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[Gertie]

Leon

OK, you've got the methodological falsification distinction, good.

Do you agree that morality is not falsifiable in that way? (If you ignore my question again I'll just assume you agree with me now, because the answer is obvious - no it isn't. Morality isn't objective using this criteria).


Which leaves P1 in your summary of my position here which you still haven't grasped, so I'll address that again now

P1. Objective knowledge exists if and only if there is consensus. ("Knowledge by consensus")
P2. Consensus obtains in science.*
P3. Consensus does not obtain in morality.
C4. Therefore, science counts as objective knowledge. (From P1 & P2)
C5. Therefore, morality does not count as objective knowledge. (From P1 & P3)

*The reason that consensus obtains in science is because science studies that which is observable/measurable/falsifiable


You keep defending P2 and P3. My point is that P1 is false. And if P1 is false then C5 is invalid (as is C4). You seem to think you have proved C4 and you keep asking me why I reject C5. My point is that you haven't proved C4, and therefore you have no valid reason to reject C5.

So as I've aiready told told you my position is that true direct objective knowledge of the world 'out there' isn't accessible to humans. We are flawed and limited observers and thinkers who don't have a perfect God's Eye third person pov. We only have a specific first person pov and only have direct certain knowledge of our own conscious experience.

So the convo re actual objective knowledge could, perhaps should, end there. Never-the-less in practice we treat certain types of knowledge as objectively true, factual.

How to we decide to bridge this gap between our own private, first person subjective, experiential knowledge, and what we treat as objective knowledge about the real world?

By comparing the content of our own private, first person subjective experience with other subjects.

So our own (private, first person specific pov, subjective) conscious experience manifests representations of the world 'out there', which we can compare notes with other subjects about. This is how we create a shared/public/third person model of the world 'out there' which we share. Inter-subjectively.

Some things we can check via observation and measurement and agree to treat as 'God's Eye Third Person' objective, because it is reliably inter-subjectively falsifiable. We also note conceptualised qualities and patterns which we treat as similarly third person (objectively) reliable, law-like, eg the laws of physics, cause and effect, logic - rooted in observation of physical, third person observable stuff.

But we're are falsifying our shared third person inter-subjectively agreed model when we treat such knowledge as objective, not reality itself.

Whether we express knowledge out loud as a proposition or somesuch isn't the issue, the issue is that we are flawed, limited knowers.


The above caveat applies to everything we treat as objectively knowable. That's my actual P1.

Got it?

Agree with it?

[Peter Holmes]

Gertie

I've been following your reasoning with interest. Here are some questions.

1 Why are humans flawed observers of reality? Why can we not - individually or collectively - observe reality as it really is? How do you know that it isn't what we think it is? Why isn't that itself a flawed observation?

2 I suggest you may be experiencing the kind of empiricist skepticism promoted by Russell's (bloody) table in 'The Problems of Philosophy'.

[Leontiskos]

Do you agree that morality is not falsifiable in that way? (If you ignore my question again I'll just assume you agree with me now, because the answer is obvious - no it isn't. Morality isn't objective using this criteria).

Nothing is falsifiable in that way. Consensus can't ground knowledge. It doesn't matter if it is empirical knowledge or moral knowledge. There was a very similar proposal earlier in the thread that you might find helpful:

Consensus amongst informed observers. If you don't have significant agreement amongst those who actually know what's going on, you don't have a theory.

It's not a matter of consensus period. It doesn't matter how we qualify that. Who taught you, or based on what did you conclude that science works via knowledge by consensus?

P1. Objective knowledge exists if and only if there is consensus. ("Knowledge by consensus")
P2. Consensus obtains in science.*
P3. Consensus does not obtain in morality.
C4. Therefore, science counts as objective knowledge. (From P1 & P2)
C5. Therefore, morality does not count as objective knowledge. (From P1 & P3)

*The reason that consensus obtains in science is because science studies that which is observable/measurable/falsifiable


You keep defending P2 and P3. My point is that P1 is false. And if P1 is false then C5 is invalid (as is C4). You seem to think you have proved C4 and you keep asking me why I reject C5. My point is that you haven't proved C4, and therefore you have no valid reason to reject C5.

So as I've aiready told told you my position is that true direct objective knowledge of the world 'out there' isn't accessible to humans. We are flawed and limited observers and thinkers who don't have a perfect God's Eye third person pov. We only have a specific first person pov and only have direct certain knowledge of our own conscious experience.

If objective knowledge does not exist in observers, then adding a bunch of them together won't get you get you to objectivity. There is no reason we should believe that a consensus of non-objective perspectives results in objectivity.

How to we decide to bridge this gap between our own private, first person subjective, experiential knowledge, and what we treat as objective knowledge about the real world?

By comparing the content of our own private, first person subjective experience with other subjects.

Again, this is logically invalid. Compounding subjective experiences cannot produce an objective fact. You seem to know this, for you continually talk about "treating." My suggestion would be to not treat non-objective things as objective. Indeed, we are rationally obligated to avoid this mistake, as I pointed out in this post (link).

Some things we can check via observation and measurement and agree to treat as 'God's Eye Third Person' objective, because it is reliably inter-subjectively falsifiable.

Intersubjective falsifiability is not objective falsifiability. Your whole approach seems to be based on various equivocations around the concept of objectivity.

But we're are falsifying our shared third person inter-subjectively agreed model when we treat such knowledge as objective, not reality itself.

Yes, that's right. So my original claim turns out to be true: your view is no more capable of supporting scientific knowledge than moral knowledge.

Whether we express knowledge out loud as a proposition or somesuch isn't the issue, the issue is that we are flawed, limited knowers.

The above caveat applies to everything we treat as objectively knowable. That's my actual P1.

Got it?

I claimed that your argument was valid but unsound since it is based on a false premise (P1). Apparently you want to substitute a new P1, which is a tautology: "Intersubjective knowledge exists if and only if there is a consensus." If we do that then P1 is true but the argument is invalid, for C4 and C5 cannot be supported.

The other problem, which I have pointed out a number of times, is that the new P1 does not divide science and morality in the way you desire. This is because strong consensus currently obtains with some moral issues, such as slavery. You might try to avoid this issue by saying that only some consensuses count as intersubjective 'knowledge'. You tried this, for example, in post #391201 where you claimed that morality doesn't count because it is abstract rather than observable. But in #391448 I pointed out that lots of abstract things are objective, such as geometry.

At the end of the day you want to say that morality is not objective, but you can't say why. In truth this is because you don't believe anything is objective. You believe that objectivity is impossible. So sure, if objectivity is impossible then it would follow that morality is not objective. It would also follow that science and everything else is also not objective.

So as I've aiready told told you my position is that true direct objective knowledge of the world 'out there' isn't accessible to humans. We are flawed and limited observers and thinkers who don't have a perfect God's Eye third person pov. We only have a specific first person pov and only have direct certain knowledge of our own conscious experience.

This is a remarkably strong anti-realism. Like Peter, I don't see why you hold it. Just because we are capable of mistakes does not mean we are not capable of knowledge. In reality it's just the opposite: the ability to make mistakes implies the ability to be correct. The ability to make a false judgment presupposes the ability to make a true judgment. If we can make false judgments then truth and falsity must exist (and be accessible to us).

You are laboring under the idea that knowledge requires reflexive certainty; that if we can't be certain we haven't made a mistake then we can't know. But knowledge does not require infallible agents. We are endowed with reliable faculties that accurately perceive reality. We have different levels of reliability with different tasks. We are good at judging whether a basketball is round, we are slightly less good at judging whether the Earth is round, and we are relatively bad at judging which quantum theory is correct. Our reliability varies with its proximity to our immediate perceptions and with our competence. Humans are better at judging whether a lion is lunging at them than we are at astrophysics, and this is because the race has had more practice at lion-spotting. But a few members of the human species have spent considerable time practicing astrophysics, and they can carry out tasks of astrophysics with reliability.

This is why consensus is indicative of objective truth. If you compile the readings of a large number instruments which are generally reliable but sometimes err in various ways, the net result tends to be accurate. Peer review in the sciences is basically just glorified error-checking and scrutiny. But this doesn't mean that the source of reliability or knowledge is found in consensus. It isn't. It must first be found in the individual 'instruments' if it is to be found in the consensus.

-Leontiskos

[Gertie]

Leon

Gertie wrote: ↑Yesterday, 12:05 pm
Do you agree that morality is not falsifiable in that way? (If you ignore my question again I'll just assume you agree with me now, because the answer is obvious - no it isn't. Morality isn't objective using this criteria).

Nothing is falsifiable in that way. Consensus can't ground knowledge. It doesn't matter if it is empirical knowledge or moral knowledge.

OK I give up.

[Gertie]

Gertie

I've been following your reasoning with interest. Here are some questions.

1 Why are humans flawed observers of reality? Why can we not - individually or collectively - observe reality as it really is? How do you know that it isn't what we think it is? Why isn't that itself a flawed observation?

2 I suggest you may be experiencing the kind of empiricist skepticism promoted by Russell's (bloody) table in 'The Problems of Philosophy'.

Peter

This is far trickier for me, and not something I've much looked into.

Thanks for mentioning Russell's paper! I've gotten half way through it, it's a lot to take in and keep in my head, but I like his approach, and yes much of it struck a chord with me. Would you have a link to a more digestible summary?

I take it you're not a fan? I'd be interested to know why?

Here;s my thinking.

TLDR version-

- We only have direct knowledge of our own private conscious experience.

- Our conscious experience is how representations of the world manifest to us, but not in ways which perfectly match reality - there is a map/territory problem. Eg our map of a table comprises colour, defined edges and solidity which aren't properties of the table itself, rather our human interaction/relationship with it.

- Humans are mentally equipped for functional utility, not accuracy. We create models circumscribed by our limited and flawed perception and cognition.

Objections which spring to mind -


- You can argue the utility is based in accuracy, but then only at a 'good enough' functional level, and a particular level of resolution.

- You can argue we can use instruments to create more accurate and complete observations, but again they are designed to fit/be accessible to our flawed and limited capabilities.

- You can argue we can use conceptual instruments like maths, logic, cause and effect. But I'm thinking these again are circumscribed by our own abilities to observe patterns in the physical world which we extrapolate law-like rules from which make sense to us? And even then QM tells us these aren't universal truths, and we don't know why they aren't.

Thoughts?


Waffly version -

I don't think it's controversial that we're flawed observers and thinkers. We function in ways suited to utility, not complete. accurate knowledge. We've identified inbuilt hacks that save time and calories, and all this is functionally generally 'good enough' at a particular level of resolution (the Classical Scale).

Our observations and measurements of physical stuff and processes (which is what is third person observable and measurable) gives the foundation to conceptualised principles like physical cause and effect, logic, the laws of physics. And we now have a really impressive physicalist model of what the world is made of and how it works.

The question is, have we developed reliable ways to eliminate error? And is that knowledge in principle able to be complete?

I don't know, but it strikes me that humans checking for human error is a problem. If we all have similar flaws and limitations, how do we falsify errors and limitations we don't recognise, as well as the ones we now do?

Can instruments solve the problem? Well they're instruments designed to be accessible to humans, to fit our observational and cognitive functioning, so there's a problem there. Or can using logic and reason identify all possible errors? I think (open to be corrected) that these are rooted in observation and measurement if you dig deep enough, so the same problem applies . QM is a wake up call there too.


QM tells us that the very building blocks of reality aren't governed by cause and effect, but probability. That what is real flashes in and out of existence. That there is action at a distance. That something can simultaneously be in two positions at once until observed/measured. (I might not have gotten this exactly right but you get my point). So in reality Russell's table isn't solid or brown with consistent definable/measurable edges. These are properties created by our experiential relationship/interaction with the table. The brown-ness, solidity and edges are representations of the table which exist only as conscious experience resulting from human interaction with the table. And it's this experiential representation we have direct certain knowledge of, not the table itself.


So QM suggests we're right to be leary of treating our physical third person observations and measurements as objective. And the law-like conceptualised rules we extrapolate as a result of observing physical patterns, as objective, real, true.


Now it might be that anomalies we note at the QM scale and massive cosmological scale are the end of the story. And can ultimately be tied together under a complete physicalist Theory of Everything. Or they might just be the adjacent slices of bread we can catch glimpses of in a loaf which is much bigger, and overall isn't encapsulated by what we think of as classical, micro and macro scales. Real reality might be something we haven't even imagined yet, or aren't equipped to recognise and/or understand. It might unify the objective and subjective, the mind-body problem. which isn't adressed by the standard model of physics. it might be that reality isn't fixed as such, but manifests relationally. Or is vibrating strings of potential somethings. Who knows what, it can get very speculative. But recent discoveries should at least give us pause for thought about the nature of reality and what is knowable, and how it;s knowable.

[Atla]

2. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is".

The problem is that premise (2) was never defended. As often happens, it was asserted as a dogma rather than defended as a premise.

An objective "is" is a feature of reality, that is true regardless of what anyone thinks.
An objective "ought" is something that we ought to do, it's true that we ought to do it regardless of what anyone thinks.

There is no known objective "ought", so as a rule, an "ought" can't be derived from an "is". Unless you can give a counterexample?

[Leontiskos]

2. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is".

The problem is that premise (2) was never defended. As often happens, it was asserted as a dogma rather than defended as a premise.

An objective "is" is a feature of reality, that is true regardless of what anyone thinks.
An objective "ought" is something that we ought to do, it's true that we ought to do it regardless of what anyone thinks.

There is no known objective "ought", so as a rule, an "ought" can't be derived from an "is". Unless you can give a counterexample?

This is an interesting claim. It's different from Hume's, but it accurately captures the common approach (such as Gertie, who thinks moral objectivity doesn't exist because no objectivity exists).

To be clear, you are saying, "'Oughts' don't exist, therefore they cannot be derived from an 'is' or in any other way."

Do you believe that promises exist? For example, do you think that marriage exists? Marriage is an obligatory relation between two individuals that is established by a particular kind of promise (a vow). If marriage exists then "oughts" exist.

Or take another kind of promise: a contract. If contracts exist then "oughts" exist.

As for myself, I believe that promises, vows, marriage, and contracts exist (along with other states of affairs that entail obligations such as private property, human rights, etc.).

[Terrapin Station]

2. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is".

The problem is that premise (2) was never defended. As often happens, it was asserted as a dogma rather than defended as a premise.

An objective "is" is a feature of reality, that is true regardless of what anyone thinks.
An objective "ought" is something that we ought to do, it's true that we ought to do it regardless of what anyone thinks.

There is no known objective "ought", so as a rule, an "ought" can't be derived from an "is". Unless you can give a counterexample?

This is an interesting claim. It's different from Hume's, but it accurately captures the common approach (such as Gertie, who thinks moral objectivity doesn't exist because no objectivity exists).

To be clear, you are saying, "'Oughts' don't exist, therefore they cannot be derived from an 'is' or in any other way."

Do you believe that promises exist? For example, do you think that marriage exists? Marriage is an obligatory relation between two individuals that is established by a particular kind of promise (a vow). If marriage exists then "oughts" exist.

Or take another kind of promise: a contract. If contracts exist then "oughts" exist.

As for myself, I believe that promises, vows, marriage, and contracts exist (along with other states of affairs that entail obligations such as private property, human rights, etc.).

Subjective oughts exist. Objective oughts do not.

[Leontiskos]

Subjective oughts exist. Objective oughts do not.

Everything in my last post relates to objective "oughts." For example, the possibility of legal divorce presupposes the objectivity of marriage.

[Leontiskos]

OK I give up.

This thread is about the objectivity of morality. My point is that the definition of "objectivity" that you and others are using is chimerical, and I think this has been demonstrated. You want to criticize morality, and so you say that it isn't objective, but when asked you have no real definition of "objective" and thus provide no possibility for the existence of objectivity in any sphere of life.

Your whole point is apparently as follows: morality isn't objective because objectivity doesn't exist; the best we can get is intersubjectivity, and science has that, which is more than morality has.

I suppose we could go on to talk about intersubjectivity rather than objectivity, but that strikes me as an entirely new topic.

[Atla]

This is an interesting claim. It's different from Hume's, but it accurately captures the common approach (such as Gertie, who thinks moral objectivity doesn't exist because no objectivity exists).

To be clear, you are saying, "'Oughts' don't exist, therefore they cannot be derived from an 'is' or in any other way."

Do you believe that promises exist? For example, do you think that marriage exists? Marriage is an obligatory relation between two individuals that is established by a particular kind of promise (a vow). If marriage exists then "oughts" exist.

Or take another kind of promise: a contract. If contracts exist then "oughts" exist.

As for myself, I believe that promises, vows, marriage, and contracts exist (along with other states of affairs that entail obligations such as private property, human rights, etc.).

Promises can be said to exist, but they aren't objective "oughts".

They are subjective agreements between people, no known force exists that would make it absolutely true that we should keep such promises.

[Belindi]

If absolute mind existed it would know objective facts, but not objective oughts. However if absolute mind existed it would not recognise oughts except as thoughts or aspirations pertaining to men.

If absolute mind were also God then not only objective facts but also objective oughts would exist.

[Terrapin Station]

Subjective oughts exist. Objective oughts do not.

Everything in my last post relates to objective "oughts." For example, the possibility of legal divorce presupposes the objectivity of marriage.

"The possibility of legal divorce presupposes the objectivity of marriage."

First, "the objectivity of marriage" wouldn't be the same thing as "the objectivity of oughts pertaining to marriage," unless you're attempting some sort of argument that that's all there is to marriage.

I don't at all agree with "The possibility of legal divorce presupposes the objectivity of marriage."

There are objective aspects of marriages, including marriage certificates (as objective pieces of paper with objective ink marks on them, for example), including wedding dresses (as objective bits of fabric), including wedding cakes (as objective flour and sugar and so on), etc.

Those objective aspects of marriages have no objective meaning, because there is no such thing as objective meaning. Most aspects of being married, including any meaning that has, including any oughts that we assign to it, including behavior of other people towards couples they consider married, and so on, are subjective--they're ways of THINKING about relationships (I'm using "relationship" in the ontological "relation" sense there more than the colloquial "continued interactions with another person" sense, though that sense applies here, too).

Getting legally divorced likewise has objective aspects--again, such as documents related to it--but as something that people are doing, it's also largely a way of THINKING about relationships, and thus it's subjective.

That someone is married or divorced or that there would be any oughts applied to any of that are things that do not obtain in the world outside of persons. Documents and wedding dresses and wedding cakes and so on can't do any of that--again, for one, there is no meaning attached to any of that stuff objectively, because there is no objective meaning.

I have a feeling that you have a(t least a "subconscious") tendency to think of "objectivity" as being about agreement, about normal behavior, even though that's not at all what objectivity is in a way that matters ontologically for any upshot that anyone wants objectivity to have, and even though saying that x being a norm makes x objective amounts to forwarding an argumentum ad populum. (And speaking of this, you continue to ignore, and will continue to ignore, in perpetuity--because even you know there's no way to answer it, the questions I've asked you about people with recalcitrant moral stances.)

[Leontiskos]

Promises can be said to exist, but they aren't objective "oughts".

By your definition they are. Here is that definition:

An objective "ought" is something that we ought to do, it's true that we ought to do it regardless of what anyone thinks.

A vow is basically an unbreakable promise. It is saying, "I promise to do X no matter what."

They are subjective agreements between people, no known force exists that would make it absolutely true that we should keep such promises.

Well, a contract is an agreement. A promise is not an agreement. A vow is a special kind of promise. A marriage is a special kind of contract or covenant which involves two persons making vows to each other.

Each of them are objective "oughts".

...no known force exists that would make it absolutely true that we should keep such promises.

This is based on a misunderstanding. "Oughts" do not require coercion or necessitation. If they did they wouldn't be "oughts" at all. They would be facts. This is one of the widespread confusions on this forum about obligation, and I am tempted to write a thread on it.

Unless you are a strange variety of Platonist, propositions are not made true in light of "existing forces." If you know what a vow is then you know that it ought to be fulfilled. It's that simple. You are not obliged to make vows, but if vows exist then objective "oughts" exist. It is a logical contradiction to say, "I made a vow and I am not obliged to fulfill it." When you make a vow you place yourself under obligation.

If someone gets a divorce it doesn't follow that they never made a vow. It means that they made a vow and they didn't fulfill the vow. They failed their obligation. If a court found that the couple never entered into the legal institution of marriage, then divorce would be impossible. You have to make a promise to break a promise.

[Atla]

Promises can be said to exist, but they aren't objective "oughts".

By your definition they are. Here is that definition:

An objective "ought" is something that we ought to do, it's true that we ought to do it regardless of what anyone thinks.

A vow is basically an unbreakable promise. It is saying, "I promise to do X no matter what."

...

No they aren't, you are ignoring the very issue. There is no known reason why it would be necessarily true that we shouldn't break our "unbreakable" promises.