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[Terrapin Station]

You are asserting that the truthmaker of the moral presupposition is something like an internal disposition, feeling, or preference?

Right, and the only thing that's true about them is that so and so feels as they do about whatever specific behavior in a moral context.

But the person who believes in private property does not claim such a thing.

People can claim whatever they like. Some people claim that they're a reincarnation of Napoleon. Some claim that aliens speak to them through their television. That someone claims something doesn't make it the case.

Private property exists independent of such things.

It really doesn't. Private property only obtains insofar as someone thinks about things a certain way.

Stealing Bob's rope is wrong regardless of his feelings.

It's not though. What makes anything morally wrong is that someone(s) feels that the behavior in question should be discouraged if not outright proscribed or prohibited. It's not a person-independent fact that anything is morally wrong. That's just the point here.

. . . I would contend that the term does not mean, "Able to exist independent of minds"

I'm not sure why you'd contend that. Maybe you just are saying that you use it that way.

Instead it means, "Unable to be influenced by minds." If we accept the latter meaning, then necessary properties of minds, such as happiness, are objective.

The supposed necessary property would be something like "striving towards happiness" not happiness itself. (Surely there are lots of folks who aren't happy.) Again, it's definitely not the case that that's actually a necessary property of minds, though. There are people who do not strive for happiness, whatever we want to say is "wrong" with them.

[Leontiskos]

What makes anything morally wrong is that someone(s) feels that the behavior in question should be discouraged if not outright proscribed or prohibited. It's not a person-independent fact that anything is morally wrong. That's just the point here.

This is a claim you are making, and to quote someone nearby, "That someone claims something doesn't make it the case."

I don't really see the point of your assertions. It's like saying, "Morality isn't objective because I say it isn't objective, regardless of what moral objectivists say." It would be as convincing to say, "Science isn't objective because scientific claims are based on internal dispositions, feelings, or preferences. It doesn't matter that scientists say otherwise." Er, okay...?

There are people who do not strive for happiness, whatever we want to say is "wrong" with them.

Such as?

[Leontiskos]

Oh, okay. 'Propositional truth'? Well, propositionas don't exist. They're misleading metaphysical fictions. So the expression 'propositional truth' is dead in the water, as is the expression 'propositional knowledge'.

Oh dear.

If you have to deny the existence of propositions to try to save your system then it must be erroneous indeed.

Can you demonstrate the existence of propositions, or any other so-called abstract things? For example, can you produce an example of a proposition that isn't a linguistic expression? If, as you'll find, you can't - what might that mean, do you think?

It might mean that propositions don't exist in the same way that apples do. Are you under the impression that someone believes propositions exist in the same way that apples do? This conversation has taken an odd turn.

Oh, okay. 'Propositional truth'? Well, propositionas don't exist. They're misleading metaphysical fictions. So the expression 'propositional truth' is dead in the water, as is the expression 'propositional knowledge'. In this context, the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Actually a proposition is precisely the sort of thing that bears a truth value. Here is the relevant definition from Merriam-Webster:

"2a. an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false."

[Peter Holmes]

Oh, okay. 'Propositional truth'? Well, propositionas don't exist. They're misleading metaphysical fictions. So the expression 'propositional truth' is dead in the water, as is the expression 'propositional knowledge'.

Oh dear.

If you have to deny the existence of propositions to try to save your system then it must be erroneous indeed.

Can you demonstrate the existence of propositions, or any other so-called abstract things? For example, can you produce an example of a proposition that isn't a linguistic expression? If, as you'll find, you can't - what might that mean, do you think?

It might mean that propositions don't exist in the same way that apples do. Are you under the impression that someone believes propositions exist in the same way that apples do? This conversation has taken an odd turn.

Oh, okay. 'Propositional truth'? Well, propositionas don't exist. They're misleading metaphysical fictions. So the expression 'propositional truth' is dead in the water, as is the expression 'propositional knowledge'. In this context, the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Actually a proposition is precisely the sort of thing that bears a truth value. Here is the relevant definition from Merriam-Webster:

"2a. an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false."

And what is that 'something'? Is it the thing that a (token) declarative declares? And have you ever wondered why we tend not to fantasise about the things that interrogatives ask, imperatives command and exclamatives exclaim?

The cure for philosophical constipation is just a spoonful of critical thinking. To repeat: do you have evidence for the existence of propositions, or any other so-called abstract things? If propositions don't exist in the same way apples do, what and where are they, and in what way do they exist? Are they a bit like fairies or gods?

[Leontiskos]

Let me try again since you took the time to answer me at length. Your, "People can claim whatever they like," line made me think that the post was not in earnest, for you seemed to be co-opting the subjective intentions of the people you disagree with and claiming that although they believe they are actively making a judgment they are really just passively experiencing a feeling. This exchange between you and GEM was along the same lines:

Moral claims are opinions in the sense of how someone feels about something, or their "personal evaluation" of something .

They very often are. And hence are subjective. But moral philosophers are not interested in moral views that merely express personal feelings (though some psychologists may be).

The following, for example, is merely a personal feeling or disposition: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

No, it is not. It is an advisory as to a property a moral maxim must have if it is to be rationally defensible, namely, universality. It is either true or false, and whether it is true or false has nothing to do with Kant's or anyone else's feelings.

You are asserting that the truthmaker of the moral presupposition is something like an internal disposition, feeling, or preference?

Right, and the only thing that's true about them is that so and so feels as they do about whatever specific behavior in a moral context.

Then there are two propositions, "X is wrong," and, "I have a bad feeling about X." The truthmaker you have proposed is the truthmaker for the second proposition. I have been talking about the first, which is a judgment and not a feeling.

Private property exists independent of such things.

It really doesn't. Private property only obtains insofar as someone thinks about things a certain way.

This is very similar to an exchange we've already had:

In any event, it wouldn't make sense to say that anyone's desire for happiness, or what makes them happy, etc. isn't an individual thing. By saying that something is an individual thing, we're not saying that only ONE individual has it. We're saying that it's something that occurs in individuals and not elsewhere. So something that occurs in ALL individuals, but that's a property of one as an individual is still an individual thing.

Right, and it is crucial that morality should be based on a property possessed by individuals, else it couldn't apply to individuals.

...so yes, of course morality only obtains in virtue of thinking. Moral norms are a form of knowledge, and all knowledge requires thinking. The reason animals don't have laws is because they are not rational. But rational judgments are not reducible to "dispositions, feelings, and preferences."

Stealing Bob's rope is wrong regardless of his feelings.

It's not though. What makes anything morally wrong is that someone(s) feels that the behavior in question should be discouraged if not outright proscribed or prohibited. It's not a person-independent fact that anything is morally wrong. That's just the point here.

If by "feel" you mean "judge" then it is not true to say that it's not an objective judgment. In other words, you're begging the question.

We're still talking about personal and specifically mental phenomena, and not phenomena that are found in the world independently of persons/minds.

. . . I would contend that the term does not mean, "Able to exist independent of minds"

I'm not sure why you'd contend that. Maybe you just are saying that you use it that way.

I would contend that because it is true. If we adhere to your principle then claims such as this are not objective: "Human beings have thoughts." On your theory, since thoughts are not found in the world independently of persons/minds, the proposition that human beings have thoughts is not an objective proposition. But this is an absurdity. Thus you've made a mistake regarding the nature of objectivity.

The supposed necessary property would be something like "striving towards happiness" not happiness itself.

Yes, I was using shorthand.

Again, it's definitely not the case that that's actually a necessary property of minds, though. There are people who do not strive for happiness...

Like who?

[Peter Holmes]

I think that what we call the mind is a metaphysical, or non-physical fiction

The fiction is that there is anything nonphysical about mind. Not that there is mind.

Here's an extract from a Wiki entry on 'mind':

'Central questions for the study of mind, like whether other entities besides humans have minds or how the relation between body and mind is to be conceived, are strongly influenced by the choice of one's definition.

Mind or mentality is usually contrasted with body, matter or physicality. The issue of the nature of this contrast and specifically the relation between mind and brain is called the mind-body problem.[5] Traditional viewpoints included dualism and idealism, which consider the mind to be non-physical.[5] Modern views often center around physicalism and functionalism, which hold that the mind is roughly identical with the brain or reducible to physical phenomena such as neuronal activity[6][need quotation to verify] though dualism and idealism continue to have many supporters.'

As you know, I think the fiction of the non-physicality of the mind is built into all mentalist talk - ineluctably. The mind containing mental things and events is one big metaphor.

That it's a popular fiction (that there's something nonphysical to mind) doesn't mean it's not a fiction. But it's silly to say that mind, period, is a fiction. Obviously we have thoughts, emotions, desires, we formulate concepts, etc.

Sorry - I missed this earlier.

So we describe the mind as the thing in which so-called mental things exist or events occur.

QED. The wheel has come full circle. The mind is a fiction invented to account for what we call thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions, and so on.

[Terrapin Station]

This is a claim you are making, and to quote someone nearby, "That someone claims something doesn't make it the case."

I don't really see the point of your assertions. It's like saying, "Morality isn't objective because I say it isn't objective . . .

It's not subjective because I say it is, obviously. It's subjective because of the complete absence of evidence of anything that would amount to objective morality. Hence why I'm noting that there is no objective morality. The way to refute this is to present evidence of objective morality (and then we'd also need to present something that would amount to why anyone should follow the objective morality that's instantiated rather than what they'd personally prefer. I don't know if you were the person I asked about this earlier, but whoever I asked, they simply ignored the issue.)

Such as?

I don't get what you're looking for here. Are you asking for me to give you someone's name, like, "Barney Buttersworth of 210 Main Street, Des Moines"? What is that going to do. Anyone I know personally as an example isn't likely going to be someone you know.

[Terrapin Station]

Oops--reposted to fix the formatting:

This is a claim you are making, and to quote someone nearby, "That someone claims something doesn't make it the case."

I don't really see the point of your assertions. It's like saying, "Morality isn't objective because I say it isn't objective . . .

It's not subjective because I say it is, obviously. It's subjective because of the complete absence of evidence of anything that would amount to objective morality. Hence why I'm noting that there is no objective morality. The way to refute this is to present evidence of objective morality (and then we'd also need to present something that would amount to why anyone should follow the objective morality that's instantiated rather than what they'd personally prefer. I don't know if you were the person I asked about this earlier, but whoever I asked, they simply ignored the issue).

Such as?

I don't get what you're looking for here. Are you asking for me to give you someone's name, like, "Barney Buttersworth of 210 Main Street, Des Moines"? What is that going to do. Anyone I know personally as an example isn't likely going to be someone you know.

[Terrapin Station]

QED. The wheel has come full circle. The mind is a fiction invented to account for what we call thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions, and so on.

It's just an overarching or catch-all term for those phenomena--thoughts, desires, concept-formation, etc.

It's just like we have an overarching or catch-all term for phenomena such as batting, running bases, trying to catch fly balls, etc.--"baseball." "Mind" is simply a term that refers to a certain set of phenomena. So if we're saying that there is no such thing, we're denying the phenomena the term picks out.

[Terrapin Station]

Just to reiterate something I said earlier (last week or whatever), and again I don't know if you're the person I explained this to, but:

First, if we all happen to agree on something, then there's nothing to worry about. It doesn't matter whether morality is subjective or objective or whatever; everyone agrees, and everyone is going to be happy with other folks' behavior, there will be no issues, etc.

Issues arise when we don't agree. For example, when Jane thinks that she should be able to poison Joe's dog, on her property, when it keeps coming into her yard and defecating, even though she's told Joe numerous times to not just let the dog wander on its own and come into her yard, but where Joe doesn't feel she should be allow to kill his dog for this. Or when Jane thinks she should be allowed to get an abortion and Joe thinks she shouldn't. Or when Jane, a 50 year-old, thinks she should be allowed to have sex with an 10 year-old boy, and Joe thinks she shouldn't. Those are the sorts of situations where this stuff becomes an issue.

In those situations, people want to be able to tell other people what they should be able to do or not, they want to be able to tell other people that they should have one opinion or the other, they want to be able to tell other people that it's wrong to have particular dispositions. This is where whether morality is subjective or objective can come into play, and if morality turns out to be objective (which is the first thing we'd need to tackle if it's going to play into the following--we'd need to establish that morality is indeed objective, which means we'd need to provide evidence of this), we also have to be able to say why, if objectively, one shouldn't poison trespassing dogs, have abortions, or have sex with 40 year-younger preadolescents, the people who desire to do those things should instead (desire to) behave otherwise.

[Peter Holmes]

QED. The wheel has come full circle. The mind is a fiction invented to account for what we call thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions, and so on.

It's just an overarching or catch-all term for those phenomena--thoughts, desires, concept-formation, etc.

It's just like we have an overarching or catch-all term for phenomena such as batting, running bases, trying to catch fly balls, etc.--"baseball." "Mind" is simply a term that refers to a certain set of phenomena. So if we're saying that there is no such thing, we're denying the phenomena the term picks out.

Okay, but I think that's a false analogy. Baseball is a real thing - a feature of reality - a game that involves those real activities. I don't think most people use the word 'mind' in the way they use the word 'baseball'. Just aint so.

[Terrapin Station]

QED. The wheel has come full circle. The mind is a fiction invented to account for what we call thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions, and so on.

It's just an overarching or catch-all term for those phenomena--thoughts, desires, concept-formation, etc.

It's just like we have an overarching or catch-all term for phenomena such as batting, running bases, trying to catch fly balls, etc.--"baseball." "Mind" is simply a term that refers to a certain set of phenomena. So if we're saying that there is no such thing, we're denying the phenomena the term picks out.

Okay, but I think that's a false analogy. Baseball is a real thing - a feature of reality - a game that involves those real activities. I don't think most people use the word 'mind' in the way they use the word 'baseball'. Just aint so.

You don't think that thoughts, desires etc. are "features of reality"? Or you're just saying that you don't think that most people use "mind" simply as an overarching term for those sorts of things? (And if so, how do you believe that most people use the term "mind" instead?)

[Peter Holmes]

QED. The wheel has come full circle. The mind is a fiction invented to account for what we call thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions, and so on.

It's just an overarching or catch-all term for those phenomena--thoughts, desires, concept-formation, etc.

It's just like we have an overarching or catch-all term for phenomena such as batting, running bases, trying to catch fly balls, etc.--"baseball." "Mind" is simply a term that refers to a certain set of phenomena. So if we're saying that there is no such thing, we're denying the phenomena the term picks out.

Okay, but I think that's a false analogy. Baseball is a real thing - a feature of reality - a game that involves those real activities. I don't think most people use the word 'mind' in the way they use the word 'baseball'. Just aint so.

You don't think that thoughts, desires etc. are "features of reality"? Or you're just saying that you don't think that most people use "mind" simply as an overarching term for those sorts of things? (And if so, how do you believe that most people use the term "mind" instead?)

I think the Wiki quote I gave earlier is a pretty standard example of what people have thought the mind is: something different from the body/brain. The metaphysical/religious baggage is inextricable. You seem to think there is no mind-body problem - but there is.

The very idea of compatibility begs the question: what is compatible with what? Is it just two ways of talking that are compatible? How is talk about electrochemical processes compatible with talk about mental things and events?

[Terrapin Station]

I think the Wiki quote I gave earlier is a pretty standard example of what people have thought the mind is: something different from the body/brain.

Right, but people are still using the term as an overarching term for stuff like thoughts, desires, concept formation, etc.--some people just believe that those things aren't physical. (Although honestly, the number of people who believe that those things aren't physical is probably seriously dwindling over the last 100 years or so . . . it's mostly religious folks (because of a vested interest) and some philosophers who continue to think that there's something nonphysical about thoughts, desires, etc.)

The very idea of compatibility begs the question: what is compatible with what? Is it just two ways of talking that are compatible? How is talk about electrochemical processes compatible with talk about mental things and events?

Compatibilism is usually just about the free will/determinism issue. And again, it's mostly a remnant of some philosophers as well as some religous folks who are stuck 100+ years back in their sketchy scientific knowledge.

These boards seem to get a lot of religious posters, so that's one reason that you find a lot ulterior motive stances here, where they're typically presented as "innocent" inquiry instead.

[Peter Holmes]

I think the Wiki quote I gave earlier is a pretty standard example of what people have thought the mind is: something different from the body/brain.

Right, but people are still using the term as an overarching term for stuff like thoughts, desires, concept formation, etc.--some people just believe that those things aren't physical. (Although honestly, the number of people who believe that those things aren't physical is probably seriously dwindling over the last 100 years or so . . . it's mostly religious folks (because of a vested interest) and some philosophers who continue to think that there's something nonphysical about thoughts, desires, etc.)

The very idea of compatibility begs the question: what is compatible with what? Is it just two ways of talking that are compatible? How is talk about electrochemical processes compatible with talk about mental things and events?

Compatibilism is usually just about the free will/determinism issue. And again, it's mostly a remnant of some philosophers as well as some religous folks who are stuck 100+ years back in their sketchy scientific knowledge.

These boards seem to get a lot of religious posters, so that's one reason that you find a lot ulterior motive stances here, where they're typically presented as "innocent" inquiry instead.

Okay. I think the mind and mentalist talk is a legacy issue of more consequence than you think it has. But I'm completely with you on the nature and significance of moral assertions.