Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Leontiskos]

First, if we all happen to agree on something, then there's nothing to worry about. It doesn't matter whether morality is subjective or objective or whatever; everyone agrees, and everyone is going to be happy with other folks' behavior, there will be no issues, etc.

I think the obligation question is still latent in this case. But yes, it won't come up as much as a practical matter.

It's not subjective because I say it is, obviously.

Note: I gave a fuller response to your post in #391868.

It's not subjective because I say it is, obviously. It's subjective because of the complete absence of evidence of anything that would amount to objective morality. Hence why I'm noting that there is no objective morality. The way to refute this is to present evidence of objective morality (and then we'd also need to present something that would amount to why anyone should follow the objective morality that's instantiated rather than what they'd personally prefer. I don't know if you were the person I asked about this earlier, but whoever I asked, they simply ignored the issue).

Most of your replies to me in this thread, especially since #391834, strike me as begging the question. At best you're making an argument regarding the burden of proof and claiming that you don't need to do anything--that it's all on me. Even on that supposition, I have presented minor arguments and evidence that you have roundly ignored and discounted. I explained some of this in detail in post #390911.

In #391834 I talked about presuppositions. The point was that foundational presuppositions are not arrived at discursively and yet they are rationally justifiable. I compared the presupposed judgment that private property exists with the presupposed judgment that laws of chemistry (or laws of nature) exist.

Now apparently you accept the second but not the first, but you haven't told us why. Why couldn't it be the case that someone who rejects private property is the equivalent of a moral flat-earther? And there are parallels, too, because each ignores and discounts any arguments that they are presented with, too sure of their own axiom to consider them.

It's no wonder that a materialistic world rejects objective morality. An argument with dyed-in-the-wool materialists is like an argument with a flat-earther who just keeps pressing his axiom button, "The Earth must be flat." It's like #354137 where your whole position was summed up in your sentence, "What we're talking about must be something physical, because only physical things exist." Your whole case comes down to a "particular ontological theory." The burden of proof is always relative to positions, presuppositions, and arguments. You have convinced yourself that physicalism is so self-evident that contradictory positions assume the burden of proof, and they do so to such an extent that the arguments for such positions can be justifiably ignored. But again, this is a form of begging the question.

There are people who do not strive for happiness...

Such as?

I don't get what you're looking for here. Are you asking for me to give you someone's name, like, "Barney Buttersworth of 210 Main Street, Des Moines"? What is that going to do. Anyone I know personally as an example isn't likely going to be someone you know.

I am looking for you to justify your claim. Is that really so much to ask? You are ignoring the arguments I give for my positions and refusing to give arguments for your own.

Issues arise when we don't agree...

Yes, and one of the reasons we disagree more often nowadays is because the faculty of practical reason has atrophied over centuries of abuse and philosophical degradation. The world is now full of "moral flat-earthers."

[Terrapin Station]

First, if we all happen to agree on something, then there's nothing to worry about. It doesn't matter whether morality is subjective or objective or whatever; everyone agrees, and everyone is going to be happy with other folks' behavior, there will be no issues, etc.

I think the obligation question is still latent in this case. But yes, it won't come up as much as a practical matter.

It's not subjective because I say it is, obviously.

Note: I gave a fuller response to your post in #391868.

It's not subjective because I say it is, obviously. It's subjective because of the complete absence of evidence of anything that would amount to objective morality. Hence why I'm noting that there is no objective morality. The way to refute this is to present evidence of objective morality (and then we'd also need to present something that would amount to why anyone should follow the objective morality that's instantiated rather than what they'd personally prefer. I don't know if you were the person I asked about this earlier, but whoever I asked, they simply ignored the issue).

Most of your replies to me in this thread, especially since #391834, strike me as begging the question. At best you're making an argument regarding the burden of proof and claiming that you don't need to do anything--that it's all on me. Even on that supposition, I have presented minor arguments and evidence that you have roundly ignored and discounted. I explained some of this in detail in post #390911.

In #391834 I talked about presuppositions. The point was that foundational presuppositions are not arrived at discursively and yet they are rationally justifiable. I compared the presupposed judgment that private property exists with the presupposed judgment that laws of chemistry (or laws of nature) exist.

Now apparently you accept the second but not the first, but you haven't told us why. Why couldn't it be the case that someone who rejects private property is the equivalent of a moral flat-earther? And there are parallels, too, because each ignores and discounts any arguments that they are presented with, too sure of their own axiom to consider them.

It's no wonder that a materialistic world rejects objective morality. An argument with dyed-in-the-wool materialists is like an argument with a flat-earther who just keeps pressing his axiom button, "The Earth must be flat." It's like #354137 where your whole position was summed up in your sentence, "What we're talking about must be something physical, because only physical things exist." Your whole case comes down to a "particular ontological theory." The burden of proof is always relative to positions, presuppositions, and arguments. You have convinced yourself that physicalism is so self-evident that contradictory positions assume the burden of proof, and they do so to such an extent that the arguments for such positions can be justifiably ignored. But again, this is a form of begging the question.

There are people who do not strive for happiness...

Such as?

I don't get what you're looking for here. Are you asking for me to give you someone's name, like, "Barney Buttersworth of 210 Main Street, Des Moines"? What is that going to do. Anyone I know personally as an example isn't likely going to be someone you know.

I am looking for you to justify your claim. Is that really so much to ask? You are ignoring the arguments I give for my positions and refusing to give arguments for your own.

Issues arise when we don't agree...

Yes, and one of the reasons we disagree more often nowadays is because the faculty of practical reason has atrophied over centuries of abuse and philosophical degradation. The world is now full of "moral flat-earthers."

Again, why I don't like typing too much. All of that and you're not addressing what I'm most interested in your addressing. How we get to telling Jane that she should not want to have an abortion, that she's somehow wrong for that, etc.

[Terrapin Station]

We can even just assume that morality is objective, however we'd like to construe that.

What I'm interested in is how we get from that to telling Jane that she should not want to have an abortion or that she's somehow wrong for that, or that she should not want to have sex with a ten year-old boy or that she's somehow wrong for that, or that she should not want to murder Betty for stealing one of Jane's Pat Metheny CDs or that she's somehow wrong for that, etc.

What's the answer there?

[Leontiskos]

Again, why I don't like typing too much. All of that and you're not addressing what I'm most interested in your addressing. How we get to telling Jane that she should not want to have an abortion, that she's somehow wrong for that, etc.

Have I said something about abortion, or are you just making up stories and putting them in my mouth?

But questions such as slavery and abortion revolve around fairly simple factual questions. Morality and law inform us that humans ought not be enslaved or murdered, whereas sub-human entities are not subject to this prohibition. So the argument turns on whether the entity in question is human or sub-human. If you want to understand what such arguments look like, I would direct you to the abolitionist movement of America in the mid-19th century.

[Leontiskos]

Terrapin Station -

What do you suppose occurred during Abolition (of slavery)? What is your analysis of that movement? Why did the Abolitionists emerge victorious. Was their victory achieved on the basis of power, or strength of emotion, or rational argument, or all of the above, or what? And if you admit that some of the rational arguments which were proferred were more than unsound appeals to emotion, how do you conceive of them? Were they instrumentally valid but not universally binding? Did their success depend on convincing their opponents to adopt a subjective value? What is your analysis?

[Terrapin Station]

Again, why I don't like typing too much. All of that and you're not addressing what I'm most interested in your addressing. How we get to telling Jane that she should not want to have an abortion, that she's somehow wrong for that, etc.

Have I said something about abortion, or are you just making up stories and putting them in my mouth?

But questions such as slavery and abortion revolve around fairly simple factual questions. Morality and law inform us that humans ought not be enslaved or murdered, whereas sub-human entities are not subject to this prohibition. So the argument turns on whether the entity in question is human or sub-human. If you want to understand what such arguments look like, I would direct you to the abolitionist movement of America in the mid-19th century.

Again, so let's say that there is an objective morality, and the objective morality, whatever it is exactly in ontological terms, says, among other things, that we shouldn't commit abortion and we shouldn't enslave others.

Now along comes Jane. Jane feels that she should be allowed to have an abortion and that she should be able to keep slaves.

The questions are these: (a) How do we convince Jane that she should feel differently than she does? That is, how do we argue that she should conform to the objective morality rather than expressing her own views? (b) How do we convince her that her views are wrong? That is, how do we argue that her views should match the objective morality rather than departing from it? And (c) How do we coax her into not covertly having an abortion or keeping slaves, which she's confident she can do without being caught at it? That is, how do we argue that she should (want to) behave differently, where it's not simply an argument appealing to her not wanting to be imprisoned, etc. (because since she's confident she'll get away with it, that won't affect her actions)?

How would the arguments for any of that go? "Objective morality says that you shouldn't be allowed to have an abortion, and so . . . " well, what? Why should that have an impact on how she feels or what she does (or tries to get away with)?

That's the real, practical issue when it comes to this stuff. What's your solution?

[Terrapin Station]

@Terrapin Station -

What do you suppose occurred during Abolition (of slavery)? What is your analysis of that movement? Why did the Abolitionists emerge victorious. Was their victory achieved on the basis of power, or strength of emotion, or rational argument, or all of the above, or what? And if you admit that some of the rational arguments which were proferred were more than unsound appeals to emotion, how do you conceive of them? Were they instrumentally valid but not universally binding? Did their success depend on convincing their opponents to adopt a subjective value? What is your analysis?

So first, moral claims/arguments can't be valid or invalid, sound or unsound, because they have no truth value. And they're certainly not "universally binding." To achieve social (customs, mores, etc.) and/or legal changes based on moral stances, you need some combination of the people placed into positions of power and/or influence where those people already have the dispositions/preferences in question, or you need to persuade people of power/influence to at least slightly modify their views, which is done by appealing to some combination of things they already feel (which you then reason to other conclusions) and vested interests they have (such as (for two examples) (i) being reelected or (ii) simple peer pressure, which at least affects what someone publicly expresses even if it doesn't change their actual moral views).

That something is a current moral norm certainly isn't an indication that it's objective or that it's universally held as a moral stance.

[Leontiskos]

But questions such as slavery and abortion revolve around fairly simple factual questions. Morality and law inform us that humans ought not be enslaved or murdered, whereas sub-human entities are not subject to this prohibition. So the argument turns on whether the entity in question is human or sub-human. If you want to understand what such arguments look like, I would direct you to the abolitionist movement of America in the mid-19th century.

Again, so let's say that there is an objective morality, and the objective morality, whatever it is exactly in ontological terms, says, among other things, that we shouldn't commit abortion and we shouldn't enslave others.

Now along comes Jane. Jane feels that she should be allowed to have an abortion and that she should be able to keep slaves.

The questions are these: (a) How do we convince Jane that she should feel differently than she does? That is, how do we argue that she should conform to the objective morality rather than expressing her own views? (b) How do we convince her that her views are wrong? That is, how do we argue that her views should match the objective morality rather than departing from it? And (c) How do we coax her into not covertly having an abortion or keeping slaves, which she's confident she can do without being caught at it? That is, how do we argue that she should (want to) behave differently, where it's not simply an argument appealing to her not wanting to be imprisoned, etc. (because since she's confident she'll get away with it, that won't affect her actions)?

How would the arguments for any of that go? "Objective morality says that you shouldn't be allowed to have an abortion, and so . . . " well, what? Why should that have an impact on how she feels or what she does (or tries to get away with)?

That's the real, practical issue when it comes to this stuff. What's your solution?

As noted above, in the 19th century context the slave holder already accepts the immorality of enslaving humans (or equals) but judges that blacks are sub-human. So the goal is to present arguments which help them see the fact that blacks are not sub-human and instead are full human beings, on equal footing with whites. Obviously such an argument can be valid or invalid, sound or unsound, and the conclusion has a truth value. ..So I would do the same thing the Abolitionists did in the 19th century, which includes power, emotion, dispositions, and rational argument.

What would that look like? When someone has misjudged some piece of reality their misconception is best corrected by way of familiarity. The more time they spend with the thing they have misjudged, the better the chance they will correct their rational error. This is essentially how Daryl Davis got 200 Klansmen to give up their robes (Tedx).

Particulars depend on each individual case. The argument will depend on the reason the slave holder believes that blacks are inferior. If he thinks there is empirical evidence that blacks are intellectually inferior you might present counterexamples to his theory. If he believes that their language or speech is primitive you might argue on the basis of linguistics.

@Terrapin Station -

What do you suppose occurred during Abolition (of slavery)? What is your analysis of that movement? Why did the Abolitionists emerge victorious. Was their victory achieved on the basis of power, or strength of emotion, or rational argument, or all of the above, or what? And if you admit that some of the rational arguments which were proferred were more than unsound appeals to emotion, how do you conceive of them? Were they instrumentally valid but not universally binding? Did their success depend on convincing their opponents to adopt a subjective value? What is your analysis?

So first, moral claims/arguments can't be valid or invalid, sound or unsound, because they have no truth value. And they're certainly not "universally binding." To achieve social (customs, mores, etc.) and/or legal changes based on moral stances, you need some combination of the people placed into positions of power and/or influence where those people already have the dispositions/preferences in question, or you need to persuade people of power/influence to at least slightly modify their views, which is done by appealing to some combination of things they already feel (which you then reason to other conclusions) and vested interests they have (such as (for two examples) (i) being reelected or (ii) simple peer pressure, which at least affects what someone publicly expresses even if it doesn't change their actual moral views).

So you see Abolition as a matter of power and preferences, and you do not believe rationality enters into it? You don't think allowing slavery is more or less rational than prohibiting slavery?

[Terrapin Station]

But questions such as slavery and abortion revolve around fairly simple factual questions. Morality and law inform us that humans ought not be enslaved or murdered, whereas sub-human entities are not subject to this prohibition. So the argument turns on whether the entity in question is human or sub-human. If you want to understand what such arguments look like, I would direct you to the abolitionist movement of America in the mid-19th century.

Again, so let's say that there is an objective morality, and the objective morality, whatever it is exactly in ontological terms, says, among other things, that we shouldn't commit abortion and we shouldn't enslave others.

Now along comes Jane. Jane feels that she should be allowed to have an abortion and that she should be able to keep slaves.

The questions are these: (a) How do we convince Jane that she should feel differently than she does? That is, how do we argue that she should conform to the objective morality rather than expressing her own views? (b) How do we convince her that her views are wrong? That is, how do we argue that her views should match the objective morality rather than departing from it? And (c) How do we coax her into not covertly having an abortion or keeping slaves, which she's confident she can do without being caught at it? That is, how do we argue that she should (want to) behave differently, where it's not simply an argument appealing to her not wanting to be imprisoned, etc. (because since she's confident she'll get away with it, that won't affect her actions)?

How would the arguments for any of that go? "Objective morality says that you shouldn't be allowed to have an abortion, and so . . . " well, what? Why should that have an impact on how she feels or what she does (or tries to get away with)?

That's the real, practical issue when it comes to this stuff. What's your solution?

As noted above, in the 19th century context the slave holder already accepts the immorality of enslaving humans (or equals) but judges that blacks are sub-human. So the goal is to present arguments which help them see the fact that blacks are not sub-human and instead are full human beings, on equal footing with whites. Obviously such an argument can be valid or invalid, sound or unsound, and the conclusion has a truth value. ..So I would do the same thing the Abolitionists did in the 19th century, which includes power, emotion, dispositions, and rational argument.

What would that look like? When someone has misjudged some piece of reality their misconception is best corrected by way of familiarity. The more time they spend with the thing they have misjudged, the better the chance they will correct their rational error. This is essentially how Daryl Davis got 200 Klansmen to give up their robes (Tedx).

Particulars depend on each individual case. The argument will depend on the reason the slave holder believes that blacks are inferior. If he thinks there is empirical evidence that blacks are intellectually inferior you might present counterexamples to his theory. If he believes that their language or speech is primitive you might argue on the basis of linguistics.

@Terrapin Station -

What do you suppose occurred during Abolition (of slavery)? What is your analysis of that movement? Why did the Abolitionists emerge victorious. Was their victory achieved on the basis of power, or strength of emotion, or rational argument, or all of the above, or what? And if you admit that some of the rational arguments which were proferred were more than unsound appeals to emotion, how do you conceive of them? Were they instrumentally valid but not universally binding? Did their success depend on convincing their opponents to adopt a subjective value? What is your analysis?

So first, moral claims/arguments can't be valid or invalid, sound or unsound, because they have no truth value. And they're certainly not "universally binding." To achieve social (customs, mores, etc.) and/or legal changes based on moral stances, you need some combination of the people placed into positions of power and/or influence where those people already have the dispositions/preferences in question, or you need to persuade people of power/influence to at least slightly modify their views, which is done by appealing to some combination of things they already feel (which you then reason to other conclusions) and vested interests they have (such as (for two examples) (i) being reelected or (ii) simple peer pressure, which at least affects what someone publicly expresses even if it doesn't change their actual moral views).

So you see Abolition as a matter of power and preferences, and you do not believe rationality enters into it? You don't think allowing slavery is more or less rational than prohibiting slavery?

Wait--so are you of the view that no one actually disagrees on moral stances but only disagrees on (because of ignorance about) facts that factor into moral judgments? (If so, that didn't strike me as being the case (that you'd think this) prior to the post above, because I find it such an, um, "odd" view.)

[Terrapin Station]

So you see Abolition as a matter of power and preferences, and you do not believe rationality enters into it? You don't think allowing slavery is more or less rational than prohibiting slavery?

Sorry, I didn't answer this above. But I want to make sure you continue addressing the other stuff, too.

I don't think that any moral stance in itself is rational or irrational. I'm basically an emotivist (though I call myself a(n ethical) subjectivist instead, and I stress that moral stances are about one's dispositions, preferences, etc.--I don't normally frame it strictly through the notion of emotions.)

Moral stances can be rational or irrational relative to other dispositions or preferences that individuals have, assuming they also have a disposition or preference of achieving particular goals, in that certain things will help them reach a goal or not. But those other dispositions/goals can't be rational or not.

So, for example, if Joe has a goal of "harvesting his crops as cheaply as possible" then it might be more rational for Joe, at least in some situations (so, for example, barring certain technological innovations, etc.) to have slaves to work his farm, especially if Joe doesn't also have a disposition that "no humans should be slaves." So rationality can factor into things that way, but "I want to harvest my crops as cheaply as possible" isn't in itself rational (no goal or disposition like that is). Rationality for such things is always relative to other desires or dispositions. It's similar to the way that needs always hinge on wants.

[Leontiskos]

Wait--so are you of the view that no one actually disagrees on moral stances but only disagrees on (because of ignorance about) facts that factor into moral judgments? (If so, that didn't strike me as being the case (that you'd think this) prior to the post above, because I find it such an, um, "odd" view.)

No; is there something I've said that makes you believe that? When you brought up abortion I pointed out that abortion and slavery are now largely factual issues. Whether murdering humans is permissible is different from the question about whether some entity is a human.

So you see Abolition as a matter of power and preferences, and you do not believe rationality enters into it? You don't think allowing slavery is more or less rational than prohibiting slavery?

Sorry, I didn't answer this above. But I want to make sure you continue addressing the other stuff, too.

I don't think that any moral stance in itself is rational or irrational. I'm basically an emotivist (though I call myself a(n ethical) subjectivist instead, and I stress that moral stances are about one's dispositions, preferences, etc.--I don't normally frame it strictly through the notion of emotions.)

Moral stances can be rational or irrational relative to other dispositions or preferences that individuals have, assuming they also have a disposition or preference of achieving particular goals, in that certain things will help them reach a goal or not. But those other dispositions/goals can't be rational or not.

So, for example, if Joe has a goal of "harvesting his crops as cheaply as possible" then it might be more rational for Joe, at least in some situations (so, for example, barring certain technological innovations, etc.) to have slaves to work his farm, especially if Joe doesn't also have a disposition that "no humans should be slaves." So rationality can factor into things that way, but "I want to harvest my crops as cheaply as possible" isn't in itself rational (no goal or disposition like that is). Rationality for such things is always relative to other desires or dispositions. It's similar to the way that needs always hinge on wants.

Okay, thanks.

I think one easy way to arrive at a rational and objective morality is by way of applying something like the "silver rule" to natures. For example, everyone agrees that enslaving an equal is impermissible; the debates arise around whether someone is an equal (or a human, or whatnot). This is based on the general principle that equal things ought to be treated equally and unequal things ought to be treated unequally, which is a rational principle and not an 'emotional' principle. Once this principle and the existence of natures are admitted, it follows that similar natures ought to be treated similarly and different natures ought to be treated differently. Ceteris paribus, we treat dogs differently than we treat cats because they are a different kind of thing.

[Terrapin Station]

No; is there something I've said that makes you believe that? When you brought up abortion I pointed out that abortion and slavery are now largely factual issues. Whether murdering humans is permissible is different from the question about whether some entity is a human.

Okay, but then you're not actually answering what I asked you.

For example, everyone agrees that enslaving an equal is impermissible;

This isn't actually true, by the way.

This is based on the general principle that equal things ought to be treated equally and unequal things ought to be treated unequally, which is a rational principle and not an 'emotional' principle.

So I don't at all agree with that as a principle personally, for example. So how would we argue that it's not just your preference (along with the preference of the people who feel the same way that you do), but that it's instead a "rational principle"? (Putting aside for the moment whether "rational principles" aren't subjective in the first place.)

[Leontiskos]

So I don't at all agree with that as a principle personally, for example.

Then provide a counterexample.

This is based on the general principle that equal things ought to be treated equally and unequal things ought to be treated unequally, which is a rational principle and not an 'emotional' principle.

So how would we argue that it's not just your preference (along with the preference of the people who feel the same way that you do), but that it's instead a "rational principle"? (Putting aside for the moment whether "rational principles" aren't subjective in the first place.)

If you are the cashier at the gas station and the price tag on a case of Pepsi is $10 you will accept as payment one $10 bill or two $5 bills but not two $1 bills, for the value of the first and second are equal and are also equal to the price of the Pepsi, but the value of the third is not equal to $10. You treat equal things equal and unequal things unequal. It would be irrational to accept the $10 bill but refuse the two $5 bills, or to accept the two $1 bills. In these latter cases you would be failing to observe the rational principle.

[Belindi]

So I don't at all agree with that as a principle personally, for example.

Then provide a counterexample.

This is based on the general principle that equal things ought to be treated equally and unequal things ought to be treated unequally, which is a rational principle and not an 'emotional' principle.

So how would we argue that it's not just your preference (along with the preference of the people who feel the same way that you do), but that it's instead a "rational principle"? (Putting aside for the moment whether "rational principles" aren't subjective in the first place.)

If you are the cashier at the gas station and the price tag on a case of Pepsi is $10 you will accept as payment one $10 bill or two $5 bills but not two $1 bills, for the value of the first and second are equal and are also equal to the price of the Pepsi, but the value of the third is not equal to $10. You treat equal things equal and unequal things unequal. It would be irrational to accept the $10 bill but refuse the two $5 bills, or to accept the two $1 bills. In these latter cases you would be failing to observe the rational principle.

But if you believe and if the socially accepted ethic is that the most powerful man is the best man then the fairness of equality would not apply. Society would be a free for all and competition would be favoured over cooperation in all social dealing between persons.

In fact there is an existential power struggle between opposing cultures of belief. This power struggle sometimes erupts into war.

Some low status person like the cashier at the gas station would then exist to serve a high status person who could force him into parting with the case of Pepsi for only as many dollars as was strictly in accordance with the necessity to maintain the lives and health of low status persons who existed to serve the higher status person.

Social morality is not fixed , and if lower status persons manage to combine their forces as they did at Runnymede , and at industrial strikes, then a new morality may be born.

[Terrapin Station]

I'll answer the stuff below, but can you tell me why you're completely ignoring the other stuff, including where I just said, "Okay, but then you're not actually answering what I asked you"?

You're instead focusing on stuff that I'm not very interested in while you're ignoring what interests me the most.

So I don't at all agree with that as a principle personally, for example.

Then provide a counterexample.

This is based on the general principle that equal things ought to be treated equally and unequal things ought to be treated unequally, which is a rational principle and not an 'emotional' principle.

So how would we argue that it's not just your preference (along with the preference of the people who feel the same way that you do), but that it's instead a "rational principle"? (Putting aside for the moment whether "rational principles" aren't subjective in the first place.)

If you are the cashier at the gas station and the price tag on a case of Pepsi is $10 you will accept as payment one $10 bill or two $5 bills but not two $1 bills, for the value of the first and second are equal and are also equal to the price of the Pepsi, but the value of the third is not equal to $10. You treat equal things equal and unequal things unequal. It would be irrational to accept the $10 bill but refuse the two $5 bills, or to accept the two $1 bills. In these latter cases you would be failing to observe the rational principle.