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[Leontiskos]

Look up "promise" in any dictionary, we all know what it means. This isn't about definitions, but about the is-ought issue which you haven't yet touch upon.

Now that I think about it, this conversation already occurred in this thread. GE Moore and Peter Hunter had it back on page 113. Here is a link.

[Peter Holmes]

Look up "promise" in any dictionary, we all know what it means. This isn't about definitions, but about the is-ought issue which you haven't yet touch upon.

Now that I think about it, this conversation already occurred in this thread. GE Moore and Peter Hunter had it back on page 113. Here is a link.

G E Moore? Blimey. He's slumming it.

[Leontiskos]

I think your moral proposal is plausible and coherent, and it strikes me as a form of utilitarianism.

As long as that term is understood loosely. Any rational moral theory must be consequentialist in the long run.

Do you take deontology to be irrational?

But I think the system is also utilitarian in the sense that it is based on maximizing quantitative units, which are defined in terms of subjectively-defined well-being. That is, the goals of each participant are collected, quantified, and analyzed until the system arrives at some maximal solution. Obviously the rules of that algorithm will have to be logically prior to the goals the algorithm analyzes. The particular rules that the algorithm uses will determine the form of utilitarianism.

As I understand it you have constructed a system where each participant's subjectively-defined welfare is 'equally' advanced, and the system is available to anyone who wishes to opt in. It is quasi-objective in the sense that the desires of each participant are publicly known and are the very thing that constitute the system itself.

Not (necessarily) equally advanced. The extent to which any individual's interests or welfare is advanced will depend upon many variable factors, particularly his own talents, strengths, diligence, and ambition, as well as "dumb luck." The only thing equal (per theory) is that the same rules apply to all agents.

Okay.

Though what each person counts as a good or evil is subjective, that they do consider various things as goods or evils is objective. So a goal to the effect, "Develop principles and rules of interaction which will allow all agents to maximize welfare as each defines it" is a morally neutral goal; it is universal, it assumes no values and begs no moral questions.

I do not agree that this systematic goal is morally neutral. By my definition something is moral if it presupposes a normative state of affairs for human thoughts, judgments, or behavior. But your principle implies that human thoughts, judgments, and behavior ought to be oriented towards this particular goal. It is a very democratic and morally thin goal, but it is moral all the same. If you want to maintain that the goal is morally neutral could you give your definition of moral neutrality?

" . . . your principle implies that human thoughts, judgments, and behavior ought to be oriented towards this particular goal."

No, it does not. It does not recommend any particular goal. It does, however, assume that all moral systems have some goal, some raison d'etre (which means that moral "oughts" are instrumental "oughts," i.e., rules or practices which objectively advance or facilitate that goal). It then assumes that the overriding goal, purpose, of most moral theories over the centuries has been to advance human welfare, per some understanding of that term (even religious moralities, by assuring adherents of an "afterlife").

Isn't the goal then welfare, maximized in some particular way? Below you affirm that, "The theory does, to be sure, propose and assume a particular conception of human welfare."

To be clear, are you attempting to propose a novel "moral" system or is this a rhetorical way of describing the factual state of human society as it finds itself?

The theory does not, however, assert any obligation to adopt that goal, any more than the rules of baseball oblige anyone to play that game. As I've said on several occasions, someone who does not share that goal --- e.g., egoists, elitists, amoralists, et al, will have no use for my moral theory. Their rejection of it doesn't render it unsound, however.

Oh, I didn't mean to imply that you were foisting this goal upon people unawares. That is why I have been using the term "participant," which is meant to refer to those who decide to participate in your system.

Why do you believe the system is sound? Why do you think people should participate?

The goal of a theory, however, is not a personal goal; it does not assert any particular interest of any particular person. It is indifferent to personal goals. But it does require a consensus among everyone interested in a viable theory of the subject matter in question. There is, I think, a consensus that the aim of ethics is to secure and advance "the good," or "the good life," in some sense. If there is, and if we agree that what constitutes "the good" or "the good life" differs from person to person, then the goal stated above becomes "quasi-objective."

Along the same lines as my last point, there are some personal goals that are common to all participants, and these would be goals such as, "To have a working system," "To have equal representation," "To achieve a particular conception of maximized welfare," etc. Those are the only personal goals presupposed by your theory, which is beginning to look a lot like classical liberalism.

I'm not sure who you're counting as a "participant." Certainly everyone who has faced any moral dilemma or given any thought to moral theory will share the goal of devising a satisfying and workable morality. But that is obviously not true of everyone in any modern society. Nor, surely, is a desire to "achieve a particular conception of maximized welfare." The theory does, to be sure, propose and assume a particular conception of human welfare. Whether that conception is sound and rationally defensible is a separate, non-moral, question.

Can I ask why you define moral 'oughts' in instrumental terms? Is it just because you think categorical 'oughts' don't exist, and so every goal of human action must be subjective, leaving the means as the only possible "objectively moral" candidate? The goals seem moral in the common sense of the word, so it strikes me as odd to exclude them from being called moral. I don't find anything in the definitions or etymologies of 'moral' that would restrict it to an instrumental concept.

I also don't see how the Equal Agency postulate could fail to be a moral principle. That everyone ought to be treated the same is a moral principle analogous to the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

The theory defines "Moral Agent." The Equal Agency postulate follows from that definition, i.e., the rules apply in the same way to anyone who qualifies as a moral agent, there being no basis in the theory for applying them differently to different agents. The postulate has moral import, of course, but it is not per se a moral imperative; it is a logical one.

When you say it is logical rather than moral, what do you mean? Given your definition above it would seem to be moral insofar as it "objectively advances or facilities" the overriding goal of your system. Or are you here using 'moral' in a more casual sense? Even so, I'm curious what makes it logical rather than moral, both because everyone imagines that their morality is logical, and because any moral norm could presumably be expressed in the language of logic. I come from an Aristotelian background where virtuous action is tied up with man's rational nature and thus all moral acts are related to rationality.

BTW, the Equal Agency postulate does not entail that "everyone ought to be treated the same." It only entails that the principles and rules of the theory apply equally to all. How people "treat" one another covers far more ground. It is (as you suggested) similar to the legal concept of "equal protection of the law" --- e.g., everyone, white, black, male, female, old, young, rich, poor, etc. --- who runs a red light pays the same fine. But it doesn't require you to invite all of your neighbors to your backyard BBQ.

Right, I understand that.


My initial criticism of your system is that it seems too vague to do any meaningful work. Human beings are liable to define 'welfare' in dramatically opposed ways--indeed, this is one of your basic premises. Only on the presupposition that their definitions strongly converge could meaningful principles and rules of interaction be implemented. In that case you would arrive at a democratically derived common good. A well-worn definition of law would be something like, "An ordinance for the sake of the common good" (Cf. Wikipedia: Common Good). Do you think a democratic legislature with no constitution or charter would produce your overriding goal in its laws?


-Leontiskos

[Belindi]

Epistemology is not enough when we are talking about objective reality. It is impossible to define the philosophically interesting usage of 'objective' without reference to ontic reality.

Well, methinks that "philosophically interesting" usage you seem to have in mind is a philosophical quagmire. Definitions in which the definiendum is more obscure than the definiens are never informative or useful.

If some theory of existence could be absolutely true, as could be the case, and this theory of existence is based on the premise that the total of individual minds = absolute mind then subjective minds become absolute mind and both of those aspects objectively exist.

You make my case.

What is the problem?

[Atla]

Look up "promise" in any dictionary, we all know what it means. This isn't about definitions, but about the is-ought issue which you haven't yet touch upon.

Now that I think about it, this conversation already occurred in this thread. GE Moore and Peter Hunter had it back on page 113. Here is a link.

Yeah that's about all there is to the problem:

Having a goal does not entail pursuing it, just as making a promise does not entail keeping it. An 'is' cannot entail an 'ought'.

Is there a God or some hidden universal morality system or whatever, that makes breaking promises objectively wrong/immoral?

[Leontiskos]

Is there a God or some hidden universal morality system or whatever, that makes breaking promises objectively wrong/immoral?

What would that even mean? How would God make breaking promises immoral? Are you thinking this through?

Listen, if you don't think one ought not break promises, I don't think you've thought through the concept of promises with anything approaching rigor. Presumably you would then also say one ought not pursue goals, as if this is not a contradictory statement, "Today I set a goal to lose ten pounds by the end of the year and I am not going to try to lose ten pounds by the end of the year." Insofar as you set a goal you ought to pursue it. Insofar as you make a promise you ought to keep it. This is elementary stuff. Human beings are capable of setting an intention with respect to the future, and to claim that promises ought not be kept or goals ought not be pursued is affirming the contradictory statement that one can intend something and not intend something at the same time and in the same way.

[Atla]

Is there a God or some hidden universal morality system or whatever, that makes breaking promises objectively wrong/immoral?

What would that even mean? How would God make breaking promises immoral? Are you thinking this through?

Listen, if you don't think one ought not break promises, I don't think you've thought through the concept of promises with anything approaching rigor. Presumably you would then also say one ought not pursue goals, as if this is not a contradictory statement, "Today I set a goal to lose ten pounds by the end of the year and I am not going to try to lose ten pounds by the end of the year." Insofar as you set a goal you ought to pursue it. Insofar as you make a promise you ought to keep it. This is elementary stuff. Human beings are capable of setting an intention with respect to the future, and to claim that promises ought not be kept or goals ought not be pursued is affirming the contradictory statement that one can intend something and not intend something at the same time and in the same way.

Okay you seem to have a serious comprehension issue. No one here is denying that promises are meant to be kept.

Again, we are talking about OBJECTIVE oughts here. Do you realize that billions of people believed/believe in objective morals handed down by gods, yes or no?

[Leontiskos]

Okay you seem to have a serious comprehension issue. No one here is denying that promises are meant to be kept.

And is it objectively true that one ought to do things that one means to do? If so, then--ceteris paribus--one ought to fulfill their promises.

[Atla]

Okay you seem to have a serious comprehension issue. No one here is denying that promises are meant to be kept.

And is it objectively true that one ought to do things that one means to do? If so, then--ceteris paribus--one ought to fulfill their promises.

No, of course it's not objectively true, which is the point. Are you familiar with religions?

[Leontiskos]

Okay you seem to have a serious comprehension issue. No one here is denying that promises are meant to be kept.

And is it objectively true that one ought to do things that one means to do? If so, then--ceteris paribus--one ought to fulfill their promises.

No, of course it's not objectively true, which is the point. Are you familiar with religions?

*Sigh*

Take care.

[Atla]

Okay you seem to have a serious comprehension issue. No one here is denying that promises are meant to be kept.

And is it objectively true that one ought to do things that one means to do? If so, then--ceteris paribus--one ought to fulfill their promises.

No, of course it's not objectively true, which is the point. Are you familiar with religions?

*Sigh*

Take care.

Guess you don't know what the term "objective morality" refers to in philosophy.

[Leontiskos]

Of course not. Obligations are solely factors of thought, and as I noted above, things like paper with ink marks on it have no objective meaning. There is no objective meaning period.

You only say that because you don't understand what objectivity is, and each time your lack of understanding leaves you wrapped up in an absurdity you conveniently ignore that fact. In this example you managed to ignore the entire post:

We're still talking about personal and specifically mental phenomena, and not phenomena that are found in the world independently of persons/minds.

. . . I would contend that the term does not mean, "Able to exist independent of minds"

I'm not sure why you'd contend that. Maybe you just are saying that you use it that way.

I would contend that because it is true. If we adhere to your principle then claims such as this are not objective: "Human beings have thoughts." On your theory, since thoughts are not found in the world independently of persons/minds, the proposition that human beings have thoughts is not an objective proposition. But this is an absurdity. Thus you've made a mistake regarding the nature of objectivity.

The fact that language depends on stipulative symbols and phonemes doesn't mean that objectivity doesn't exist. That idea is based on a lousy theory of language. Propositions are not made true or false by way of material symbols. They are made true or false by the meaning of the symbols.

I don't think that any moral stance in itself is rational or irrational. I'm basically an emotivist (though I call myself a(n ethical) subjectivist instead, and I stress that moral stances are about one's dispositions, preferences, etc.--I don't normally frame it strictly through the notion of emotions.)

Moral obligation is not rooted in value or desire. Things like promises are not made obligatory by values, desires, or preferences. See John Searle's paper, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'."

[Terrapin Station]

You only say that because you don't understand what objectivity is,

Oy vey.

lol

I would contend that because it is true.

Definitions (as well as meanings) are not true or false.

In any event, "objectivity" (or whatever we'd want to call it) that is mind-dependent can't do the work that anyone wants objectivity to do. I explained this earlier.

If we adhere to your principle then claims such as this are not objective: "Human beings have thoughts." On your theory, since thoughts are not found in the world independently of persons/minds, the proposition that human beings have thoughts is not an objective proposition.

No proposition is objective, because propositions are the meanings of sentences that can be true or false, and meanings are not objective.

But this is an absurdity.

It's an absurdity because _____? (Because you feel it is, maybe? Or because you use the term in a different way? Or?)

The fact that language depends on stipulative symbols and phonemes doesn't mean that objectivity doesn't exist.

It's not that mind-independence doesn't exist (whether we want to call it that "objectivity" or whatever). It's that things like propositions, moral stances, oughts, meaning, etc. are not mind-independent. Only mind-independence can do the work that people want "objectivity" to do.

That idea is based on a lousy theory of language. Propositions are not made true or false by way of material symbols. They are made true or false by the meaning of the symbols.

Whether a proposition is true or false is a judgment that an individual makes.

Moral obligation is not rooted in value or desire. Things like promises are not made obligatory by values, desires, or preferences. See John Searle's paper, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'."

That Searle thinks otherwise doesn't make it so. Do you want me to go through Searle's paper with you and point out all of the problems with it? I'll do that insofar as you actually respond to points made, answer questions I ask, etc.

[Leontiskos]

Definitions (as well as meanings) are not true or false.

Of course they are. A definition is true insofar as it specifies the nature or essence of the thing in question.

In any event, "objectivity" (or whatever we'd want to call it) that is mind-dependent can't do the work that anyone wants objectivity to do. I explained this earlier.

Lol. Where do you suppose you "explained" this?

No proposition is objective, because propositions are the meanings of sentences that can be true or false, and meanings are not objective.

I'm not sure why you would hold that meanings cannot be objective (language is precisely what mediates objective meaning), but propositions are claims and claims may or may not be subject to public verification. If they are subject to public verification then they are objective. There is no reason why things that are subject to truth and falsity cannot be objective.

If we adhere to your principle then claims such as this are not objective: "Human beings have thoughts." On your theory, since thoughts are not found in the world independently of persons/minds, the proposition that human beings have thoughts is not an objective proposition. But this is an absurdity. Thus you've made a mistake regarding the nature of objectivity.

It's an absurdity because _____? (Because you feel it is, maybe? Or because you use the term in a different way? Or?)

Because anyone who still has two brain cells to rub together knows that it is objectively true that human beings have thoughts. "Dogs have saliva," "Humans have thoughts," "Snakes have forked tongues." These are all objectively true.

<Objective 1a. Expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations>

Whether a proposition is true or false is a judgment that an individual makes.

An individual can make a judgment about whether a proposition is true or false, but propositions are not true or false in virtue of an individual's judgment.

Moral obligation is not rooted in value or desire. Things like promises are not made obligatory by values, desires, or preferences. See John Searle's paper, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'."

That Searle thinks otherwise doesn't make it so. Do you want me to go through Searle's paper with you and point out all of the problems with it? I'll do that insofar as you actually respond to points made, answer questions I ask, etc.

I will engage you on Searle's paper on two points of your choosing.

[Terrapin Station]

Definitions (as well as meanings) are not true or false.

Of course they are. A definition is true insofar as it specifies the nature or essence of the thing in question.

I'm not going to argue more and more things every post where we keep adding things that we keep arguing about. So let's try to settle one thing at a time.

"Essences" are subjective--they're about an individual's conceptual formulations, specifically re what an individual requires to call some x (some particular thing) an F (some type or kind term). As such, definitions are not true or false (aside from it being true or false that an individual defines something however they do).