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[Leontiskos]

No, it was deliberate. We can and do use the word objective to mean 'fact-based'. So an objective decision, judgement - or opinion - is one based on facts. The condition 'independent from opinion' means unbiased, impartial or disinterested.

Okay.

What is an opinion? What is a fact? How do I tell the difference? Is there a qualitative difference?

Indeed there is. And words can mean only what we use them to mean. I refer you to my description of facts above. And I use standard dictionary definitions of the word opinion. In this context, I take opinions to be functionally the same as beliefs or judgements.

Okay, thanks. So in your description you say, "facts are either features of reality that are or were the case - such as what we call objects - or descriptions of them that are true..." How does one access facts with opinions (beliefs or judgments)? How do we access reality and how to do know that we have accessed it? Obviously opinions exist. Do facts?

I think your claim that factual assertions are 'oughts', because they implicitly claim that others ought to accept their truth - is false. The condition 'given the way we use the words or other signs involved' does not imply that 'you' ought to use them that way.

What is prescribed by the "ought" is not the syntactic words, but the meaning of those words. When I say, "The Earth is not flat," I am not saying that anyone is obliged to use the English language or these specific words. I am saying that they have an obligation to accept the truth that these words point to. It would be very strange to describe a fact as a set or words or signs without any reference to their meaning. The fact that the Earth is not flat is not found in the material symbols, but in the meaning that those symbols convey.

Because, with one valid and sound example, as requested, you would necessarily demolish my claim. So I repeat the request.

(I have defended my claim, and I think shown why it's true. It's to do with a very basic rules of deductive inference: a conclusion can't introduce new material. So if there's no reference to 'should', 'ought', or such ideas, in the premise or premises, then that premise or those premises don't justify a conclusion that does refer to them.)

Okay, thanks. Let's just continue with propositional truth claims. When the brother claims that the fruit is a tangerine or when Aristotle claims that the Earth is round their claim includes the idea that rational minds are obliged to assent to this proposition if they were provided with the relevant evidence and argument. The obligation attaches to content and meaning, not to symbols.

See the above. This is not a dogma, but rather a rule in classical logic. To repeat: all you have to do is produce an example demonstrating that a factual (is) premise entails a 'judgemental' (ought) conclusion. Thing is - I've asked this of, probably, hundreds of moral objectivists, none of whom have walked the walk. Perhaps you can.

Well, thing is, GE Morton already showed that hypothetical "oughts" are derivable (he calls them "instrumental"). CIN already did a pretty good job with universal "oughts" following upon the desire for happiness. It seems to me that both of those conversations ended when you became dogmatic about IOF.

So we can give it a try, but I'm more interested in whether your system can even support objectivity. We can look at IOF through the lens of propositional truth.

[Leontiskos]

Hello Gertie. I think I have a better sense of where you are coming from this time around.

When the brother says, "This is a tangerine," he is also saying, "My statement is true (for everyone)." "Objective truth" is redundant, as Peter pointed out. The claim places a burden on all rational minds to see it the same way. That's why when the sister contradicts him friction will arise, because the "ought"-claims are conflicting. Each believes the other ought to--at the very least--use a different word to describe the fruit.

Sorry I still don't get it.

Let's just set the stage a bit to begin. I gave an example where a brother claims a piece of fruit is a tangerine and his sister disagrees, calling it a clementine. The point of my illustration was that the encounter is, prima facie, identical to a moral argument. There are two competing claims, both of which are "ought" claims. The point was that this is already too much for Peter's criteria for objectivity.

Now you claim that this is a different sort of ought than a moral claim. We can explore this question, but again, prima facie, it is the same. The siblings take their claims to be normative for the other person. This same thing happens when a vehement pro-lifer encounters a vehement pro-choicer. You have two conflicting "ought"-claims that presumably lead to interminable argument. What I mean when I say that the brother or the pro-lifer makes an "ought"-claim is that they intend their claim to be normative. In the first place I wanted to attend to the matter of intention.

Just because someone says out loud ''That is a tangerine'' doesn't introduce some burden of ought as far as I can see (except along the lines I already mentioned). I'm not seeing where the oughtness lies in this scenario and what it's based in. I can guess some more but it would be helpful if you can clarify further?

I'm saying that our shared experience-based model of the world where we share notes and agree eg that tangerines exist and categorise them, is inter-subjective. We then treat the physical observable and measurable aspects of this working model as true, as factual and falsifiable. Until we hit a problem and have to adjust the model, or our own misunderstanding of it (as in your scenario). It applies to all of us. Hopefully that's clearer. Are you disagreeing? If so, we do have a deeper issue.

I don't disagree with what you say here, but I don't think this non-realist account goes far enough. Throughout this discussion you talk about, "treating things as true/objective/factual/falsifiable." Clearly you're uncomfortable with the claim that they really are true/objective/factual/falsifiable. Let's try to get to an objective ought and to realism. (Note: Many today follow Hume and Kant in rejecting classical moral knowledge, but they don't see that these same premises, if followed consistently, require one to reject scientific knowledge as well.)

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the intersubjective "ought" claim that you recognize is essentially the claim that English speakers ought to label the fruit as a tangerine, and that "the purpose behind that is to maintain the useful consistency of our shared objective model of the world." More generally, it is the claim that language speakers should follow the stipulated vocabulary of the language. This is actually a relatively superficial claim. So let's consider two different meanings of the predication, "This piece of fruit is a tangerine."

M1: English speakers ought to apply the label "tangerine" to this piece of fruit.
M2: This fruit is the kind of reality that the English word "tangerine" points to.

The difference is subtle but important. If you wanted to defend M1 you could go to a dictionary, or take a poll, or in some way attempt to discover common usage. If you wanted to defend M2 you would go to a pomologist, because they are the ones who best understand fruits. M1 is merely stipulative. "It is a tangerine because we English speakers decided that it is a tangerine." M2 is substantive. "It is a tangerine because it instantiates the objective concept that is represented by the word 'tangerine'." In the first case we have a semantic quibble; in the second case we have a disagreement over the nature of reality.

Now it's not really clear whether the brother and sister are having a semantic quibble or a substantive disagreement. You assumed they were having a semantic quibble and I assumed they were having a substantive disagreement. I would say that if the brother and sister are just learning English then it is more likely they are having a semantic quibble--they both have a clear understanding of the fruit but are ignorant of what to call it in English. On the other hand if they are both expert pomologists then it is more likely they are having a substantive disagreement--they know exactly what the two words mean, but they are disagreeing on the empirical nature of the piece of fruit.

My general point was that the fruit claims are analogous to scientific claims. When a scientist says that helium has two protons, this could be a stipulative claim justified by the English language such as M1, or it could be a substantive claim about reality such as M2. Certainly the first scientist who theorized that helium has two protons was not speaking stipulatively, and this shows forth the truth that science must go beyond linguistic stipulation and intersubjective agreement by reason of its very nature. This means that the falsifiability of stipulative claims is different from the falsifiability of substantive claims. Stipulative claims are falsified on the basis of intersubjective agreement, whereas substantive claims are falsified by reality and argument. Oftentimes scientists challenge or transcend intersubjective agreement, in which case their claim could be objectively true even if it is false according to intersubjective agreement (e.g. When Copernicus claimed that the Earth orbits the Sun).

Let me offer one more example since I know this can be difficult to understand. A stipulative mindset would be shown forth by the siblings if they are thinking, "Which English word identifies this piece of fruit?" But in that case they would be assuming that the intersubjective language is isomorphic with reality. Of course it's not. A question that does not make this assumption would be, "What is this fruit?" It is conceivable that during their argument a pomologist would enter the room, examine the fruit, and declare that it is an entirely new fruit that has never been discovered before and has no name. That is, it is neither a tangerine nor a clementine, nor is it identifiable by way of existing names. My argument presupposes that they are primarily interested in the reality of the fruit rather than in which name to apply.

I think this is the same thing Kant referred to as the analytic/synthetic distinction, but I may be wrong and I don't want to misrepresent him so I will just call it the stipulative/substantive distinction. My point is that the brother's claim is a substantive "ought," and that this kind of "ought" is in accord with moral judgments. It could be stipulative, and I understand why you would say that, but the idea that he is making a truth claim that goes beyond language goes hand in hand with it being a substantive assertion. Stipulative claims can be "treated as" objective or true, but they're actually not. Those claims are primarily about language and appearance rather than reality. Substantive claims are about reality and therefore really do have the capacity to be objective and true.

So now I've at least addressed the intentionality of the act at length. Obviously your other objection has to do with adjudication...

Listen, I don't want this post to become excessively long. You make a number of points below that will need to be taken up, but for now I am only going to offer a few minor comments on them. This post will therefore be primarily about the tangerine claim and the difference between stipulative and substantive claims. That strikes me as a foundational issue that needs to be addressed. We can come back to the other things.

The tangerine is a physical feature of our shared physical model of the world which we treat as objectively correct and have agreed ways of checking for accuracy via observation and measurement. This is the realm of shared public knowledge about facts of the world we can all access. If I call a tangerine an apple or lamp post or clementine or symphony, I can be shown why I'm mistaken. I'm saying this is the appropriate context for thinking about 'right' and 'wrong' here in terms of accuracy - whether I have correctly identified the tangerine, or I've made an error. You can say rational people 'ought' not make such an error, but as I said before, that's a different type of ought, using the term to mean ''would be expected not to make this error in observation or categorisation''.

Okay, so the sort of "ought" that deals with mistaking a piece of fruit is, "would be expected not to make this error in observation or categorisation." What is the alternative ought that you would contrast it with? If you think capital punishment is moral and I think it is immoral, aren't we both claiming that the other person has falsely categorized the act of capital punishment? You think I have falsely categorized it as immoral and I think you have falsely categorized it as moral. So again, I don't see two different kinds of "oughts" here, but I admit that this is only a preliminary answer.

I think we just have to accept that what we treat as objective is actually rooted in inter-subjective agreement. But the key thing is we can point to what we agree to call objective facts about the world and compare notes. They are 'out there', observable and measurable by us both, and our observations and measurements will tally unless we make an error. That is the realm we treat as objective. The realm of publically accessible knowledge we share. Where tangerines exist and have specific observable, measurable characteristics.

But subjective experience itself is not 'out there' to be pointed at, it's not public/shared, observable, measurable in that way. It is private, and qualiative. So while I can point to the hanging and ask you if you see the hanging too, to check I'm not factually mistaken, I can't point to my opinion that hanging is wrong for you to check in that way. If we compare notes on our opinion about capital punishment, there is nothing to point to 'out there' which is falsifiable in the public/shared way that pointing to the physical event of the hanging is. When I say hanging is morally wrong, I'm not talking about an objectively, publically, observable, falsifiable error in observation or categorisation.


Moral judgements only exist as expressions of the private mental experience of Subjects. Not as publically falsifiable facts.

[...]

I think we have to think through what the lexicon represents. I make the distinction, as outlined above, between facts about the world which are observable and measurable and agreed via sharing notes on our private subjective experience vs the private qualiative subjective experience itself. The first category we call objective, the latter subjective. If a mental experience can't be checked in that public/shared way, it is still real, but it doesn't have that public authoriative stamp of objective agreement between us. When it comes to opinions, feeling of disapproval, values, a sense of guilt or moral obligation these are real, but ours might be the opposite. Like I might love chocolate ice cream and you might hate it.

So again, we will have to come back to this, but my position is that there is no qualitative difference between an opinion and a fact. A fact is just a bunch of opinions strung together by intersubjective agreement. At least I don't see how you or Peter can get more than that. Here you call it objective, but elsewhere you would say that we "treat it as objective." Presumably on your view we have subjective experiences, and when a similar subjective experience is elicited by the same stimulus in many different individuals it becomes objective. As noted above, that view won't support science, and this was my original point to Peter.

That said, I hope we are sorting out intention properly. The ice cream preference has no intended objectivity. When I say there is no qualitative difference, I am talking about things that are intended objectively. I included a parenthetical remark with my initial comment to clarify this.

We will also have to come back to the question of adjudication, which is central to your view.

I would say that the difference is a matter of degree. The truth about capital punishment is simply more obscure than the truth about the tangerine, so fewer people are able to recognize it. But just because fewer people recognize a truth does not make it non-objective. Or to use your language, the claim about capital punishment enjoys less intersubjective agreement than the claim about the tangerine, so it is less "objective."

Hopefully I've clarified why I disagree. What is your foundation and methodology for establishing the moral truth about hanging? Maybe you could walk me through the example of capital punishment.

I don't think there is any qualitative difference between fact and opinion. One merely enjoys more "intersubjective agreement." The opinions of yesterday are the facts of today, and the folly of tomorrow.

Again, this misses the distinction I make between observable/measurable/objective vs private/qualiative/subjective which I believe underlies a real distinction with consequences. One consequence being, moral judgements are by their nature are not accessible to public/shared verification. We might disagrees over the use of terminology, but the distinction is real.

I'm guessing you believe reason can bridge this gap, but to do so I think your first problem is to provide an objective moral foundation to reason your way from. If you're not hiding God up your sleeve, that's a tough one imo.

These are important points you bring up. Like I said, I am not going to try to give a thorough answer to them here, for this post is already too long. However, I will give you the basic framework.

I actually want to look at slavery first, because you brought it up earlier in the thread and I think would be an easier moral prohibition for me to defend. Obviously the intersubjective agreement surrounding slavery has changed in the last few hundred years. Now we tend to view it as objectively wrong. What might that mean?

Just like the brother would make use of the nature of the fruit in order to argue that it is a tangerine, so would we appeal to the nature of the human being in order to argue against slavery. A common argument would be: Human beings have inherent dignity; Slavery is incompatible with that dignity; Therefore slavery is impermissible. The middle term, 'dignity', would surely be elaborated in terms of freedom. That is, our intellect and our will endow us with freedom, and that freedom cannot be arbitrarily denied. Similar "natural law" arguments would be applied to murder, or theft, or capital punishment, etc. We can talk more about this.

Best,
Leontiskos

[Peter Holmes]

No, it was deliberate. We can and do use the word objective to mean 'fact-based'. So an objective decision, judgement - or opinion - is one based on facts. The condition 'independent from opinion' means unbiased, impartial or disinterested.

Okay.

What is an opinion? What is a fact? How do I tell the difference? Is there a qualitative difference?

Indeed there is. And words can mean only what we use them to mean. I refer you to my description of facts above. And I use standard dictionary definitions of the word opinion. In this context, I take opinions to be functionally the same as beliefs or judgements.

Okay, thanks. So in your description you say, "facts are either features of reality that are or were the case - such as what we call objects - or descriptions of them that are true..." How does one access facts with opinions (beliefs or judgments)? How do we access reality and how to do know that we have accessed it? Obviously opinions exist. Do facts?

Well, I assume features of reality that are or were the case exist. And I assume we believe they do exist, and can know about them. If you challenge those assumptions, we're into a different discussion

I think your claim that factual assertions are 'oughts', because they implicitly claim that others ought to accept their truth - is false. The condition 'given the way we use the words or other signs involved' does not imply that 'you' ought to use them that way.

What is prescribed by the "ought" is not the syntactic words, but the meaning of those words. When I say, "The Earth is not flat," I am not saying that anyone is obliged to use the English language or these specific words. I am saying that they have an obligation to accept the truth that these words point to. It would be very strange to describe a fact as a set or words or signs without any reference to their meaning. The fact that the Earth is not flat is not found in the material symbols, but in the meaning that those symbols convey.

Erm. Given my description of facts, acceptance of the truth of a factual assertion is identical to acceptance that what it asserts exists. And my point stands: there is no 'ought' implied in either kind of acceptance. If I say 'water is H2O', I suggest no obligation that anyone else has to agree with me. That's a strange idea - and a blind alley for your argument - may I suggest.

Because, with one valid and sound example, as requested, you would necessarily demolish my claim. So I repeat the request.

(I have defended my claim, and I think shown why it's true. It's to do with a very basic rules of deductive inference: a conclusion can't introduce new material. So if there's no reference to 'should', 'ought', or such ideas, in the premise or premises, then that premise or those premises don't justify a conclusion that does refer to them.)

Okay, thanks. Let's just continue with propositional truth claims. When the brother claims that the fruit is a tangerine or when Aristotle claims that the Earth is round their claim includes the idea that rational minds are obliged to assent to this proposition if they were provided with the relevant evidence and argument. The obligation attaches to content and meaning, not to symbols.

The same blind alley. The 'ought' you imagine attaches to a falsifiable factual assertion about a tangerine or the earth - you ought to accept what this asserts - is different from a moral 'ought' - you ought to do this.

I note you haven't provided an example of the kind of entailment you claim exists. And you haven't tried to refute my argument for its logical impossibility. Why not give it a go - and stop stalling with this deflection into propositional truth?

See the above. This is not a dogma, but rather a rule in classical logic. To repeat: all you have to do is produce an example demonstrating that a factual (is) premise entails a 'judgemental' (ought) conclusion. Thing is - I've asked this of, probably, hundreds of moral objectivists, none of whom have walked the walk. Perhaps you can.

Well, thing is, @GE Morton already showed that hypothetical "oughts" are derivable (he calls them "instrumental"). @CIN already did a pretty good job with universal "oughts" following upon the desire for happiness. It seems to me that both of those conversations ended when you became dogmatic about IOF.

I disagree. GEM's reduction of moral 'ought' to goal-consistency robs morality of the objectivity he claims for it. And, as I've explained, a supposed or actual fact about human nature - such as that everyone desires happiness - can't deductively entail an 'ought' conclusion.

So we can give it a try, but I'm more interested in whether your system can even support objectivity. We can look at IOF through the lens of propositional truth.

Sorry, but you need to produce the goods. I'm tired of running around every which way - done it too many times.

[Leontiskos]

(Sorry for the empty post just above this one. I accidentally clicked "submit" rather than "preview." I asked a moderator to remove it, so hopefully it won't be there long.)

Okay, thanks. So in your description you say, "facts are either features of reality that are or were the case - such as what we call objects - or descriptions of them that are true..." How does one access facts with opinions (beliefs or judgments)? How do we access reality and how to do know that we have accessed it? Obviously opinions exist. Do facts?

Well, I assume features of reality that are or were the case exist. And I assume we believe they do exist, and can know about them. If you challenge those assumptions, we're into a different discussion

Why would you assume we can know about them? That's a pretty big assumption. You've said that some opinions are based on fact and some aren't. How do I know which are which? Is there really a difference between fact and opinion on your system?

Presumably if I said there are some moral opinions that are true and some that are false you would want to know how to tell the difference. Again, my whole point is that the problems that you point to in morality exist in your system as well. You are just ignoring them in your system.

I think your claim that factual assertions are 'oughts', because they implicitly claim that others ought to accept their truth - is false. The condition 'given the way we use the words or other signs involved' does not imply that 'you' ought to use them that way.

What is prescribed by the "ought" is not the syntactic words, but the meaning of those words. When I say, "The Earth is not flat," I am not saying that anyone is obliged to use the English language or these specific words. I am saying that they have an obligation to accept the truth that these words point to. It would be very strange to describe a fact as a set or words or signs without any reference to their meaning. The fact that the Earth is not flat is not found in the material symbols, but in the meaning that those symbols convey.

Erm. Given my description of facts, acceptance of the truth of a factual assertion is identical to acceptance that what it asserts exists. And my point stands: there is no 'ought' implied in either kind of acceptance. If I say 'water is H2O', I suggest no obligation that anyone else has to agree with me. That's a strange idea - and a blind alley for your argument - may I suggest.

You don't think that other people ought to believe that water has two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom? When they claim that water has three hydrogen atoms they aren't doing anything wrong? That's a strange idea.

Okay, thanks. Let's just continue with propositional truth claims. When the brother claims that the fruit is a tangerine or when Aristotle claims that the Earth is round their claim includes the idea that rational minds are obliged to assent to this proposition if they were provided with the relevant evidence and argument. The obligation attaches to content and meaning, not to symbols.

The same blind alley. The 'ought' you imagine attaches to a falsifiable factual assertion about a tangerine or the earth - you ought to accept what this asserts - is different from a moral 'ought' - you ought to do this.

So now you're admitting that it is an "ought," but claiming that it is a different kind of "ought." Yet to say that it is different because it is about a tangerine begs the question. My whole purpose in introducing the tangerine was to show that it is not different. They are both "oughts." And you deferred your opportunity to define what you mean by "ought," so my argument stands. You will have to give some reason or argument for your assertion that they are different.

I note you haven't provided an example of the kind of entailment you claim exists. And you haven't tried to refute my argument for its logical impossibility. Why not give it a go - and stop stalling with this deflection into propositional truth?

The basic inference is as follows, in a few different forms:

• If something is true, then it ought to be believed.
• If something is shown to be true, then it ought to be believed.
• If an argument is sound, then the conclusion ought to be believed (because it is true).

Obviously the claim, "This is a tangerine," is purported to be true, and therefore ought to be believed by the sister (at least as far as the brother is concerned).

I want to focus on the third form, which is about argument and soundness. Above you claimed that truth and belief/acceptance are equivalent. I think they come apart a bit, and this is seen in formal arguments (but even if they don't the obligation still attaches to the conclusion). Take any argument:

• Premise 1
• Premise 2
• Conclusion

In an argument the conclusion is virtually but not formally contained in the premises. Or, the conclusion is implicitly but not explicitly contained in the premises. What an argument is actually doing is taking accepted premises and showing that they lead ineluctably to a previously unaccepted conclusion. A successful argument will make use of premises and inferential rules that are already accepted by the interlocutor (these are the "is" parts), and it will move to a conclusion that was previously rejected by the interlocutor, but that they will now be forced to accept due to the obligation placed upon them (the conclusion is the "ought" part). The conclusion of a sound argument ought to be believed in virtue of its truth. For someone to accept the soundness of an argument and reject its conclusion would be for them to abandon their obligation to truth and logical consistency.

See the above. This is not a dogma, but rather a rule in classical logic. To repeat: all you have to do is produce an example demonstrating that a factual (is) premise entails a 'judgemental' (ought) conclusion. Thing is - I've asked this of, probably, hundreds of moral objectivists, none of whom have walked the walk. Perhaps you can.

Well, thing is, @GE Morton already showed that hypothetical "oughts" are derivable (he calls them "instrumental"). @CIN already did a pretty good job with universal "oughts" following upon the desire for happiness. It seems to me that both of those conversations ended when you became dogmatic about IOF.

I disagree. GEM's reduction of moral 'ought' to goal-consistency robs morality of the objectivity he claims for it. And, as I've explained, a supposed or actual fact about human nature - such as that everyone desires happiness - can't deductively entail an 'ought' conclusion.

But there are two questions, and you keep shifting back and forth between them. The first question is whether there is an objective "ought." The second question is whether IOF is true. GEM was arguing against IOF, not in favor of objective obligation. Just because an "is" can be derived from an "ought" does not mean that there must be universally binding and knowable "oughts."

In our discussion the two questions happen to be converging, the the convergence isn't necessary.

[Terrapin Station]

Without trying to address all of the details here, I would say that it does solve the problem at hand. When we talk about an objective morality we are talking about a morality that is normative for all rational beings, and which cannot be altered by their will.

I explained why this doesn't work in my post.

The issue in a nutshell is this:

Joe comes along, where Joe is quite unusual for whatever reasons. On moral issue m, Joe feels, and so has behaved, not-m, whereas everyone else feels and behaves m. If we want to be able to say that Joe should feel and behave differently than he does (or has), that Joe should feel or at least behave m, that Joe is somehow incorrect for feeling or behaving not-m, then we need to be able to justify that. "Every other single person alive or who has ever lived felt and behaved m" wouldn't do it. Because why should Joe feel or behave m just because everyone else does/ever did? Joe doesn't feel the same way as everyone else. Why should he?

In your last post you said that it is either impossible or improbable for someone to be oriented towards something other than happiness. I affirmed that it is impossible. That is what a necessary property of persons means. Here you are mistaken in thinking that I believe it is improbable.

Indeed, this is the same assumption you accepted at the beginning of your last post. You said you don't think it is universal but you will assume that for the sake of discussion. I said I think it is universal, but that I too am happy to move forward on the assumption.

Maybe you want to abandon that assumption and challenge the idea that happiness is a universal, necessary property that belongs to all human beings by their very nature? Feel free to proceed in that way if you'd like, but don't assume that the desire for happiness is merely improbable. It should be clear from my last post that I don't accept that assumption.

Or, more broadly, normatives, with any sort of connotation of should/ought to them--which normatives in a philosophical sense, at least, are supposed to have--aren't supportable, certainly not in an objective sense. Suggesting that people should think, behave, etc. the same as others simply because others feel or behave however they do is the argumentum ad populum fallacy.

But I have not argued that someone ought to think or behave in a certain way simply because others think or behave in that way. Nowhere have I given such an argument.

You're completely ignoring the issue and the questions I posed.

Again:

Joe comes along, where Joe is quite unusual for whatever reasons. On moral issue m, Joe feels, and so has behaved, not-m, whereas everyone else feels and behaves m. If we want to be able to say that Joe should feel and behave differently than he does (or has), that Joe should feel or at least behave m, that Joe is somehow incorrect for feeling or behaving not-m, then we need to be able to justify that. "Every other single person alive or who has ever lived felt and behaved m" wouldn't do it. Because why should Joe feel or behave m just because everyone else does/ever did? Joe doesn't feel the same way as everyone else. Why should he?

I want you to actually answer why Joe should feel differently than he does about m. That's the moral dilemma that we'd need to solve, the dilemma I had in mind re "the problem at hand" and whether the fact that something is universal (contingently or otherwise) solves this problem.

[Terrapin Station]

If you need a concrete example instead, I can give you one, but let's see if we can answer this without needing a concrete example rather than a generalized, abstracted one (because I want to avoid concrete examples sidetracking things).

[Terrapin Station]

You shouldn't have a problem, by the way, believing that someone can diverge from the norm about m versus not-m for some moral stance, because we see examples of this all the time.

[Peter Holmes]

(Sorry for the empty post just above this one. I accidentally clicked "submit" rather than "preview." I asked a moderator to remove it, so hopefully it won't be there long.)

Okay, thanks. So in your description you say, "facts are either features of reality that are or were the case - such as what we call objects - or descriptions of them that are true..." How does one access facts with opinions (beliefs or judgments)? How do we access reality and how to do know that we have accessed it? Obviously opinions exist. Do facts?

Well, I assume features of reality that are or were the case exist. And I assume we believe they do exist, and can know about them. If you challenge those assumptions, we're into a different discussion

Why would you assume we can know about them? That's a pretty big assumption. You've said that some opinions are based on fact and some aren't. How do I know which are which? Is there really a difference between fact and opinion on your system?

Presumably if I said there are some moral opinions that are true and some that are false you would want to know how to tell the difference. Again, my whole point is that the problems that you point to in morality exist in your system as well. You are just ignoring them in your system.

Not so. My 'system', as you call it, rests on the existence of features of reality that are or were the case, whose existence and nature are independent from anyone's opinion or description of them. In short, I'm a (at least methodological) realist. If you want to argue about ontology, we can certainly do so. But I assume that, if you think there's no way to distinguish between what we call facts and what we call opinions, you at least understand what the things we call facts and opinions are.

That thing we call a tangerine exists, independently from any opinion about its existence or nature. And we can describe it in many different ways, by listing its properties, which also exist independently from any opinion about them. Now, you claim that moral rightness or wrongness are properties of a thing such as, say, capital punishment or abortion, in the same way as, say, colour is a property of a tangerine. And I say you have a burden of proof for that claim - which, so far, no moral objectivist has ever met - to my knowledge.

I think your claim that factual assertions are 'oughts', because they implicitly claim that others ought to accept their truth - is false. The condition 'given the way we use the words or other signs involved' does not imply that 'you' ought to use them that way.

What is prescribed by the "ought" is not the syntactic words, but the meaning of those words. When I say, "The Earth is not flat," I am not saying that anyone is obliged to use the English language or these specific words. I am saying that they have an obligation to accept the truth that these words point to. It would be very strange to describe a fact as a set or words or signs without any reference to their meaning. The fact that the Earth is not flat is not found in the material symbols, but in the meaning that those symbols convey.

Erm. Given my description of facts, acceptance of the truth of a factual assertion is identical to acceptance that what it asserts exists. And my point stands: there is no 'ought' implied in either kind of acceptance. If I say 'water is H2O', I suggest no obligation that anyone else has to agree with me. That's a strange idea - and a blind alley for your argument - may I suggest.

You don't think that other people ought to believe that water has two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom? When they claim that water has three hydrogen atoms they aren't doing anything wrong? That's a strange idea.

What I think people ought to do in response to a factual assertion is irrelevant. The assertion itself has no intrinsic 'ought' component. You've made that up.

Okay, thanks. Let's just continue with propositional truth claims. When the brother claims that the fruit is a tangerine or when Aristotle claims that the Earth is round their claim includes the idea that rational minds are obliged to assent to this proposition if they were provided with the relevant evidence and argument. The obligation attaches to content and meaning, not to symbols.

The same blind alley. The 'ought' you imagine attaches to a falsifiable factual assertion about a tangerine or the earth - you ought to accept what this asserts - is different from a moral 'ought' - you ought to do this.

So now you're admitting that it is an "ought," but claiming that it is a different kind of "ought." Yet to say that it is different because it is about a tangerine begs the question. My whole purpose in introducing the tangerine was to show that it is not different. They are both "oughts." And you deferred your opportunity to define what you mean by "ought," so my argument stands. You will have to give some reason or argument for your assertion that they are different.

Read more carefully. You imagine an ought attaches to a falsifiable factual assertion - but it doesn't. My point is that the assertion 'you ought to believe this is the case' - which contextually has a use - is completely different from the assertion 'you ought/ought not to do that'. So you've invented an implied obligation in a factual assertion, and conflated it with the obligation stated by a conventional moral assertion.

I note you haven't provided an example of the kind of entailment you claim exists. And you haven't tried to refute my argument for its logical impossibility. Why not give it a go - and stop stalling with this deflection into propositional truth?

The basic inference is as follows, in a few different forms:

• If something is true, then it ought to be believed.
• If something is shown to be true, then it ought to be believed.
• If an argument is sound, then the conclusion ought to be believed (because it is true).

Obviously the claim, "This is a tangerine," is purported to be true, and therefore ought to be believed by the sister (at least as far as the brother is concerned).

I want to focus on the third form, which is about argument and soundness. Above you claimed that truth and belief/acceptance are equivalent. I think they come apart a bit, and this is seen in formal arguments (but even if they don't the obligation still attaches to the conclusion). Take any argument:

• Premise 1
• Premise 2
• Conclusion

In an argument the conclusion is virtually but not formally contained in the premises. Or, the conclusion is implicitly but not explicitly contained in the premises. What an argument is actually doing is taking accepted premises and showing that they lead ineluctably to a previously unaccepted conclusion. A successful argument will make use of premises and inferential rules that are already accepted by the interlocutor (these are the "is" parts), and it will move to a conclusion that was previously rejected by the interlocutor, but that they will now be forced to accept due to the obligation placed upon them (the conclusion is the "ought" part). The conclusion of a sound argument ought to be believed in virtue of its truth. For someone to accept the soundness of an argument and reject its conclusion would be for them to abandon their obligation to truth and logical consistency.

This description of deductive inference is correct. Well done. Now, please produce an example of a valid and sound argument with a factual (is) premise, or factual (is) premises, and a morally judgemental (ought) conclusion. That's all you have to do. (Whether the rest of us ought to accept the argument is an irrelevant and completely separate issue.)

See the above. This is not a dogma, but rather a rule in classical logic. To repeat: all you have to do is produce an example demonstrating that a factual (is) premise entails a 'judgemental' (ought) conclusion. Thing is - I've asked this of, probably, hundreds of moral objectivists, none of whom have walked the walk. Perhaps you can.

Well, thing is, @GE Morton already showed that hypothetical "oughts" are derivable (he calls them "instrumental"). @CIN already did a pretty good job with universal "oughts" following upon the desire for happiness. It seems to me that both of those conversations ended when you became dogmatic about IOF.

I disagree. GEM's reduction of moral 'ought' to goal-consistency robs morality of the objectivity he claims for it. And, as I've explained, a supposed or actual fact about human nature - such as that everyone desires happiness - can't deductively entail an 'ought' conclusion.

But there are two questions, and you keep shifting back and forth between them. The first question is whether there is an objective "ought." The second question is whether IOF is true. GEM was arguing against IOF, not in favor of objective obligation. Just because an "is" can be derived from an "ought" does not mean that there must be universally binding and knowable "oughts."

As I see it, the question is: are there moral facts? (Because only the existence of moral facts could make morality objective.) GEM's answer is yes, there are moral facts, because moral oughts are nothing more than instrumental deductions from goals - which is not what moral objectivists claim.

As it happens, I think an ought can't entail an is, just as an is can't entail an ought. But that's a separate argument. Ours is about whether a moral assertion (an ought) makes a falsifiable factual claim about reality. You say it does, but that knowing the answer is just a lot harder that knowing whether a claim about a tangerine is true or false. And I think your moral cognitivism is incoherent. We can never know if abortion is or isn't morally wrong - and claiming that we can is absurd - in effect, a category error.

In our discussion the two questions happen to be converging, the the convergence isn't necessary.

Okay, stick to the existence of moral facts. Please produce one, and show why it's a fact (a feature of reality) and not a moral opinion about a feature of reality. It really is that simple. You could win the argument for moral objectivism at a stroke. Stop dodging.

[Leontiskos]

In your last post you said that it is either impossible or improbable for someone to be oriented towards something other than happiness. I affirmed that it is impossible. That is what a necessary property of persons means. Here you are mistaken in thinking that I believe it is improbable.

Indeed, this is the same assumption you accepted at the beginning of your last post. You said you don't think it is universal but you will assume that for the sake of discussion. I said I think it is universal, but that I too am happy to move forward on the assumption.

Maybe you want to abandon that assumption and challenge the idea that happiness is a universal, necessary property that belongs to all human beings by their very nature? Feel free to proceed in that way if you'd like, but don't assume that the desire for happiness is merely improbable. It should be clear from my last post that I don't accept that assumption.

You're completely ignoring the issue and the questions I posed.

No, you are the one who is ignoring the issues. Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence that you are not even reading my posts.

For example, in my first post to you I provided a way to overcome "the most obvious objection," namely that happiness is an artificial term which disguises the fact that different people seek happiness in different things. In your reply you gave the objection that different things make different people happy. But I had already given arguments against that objection. It is as if you hadn't even read my first post.

Then in my first reply to you I made it very clear that I do not believe that the desire for happiness is contingent. Even after pointing that out you continue to ask me, paraphrasing, "So what do you make of the fact that happiness is contingent?" It's as if you didn't read my post which made it abundantly clear that I do not believe happiness is contingent.

Let's look at this again. You gave a dichotomy along with an argument against the second disjunct:

(Here is the dichotomy:)

Secondly, we're either saying that it would be physically impossible for someone to be oriented towards something other than happiness (in which case, ignoring how we'd establish that it would be physical impossible, okay, but then we're just noting that everyone has the same subjective orientation), or we're saying that it just so happens to be contingently the case that everyone extant is oriented towards achieving happiness (again, where we're assuming that this is the case), but as something contingent, it wouldn't be impossible for someone to come along who isn't oriented towards achieving happiness.

(And here is the argument against the second disjunct:)

Well, let's say that 100 billion people have existed by the time the one very unusual person not oriented towards achieving happiness comes along--let's say that something very unusual happens with a genetic mutation with that person that causes their brain to develop so that they're not oriented towards achieving happiness. In that case, should that person orient themselves towards achieving happiness? Why? Just because everyone else is like that? Why should they orient themself to be just like every other person who has existed to that point?

But I explicitly chose the first disjunct, not the second:

Secondly, we're either saying that it would be physically impossible for someone to be oriented towards something other than happiness (in which case, ignoring how we'd establish that it would be physical impossible, okay, but then we're just noting that everyone has the same subjective orientation)...

After reading the above you probably already know that this is what I am saying. This is how virtue ethicists understand happiness. We don't have any choice but to pursue happiness.

It makes no sense to continually repeat your argument against the second disjunct. I accept the first, not the second. Again, it is incredibly hard to believe that you are reading my posts.

Again:

Joe comes along, where Joe is quite unusual for whatever reasons. On moral issue m, Joe feels, and so has behaved, not-m, whereas everyone else feels and behaves m. If we want to be able to say that Joe should feel and behave differently than he does (or has), that Joe should feel or at least behave m, that Joe is somehow incorrect for feeling or behaving not-m, then we need to be able to justify that. "Every other single person alive or who has ever lived felt and behaved m" wouldn't do it. Because why should Joe feel or behave m just because everyone else does/ever did? Joe doesn't feel the same way as everyone else. Why should he?

I want you to actually answer why Joe should feel differently than he does about m. That's the moral dilemma that we'd need to solve, the dilemma I had in mind re "the problem at hand" and whether the fact that something is universal (contingently or otherwise) solves this problem.

Again, I do not grant that m is contingent. If you read my first reply to you it will become abundantly clear that I take the desire for happiness to be a necessary property, not an accidental or contingent property.

Not all properties are contingent. You may as well be asking me, "Suppose Joe walks up to you and has no consciousness," or, "Suppose Joe walks up to you and has no brain," etc.

Again:

Maybe you want to abandon that assumption and challenge the idea that happiness is a universal, necessary property that belongs to all human beings by their very nature? Feel free to proceed in that way if you'd like, but don't assume that the desire for happiness is merely improbable. It should be clear from my last post that I don't accept that assumption.

[Leontiskos]

Not so. My 'system', as you call it, rests on the existence of features of reality that are or were the case, whose existence and nature are independent from anyone's opinion or description of them. In short, I'm a (at least methodological) realist. If you want to argue about ontology, we can certainly do so. But I assume that, if you think there's no way to distinguish between what we call facts and what we call opinions, you at least understand what the things we call facts and opinions are.

So you still haven't given any justification for your claim that facts are different from opinions. After asking you three times, the absence of an answer is disconcerting. Apparently you don't have any way to differentiate them.

I'm clear on your ontology. What's at issue here is epistemology. Your claim is that objective moral "oughts" are epistemically impossible. I say that your system has the exact same problems, and that your "facts" are epistemically impossible. Once enough opinions agree on one thing do we call it a fact? Because if that is so, then there are moral facts, too, for some moral opinions converge. Or is there some other way to differentiate an opinion from a fact? You seem to think we can't get to moral facts from moral opinions. I am wondering how we get to natural facts from natural opinions?

You don't think that other people ought to believe that water has two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom? When they claim that water has three hydrogen atoms they aren't doing anything wrong? That's a strange idea.

What I think people ought to do in response to a factual assertion is irrelevant. The assertion itself has no intrinsic 'ought' component. You've made that up.

I didn't say a single word about an assertion. You say people have no obligation to believe that water is made up of H2O. I say they do. I say they ought to believe that water is made up of H2O.

The reason the obligation arises could be several: investigation, arguments from authority, accepting the common opinion, etc.

So now you're admitting that it is an "ought," but claiming that it is a different kind of "ought." Yet to say that it is different because it is about a tangerine begs the question. My whole purpose in introducing the tangerine was to show that it is not different. They are both "oughts." And you deferred your opportunity to define what you mean by "ought," so my argument stands. You will have to give some reason or argument for your assertion that they are different.

Read more carefully. You imagine an ought attaches to a falsifiable factual assertion - but it doesn't. My point is that the assertion 'you ought to believe this is the case' - which contextually has a use - is completely different from the assertion 'you ought/ought not to do that'. So you've invented an implied obligation in a factual assertion, and conflated it with the obligation stated by a conventional moral assertion.

My challenge stands: what is the difference between the presumptive "ought" and the conventional moral "ought"? As noted, you are begging the question. You are giving no argument for your assertion that they are different.

The basic inference is as follows, in a few different forms:

• If something is true, then it ought to be believed.
• If something is shown to be true, then it ought to be believed.
• If an argument is sound, then the conclusion ought to be believed (because it is true).

Obviously the claim, "This is a tangerine," is purported to be true, and therefore ought to be believed by the sister (at least as far as the brother is concerned).

I want to focus on the third form, which is about argument and soundness. Above you claimed that truth and belief/acceptance are equivalent. I think they come apart a bit, and this is seen in formal arguments (but even if they don't the obligation still attaches to the conclusion). Take any argument:

• Premise 1
• Premise 2
• Conclusion

In an argument the conclusion is virtually but not formally contained in the premises. Or, the conclusion is implicitly but not explicitly contained in the premises. What an argument is actually doing is taking accepted premises and showing that they lead ineluctably to a previously unaccepted conclusion. A successful argument will make use of premises and inferential rules that are already accepted by the interlocutor (these are the "is" parts), and it will move to a conclusion that was previously rejected by the interlocutor, but that they will now be forced to accept due to the obligation placed upon them (the conclusion is the "ought" part). The conclusion of a sound argument ought to be believed in virtue of its truth. For someone to accept the soundness of an argument and reject its conclusion would be for them to abandon their obligation to truth and logical consistency.

This description of deductive inference is correct. Well done. Now, please produce an example of a valid and sound argument with a factual (is) premise, or factual (is) premises, and a morally judgemental (ought) conclusion. That's all you have to do. (Whether the rest of us ought to accept the argument is an irrelevant and completely separate issue.)

No, whether "the rest of us ought to accept the argument" is precisely what is at stake, because if I give a concrete argument that need not be accepted you will immediately claim that it is not universally obligatory. This being the case, I already gave the argument, you're just uncomfortable with the level of abstraction. To repeat myself, "A successful argument will make use of premises and inferential rules that are already accepted by the interlocutor (these are the 'is' parts), and it will move to a conclusion that was previously rejected by the interlocutor, but that they will now be forced to accept due to the obligation placed upon them (the conclusion is the 'ought' part)."

Sound or obligatory arguments are always person-specific. If you are able to present an argument to your interlocutor that they believe to be sound, then they must accept the conclusion. That is, they are obliged to accept the conclusion. This is the relevance of the three conditionals I gave above. Each of them illustrate the nature of the obligatory inference. Again, the punch-line is that if you believe an argument is sound then you have an obligation to believe it.

So what's an example? What you are doing right now is an example. You are trying to convince me that morality is not objective. All you are trying to do is present an argument that I agree is sound. You are not trying to convince me that I must accept sound arguments. If we get to the end of this and I say, "Well, I accept that all of the premises of your argument are true, and I also accept that all of your inferential reasoning is valid, but I still reject your conclusion," what would you say? You certainly would not go on arguing. You might say that I am intellectually dishonest, or that I am engaging in bad faith, or that I am not a real philosopher, etc. At root I would be failing my obligation accept truth where it is found. To accept an argument as sound and to reject its conclusion is to fail one's obligation to truth, and the very fact that you are engaging with me presupposes this obligation. If you didn't think I had an obligation to accept sound arguments you would stop engaging immediately.

So we are at the hypothetical stage of my argument. I gave conditional inferences. If you admit that an argument is sound, then you are obliged to accept the conclusion. Obviously you think the hypothetical obligation is insufficient to prove my point, and hopefully you will tell us why, but are you at least willing to admit that this hypothetical obligation exists?

But there are two questions, and you keep shifting back and forth between them. The first question is whether there is an objective "ought." The second question is whether IOF is true. GEM was arguing against IOF, not in favor of objective obligation. Just because an "is" can be derived from an "ought" does not mean that there must be universally binding and knowable "oughts."

As I see it, the question is: are there moral facts? (Because only the existence of moral facts could make morality objective.) GEM's answer is yes, there are moral facts, because moral oughts are nothing more than instrumental deductions from goals - which is not what moral objectivists claim.

That's largely correct. Kantian moral objectivists believe that there are universally binding moral "oughts" that exist independent of desires and goals. GEM has argued that there are hypothetical instrumental "oughts" that are not universal and are dependent on desires and goals. I don't think he has claimed that there are "moral facts." Indeed, he even eschewed the adjective "moral."

As it happens, I think an ought can't entail an is, just as an is can't entail an ought. But that's a separate argument.

Sorry, that was just a typo on my part.

Ours is about whether a moral assertion (an ought) makes a falsifiable factual claim about reality. You say it does, but that knowing the answer is just a lot harder that knowing whether a claim about a tangerine is true or false. And I think your moral cognitivism is incoherent. We can never know if abortion is or isn't morally wrong - and claiming that we can is absurd - in effect, a category error.

Nothing in what you say here surprises me, but my conversations in this thread are separate. I am engaging you on exactly two points: 1) Whether your system can support scientific objectivity; and 2) Whether propositional truth involves obligation. I haven't raised the "moral" question with you at all. That is intentional given my reading of your exchanges with folks like CIN and GEM.

In our discussion the two questions happen to be converging, the the convergence isn't necessary.

Okay, stick to the existence of moral facts. Please produce one, and show why it's a fact (a feature of reality) and not a moral opinion about a feature of reality. It really is that simple. You could win the argument for moral objectivism at a stroke. Stop dodging.

Er, again, I am talking about propositional truth. That's all I've ever been talking to you about. The question of propositional truth is converging with regard to universality and IOF. I haven't engaged your "moral" argument at all, which I think is largely confused. The two issues that I have been pursuing with you will lend clarity to the "moral" question, but I have no need to beat the dead horse that GEM and CIN helped kill. We don't have to repeat that.

[Terrapin Station]

. . .

Oy vey . . . so you're simply not going to attempt to address why Joe should Joe feel or behave m, or how we could say that Joe is somehow incorrect for feeling or behaving not-m?

[Slavedevice]

We all know what pain/Suffering is without any religious or philosophical teaching. Right? If you were born on Mars, you would recognize a living being was in pain or was suffering! So, without philosophical or religious mumbo jumbo:

Evil - that which increases pain an suffering (mental suffering included).

Good - that which DECREASES pain and suffering.

>>. Now you don’t get no more objective than that!

The next big objectivity: How do YOU define happiness? Can happiness exist WITHOUT sadness? Huh?

How would you know if you were happy if you had nothing to compare?

[Peter Holmes]

We all know what pain/Suffering is without any religious or philosophical teaching. Right? If you were born on Mars, you would recognize a living being was in pain or was suffering! So, without philosophical or religious mumbo jumbo:

Evil - that which increases pain an suffering (mental suffering included).

Good - that which DECREASES pain and suffering.

>>. Now you don’t get no more objective than that!

The next big objectivity: How do YOU define happiness? Can happiness exist WITHOUT sadness? Huh?

How would you know if you were happy if you had nothing to compare?

Is it a fact that that which increases pain and suffering is evil? Or is that just an opinion? And are there exceptions? And are those exceptions facts or matters of opinion?

Is it a fact that that which decreases pain and suffering is good? Or is that just an opinion? And are there exceptions? And are those exceptions facts or matters of opinion?

[Sy Borg]

The problem here is that we live in a world replete with zero sum games, where one organism survives by killing another. And humans survive by displacing peers and by taking their stuff, directly or indirectly, as individuals and as groups.

Morality ultimately refers to rules of engagement within a group. Rules of engagement vary from species to species, nation to nation, culture to culture, even between neighbourhoods and families. There is no moral that runs across all. Not even killing and torturing.

Failing any kind of consensus, a looser approach is needed to find quasi-universal morals. There you would have the "old chestnuts":

- do not kill (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do not torture (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do not steal (unless you can have the theft ratified by law)
- do not destroy (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)

Life forms are beings of order, the sum of an astonishingly integrated network of microbial entities. Very broadly speaking, life embraces order and growth and abhors chaos and entropy. However, entropy is necessary to avoid stagnation and to check parasitic growths. Thus, people disagree as to how to handle growth and entropy, either out of self-interest or the self-interest of a group with which they identify.

[Gertie]

Leon

Leon I'll try to be succinct, but I'm struggling! We need to focus in now Ithink

Let's just set the stage a bit to begin. I gave an example where a brother claims a piece of fruit is a tangerine and his sister disagrees, calling it a clementine. The point of my illustration was that the encounter is, prima facie, identical to a moral argument. There are two competing claims, both of which are "ought" claims. The point was that this is already too much for Peter's criteria for objectivity.

Now you claim that this is a different sort of ought than a moral claim. We can explore this question, but again, prima facie, it is the same. The siblings take their claims to be normative for the other person. This same thing happens when a vehement pro-lifer encounters a vehement pro-choicer. You have two conflicting "ought"-claims that presumably lead to interminable argument. What I mean when I say that the brother or the pro-lifer makes an "ought"-claim is that they intend their claim to be normative. In the first place I wanted to attend to the matter of intention.

OK, lets agree this is a scenario where Peter is intending his statement ''This fruit is a tangerine'' to place some sort of ought obligation on whoever is in his company (to agree with him presumably). So our issue is twofold - why is there such an obligation, what's the foundation? And if there is, is it the same type of obligation a moral ought confers?

Just because someone says out loud ''That is a tangerine'' doesn't introduce some burden of ought as far as I can see (except along the lines I already mentioned). I'm not seeing where the oughtness lies in this scenario and what it's based in. I can guess some more but it would be helpful if you ca…
I'm saying that our shared experience-based model of the world where we share notes and agree eg that tangerines exist and categorise them, is inter-subjective. We then treat the physical observable and measurable aspects of this working model as true, as factual and falsifiable. Until we hit a prob…

I don't disagree with what you say here, but I don't think this non-realist account goes far enough.

Fine, it's just getting this type of 'objective' agreement pinned down. Ie if something is observable/measurable we can check each other's claims and falsify them - by looking ourselves. This is the basis of the scientific method. Note it can't be applied to abstract concepts like morality, which isn't third person falsifiable via observation/measurement.

If you agree this is the basis by which people agree to call something objectively true, then it doesn't work for morality, so you need to provide a different type of basis for your claim that morality is objective... ?

Throughout this discussion you talk about, "treating things as true/objective/factual/falsifiable." Clearly you're uncomfortable with the claim that they really are true/objective/factual/falsifiable. Let's try to get to an objective ought and to realism. (Note: Many today follow Hume and Kant in rejecting classical moral knowledge, but they don't see that these same premises, if followed consistently, require one to reject scientific knowledge as well.)

I'm making the distinction above re observable/measurable/falsifiable physical facts, and abstract concepts.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the intersubjective "ought" claim that you recognize is essentially the claim that English speakers ought to label the fruit as a tangerine, and that "the purpose behind that is to maintain the useful consistency of our shared objective model of the world." More generally, it is the claim that language speakers should follow the stipulated vocabulary of the language. This is actually a relatively superficial claim.

Yes, according to my moral foundation, the welfare of conscious creatures, it's a good rule of thumb to share a consistent vocabulary to get **** done and avoid accidents. But the rule of thumb is there to serve the foundational principle, so it won't always apply.
But I don't claim that my moral foundation is rooted in objectivity, rather I claim it is the appropriate foundation for oughts.

So let's consider two different meanings of the predication, "This piece of fruit is a tangerine."

M1: English speakers ought to apply the label "tangerine" to this piece of fruit.
M2: This fruit is the kind of reality that the English word "tangerine" points to.


The difference is subtle but important. If you wanted to defend M1 you could go to a dictionary, or take a poll, or in some way attempt to discover common usage. If you wanted to defend M2 you would go to a pomologist, because they are the ones who best understand fruits. M1 is merely stipulative. "It is a tangerine because we English speakers decided that it is a tangerine." M2 is substantive. "It is a tangerine because it instantiates the objective concept that is represented by the word 'tangerine'." In the first case we have a semantic quibble; in the second case we have a disagreement over the nature of reality.

Yes I get the difference, I'd say they're really having a dispute over labelling or observation tho. It's the observation (the experiential representation of reality) which is known to them and can be faulty and not tally. Conscious experience is itself a limited and faulty basis for knowledge, but humans generally share the same limitations and faults, so what we can do is create consistent working models of reality. In M2 there is an inconsistency in observation we wouldn't expect from normally functioning humans, except for the fact tangerines and clementines are very similar, which just means more thorough observation/measurement is required.

Now it's not really clear whether the brother and sister are having a semantic quibble or a substantive disagreement. You assumed they were having a semantic quibble and I assumed they were having a substantive disagreement. I would say that if the brother and sister are just learning English then it is more likely they are having a semantic quibble--they both have a clear understanding of the fruit but are ignorant of what to call it in English. On the other hand if they are both expert pomologists then it is more likely they are having a substantive disagreement--they know exactly what the two words mean, but they are disagreeing on the empirical nature of the piece of fruit.

I'm more than happy to put aside the labelling M1 issue and get down to your intended point!

My general point was that the fruit claims are analogous to scientific claims. When a scientist says that helium has two protons, this could be a stipulative claim justified by the English language such as M1, or it could be a substantive claim about reality such as M2. Certainly the first scientist who theorized that helium has two protons was not speaking stipulatively, and this shows forth the truth that science must go beyond linguistic stipulation and intersubjective agreement by reason of its very nature. This means that the falsifiability of stipulative claims is different from the falsifiability of substantive claims. Stipulative claims are falsified on the basis of intersubjective agreement, whereas substantive claims are falsified by reality and argument. Oftentimes scientists challenge or transcend intersubjective agreement, in which case their claim could be objectively true even if it is false according to intersubjective agreement (e.g. When Copernicus claimed that the Earth orbits the Sun).

I disagree with your intended point! Substantive M2 claims are falsified by observation and measurement. Hard science deals with the physically observable/measurable, that which is third person accessible. Hence checkable by others who observe/measure it. That's what makes scientific claims falsifiable. A scientific claim is accepted as objectively true on the basis that anyone who observes/measures the claimed discovery will concur.

Morality is an abstract concept, it can't be observed/measured this way, and moral claims can't be falsified this way.


I think our difference here is you're talking about reality, as if we have direct, complete, perfect access to it. I'm talking about knowledge of reality, which is gained through (limited, flawed) conscious experience, which we then compare notes about to create a model of reality which is comprehensible to us. Which is just how it is, I think. Within that model some things (physical things) are accessible to third person observation and checking, and we agree to treat these things as facts, which is generally good enough.

My argument presupposes that they are primarily interested in the reality of the fruit rather than in which name to apply.

Good lets go with that then. Forget stipulative and M1 stuff.

I think this is the same thing Kant referred to as the analytic/synthetic distinction, but I may be wrong and I don't want to misrepresent him so I will just call it the stipulative/substantive distinction. My point is that the brother's claim is a substantive "ought," and that this kind of "ought" is in accord with moral judgments.

But why? It can't just be intention, because I could say ''That fruit is a tangerine'' without the intention of putting an obligation of agreement on anyone. I could say it an empty room. The saying of it or intention doesn't look like enough to me. I'm still not seeing your underlying justification for this being an ought claim?

Substantive claims are about reality and therefore really do have the capacity to be objective and true.

This is reasonable, but firstly - remember your knowledge toolkit is your conscious experience. We can cross check our conscious experience of physical things like tangerines because they are third person observable/measurable. But an abstract concept like morality isn't checkable in that way. It doesn't have a mind independent existence 'out there' we can observe.

So now I've at least addressed the intentionality of the act at length.

Well you've addressed the labelling/substantive distinction, which I agree with. But I'm not sure how intention itself creates a basis for oughts, sorry. Can you summarise the argument?

Obviously your other objection has to do with adjudication...

Listen, I don't want this post to become excessively long. You make a number of points below that will need to be taken up, but for now I am only going to offer a few minor comments on them. This post will therefore be primarily about the tangerine claim and the difference between stipulative and substantive claims. That strikes me as a foundational issue that needs to be addressed. We can come back to the other things.

The tangerine is a physical feature of our shared physical model of the world which we treat as objectively correct and have agreed ways of checking for accuracy via observation and measurement. This is the realm of shared public knowledge about facts of the world we can all access. If I call a tang…

Okay, so the sort of "ought" that deals with mistaking a piece of fruit is, "would be expected not to make this error in observation or categorisation." What is the alternative ought that you would contrast it with? If you think capital punishment is moral and I think it is immoral, aren't we both claiming that the other person has falsely categorized the act of capital punishment? You think I have falsely categorized it as immoral and I think you have falsely categorized it as moral. So again, I don't see two different kinds of "oughts" here, but I admit that this is only a preliminary answer.

Lets forget about errors in categorisation, it's become a red herring. The reason we can agree it's an objective fact that a hanging is happening in front of us is that it is observable/measurable/falsifiable, hence I can point to it and you can agree you see it too. As can any normally functioning human. The morality of hanging isn't observable/measurable/falsifiable in that way. Is the distinction I'm making clear now? So if that isn't your basis for calling hanging objectively immoral, what is?

I think we just have to accept that what we treat as objective is actually rooted in inter-subjective agreement. But the key thing is we can point to what we agree to call objective facts about the world and compare notes. They are 'out there', observable and measurable by us both, and our observati…

So again, we will have to come back to this, but my position is that there is no qualitative difference between an opinion and a fact. A fact is just a bunch of opinions strung together by intersubjective agreement. At least I don't see how you or Peter can get more than that. Here you call it objective, but elsewhere you would say that we "treat it as objective." Presumably on your view we have subjective experiences, and when a similar subjective experience is elicited by the same stimulus in many different individuals it becomes objective. As noted above, that view won't support science, and this was my original point to Peter.

If it is observable/measurable/falsifiable we treat it as a fact, objective knowledge of reality, by comparing the content of our experience which is the source of our knowledge. This is the scientific method. But a moral claim/opinion isn't falsifiable via observation/measurement. We'd need to use different criteria to establish the objectivity. I'm still unclear what yours are?

That said, I hope we are sorting out intention properly. The ice cream preference has no intended objectivity. When I say there is no qualitative difference, I am talking about things that are intended objectively. I included a parenthetical remark with my initial comment to clarify this.

I still don't think intention is key. I might genuinely believe there's a pixie living in my attic, and when I tell you about it I intend you to believe it too. But we don't generally treat it as objectively true unless everyone who goes look in my attic observes the pixie too. What is relevant is that the ice cream itself is observable/measurable, we can treat it as a fact I'm eating an ice cream. My liking the taste is about my feelings regarding ice cream, it's not 'out there' to be observed/measured, and it's a subject specific individual preference. Hume talks about moral intuitions as feelings of approval/disapproval, and my feelings about the taste of ice cream are similarly approving, where-as yours might be disapproving. We can't falsify either claim, because it's not observable/measurable.

So to support the claim that morality is objective, you need a different method to the way scientific claims are falsiable.

We will also have to come back to the question of adjudication, which is central to your view.
I would say that the difference is a matter of degree. The truth about capital punishment is simply more obscure than the truth about the tangerine, so fewer people are able to recognize it. But just because fewer people recognize a truth does not make it non-objective. I don't think there is any qualitative difference between fact and opinion. One merely enjoys more "intersubjective agreement." The opinions of yesterday are the facts of today, and the folly of tomorrow. Again, this misses the distinction I make between observable/measurable/objectiv e vs private/q…

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I'd say what you call adjudication is how we compare the content of our experience, our basis for knowledge. There are subject-specific truths only I can know about the content of my experience, such as whether the taste of ice cream is nice, or that I experience seeing a pixie living in my attic. So when I make such statements, I can intend you to agree, but if you can't third person falsify them, then we don't treat them with the status of objectively correct. They don't automatically enter the public canon of shared working knowledge of the world we can falsify.

These are important points you bring up. Like I said, I am not going to try to give a thorough answer to them here, for this post is already too long. However, I will give you the basic framework.

I actually want to look at slavery first, because you brought it up earlier in the thread and I think would be an easier moral prohibition for me to defend. Obviously the intersubjective agreement surrounding slavery has changed in the last few hundred years. Now we tend to view it as objectively wrong. What might that mean?

I didn't bring up slavery, but happy to use that. I wouldn't claim it's wrong on the basis of objective morality tho, I'd say it's wrong according my moral foundation of the welfare of conscious creatures. Which isn't justified as objective.

Just like the brother would make use of the nature of the fruit in order to argue that it is a tangerine, so would we appeal to the nature of the human being in order to argue against slavery.

Here we might find common ground

A common argument would be: Human beings have inherent dignity; Slavery is incompatible with that dignity; Therefore slavery is impermissible. The middle term, 'dignity', would surely be elaborated in terms of freedom. That is, our intellect and our will endow us with freedom, and that freedom cannot be arbitrarily denied. Similar "natural law" arguments would be applied to murder, or theft, or capital punishment, etc. We can talk more about this.

And here we might not