant fact for grounding morality. And of course reason can help you implement your goals.

Morality and oughts are all about what it means to be an experiencing subject with interests, a quality of life, well-being. That's what makes value, meaning, purpose, harm, flourishing, needs, desires, etc the appropriate qualiative language of morality. That's why it's at the heart of your own theory too. It's about mattering. It matters how we treat each other, because you have a quality of life, like me.

I agree with all of that. Now you have to take the Equal Agency postulate and the subjectivity of values and their implications seriously --- or reject them and settle for some form of egoism or moral tribalism.

What do you mean by egoism here? And why do you think it would lead to moral tribalism? I think it provides a bullwark against tribalism, because moral consideration is granted simply by being a conscious creature, no matter who you are.

I think if we accept the basic foundation, we've moved into the territory of woollier appropriateness to some extent, because no two subjects are identical. Hence the need for a balance between providing for basic needs for all to flourish, and providing the freedom to do so. There is no perfect formula, because that's the nature of the subject beast. Pretending there is some quantifiable equation or somesuch doesn't help, we just have to try to do our best.

So for example the overall notion of wellbeing will take into account inherent and pre-existing inequalities, to try to even the playing field somewhat. Rather than simply say we're all equal agents so leave me to get on with my agenting and you look out for yourself. It will say even if I don't find you deserving or appealing enough to hand you some of my money if I happen across you sleeping on the street, you should still have a right to somewhere safe and warm to sleep, and we who can afford it ought to chip in for that. Because your and my wellbeing matters, simply by dint of being an experiencing subject.

[Ecurb]

]Now, why would you suppose I think that? I've never said any such thing. No, no one "deserves" rights (any rights), though they can be said to deserve some of the things to which rights attach --- but not all of them. You have two arms, and you have a natural right to them because Nature provided you with them, but do you "deserve" them?

Deserts, merit, etc., apply to the fruits of human actions. Rights (natural and common rights, not legal rights) are not themselves fruits of human action; they are simply pseudo-properties --- a kind of tag --- assigned to persons to denote a particular historical fact about them: the fact that they acquired the thing to which they claim a right without inflicting loss or injury on other moral agents. Rights are not honorifics or rewards.

Once again, GE Morton prefers nit picking and defining words to actually discussing issues. I can see why. Any actual discussion would portray his paucity of good will.

Discussing philosophy with Morton is like swimming upstream; try as you might, you never seem to get anywhere.

In his response to Gertie Morton writes:

One has a duty to aid another in distress when the victim will suffer a substantial loss in welfare (serious injury or significant loss of property) which the rescuer can prevent or mitigate at a relatively small cost (loss of his own welfare). So, yes, I have a duty to prevent the blind man from wandering into a busy street, to save a child drowning in a shallow pond, to render CPR to an apparent heart attack victim, to help a neighbor escape a burning house and extinguish the fire, to intervene if I witness a theft, mugging, rape, assault, etc., to the extent I can do so without risking my own life or limb.

That duty is conditioned upon several factors:

1. The victim did not bring the distress upon himself by some wilful and intentional act when he "knew or should have known" what the consequences would be;

2. The victim has done all in his power, in the circumstances, to save himself or his property;

3. The rescuer has no reason to believe the victim would not reciprocate, were their roles reversed. I.e., Alfie has no duty to save Bruno if he knows Bruno has shirked or would shirk that same duty.

That duty, to the extent it is honored, advances the goal of the axiom by reducing risks of welfare losses for all agents, but only when the three conditions apply.

A couple of other points: the duty only requires action when the cost to the rescuer is "relatively small." But since welfare consists in securing what one values, and values are subjective and idiosyncratic, only the rescuing agent can decide how large that loss will be. Hence the Duty to Aid must be discretionary, not mandatory.

Picture this; GE MOrton is dining at a fancy restaurant. Strangely (given his personality) his dinner companion is the gorgeous Dominique Francon. Suddenly, Ms. Francon grasps her throat, unable to speak, but gasping for breath that will not come. "Aaaargh," she cries. It is clear that she is choking on a piece of meat.

"I know the Heimlich maneuver," says Morton. "But I'm afraid that you didn't sufficiently masticate your steak. That's why you're choking. Since you should have known that this might lead to choking, I have no duty to help you."

"Aaaargh!" cries Francon, turning blue.

"In addition," Morton calmly states,"I have no reason to believe you would help me if I were choking. I believe in the reverse Golden Rule -- never help others unless they would help you."

Ms. Francon collapses to the ground and dies. "Oh well,"says Morton, returning to his dinner and carefully chewing every bite.

Why bother discussing morality with someone whose views are so clearly uncharitable, self-serving, and (frankly) obnoxious? In Jane Austen's "Sense and Sensibility", Elinor Dashwood knows how to deal with Morton and his fellow travellers (from memory), "Elinor agreed with everything he said, because she did not think he deserved the compliment of rational opposition."