Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

Rights are solely a way that individuals think--namely they're ethical stances that the individual feels should be inviolable, regardless of local laws, customs, etc.

Sorry, TS, but the words of a natural language have specific meanings, and must if they are to be useful for communication. What someone may think a "right" is, or what rights they have, or how they "feel" about rights, is irrelevant to that established meaning. No one has any "right" to the services of other persons (absent some sort of promise made or contract between them), no matter what they think or feel. Whether P has a right to X is an empirical question with an objective answer. Namely,

P has a right to X IFF
1. P is the first possessor of X, or
2. P acquired X via a chain of consent from the first possessor.

If one of those conditions is not satisfied then P's claim is false.

Common beliefs about what something is, as they may be reflected in common definitions, do not determine ontological facts, and those ontological misconceptions can be corrected while still retaining the term in question.

Whether P is the first possessor of X, or acquired it via a chain of consent from the first possessor, are "ontological facts." The meaning of the word "rights" (and every other valid word in a natural language) is determined by how that word is actually used, currently and historically, in that speech community. Those are also an "ontological facts."

[Ecurb]

https://worldpopulationreview.com/count ... -the-world

^Forgot the link, but the happiest countries are Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway... I don't think the skiing is the common thread, though. They are a bunch of REAL socialists!

Maybe they're happy about global warming. They're sick of being so cold!

[-TheLastAmerican]

Gentlemen, and ladies,

Never forget that Stalin was, in fact, a Socialist. Furthermore, Stalin believed is socialism so strongly that he was willing to imprison / exterminate 18-million people that he thought MIGHT disagree with him, in order to force his pathological belief on them.

No, Stalin presided over a corrupted version of communism with a caste system and dictatorial powers added. Real socialists are found in the countries where people report that they are the happiest in the world. These reports are not due to censorship, as when Stalin or Putin gets 98% of the vote in a 'free and fair' election.

Why are they relatively happier than the rest of us? It is because they have the best of both worlds. They are free to speak their minds and pursue happiness in their own way. Yet, they are also free of the worry that a mistake or misfortune might take everything from them. They don't face bankruptcy (or even preventable death!) if they get sick. They have opportunities for education, health care and housing that are not always available to all of us here in the U.S.

Tax and spend is not a virtual gulag for them. Rather it is the best possible combination of freedom and security.

Interesting... I wonder why more of the world's enlightened people aren't clamoring to get into Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway...

[Terrapin Station]

Whether P is the first possessor of X, or acquired it via a chain of consent from the first possessor, are "ontological facts."

Possession of anything, aside from parsing that as someone, say, holding on to an item, only obtains via people thinking about the item and the person in terms of possession. It's certainly an ontological fact that the people who think of the relationship that way think of it that way, but it's not a fact that obtains outside of those subjective phenomena.

The meaning of the word "rights" (and every other valid word in a natural language) is determined by how that word is actually used,

It's determined by how an individual thinks about it. Many individuals look at usage, and then interpret that usage, as part of the way that they think about a term's meaning.

[GE Morton]

This is much too simplistic, and does not carry the weight of certainty you want to attach to it. You have to first declare whether you are talking
about legal rights or moral rights.

I answered that in first response to TS. I'm speaking of natural and common rights, as understood throughout the liberal tradition and in common law.

Legal rights are given and supported by the legislature and the courts and the power of the military or police to enforce them. They didn't come down from the mountain on a stone tablet. They are enacted and enforced by people, and subject to change as the opinions of those people change.

Quite correct. One may have a legal right to whatever some demagogue or despot with the power to enforce it decrees. Such fiat rights ("frights") are without moral significance --- unless they merely codify a natural or common right.

Moral rights are purely subjective and decided by the individual. I may disagree with any or all of the moral rights which you think should apply, and you have no objective basis to declare that you are right and I am wrong.

I just gave you the objective basis for determining whether a claimed right exists. If you disagree that P has a right to X when those conditions are satisfied, then you simply misunderstand or are mis-using the term "rights."

There are many exceptions to your rules about rights. There are taxes and fees that could cause you to lose your right to keep your house if you don't pay them. There are building codes and divorce court rulings or even things like adverse possession that could cost you your home. On the legal side, you don't get to keep what you have unless you pay your share for the common good and play by the rest of the rules. The rules vary over time.

Those are not exceptions to my "rules about rights." Rights are not inviolable; they can sometimes be morally violated. E.g., if you injure somehow you become liable for the damages you've caused, and the victim of the injury, or someone acting on his behalf, may seize some of your property (to which you have a right) for restitution.

On the moral side, all societies are mutual pacts of cooperation to some extent. We use public funds for the public good in every society. You don't get to hold 100% of the value of your property. Rather, you give back a percentage of it to pay for roads and fire and police protection and such. Where do we draw the line? Wherever the blazes we decide to draw it.

Well, this exchange is wandering far from the homelessness issue, but . . .

Where we draw the line --- if we wish to draw it in a principled way --- is obvious. Yes, you are obligated to pay for those public services from which you benefit, i.e., roads, police protection, etc. You have no obligation to pay for anyone else's health care, however --- unless, of course, you have inflicted whatever illness or injury he suffers. And, no, we can't draw it "wherever in blazes we decide to draw it" --- unless we're amoral thugs unconcerned with rational or moral justification of our acts, who act on whim: "If it feels good, do it!"

And, no, societies are not "mutual pacts of cooperation." They are no such thing. That is the "organic fallacy." Modern, civilized societies are not tribes, "teams," giant co-ops, or "big happy families." They are not collectives of any kind. They are randomly-assembled groups of unrelated, independent, autonomous individuals who happen, by accident of birth, to occupy a common territory. They have no natural bonds, no shared personal histories, no common interests, no overriding concern with one another's welfare, and no a priori obligations to one another. Nor have they entered into any sort of pact or contract. Before you can consider these issues productively you have to discard that ubiquitous social myth.

There is nothing immoral about taking some of your wealth to pay for guaranteed health care for everyone. Most societies do so. In fact, I would say this is the moral choice. There is also nothing immoral about deciding that a minimum standard of housing or education should be available to everyone regardless of their ability to pay for it. Many societies also do this.

Then apparently you see nothing immoral about slavery (which is, after all, forcing others to work for your benefit).

[GE Morton]

"E.g., if you injure somehow you become liable . .. "

Should be "someone."

[Ecurb]

Quite correct. One may have a legal right to whatever some demagogue or despot with the power to enforce it decrees. Such fiat rights ("frights") are without moral significance --- unless they merely codify a natural or common right.

Oh, malarky! My earlier example of "right-of-way" serves to show how ridicuolous this is. Are you suggesting there is no moral significance to "rights-of-way"? The moral significance of a right of way derives from the fact that if one ignores this standard legal and moral precept, one is likely to kill someone else. Clearly, rights of way are not "natural rights". At one intersection, they didn't exist until someone put up a "yield" sign. Nonetheless, it is immoral to ignore these rights.

To paraphrase GE Morton, if he disagrees that a "right-of-way" is a "right", then he "simply misunderstand(s) or (is) mis-using the term "rights."

[GE Morton]

Oh, malarky! My earlier example of "right-of-way" serves to show how ridicuolous this is. Are you suggesting there is no moral significance to "rights-of-way"? The moral significance of a right of way derives from the fact that if one ignores this standard legal and moral precept, one is likely to kill someone else. Clearly, rights of way are not "natural rights". At one intersection, they didn't exist until someone put up a "yield" sign. Nonetheless, it is immoral to ignore these rights.

Sorry, Ecurb --- I missed your earlier post. Here it is:

If "natural language(s)" have specific meanings", is it reasonable to define "rights' in a manner inconsistant with the standard meaning of the word?

Let's look at one "right" -- widely established both legally and morally. It's the "right-of-way". We all know that a pedestrian in a crosswalk has the right of way. What does this mean? It means that drivers are morally and legally obliged to stop when he is in the crosswalk, instead of running him down.

Is P (the pedestrian) the "first possessor" of the crosswalk? Has he acquired it through a chain of consent? Of course not. His right of way is established by law, more, and tradition.

Based on his post above, GE Morton must either claim that the right of way is not a real right (a claim which will fly in the face of his claim that words have specific meanings) or claim Joe Tourist, the millionth tourist to cross Broadway and 42nd, is the "first possessor" of the intersection. Neither claim is credible. The right of way, like other rights, is culturally and legally constiuted. It was not handed down by God.

The first possessor the crosswalk is the government of the city in which it is located, and the citizens of that city. As the owner of the street and the crosswalk, the city may impose any conditions it wishes on their use, as may the owner of any other property. The pedestrian's right-of-way in a crosswalk was transferred to him by the owner, just as a tenant's right to occupy a rental apartment was conveyed to him by the landlord (in consideration for rent paid).

Yes, the right-of-way in your example is a real right. That is is codified in law is irrelevant; if a similar right was granted to pedestrians by the owner of a private roadway it would not not be a law, but still a real right.

[Ecurb]

The first possessor the crosswalk is the government of the city in which it is located, and the citizens of that city. As the owner of the street and the crosswalk, the city may impose any conditions it wishes on their use, as may the owner of any other property. The pedestrian's right-of-way in a crosswalk was transferred to him by the owner, just as a tenant's right to occupy a rental apartment was conveyed to him by the landlord (in consideration for rent paid).

Yes, the right-of-way in your example is a real right. That is is codified in law is irrelevant; if a similar right was granted to pedestrians by the owner of a private roadway it would not not be a law, but still a real right.

This seems at odds with another statement you wrote:

And, no, societies are not "mutual pacts of cooperation." They are no such thing. That is the "organic fallacy." Modern, civilized societies are not tribes, "teams," giant co-ops, or "big happy families." They are not collectives of any kind. They are randomly-assembled groups of unrelated, independent, autonomous individuals who happen, by accident of birth, to occupy a common territory. They have no natural bonds, no shared personal histories, no common interests, no overriding concern with one another's welfare, and no a priori obligations to one another. Nor have they entered into any sort of pact or contract. Before you can consider these issues productively you have to discard that ubiquitous social myth.

If modern societies are not "collectives", how can they "possess" something collectively?

In addition, "owners" cannot (and by right should not) impose any conditions they wish on the use of property. For example, if you own a house, you cannot impose the condition that if anyone walks in your yard without permission he is subject to being shot. If you shoot him, you will be guilty of murder.

IN addition, your claim (to someone else) that forcing people to work for someone else is a form of slavery is incorrect. The street which was built by the city (on which the crosswalk is located) was built with taxes that were forcibly collected (which amounts to forcing someone to work for someone else). Are you saying that imposing right-of-way rules on the crosswalk is akin to slavery?

Rights (I suggest) are best seen as culturally constituted, conditional, and negotiated. They are (we've had this discussion before) nothing more than a set of obligations (the rights of one man are the obligations of another). When we endorse rights, we endorse obligations. If we say that we believe in property rights, we are saying that we feel obliged to ask permission before driving someone else's car. When we say we believe in a "right to health care" we are saying we feel obliged to help pay for other people's health care. Perhaps you don't want to be obligated to help your ill fellow citizens, but such an obligation is no more like slavery than the obligation to avoid driving someone else's car. Both are simply culturally constituted obligations, which, seen from the flip side of the coin, are called "rights".

[chewybrian]

I just gave you the objective basis for determining whether a claimed right exists. If you disagree that P has a right to X when those conditions are satisfied, then you simply misunderstand or are mis-using the term "rights."

I assume you mean this...

P has a right to X IFF
1. P is the first possessor of X, or
2. P acquired X via a chain of consent from the first possessor.

So, if I discovered a lake in the desert and planted a flag and claimed it as my own, then I have the "right" to withhold the water unless people pay me whatever I want for it? Why don't the American Indians have "rights" to your property, if they were first possessors and did not give you consent to take it?

It seems like you are claiming rights as objective because they have persisted for a while within our own society, the way a judge might cite 'precedent' to avoid ruling on the facts with his own judgement. It seems like a copout to me. Two hundred years ago, both you and the judge could have justified slavery in these ways. But, which is a real right: the right to own slaves, or the right to be free? One was legal and one was morally correct, and the judgement is subjective, even though the right to live free is about the easiest one to support that I can think of--much more important than the right to property.

Rousseau made a good argument against property rights...

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11136/pg11136.html

Anyway, there have been several threads about the objective basis for morality, and most contributors agreed there is no objective basis. I think you can extend that to rights as well. Rights are what we believe they are at any given time.

[chewybrian]

Rights (I suggest) are best seen as culturally constituted, conditional, and negotiated. They are (we've had this discussion before) nothing more than a set of obligations (the rights of one man are the obligations of another). When we endorse rights, we endorse obligations. If we say that we believe in property rights, we are saying that we feel obliged to ask permission before driving someone else's car. When we say we believe in a "right to health care" we are saying we feel obliged to help pay for other people's health care. Perhaps you don't want to be obligated to help your ill fellow citizens, but such an obligation is no more like slavery than the obligation to avoid driving someone else's car. Both are simply culturally constituted obligations, which, seen from the flip side of the coin, are called "rights".

Well said.

[GE Morton]

I just gave you the objective basis for determining whether a claimed right exists. If you disagree that P has a right to X when those conditions are satisfied, then you simply misunderstand or are mis-using the term "rights."

I assume you mean this...

P has a right to X IFF
1. P is the first possessor of X, or
2. P acquired X via a chain of consent from the first possessor.

So, if I discovered a lake in the desert and planted a flag and claimed it as my own, then I have the "right" to withhold the water unless people pay me whatever I want for it?

Yep. But it depends upon the size of the lake. If it is small enough that you can exercise effective supervision and control over all of it, then it is all yours; you have a right to it.

Why don't the American Indians have "rights" to your property, if they were first possessors and did not give you consent to take it?

They do in some cases. Per the above criteria, if the current possessor did not acquire the property via a chain of consent from the first possessor, then his claim to it is invalid.

It seems like you are claiming rights as objective because they have persisted for a while within our own society, the way a judge might cite 'precedent' to avoid ruling on the facts with his own judgement.

Well, no. I've given, and you've just repeated, the objective basis for rights claims. It has nothing to do with precedent. It rests on verifiable historical facts.

Rousseau made a good argument against property rights...

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11136/pg11136.html

Ah, yes. Like many before and after him Rousseau makes the Georgist (and ultimately Biblical) argument: "The first man, who, after enclosing a piece of ground, took it into his head to say, 'This is mine,' and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. How many crimes, how many wars, how many murders, how many misfortunes and horrors, would that man have saved the human species, who pulling up the stakes or filling up the ditches should have cried to his fellows: Be sure not to listen to this imposter; you are lost, if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong equally to us all, and the earth itself to nobody!"

The trouble is, there is utterly no basis for his claim that "the fruits of the earth belong to us all." Like the Earth, until discovered they belong to nobody, and that which belongs to nobody is available for the taking by the first person who comes along.

Anyway, there have been several threads about the objective basis for morality, and most contributors agreed there is no objective basis. I think you can extend that to rights as well.

Yes, I've been involved in some of those threads. But I've given you an objective basis for rights claims. Are you claiming the criteria I gave are not objective? Or are you saying verifiable facts cease to be objective if some don't like their implications?

Rights are what we believe they are at any given time.

Really? Then if I have failing kidneys and believe I have a right to one of yours, then I do? Per a study several years ago of attitudes among teenage boys in Los Angeles, many of them declared they had a "right" to sex --- that sex is a "human need" and girls have a duty to provide it. So they have that "right"?

No, rights are not "what we believe they are at any given time" (who is the "we" there, BTW?), any more than are elephants and tigers, fairies and unicorns. Wishes, as the saying goes, are not horses.

[Ecurb]

Really? Then if I have failing kidneys and believe I have a right to one of yours, then I do? Per a study several years ago of attitudes among teenage boys in Los Angeles, many of them declared they had a "right" to sex --- that sex is a "human need" and girls have a duty to provide it. So they have that "right"?

No, rights are not "what we believe they are at any given time" (who is the "we" there, BTW?), any more than are elephants and tigers, fairies and unicorns. Wishes, as the saying goes, are not horses.

The notion (with which I agree) that "rights are not (merely) what we believe them to be" is reasonable. I do not claim that culturally constituted mores (such as rights) are utterly malleable. To demand an obligation on the part of others (and thus a "right" on your own part) one SHOULD look to precedents, standard moral precepts and (specifically) the history of rights. To your credit, GE, you are willing to do this. Nonetheless, we should be leary of sellecting only those precedents, moral precepts, and histories which mold the notion of rights to our own preferences. You seem to want to claim rights have some sort of divine mandate (not necessarily from God, but from some sort of Natural Truth). This is where we differ (as well as in many of the details).

[Leontiskos]

Anyway, there have been several threads about the objective basis for morality, and most contributors agreed there is no objective basis. I think you can extend that to rights as well. Rights are what we believe they are at any given time.

Apart from the absurd consequences already pointed out, there are also semantic problems with your claim. The relevant root means, "what someone deserves; a just claim, what is due, equitable treatment...." By definition rights must be more than "what we say they are," for human will does not determine what is deserved and what is just by fiat. Rather, the concepts of desert and justice rule the human will, which is thus subordinated. This is why laws which rule human action appeal to justice and are ideally rooted in justice.

If you wanted to make a claim on the basis of fiat, power, majority, etc., you would not talk about rights (at least if you were being honest). Rights by definition involve mutual accountability to something outside the control of the two parties. For example, if your friend finds a precious ring in the river Anduin you could ask him to give it to you. You might try to coax him with a reminder that it is your birthday. You might threaten him, especially if you are stronger or you have him outnumbered. You might take it by force. You might throttle him until he is dead if he won't give it up. But even Smeagol did not claim a right to the ring. Even he knew that mere desire does not constitute a right.

We can steal rings or houses from others if we are powerful enough to carry out the theft, but there is a difference between taking something because you want it and taking something because you have a right to it. You are misapplying the word "right." If someone thinks morality doesn't exist they wouldn't go on to make claims on the basis of morality. If you don't think rights exist then you shouldn't simultaneously go on to make claims on the basis of rights, or to arbitrarily re-define "I want X" as "I have a right to X," at least if you're honest.

[Leontiskos]

Possession of anything, aside from parsing that as someone, say, holding on to an item, only obtains via people thinking about the item and the person in terms of possession. It's certainly an ontological fact that the people who think of the relationship that way think of it that way, but it's not a fact that obtains outside of those subjective phenomena.

This is quite an artificial way to think about it. You rightly note that your construction fails to explain the dynamics of someone literally holding onto an item, but you don't seem to notice how the metaphorical synecdoche of "possessing" is also realized in reality. It's not that possession is merely a matter of thinking with the one exception of physically holding an object. In reality the unanimous belief in possession manifests in all sorts of ways: titles, fences, locks, borders, keys, security systems, safety deposits, IDs. These things obtain at local, state, and national levels; in physical and virtual environments. The belief in property inundates all of human civilization.

Now the obvious answer is that there is such a thing as private property which is recognized by human beings and instantiated in their civilizations. Presumably you think that it is merely a matter of subjective thought with no correlate to reality (such as the ontological fact of scarcity). That's an ..interesting idea. I'll stick with the commonsensical notion that a rational, tool-using species appropriates and recognizes property.