Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Peter Holmes]

Gertie

I've been following your reasoning with interest. Here are some questions.

1 Why are humans flawed observers of reality? Why can we not - individually or collectively - observe reality as it really is? How do you know that it isn't what we think it is? Why isn't that itself a flawed observation?

2 I suggest you may be experiencing the kind of empiricist skepticism promoted by Russell's (bloody) table in 'The Problems of Philosophy'.

Peter

This is far trickier for me, and not something I've much looked into.

Thanks for mentioning Russell's paper! I've gotten half way through it, it's a lot to take in and keep in my head, but I like his approach, and yes much of it struck a chord with me. Would you have a link to a more digestible summary?

I take it you're not a fan? I'd be interested to know why?

First - apologies for taking so long to respond to your post, which I think is clear and thoughtful.

I'll add comments later - but my objection to Russell's approach is twofold.

1 The question 'what is knowledge and where does it come from?' is a (perhaps the) classic example of a philosphical mistake. The idea that what we call knowledge - or any other abstraction - is a thing of some kind that comes from somewhere is a metaphysical delusion. We just use the word 'knowledge', its cognates and related words in certain completely clear and explicable ways. There's no mystery, and certainly no need for theorising. So theories of knowledge, including empiricism, including Russell's version, are solutions to a non-existent problem.

2 Empiricism - the claim that knowledge can only come from experience - like any foundationalism - is famously unable to account for its premise - because no experience can provide the knowledge that knowledge can only come from experience - and it leads directly to the kind of skepticism that Russell recycles in his account of the supposed problem of knowledge of the table: all experience is supposedly necessarily first-person, perspectival and limited. The supposed upshot is that all we can have is the tentative, subjective-consensual knowledge you talk about.

Here;s my thinking.

TLDR version-

- We only have direct knowledge of our own private conscious experience.

- Our conscious experience is how representations of the world manifest to us, but not in ways which perfectly match reality - there is a map/territory problem. Eg our map of a table comprises colour, defined edges and solidity which aren't properties of the table itself, rather our human interaction/relationship with it.

- Humans are mentally equipped for functional utility, not accuracy. We create models circumscribed by our limited and flawed perception and cognition.

Objections which spring to mind -


- You can argue the utility is based in accuracy, but then only at a 'good enough' functional level, and a particular level of resolution.

- You can argue we can use instruments to create more accurate and complete observations, but again they are designed to fit/be accessible to our flawed and limited capabilities.

- You can argue we can use conceptual instruments like maths, logic, cause and effect. But I'm thinking these again are circumscribed by our own abilities to observe patterns in the physical world which we extrapolate law-like rules from which make sense to us? And even then QM tells us these aren't universal truths, and we don't know why they aren't.

Thoughts?

I think the fantasy or delusion of 'things-as-they-really-are' is what haunts all of this - as it haunts Kant's take on empiricism. Supposedly, no individual (human or otherwise) can grasp things-as-they-really-are - the table as it really is - so (we) can only ever approximate by consensus. But why must there be a thing-as-it-really-is? Why are there not just things that different observers observe differently - but similarly, given a common physiology? Instead of our bodies ineluctably dividing us from each other, why don't they unite us? Substance dualism informs this fear, I think.

Waffly version -

I don't think it's controversial that we're flawed observers and thinkers. We function in ways suited to utility, not complete. accurate knowledge. We've identified inbuilt hacks that save time and calories, and all this is functionally generally 'good enough' at a particular level of resolution (the Classical Scale).

Our observations and measurements of physical stuff and processes (which is what is third person observable and measurable) gives the foundation to conceptualised principles like physical cause and effect, logic, the laws of physics. And we now have a really impressive physicalist model of what the world is made of and how it works.

The question is, have we developed reliable ways to eliminate error? And is that knowledge in principle able to be complete?

Again, I think these dreams of accuracy and completeness are the flip-side of our supposed inadequacy - our supposed fate as flawed observers and thinkers. Words such as like 'accuracy', 'completeness', 'precision' and 'absoluteness' aren't names of real things. We just use them in specific descriptive contexts. They aren't for ever unobtainables.

I don't know, but it strikes me that humans checking for human error is a problem. If we all have similar flaws and limitations, how do we falsify errors and limitations we don't recognise, as well as the ones we now do?

Can instruments solve the problem? Well they're instruments designed to be accessible to humans, to fit our observational and cognitive functioning, so there's a problem there. Or can using logic and reason identify all possible errors? I think (open to be corrected) that these are rooted in observation and measurement if you dig deep enough, so the same problem applies . QM is a wake up call there too.


QM tells us that the very building blocks of reality aren't governed by cause and effect, but probability. That what is real flashes in and out of existence. That there is action at a distance. That something can simultaneously be in two positions at once until observed/measured. (I might not have gotten this exactly right but you get my point). So in reality Russell's table isn't solid or brown with consistent definable/measurable edges. These are properties created by our experiential relationship/interaction with the table. The brown-ness, solidity and edges are representations of the table which exist only as conscious experience resulting from human interaction with the table. And it's this experiential representation we have direct certain knowledge of, not the table itself.


So QM suggests we're right to be leary of treating our physical third person observations and measurements as objective. And the law-like conceptualised rules we extrapolate as a result of observing physical patterns, as objective, real, true.


Now it might be that anomalies we note at the QM scale and massive cosmological scale are the end of the story. And can ultimately be tied together under a complete physicalist Theory of Everything. Or they might just be the adjacent slices of bread we can catch glimpses of in a loaf which is much bigger, and overall isn't encapsulated by what we think of as classical, micro and macro scales. Real reality might be something we haven't even imagined yet, or aren't equipped to recognise and/or understand. It might unify the objective and subjective, the mind-body problem. which isn't adressed by the standard model of physics. it might be that reality isn't fixed as such, but manifests relationally. Or is vibrating strings of potential somethings. Who knows what, it can get very speculative. But recent discoveries should at least give us pause for thought about the nature of reality and what is knowable, and how it;s knowable.

I suggest that QM is a red herring here. Russell's empiricist skepticism - if it's correct - applies euqally to our obsevation of QM phenonmena. And basic atomic theory provides enough reason to claim that 'things ain't what we think they are'. We can describe reality in different ways, but to claim that one kind of description is truer or more accurate or more complete than others is silly. For example, QM can't explain the causes of war or why we fall in love.

[Peter Holmes]

So you still haven't given any justification for your claim that facts are different from opinions. After asking you three times, the absence of an answer is disconcerting. Apparently you don't have any way to differentiate them.

I've explained that what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case - for example, water is H2O. And opinions or beliefs are attitudes that people have - for example the opinion or belief that water is H20. So facts and opinions are two different things. If you reject that standard distinction in the use of those terms, perhaps you can explain how you use them.

But I want to know how to tell whether some opinion is a fact. How do I figure it out? That's what I've been asking.

The question 'is some opinion a fact?' demonstrates the confusion between two different things that I've just explained. Perhaps if you read the explanation again, you'll see the difference. I suggest what you mean to ask is 'is this thing a fact? - which means 'is this thing a feature of reality that is or was the case?' And, in this discussion, the question is 'is the moral rightness/wrongness of (say) slavery a fact - a feature of reality that is or was the case?'

See, I could say the same thing about moral facts and moral opinions. "Moral facts are obligatory features of reality that are or were the case - for example, slavery is wrong. And moral opinions or beliefs are attitudes that people have - for example the opinion or belief that slavery is wrong." This whole discussion revolves around whether you possess a principled way to distinguish scientific/empirical knowledge from moral knowledge.

Of course you can claim there are moral facts. But yours is the burden of proof for that claim, and you accept the need for empirical evidence. So - produce the goods. What evidence is there for the claim that slavery is morally wrong? (Just a tip: appeal to a claim that something else is morally wrong isn't empirical evidence.) And when you can't produce the evidence, perhaps the penny will drop.

You say that moral facts don't exist. I say that, on your system, neither do natural facts. And if you can't support natural facts then it's no wonder that you can't support moral facts.

Why 'on my system', can I not establish the existence of natural facts - which I define as features of reality? Sorry to be obtuse - but please can you spell out the reason?

I'm clear on your ontology. What's at issue here is epistemology. Your claim is that objective moral "oughts" are epistemically impossible. I say that your system has the exact same problems, and that your "facts" are epistemically impossible. Once enough opinions agree on one thing do we call it a fact? Because if that is so, then there are moral facts, too, for some moral opinions converge. Or is there some other way to differentiate an opinion from a fact? You seem to think we can't get to moral facts from moral opinions. I am wondering how we get to natural facts from natural opinions?

We agree that consensus theories of truth are incorrect. And my definition of facts - features of reality that are or were the case - deliberately makes no mention of either knowledge or linguistic expression (description), which I think are completely separate issues. You seem unable to differentiate between features of reality (facts) and what we believe and know about them.

Epistemology (theory of knowledge) is a complete - though, for some of us, entertaining - waste of time. What we call knowledge isn't a thing of some kind that exists somewhere, somehow, and that can therefore be described. That's an ancient metaphysical delusion. Knowledge and 'knowing things' are what we say they are. How could they be anything else?

So I skimmed your website and some of your other threads, such as the thread on objective and subjective morality, and the thread on the Gettier problem. It's very obvious that you haven't formally studied philosophy. That's fine, but I'm not sure these epistemological questions are going to bear fruit for someone who doesn't understand the basics of epistemology. That is, I am doubting whether this fact/opinion discussion is worthwhile. It may be better to simply focus on my "ought" claim about propositional truth.

Condescending wanker. You have no idea what I've studied, formally or otherwise. You fail to address my point about the emptiness of talk about the nature of so-called abstract things, such as knowledge. And you don't seem able to engage with the very simple distinction between features of reality and what people think about them. By all means, use your knowledge of epistemology to refute my argument against the JTB description of knowledge, and Gettier's criticism. I wait with unbated breath.

I make a sharp distinction between features of reality (facts) and what we believe and know about them.

I realize that, but it doesn't make any sense to talk about reality apart from what we can believe and know about reality. We have no access to "facts" apart from what we believe and know about reality.

And yet you agree that consensus theories of truth are incorrect, and you agree that scientific objectivity is possible. How so, if all we have is what we believe and know? You seem to be recycling Gertie's intersubjective-consensus approach.

I didn't say a single word about an assertion. You say people have no obligation to believe that water is made up of H2O. I say they do. I say they ought to believe that water is made up of H2O.
The reason the obligation arises could be several: investigation, arguments from authority, accepting the common opinion, etc.

Those constitute reasons justifying the factual assertion that water is H2O. But your idea that the assertion itself implies an obligation to agree with it is simply false. Nobody is obliged to agree with any assertion, factual or non-factual. You've made that up.

The obligation arises from a sound argument, which I have addressed elsewhere. Let's establish two propositions about water:

WP1: "Educated people living in the 21st century ought to believe that water is made up of H2O."
WP2: "WP1 is false. Educated people living in the 21st century have no obligation to believe that water is made up of H2O."

I hold WP1. You hold WP2. Let's keep these in mind.

Just to interject. It's because we can know that water is H2O that what we believe is not the point. It just is H2O - and would be whether anyone believed or knew it or not. This is the sharp distinction I'm talking about. And this 'obligation to believe that something is the case' is a complete red herring. There just are what we call facts.

My challenge stands: what is the difference between the presumptive "ought" and the conventional moral "ought"? As noted, you are begging the question. You are giving no argument for your assertion that they are different.

Not so. I've given a clear argument for the functional difference between the falsifiable factual assertion 'this is a tangerine' and the unfalsifiable non-factual assertion (say) 'capital punishment is morally wrong'. And the evidence for the functional difference is that, given the way we use the words involved, 'this is a tangerine' is falsifiable - because, if it's an apple, the assertion is false. Whereas 'capital punishment is morally wrong' is unfalsifiable, which is why it's rationally possible to accept or reject that moral assertion. The moral rightness/wrongness of capital punishment is nothing like a tangerine. I wonder why this is so hard to grasp.

You are not giving arguments, you are just asserting your position (begging the question).
I could mimic your words, "And the evidence for the functional difference is that, given the way we use the words involved, 'capital punishment is morally wrong' is falsifiable - because, if someone claims it's right, the assertion is false. Whereas 'this is a tangerine' is unfalsifiable, which is why it's rationally possible to accept or reject that assertion--and the sister does reject it."

The claim 'this is a tangerine' refers to a real thing, a feature of reality. The claim is true or false - as with all factual assertions - given the way we use the words involved. The claim is falsifiable because, if that thing is not what we call a tangerine, then the claim is false. And whether someone says it's true is irrelevant. So your analogy with the claim 'capital punishment is morally wrong' fails. Given the way we use the words involved, it's perfectly rational to assert either it or its negation - which is why we have continuing moral arguments about things like capital punishment, abortion and eating animals. There are no facts - features of reality - that can settle them.

These aren't arguments.

But I've spoken to this question at length with Gertie. Feel free to read that. My guess is that you also subscribe to knowledge as consensus.

Sound or obligatory arguments are always person-specific. If you are able to present an argument to your interlocutor that they believe to be sound, then they must accept the conclusion. That is, they are obliged to accept the conclusion. This is the relevance of the three conditionals I gave above. Each of them illustrate the nature of the obligatory inference. Again, the punch-line is that if you believe an argument is sound then you have an obligation to believe it.

So what's an example? What you are doing right now is an example. You are trying to convince me that morality is not objective. All you are trying to do is present an argument that I agree is sound. You are not trying to convince me that I must accept sound arguments. If we get to the end of this and I say, "Well, I accept that all of the premises of your argument are true, and I also accept that all of your inferential reasoning is valid, but I still reject your conclusion," what would you say? You certainly would not go on arguing. You might say that I am intellectually dishonest, or that I am engaging in bad faith, or that I am not a real philosopher, etc. At root I would be failing my obligation accept truth where it is found. To accept an argument as sound and to reject its conclusion is to fail one's obligation to truth, and the very fact that you are engaging with me presupposes this obligation. If you didn't think I had an obligation to accept sound arguments you would stop engaging immediately.

QED. You're free to accept or reject my argument. There's no obligation. And this is all a red herring anyway.

Do you even know what soundness is? Again, we are not talking about someone who accepts or rejects an argument. We are talking about someone who admits that an argument is sound and then rejects the conclusion. This is contrary to our obligation to truth.

Do you even know what soundness is? It refers to the truth of premises, which is independent from inferential validity. The whole point of classical validity is that, given the truth of the premise or premises, the conclusion is true - whatever anyone thinks about it. This business of an obligation to accept the conclusion is an entirely irrelevant distraction. And I don't understand why you're banging on about it.

Side-question: do you think we are obliged to accept and apply the law of non-contradiction?

Strictly speaking, no. The rules of classical logic apply to what can be said consistently, without contradiction. (And logic deals with language, of course, not reality.) And there are non-classical logics, as you know, which ignore classical rules. But any use of language must follow the rules of one logic or another, for communication to be possible.

Oh, okay. 'Propositional truth'? Well, propositionas don't exist. They're misleading metaphysical fictions. So the expression 'propositional truth' is dead in the water, as is the expression 'propositional knowledge'. In this context, the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Oh dear.

If you have to deny the existence of propositions to try to save your system then it must be erroneous indeed.

I note you've yet to provide evidence for the existence of propositions, or any other so-called abstract things. Perhaps you think it an untutored impertinence to point out that that emperor is, in fact, naked.

[Gertie]

Gertie

I've been following your reasoning with interest. Here are some questions.

1 Why are humans flawed observers of reality? Why can we not - individually or collectively - observe reality as it really is? How do you know that it isn't what we think it is? Why isn't that itself a flawed observation?

2 I suggest you may be experiencing the kind of empiricist skepticism promoted by Russell's (bloody) table in 'The Problems of Philosophy'.

Peter

This is far trickier for me, and not something I've much looked into.

Thanks for mentioning Russell's paper! I've gotten half way through it, it's a lot to take in and keep in my head, but I like his approach, and yes much of it struck a chord with me. Would you have a link to a more digestible summary?

I take it you're not a fan? I'd be interested to know why?

First - apologies for taking so long to respond to your post, which I think is clear and thoughtful.

I'll add comments later - but my objection to Russell's approach is twofold.

1 The question 'what is knowledge and where does it come from?' is a (perhaps the) classic example of a philosphical mistake. The idea that what we call knowledge - or any other abstraction - is a thing of some kind that comes from somewhere is a metaphysical delusion. We just use the word 'knowledge', its cognates and related words in certain completely clear and explicable ways. There's no mystery, and certainly no need for theorising. So theories of knowledge, including empiricism, including Russell's version, are solutions to a non-existent problem.

2 Empiricism - the claim that knowledge can only come from experience - like any foundationalism - is famously unable to account for its premise - because no experience can provide the knowledge that knowledge can only come from experience - and it leads directly to the kind of skepticism that Russell recycles in his account of the supposed problem of knowledge of the table: all experience is supposedly necessarily first-person, perspectival and limited. The supposed upshot is that all we can have is the tentative, subjective-consensual knowledge you talk about.

Here;s my thinking.

TLDR version-

- We only have direct knowledge of our own private conscious experience.

- Our conscious experience is how representations of the world manifest to us, but not in ways which perfectly match reality - there is a map/territory problem. Eg our map of a table comprises colour, defined edges and solidity which aren't properties of the table itself, rather our human interaction/relationship with it.

- Humans are mentally equipped for functional utility, not accuracy. We create models circumscribed by our limited and flawed perception and cognition.

Objections which spring to mind -


- You can argue the utility is based in accuracy, but then only at a 'good enough' functional level, and a particular level of resolution.

- You can argue we can use instruments to create more accurate and complete observations, but again they are designed to fit/be accessible to our flawed and limited capabilities.

- You can argue we can use conceptual instruments like maths, logic, cause and effect. But I'm thinking these again are circumscribed by our own abilities to observe patterns in the physical world which we extrapolate law-like rules from which make sense to us? And even then QM tells us these aren't universal truths, and we don't know why they aren't.

Thoughts?

I think the fantasy or delusion of 'things-as-they-really-are' is what haunts all of this - as it haunts Kant's take on empiricism. Supposedly, no individual (human or otherwise) can grasp things-as-they-really-are - the table as it really is - so (we) can only ever approximate by consensus. But why must there be a thing-as-it-really-is? Why are there not just things that different observers observe differently - but similarly, given a common physiology? Instead of our bodies ineluctably dividing us from each other, why don't they unite us? Substance dualism informs this fear, I think.

Waffly version -

I don't think it's controversial that we're flawed observers and thinkers. We function in ways suited to utility, not complete. accurate knowledge. We've identified inbuilt hacks that save time and calories, and all this is functionally generally 'good enough' at a particular level of resolution (the Classical Scale).

Our observations and measurements of physical stuff and processes (which is what is third person observable and measurable) gives the foundation to conceptualised principles like physical cause and effect, logic, the laws of physics. And we now have a really impressive physicalist model of what the world is made of and how it works.

The question is, have we developed reliable ways to eliminate error? And is that knowledge in principle able to be complete?

Again, I think these dreams of accuracy and completeness are the flip-side of our supposed inadequacy - our supposed fate as flawed observers and thinkers. Words such as like 'accuracy', 'completeness', 'precision' and 'absoluteness' aren't names of real things. We just use them in specific descriptive contexts. They aren't for ever unobtainables.

I don't know, but it strikes me that humans checking for human error is a problem. If we all have similar flaws and limitations, how do we falsify errors and limitations we don't recognise, as well as the ones we now do?

Can instruments solve the problem? Well they're instruments designed to be accessible to humans, to fit our observational and cognitive functioning, so there's a problem there. Or can using logic and reason identify all possible errors? I think (open to be corrected) that these are rooted in observation and measurement if you dig deep enough, so the same problem applies . QM is a wake up call there too.


QM tells us that the very building blocks of reality aren't governed by cause and effect, but probability. That what is real flashes in and out of existence. That there is action at a distance. That something can simultaneously be in two positions at once until observed/measured. (I might not have gotten this exactly right but you get my point). So in reality Russell's table isn't solid or brown with consistent definable/measurable edges. These are properties created by our experiential relationship/interaction with the table. The brown-ness, solidity and edges are representations of the table which exist only as conscious experience resulting from human interaction with the table. And it's this experiential representation we have direct certain knowledge of, not the table itself.


So QM suggests we're right to be leary of treating our physical third person observations and measurements as objective. And the law-like conceptualised rules we extrapolate as a result of observing physical patterns, as objective, real, true.


Now it might be that anomalies we note at the QM scale and massive cosmological scale are the end of the story. And can ultimately be tied together under a complete physicalist Theory of Everything. Or they might just be the adjacent slices of bread we can catch glimpses of in a loaf which is much bigger, and overall isn't encapsulated by what we think of as classical, micro and macro scales. Real reality might be something we haven't even imagined yet, or aren't equipped to recognise and/or understand. It might unify the objective and subjective, the mind-body problem. which isn't adressed by the standard model of physics. it might be that reality isn't fixed as such, but manifests relationally. Or is vibrating strings of potential somethings. Who knows what, it can get very speculative. But recent discoveries should at least give us pause for thought about the nature of reality and what is knowable, and how it;s knowable.

I suggest that QM is a red herring here. Russell's empiricist skepticism - if it's correct - applies euqally to our obsevation of QM phenonmena. And basic atomic theory provides enough reason to claim that 'things ain't what we think they are'. We can describe reality in different ways, but to claim that one kind of description is truer or more accurate or more complete than others is silly. For example, QM can't explain the causes of war or why we fall in love.

Thanks Peter. Can you explain this a bit more?

1 The question 'what is knowledge and where does it come from?' is a (perhaps the) classic example of a philosphical mistake. The idea that what we call knowledge - or any other abstraction - is a thing of some kind that comes from somewhere is a metaphysical delusion. We just use the word 'knowledge', its cognates and related words in certain completely clear and explicable ways. There's no mystery, and certainly no need for theorising. So theories of knowledge, including empiricism, including Russell's version, are solutions to a non-existent problem.

My first thought is that knowledge is perhaps synonymous with conscious experience. (Then we divvy it up into categories like objective and opinion using this or that criteria). And its the conscious experience itself which definitely exists and it's impossible to be mistaken about, by its very nature.

[Tegularius]

Locally objective or universally objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Locally objective or universally objective?

If objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts - so that facts (features of reality that are or were the case) are a given - then objectivity can be local or universal, and all points in between.

But perhaps you can explain the distinction and why it matters.

[Belindi]

Regarding facts, unless someone knows everything about an event or an entity E they can't know E.

When we say we know E what we have done is selected what in our opinion are relevant facts ABCYVHJIUHBBGHJ about E.

[Peter Holmes]

Regarding facts, unless someone knows everything about an event or an entity E they can't know E.

When we say we know E what we have done is selected what in our opinion are relevant facts ABCYVHJIUHBBGHJ about E.

I think this may be to conflate two completely different uses of the word 'fact'. What we call a fact is either a feature of reality - a state-of-affairs - that is or was the case; or a (typically linguistic) description of such a feature of reality that's true, given the way we use the signs involved. And obviously, only facts-as-descriptions can have truth-value. Outside language, facts-as-features-of-reality just are or were the case.

The point is that a feature of reality can be described in a limitless number of different ways, for different purposes. And that's where the selection you refer to comes in.

As for knowledge, I think the idea of knowing everything about a thing or event is a delusion. What would such complete or perfect or absolute knowledge be like? What would it include, and where would the boundary be?

[Peter Holmes]

Belindi

To put it another way: if we deny the possibility of knowing everything about a thing or event, what exactly is it that we're denying?

[Peter Holmes]

Belindi

I'm reminded of (I think it was) Carnap's (logical positivist) proposal to map everything, which seems to be related to the early Wittgenstein's idea about atomic facts. But I may have this all mixed up.

[Belindi]

Regarding facts, unless someone knows everything about an event or an entity E they can't know E.

When we say we know E what we have done is selected what in our opinion are relevant facts ABCYVHJIUHBBGHJ about E.

I think this may be to conflate two completely different uses of the word 'fact'. What we call a fact is either a feature of reality - a state-of-affairs - that is or was the case; or a (typically linguistic) description of such a feature of reality that's true, given the way we use the signs involved. And obviously, only facts-as-descriptions can have truth-value. Outside language, facts-as-features-of-reality just are or were the case.

The point is that a feature of reality can be described in a limitless number of different ways, for different purposes. And that's where the selection you refer to comes in.

As for knowledge, I think the idea of knowing everything about a thing or event is a delusion. What would such complete or perfect or absolute knowledge be like? What would it include, and where would the boundary be?

It is a delusion which what I implied by what I wrote. The only Beings that know everything are 1. Absolute mind and 2, God.

As for the word 'fact' please apply Wittgenstein "the meaning of a word is its use". I.e see the social and verbal context of the word.

[Peter Holmes]

Regarding facts, unless someone knows everything about an event or an entity E they can't know E.

When we say we know E what we have done is selected what in our opinion are relevant facts ABCYVHJIUHBBGHJ about E.

I think this may be to conflate two completely different uses of the word 'fact'. What we call a fact is either a feature of reality - a state-of-affairs - that is or was the case; or a (typically linguistic) description of such a feature of reality that's true, given the way we use the signs involved. And obviously, only facts-as-descriptions can have truth-value. Outside language, facts-as-features-of-reality just are or were the case.

The point is that a feature of reality can be described in a limitless number of different ways, for different purposes. And that's where the selection you refer to comes in.

As for knowledge, I think the idea of knowing everything about a thing or event is a delusion. What would such complete or perfect or absolute knowledge be like? What would it include, and where would the boundary be?

It is a delusion which what I implied by what I wrote. The only Beings that know everything are 1. Absolute mind and 2, God.

As for the word 'fact' please apply Wittgenstein "the meaning of a word is its use". I.e see the social and verbal context of the word.

My point is that, if the very idea of knowing everything is incoherent, then the claim that 'Absolute mind' (whatever that is) and a god can know everything is also incoherent. Omniscience is a silly fiction - like Absolute mind and a god.

[Belindi]

Regarding facts, unless someone knows everything about an event or an entity E they can't know E.

When we say we know E what we have done is selected what in our opinion are relevant facts ABCYVHJIUHBBGHJ about E.

I think this may be to conflate two completely different uses of the word 'fact'. What we call a fact is either a feature of reality - a state-of-affairs - that is or was the case; or a (typically linguistic) description of such a feature of reality that's true, given the way we use the signs involved. And obviously, only facts-as-descriptions can have truth-value. Outside language, facts-as-features-of-reality just are or were the case.

The point is that a feature of reality can be described in a limitless number of different ways, for different purposes. And that's where the selection you refer to comes in.

As for knowledge, I think the idea of knowing everything about a thing or event is a delusion. What would such complete or perfect or absolute knowledge be like? What would it include, and where would the boundary be?

It is a delusion which what I implied by what I wrote. The only Beings that know everything are 1. Absolute mind and 2, God.

As for the word 'fact' please apply Wittgenstein "the meaning of a word is its use". I.e see the social and verbal context of the word.

My point is that, if the very idea of knowing everything is incoherent, then the claim that 'Absolute mind' (whatever that is) and a god can know everything is also incoherent. Omniscience is a silly fiction - like Absolute mind and a god.

Absolute mind, and God, are imaginary Beings that may be true for all we can know.
Absolute mind is a silly idea for people who don't understand that mind may be the ontic precursor of physical matter.

For those who do understand that mind may be the ontic precursor of physical matter, absolute mind is the mental equivalent of the materialist's "universe ".

Peter, please note I wrote God not god. God gets a capital G because it designates a unique person. When you spell god with a lower case g it properly refers to one of a number of gods as in polytheism.

[Peter Holmes]

I think this may be to conflate two completely different uses of the word 'fact'. What we call a fact is either a feature of reality - a state-of-affairs - that is or was the case; or a (typically linguistic) description of such a feature of reality that's true, given the way we use the signs involved. And obviously, only facts-as-descriptions can have truth-value. Outside language, facts-as-features-of-reality just are or were the case.

The point is that a feature of reality can be described in a limitless number of different ways, for different purposes. And that's where the selection you refer to comes in.

As for knowledge, I think the idea of knowing everything about a thing or event is a delusion. What would such complete or perfect or absolute knowledge be like? What would it include, and where would the boundary be?

It is a delusion which what I implied by what I wrote. The only Beings that know everything are 1. Absolute mind and 2, God.

As for the word 'fact' please apply Wittgenstein "the meaning of a word is its use". I.e see the social and verbal context of the word.

My point is that, if the very idea of knowing everything is incoherent, then the claim that 'Absolute mind' (whatever that is) and a god can know everything is also incoherent. Omniscience is a silly fiction - like Absolute mind and a god.

Absolute mind, and God, are imaginary Beings that may be true for all we can know.
Absolute mind is a silly idea for people who don't understand that mind may be the ontic precursor of physical matter.

For those who do understand that mind may be the ontic precursor of physical matter, absolute mind is the mental equivalent of the materialist's "universe ".

Peter, please note I wrote God not god. God gets a capital G because it designates a unique person. When you spell god with a lower case g it properly refers to one of a number of gods as in polytheism.

1 To repeat, if the idea of knowing everything about a thing or event is incoherent, talk about about who could do it is redundant.

2 The claims 'imaginary beings may exist for all we know' and 'mind may be the ontic precursor of physical matter' demonstrate the abandonment of rational skepticism. The absence of evidence may not mean a claim is false; but it does mean that to believe the claim is true is irrational.

3 The god that some people call God is just a god - one of the thousands invented by our ancestors, many of whom called their god 'God'. 'God' is no more a proper noun than is 'Fairy', 'Goblin', 'Devil' and so on.

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote:

'God' is no more a proper noun than is 'Fairy', 'Goblin', 'Devil' and so on.

And yet millions of people address God as if that is indeed His name.
I used to ride a little horse called Goblin and that was his name. I doubt not that some individual has been named Fairy.

You are confused because the generic word for supernatural beings is god, and that is the same word as the proper name God.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote:

'God' is no more a proper noun than is 'Fairy', 'Goblin', 'Devil' and so on.

And yet millions of people address God as if that is indeed His name.
I used to ride a little horse called Goblin and that was his name. I doubt not that some individual has been named Fairy.

You are confused because the generic word for supernatural beings is god, and that is the same word as the proper name God.

But I assume the little horse actually existed. And the existence of the thing we name with a proper noun is what matters. The use of a common noun as a proper noun is a linguistic idiom - so, as far as I know, no English speakers refer to the devil as 'Devil' - though, no doubt, real things have been called 'Devil', just as you called the little horse 'Goblin'. You didn't think it was a goblin.

The trick of calling your own god 'God' is pure ideology at work. And that remains true if millions - or billions - of people do it - as they do and have done, referring to different gods - all of them inventions. Do you take seriously Plato's use of the word 'God'? If not, why take seriously any other use of the word? Why insist on it in one context and not any others?