Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[popeye1945]

Now, one hundred and nineteen pages--119.

[Gertie]

Leontiskos

It is interesting to note that Peter has also violated the is-ought "fallacy." This is because he began with an "is": the existence of a piece of fruit. He moved to an "ought": "This is a tangerine". Why is it an "ought"? Because truth claims are teleological in the relevant ought-sense. The propositional truth claim entails the normative claim that objective and rational observers ought to recognize this as a tangerine. To claim that some proposition is true is to claim that one has accurately perceived reality and that other minds ought to come to the same conclusion if they studied the same phenomena. Truth claims are necessarily "ought"-claims on all rational agents. Indeed, his sister will feel this "ought" claim particularly acutely.

Is this ''the relevant ought sense'' tho? Or is it simply a linguistic blurring of 'ought'', which here means would be expected, barring error, to similarly accurately perceive reality?

Lets say it's an apple and orange instead, then the inaccuracy is clearer. The sister has made an inaccurate classification based on some fault in observation, or misuse of our shared language which the brother is using. You can say we ought not make such observational errors or we ought to use our shared language accurately to avoid miscommunication, but the purpose behind that is to maintain the useful consistency of our shared objective model of the world.

And our shared objective model of the world is ultimately inter-subjective, because it's based in our shared way of experiencing the world - that is the consistency underlying the distinctions between apples and oranges, physics, everything. We linguistically compare notes of our experience of the world in order to create this shared 'objective' model, and label and categorise as seems appropriate. If I'm doing this inaccurately, say I'm high or delusional or colour blind, my experience won't tally with others. But we have a repeatable, testable model for checking such errors against in our shared world model, which we are so confident in we call it objective.

Is the same thing going on when two people disagree about say capital punishment? Can we observe and measure an opinion about the rightness of capital punishment to see if it is accurate in that way in order to spot an error in the opinion? No. We can observe the act of capital punishment and inter-subjectively agree on what we see as a feature of our world model. But to conform with your example the error would be in the observation or categorisation, for example someone might observe someone being hanged as a terrible accident or something.

That's not the same thing as someone believing capital punishment is morally wrong in principle. That belief isn't objectively accurate or inaccurate, in that it can't be falsified in the same way by observation and measurement within the context of our shared objective world model.

We know this difference without having to spell it out this way, which is why we have different words for fact and opinion. These are just tedious, obscuring weeds we need to clear away I think, in order to get to Is-Ought problem for morality.

[Peter Holmes]

Leontiskos

It is interesting to note that Peter has also violated the is-ought "fallacy." This is because he began with an "is": the existence of a piece of fruit. He moved to an "ought": "This is a tangerine". Why is it an "ought"? Because truth claims are teleological in the relevant ought-sense. The propositional truth claim entails the normative claim that objective and rational observers ought to recognize this as a tangerine. To claim that some proposition is true is to claim that one has accurately perceived reality and that other minds ought to come to the same conclusion if they studied the same phenomena. Truth claims are necessarily "ought"-claims on all rational agents. Indeed, his sister will feel this "ought" claim particularly acutely.

Is this ''the relevant ought sense'' tho? Or is it simply a linguistic blurring of 'ought'', which here means would be expected, barring error, to similarly accurately perceive reality?

Lets say it's an apple and orange instead, then the inaccuracy is clearer. The sister has made an inaccurate classification based on some fault in observation, or misuse of our shared language which the brother is using. You can say we ought not make such observational errors or we ought to use our shared language accurately to avoid miscommunication, but the purpose behind that is to maintain the useful consistency of our shared objective model of the world.

And our shared objective model of the world is ultimately inter-subjective, because it's based in our shared way of experiencing the world - that is the consistency underlying the distinctions between apples and oranges, physics, everything. We linguistically compare notes of our experience of the world in order to create this shared 'objective' model, and label and categorise as seems appropriate. If I'm doing this inaccurately, say I'm high or delusional or colour blind, my experience won't tally with others. But we have a repeatable, testable model for checking such errors against in our shared world model, which we are so confident in we call it objective.

Is the same thing going on when two people disagree about say capital punishment? Can we observe and measure an opinion about the rightness of capital punishment to see if it is accurate in that way in order to spot an error in the opinion? No. We can observe the act of capital punishment and inter-subjectively agree on what we see as a feature of our world model. But to conform with your example the error would be in the observation or categorisation, for example someone might observe someone being hanged as a terrible accident or something.

That's not the same thing as someone believing capital punishment is morally wrong in principle. That belief isn't objectively accurate or inaccurate, in that it can't be falsified in the same way by observation and measurement within the context of our shared objective world model.

We know this difference without having to spell it out this way, which is why we have different words for fact and opinion. These are just tedious, obscuring weeds we need to clear away I think, in order to get to Is-Ought problem for morality.

Yep. What Gertie said.

[Peter Holmes]

1 The claim 'this is a tangerine' is falsifiable, because the fruit may or may not be the object (the thing) we call a tangerine. But the claim 'this action is good' is unfalsifiable, because there's nothing in reality that, as it were, functions in the way the tangerine does.

I admitted that the claim about the tangerine is falsifiable. In the method you give here falsifiability is not sufficient to provide objectivity. The claim, "This is a tangerine," fulfills condition 2, but fails conditions 3, 4, and 5.

2 Your claim that 'truth-claims are teleological in the relevant ought-sense' is patent nonsense.

This is just one more dogmatic re-assertion of premise (2). It is not an argument. Again, here is premise (2):

2. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is".

Oh, and by the way, if the premises don't contain any reference to an ought or a should, a conclusion that does contain them doesn't follow. This is basic logic.

Again, this is merely a dogmatic reassertion of premise (2). You have not argued for premise (2) in this thread, you have merely asserted it.

From what I can see there are at least four false assumptions you are making in this thread, and they ground your argument:

1. It is fallacious to derive an "ought" from an "is". (Cf. #5 here)
2. Objective assertions must be falsifiable. (Cf. #2 here)
3. The judgment and the contrary judgment cannot share the same object. (Cf. #3 here)
4. The object cannot be "the judgment itself." (Cf. #4 here)

Counterexamples and critiques:

1. Truth and desirability are inherently teleological; I gave an unanswered example in the previous post and CIN has provided many throughout the thread.
2. Necessary truths are objective and unfalsifiable (Cf. CIN's post here). A simple example would be the law of non-contradiction, which is necessary, objective, and unfalsifiable.
3. Just because someone makes a counter-claim does not mean that your claim was non-objective. I see no reason to accept this principle. Disagreements about single objects happen all the time. For example, the fact that we disagree about premise (2) surely doesn't mean that claims regarding premise (2) are non-objective!
4. This seems to flow from a misunderstanding of the foundation of argument and reason. We can analyze complex arguments and premises, but at the end of the reasoning chain are direct judgments about basic premises ("first principles"). If some judgments are not immediately derived from the object then there could be no foundation to build upon.

Again, if we accept assumptions like (1-4) we arrive at the absurd conclusion that no objective statements are possible in any discipline. They are false and they lead to absurdities. Therefore they must be left behind.

Thanks. It may be that we're using terms differently. And you may have missed my explanation of the way I use them - which explains why you misrepresent my argument.

1 Signs such as words can mean only what we use them to mean.

2 What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts - so that facts are a given. And this explains what we mean by the expressions 'objective opinion' and 'objective decision'. The modifiers 'objective' and 'factual' are near synonyms.

3 What we call facts are either features of reality that are or were the case - such as what we call objects - or descriptions of them that are true, given the way we use the signs (such as words) involved. And it's because features of reality may or may not be or have been the case that factual assertions are falsifiable.

4 It follows that the expression 'objective truth' is confused or redundant. If, as I maintain, there's no such thing as subjective truth, the distinction made by the expression 'objective truth' is illusory.

5 It also follows that the expression 'necessary truth' is also a (venerable) philosophical redundancy. If an assertion could not be false - such as a tautological rule of classical logic - there's no reason to call it true. It just 'follows the rules', as does a (correct) mathematical assertion. So it's a mistake to call a necessary truth 'objective'. The only fact asserted by a so-called necessary truth is a linguistic rule.

6 Logic deals with language, not reality. Other discourses deal with reality, such as the natural sciences. Logic just deals with what can be said consistently, without contradiction. And features of reality don't conform to the rules of logic. The truth isn't out there, any more than falsehood is.

7 If you have an example of a valid argument with a factual premise or premises that entail(s) an 'ought' conclusion, please provide it. Just one example will demolish my claim that this is deductively impossible. 'Derivation' is completely different from logical entailment, of course. CIN hasn't provided such an argument, in my opinion.

8 I don't understand the meaning of the modifier 'teleological' in this context. Please spell it out. What does it mean to say that truth and desirability are teleological? Why is truth teleological? This strikes me as metaphysical, or even mystical, claptrap.

[Leontiskos]

Leontiskos

Thanks for your substantial post, Gertie. (I missed it for awhile because I didn't receive a notification that someone had replied to me. I think you have to include my name in the quote function in order for the notifications to trigger)

Just to forewarn you, I am about to disagree with much of what you say, and it may be based in some fundamental disagreements (e.g. I am not a Kantian).

Is this ''the relevant ought sense'' tho? Or is it simply a linguistic blurring of 'ought'', which here means would be expected, barring error, to similarly accurately perceive reality?

No, I believe it is the relevant sense of "ought." Let me just give a quick overview of what I am claiming, which might clear some things up.

So when the brother ("Peter") claims that the fruit on the table is a tangerine, that claim is already normative before any counter-claim or introduction of error occurs. That is, it is already an "ought" claim. This is because the speaker is claiming that all rational minds ought to recognize the fruit as a tangerine (supposing they know what "tangerine" means and they have also perceived the fruit).

Lets say it's an apple and orange instead, then the inaccuracy is clearer.

Feel free to use "apple" and "orange" instead if you would like. I am going to continue with "tangerine" and "clementine," as those were chosen intentionally and I prefer them. My purpose is not to highlight the inaccuracy, but rather to highlight the "ought"-claims.

The sister has made an inaccurate classification based on some fault in observation, or misuse of our shared language which the brother is using.

Well someone made an error, but I didn't give any indication of who it was.

You can say we ought not make such observational errors or we ought to use our shared language accurately to avoid miscommunication, but the purpose behind that is to maintain the useful consistency of our shared objective model of the world.

Those two normative claims are surely true, but they are different from the original claim that occurred even before the counter-claim was introduced.

When the brother says, "This is a tangerine," he is also saying, "My statement is true (for everyone)." "Objective truth" is redundant, as Peter pointed out. The claim places a burden on all rational minds to see it the same way. That's why when the sister contradicts him friction will arise, because the "ought"-claims are conflicting. Each believes the other ought to--at the very least--use a different word to describe the fruit.

And our shared objective model of the world is ultimately inter-subjective, because it's based in our shared way of experiencing the world - that is the consistency underlying the distinctions between apples and oranges, physics, everything. We linguistically compare notes of our experience of the world in order to create this shared 'objective' model, and label and categorise as seems appropriate. If I'm doing this inaccurately, say I'm high or delusional or colour blind, my experience won't tally with others. But we have a repeatable, testable model for checking such errors against in our shared world model, which we are so confident in we call it objective.

I haven't interacted with non-realists in some time, and I am trying to avoid rabbit holes at this stage of our conversation. I certainly understand what you are saying. It seems like you're not sure whether the claim about the tangerine is objective or not. You put "objective" in square quotes, and your last 10 words seem to imply that you believe it is only pseudo-objective (based on intersubjective agreement). Is that accurate? This will presumably relate to Peter's position as well, so I'm glad you are presenting this difficulty with objectivity.

Is the same thing going on when two people disagree about say capital punishment? Can we observe and measure an opinion about the rightness of capital punishment to see if it is accurate in that way in order to spot an error in the opinion? No. We can observe the act of capital punishment and inter-subjectively agree on what we see as a feature of our world model. But to conform with your example the error would be in the observation or categorisation, for example someone might observe someone being hanged as a terrible accident or something.

So I think the claim about the tangerine and the claim about capital punishment are qualitatively the same. In both cases we are making a claim that we consider to be objective and normative on all rational minds. We have reasons to justify our claim, and we think rational minds ought to accede to our reasons. Or to use my language from above, anyone who understands the predication ought to agree. That is, anyone who understands what "capital punishment" is and what "wrong" is will agree, just as anyone who understands what "tangerine" is ought to agree that the fruit on the table is a tangerine.

I am curious: why do you believe a disagreement about capital punishment is qualitatively different from a disagreement about a fruit? You used the same method, "Observe the act [...] and inter-subjectively agree on what we see..." It seems like you think the capital punishment question is non-objective, but you also think the fruit question is only "objective" or "called objective." Seems pretty similar to me.

I would say that the difference is a matter of degree. The truth about capital punishment is simply more obscure than the truth about the tangerine, so fewer people are able to recognize it. But just because fewer people recognize a truth does not make it non-objective. Or to use your language, the claim about capital punishment enjoys less intersubjective agreement than the claim about the tangerine, so it is less "objective."

I would say that according to our contemporary lexicon facts, opinions, and values are all separated by degree rather than kind/quality. (Of course, someone could employ a "value" or a "moral claim" in a merely subjective way. For example, someone might claim that they find capital punishment abhorrent or distasteful without intending to make an objective claim; without intending to make an "ought" claim. People seem to do this on some occasions.)

That's not the same thing as someone believing capital punishment is morally wrong in principle. That belief isn't objectively accurate or inaccurate, in that it can't be falsified in the same way by observation and measurement within the context of our shared objective world model.

To say that it can't be falsified in the same way, or as easily, is (on my view) just to say that it is more obscure. For example, the claim that the Earth is round is more obscure than the claim that a basketball is round, and for that reason it enjoys less intersubjective agreement. But this isn't a qualitative difference. It just means that it's easier to identify the shape of a basketball than it is to identify the shape of the Earth.

Anyway, I'll leave it to you to respond to my claim that capital punishment and tangerines aren't apples and oranges.

We know this difference without having to spell it out this way, which is why we have different words for fact and opinion. These are just tedious, obscuring weeds we need to clear away I think, in order to get to Is-Ought problem for morality.

I don't think there is any qualitative difference between fact and opinion. One merely enjoys more "intersubjective agreement." The opinions of yesterday are the facts of today, and the folly of tomorrow.

[Leontiskos]

Thanks. It may be that we're using terms differently. And you may have missed my explanation of the way I use them - which explains why you misrepresent my argument.

Great, thanks for these additions. To start, let me give premise (2) a name:

< IOF: It is fallacious to infer an "ought" from an "is" >

I agree with some of the points you give and disagree with some. For simplicity's sake I will just continue the argument I started by making use of the relevant points from your post. This basic argument is that your position precludes all objectivity, not merely moral objectivity. We can also begin to address IOF.

2 What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts - so that facts are a given. And this explains what we mean by the expressions 'objective opinion' and 'objective decision'. The modifiers 'objective' and 'factual' are near synonyms.

3 What we call facts are either features of reality that are or were the case - such as what we call objects - or descriptions of them that are true, given the way we use the signs (such as words) involved. And it's because features of reality may or may not be or have been the case that factual assertions are falsifiable.

Keeping things in line with Gertie's post, I would like you to present a principled way to distinguish facts from opinion (note that the term "objective opinion" is technically an oxymoron on your system, so perhaps that was a typo?).

What is an opinion? What is a fact? How do I tell the difference? Is there a qualitative difference?

7 If you have an example of a valid argument with a factual premise or premises that entail(s) an 'ought' conclusion, please provide it. Just one example will demolish my claim that this is deductively impossible. 'Derivation' is completely different from logical entailment, of course. CIN hasn't provided such an argument, in my opinion.

I am wary of presenting another argument against IOF, for it is foolish to argue against something which my interlocutor is not willing to defend. There is no point in arguing with a dogma. For example, in post #390223 I quoted some exchanges between you and CIN, where CIN presented an argument and you deflected by appealing to IOF itself (which is precisely what CIN was arguing against). For example:

4 The is/ought barrier is insuperable. An argument that pretends it isn't, or that the barrier doesn't exist, begs the question and is therefore fallacious.

This is a mighty declaration. Why would I present an argument that you already consider fallacious?

So I will be willing to present such arguments, but I need you to at least bring yourself to a position where you do not pre-judge such arguments on the basis of IOF, for it is not logically permissible to repel an argument with the very principle that argument is intended to falsify. That is begging the question. Indeed, I would prefer that you present some sort of rational justification for IOF. If that is not possible then you must at least consider IOF to be "superable," to use your word. If you aren't willing to do this, please tell me, for I do not want to waste my time arguing against dogmas.

Before I would present such arguments I would like you to at least spell out IOF in more detail, so that I know what you take it to be. What is an "is"? What is an "ought"? What are their general domains? What is the nature of the inference or "entailment" referred to in IOF? Tell me what exactly you mean by IOF, so that I can avoid strawmen.

8 I don't understand the meaning of the modifier 'teleological' in this context. Please spell it out. What does it mean to say that truth and desirability are teleological? Why is truth teleological? This strikes me as metaphysical, or even mystical, claptrap.

The basic idea here is that the human being is naturally ordered to truth and goodness, where goodness is more or less desirability. I think CIN succeeded with goodness (happiness), so I will probably end up beginning with truth instead. More on this later.

[Leontiskos]

(A number of separate and unconnected quotes:)

And there's the rub. We can't "scientifically determine" what promotes the physical and psychological well-being of a person, because what promotes well-being is different for each person.

The problem with this approach is that what counts as wellbeing, or what counts as a normative (in the sense of a goal-oriented, should/ought-to-achieve state), isn't objective. That all depends on preferences.

There is no obligation to pursue a goal, any more than there is an obligation to draw a figure with 3 sides. But if you don't, you won't have a triangle, or a goal (at least not the one you claimed).

The problem there is that while we can specify objective criteria that we're going to name "good (x)," those objective criteria do not have any normative weight to them, so it fails to capture an important connotation of "good." In other words, we can name any arbitrary objective range of states "good," but there's nothing in that that either (a) implies that anyone should attain those states, or (b) that anyone is going to prefer those states or that they should prefer them. So it misses a conventional connotative aspect of terms like "good."

Hello GE Morton and Terrapin Station. I really appreciate your contributions in this thread. I have a question for the two of you.

Surely you are right to say that generally speaking goals are chosen and are therefore not obligatory. "Instrumental"/Hypothetical "oughts" can be derived once we have a goal and a path to achieve that goal, but this leaves us short of objective morality since no goals are thought to be obligatory. So far so good.

What do you make of virtue ethics following Aquinas or Aristotle?* The idea is that we are naturally ordered to the end of happiness. Every act we carry out is based on a desire, and that desire is for happiness. We erect various goals in relation to this end of happiness, and we pursue those goals only insofar as we believe they are leading us towards happiness. If we abandon a goal it is ultimately because we have decided that it will not make us happy (or is not achievable, which amounts to the same). Everything we do is a means to happiness, for happiness is the end or ultimate goal which drives all of our acts. In this way you have a universal, objective morality that is based on the end/goal of happiness.


To GE Morton: It would be a contradiction to say, "He is a human being and he does not desire happiness."

To Terrapin Station: The kind of wellbeing that does not depend on individual preferences is happiness.


The most obvious objection is that happiness is just a vague term that collects all human desires, reifying them into a monolithic fulfillment. I don't have much time to elaborate tonight, and I want to hear your initial thoughts, but the basic response to this objection is given by Socrates in Plato's Republic where he claims that the hierarchy of the three kinds of pleasures--which correspond to the three parts of the soul--is determined by those who have a well-ordered soul and can therefore experience each kind of pleasure optimally. Aquinas gives a similar argument:

But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end.

The general idea is that a knowable, objective hierarchy exists which orders the nature of happiness. The hierarchy consists of various goods/desires which are a means to happiness, and it also involves conforming yourself in such a way that you are optimally disposed to happiness. Aristotle calls this disposition virtue. The virtuous man is the one who acts in the best possible way to achieve happiness, and thus also at least implicitly recognizes the hierarchy of goods/desires.

Thanks much,
Leontiskos


* See: Summa Theologica I-II.1 and Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1

[Peter Holmes]

Thanks. It may be that we're using terms differently. And you may have missed my explanation of the way I use them - which explains why you misrepresent my argument.

Great, thanks for these additions. To start, let me give premise (2) a name:

< IOF: It is fallacious to infer an "ought" from an "is" >

I agree with some of the points you give and disagree with some. For simplicity's sake I will just continue the argument I started by making use of the relevant points from your post. This basic argument is that your position precludes all objectivity, not merely moral objectivity. We can also begin to address IOF.

2 What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts - so that facts are a given. And this explains what we mean by the expressions 'objective opinion' and 'objective decision'. The modifiers 'objective' and 'factual' are near synonyms.

3 What we call facts are either features of reality that are or were the case - such as what we call objects - or descriptions of them that are true, given the way we use the signs (such as words) involved. And it's because features of reality may or may not be or have been the case that factual assertions are falsifiable.

Keeping things in line with Gertie's post, I would like you to present a principled way to distinguish facts from opinion (note that the term "objective opinion" is technically an oxymoron on your system, so perhaps that was a typo?).

No, it was deliberate. We can and do use the word objective to mean 'fact-based'. So an objective decision, judgement - or opinion - is one based on facts. The condition 'independent from opinion' means unbiased, impartial or disinterested.

What is an opinion? What is a fact? How do I tell the difference? Is there a qualitative difference?

Indeed there is. And words can mean only what we use them to mean. I refer you to my description of facts above. And I use standard dictionary definitions of the word opinion. In this context, I take opinions to be functionally the same as beliefs or judgements.

I think your claim that factual assertions are 'oughts', because they implicitly claim that others ought to accept their truth - is false. The condition 'given the way we use the words or other signs involved' does not imply that 'you' ought to use them that way.

7 If you have an example of a valid argument with a factual premise or premises that entail(s) an 'ought' conclusion, please provide it. Just one example will demolish my claim that this is deductively impossible. 'Derivation' is completely different from logical entailment, of course. CIN hasn't provided such an argument, in my opinion.

I am wary of presenting another argument against IOF, for it is foolish to argue against something which my interlocutor is not willing to defend. There is no point in arguing with a dogma. For example, in post #390223 I quoted some exchanges between you and CIN, where CIN presented an argument and you deflected by appealing to IOF itself (which is precisely what CIN was arguing against). For example:

4 The is/ought barrier is insuperable. An argument that pretends it isn't, or that the barrier doesn't exist, begs the question and is therefore fallacious.

This is a mighty declaration. Why would I present an argument that you already consider fallacious?

Because, with one valid and sound example, as requested, you would necessarily demolish my claim. So I repeat the request.

(I have defended my claim, and I think shown why it's true. It's to do with a very basic rules of deductive inference: a conclusion can't introduce new material. So if there's no reference to 'should', 'ought', or such ideas, in the premise or premises, then that premise or those premises don't justify a conclusion that does refer to them.)

So I will be willing to present such arguments, but I need you to at least bring yourself to a position where you do not pre-judge such arguments on the basis of IOF, for it is not logically permissible to repel an argument with the very principle that argument is intended to falsify. That is begging the question. Indeed, I would prefer that you present some sort of rational justification for IOF. If that is not possible then you must at least consider IOF to be "superable," to use your word. If you aren't willing to do this, please tell me, for I do not want to waste my time arguing against dogmas.

See the above. This is not a dogma, but rather a rule in classical logic. To repeat: all you have to do is produce an example demonstrating that a factual (is) premise entails a 'judgemental' (ought) conclusion. Thing is - I've asked this of, probably, hundreds of moral objectivists, none of whom have walked the walk. Perhaps you can.

Before I would present such arguments I would like you to at least spell out IOF in more detail, so that I know what you take it to be. What is an "is"? What is an "ought"? What are their general domains? What is the nature of the inference or "entailment" referred to in IOF? Tell me what exactly you mean by IOF, so that I can avoid strawmen.

But you must be familiar with these terms, in order to assert that the is/ought barrier is superable! And may I suggest you look up logical entailment, if you're unfamiliar with that.

8 I don't understand the meaning of the modifier 'teleological' in this context. Please spell it out. What does it mean to say that truth and desirability are teleological? Why is truth teleological? This strikes me as metaphysical, or even mystical, claptrap.

The basic idea here is that the human being is naturally ordered to truth and goodness, where goodness is more or less desirability. I think CIN succeeded with goodness (happiness), so I will probably end up beginning with truth instead. More on this later.

Sorry, but I think this is bunkum every which way. Are you religious?

[Terrapin Station]

What do you make of virtue ethics following Aquinas or Aristotle?* The idea is that we are naturally ordered to the end of happiness. Every act we carry out is based on a desire, and that desire is for happiness. We erect various goals in relation to this end of happiness, and we pursue those goals only insofar as we believe they are leading us towards happiness. If we abandon a goal it is ultimately because we have decided that it will not make us happy (or is not achievable, which amounts to the same). Everything we do is a means to happiness, for happiness is the end or ultimate goal which drives all of our acts. In this way you have a universal, objective morality that is based on the end/goal of happiness.

So first, I don't agree that that's actually universal. Brains are complex things and they can develop in all sorts of ways, including various ways that we'd classify as (sometimes serious) medical conditions.

But we can ignore that for a moment and assume that it's universal.

The problem is this: "subjective" doesn't mean (or imply) "not universal." And "objective" doesn't mean or imply "universal." So first, that something is universal doesn't amount to it being objective/not subjective--or in other words, finding something universal doesn't solve the problem at hand. We're still talking about personal and specifically mental phenomena, and not phenomena that are found in the world independently of persons/minds.

Secondly, we're either saying that it would be physically impossible for someone to be oriented towards something other than happiness (in which case, ignoring how we'd establish that it would be physical impossible, okay, but then we're just noting that everyone has the same subjective orientation), or we're saying that it just so happens to be contingently the case that everyone extant is oriented towards achieving happiness (again, where we're assuming that this is the case), but as something contingent, it wouldn't be impossible for someone to come along who isn't oriented towards achieving happiness. Well, let's say that 100 billion people have existed by the time the one very unusual person not oriented towards achieving happiness comes along--let's say that something very unusual happens with a genetic mutation with that person that causes their brain to develop so that they're not oriented towards achieving happiness. In that case, should that person orient themselves towards achieving happiness? Why? Just because everyone else is like that? Why should they orient themself to be just like every other person who has existed to that point?

Finally, what makes different people happy obviously differs, so even if we want something like a "everyone acting in concert with each other subjective morality where we're all oriented towards achieving happiness," there are still going to be a ton of conflicts, despite noting that we're all oriented towards achieving happiness.

In any event, it wouldn't make sense to say that anyone's desire for happiness, or what makes them happy, etc. isn't an individual thing. By saying that something is an individual thing, we're not saying that only ONE individual has it. We're saying that it's something that occurs in individuals and not elsewhere. So something that occurs in ALL individuals, but that's a property of one as an individual is still an individual thing.

The general idea is that a knowable, objective hierarchy exists which orders the nature of happiness.

How would this be anything more than projection? It's simply projecting the way one thinks about it as if it's "in the world at large." It isn't. (Otherwise, where is it, etc.)

[Leontiskos]

Thanks for your reply, Terrapin Station. I am going to try to keep this reply relatively short, but unfortunately that means it will also be dense.

So first, I don't agree that that's actually universal. Brains are complex things and they can develop in all sorts of ways, including various ways that we'd classify as (sometimes serious) medical conditions.

But we can ignore that for a moment and assume that it's universal.

Okay. I'm not sure I agree that the desire for happiness is the consequence of a contingent state of the brain, but I do agree that we can assume it is universal. If you like, we can assume that we are talking about a healthy human being and not someone who is, say, catatonic.

The problem is this: "subjective" doesn't mean (or imply) "not universal." And "objective" doesn't mean or imply "universal." So first, that something is universal doesn't amount to it being objective/not subjective--or in other words, finding something universal doesn't solve the problem at hand. We're still talking about personal and specifically mental phenomena, and not phenomena that are found in the world independently of persons/minds.

Without trying to address all of the details here, I would say that it does solve the problem at hand. When we talk about an objective morality we are talking about a morality that is normative for all rational beings, and which cannot be altered by their will. When we talk about an objective morality we are not talking about a morality that would exist as an object even if no persons/minds existed. This is because morality is a law that governs persons. Surely if there are no persons then there is no morality, for there would be nothing for the law to govern. Thus all attempts at objective morality presuppose persons (e.g. virtue ethics, consequentialism, deontology). Rocks, plants, and animals don't need to concern themselves with morality.

As to your semantic point about the word, "objective," a necessary--or "universal"--property of a class of entities is objectively predicated of that class. "All dolphins are mammals," is an objective statement. If morality governs persons, then a necessary property of persons could ground an objective morality. For example, "All persons seek happiness." Your argument is apparently as follows: "Objective" means mind-independent; happiness is found only within minds; therefore happiness is not objective. The ambiguity attaches to the term "mind-independent." I would contend that the term does not mean, "Able to exist independent of minds." Instead it means, "Unable to be influenced by minds." If we accept the latter meaning, then necessary properties of minds, such as happiness, are objective. That is, they are objectively predicated of the entire class of persons/minds and this cannot be altered by minds. This is just the sort of thing that has the potential to solve the problem at hand.

Secondly, we're either saying that it would be physically impossible for someone to be oriented towards something other than happiness (in which case, ignoring how we'd establish that it would be physical impossible, okay, but then we're just noting that everyone has the same subjective orientation)...

After reading the above you probably already know that this is what I am saying. This is how virtue ethicists understand happiness. We don't have any choice but to pursue happiness.

Finally, what makes different people happy obviously differs, so even if we want something like a "everyone acting in concert with each other subjective morality where we're all oriented towards achieving happiness," there are still going to be a ton of conflicts, despite noting that we're all oriented towards achieving happiness.

Yes, this was the objection I gave in my first post to you, and I briefly tried to address it there.

In any event, it wouldn't make sense to say that anyone's desire for happiness, or what makes them happy, etc. isn't an individual thing. By saying that something is an individual thing, we're not saying that only ONE individual has it. We're saying that it's something that occurs in individuals and not elsewhere. So something that occurs in ALL individuals, but that's a property of one as an individual is still an individual thing.

Right, and it is crucial that morality should be based on a property possessed by individuals, else it couldn't apply to individuals.

The general idea is that a knowable, objective hierarchy exists which orders the nature of happiness.

How would this be anything more than projection? It's simply projecting the way one thinks about it as if it's "in the world at large." It isn't. (Otherwise, where is it, etc.)

I think this is addressed above. If not, feel free to rephrase.

Best,
Leontiskos

[Terrapin Station]

Without trying to address all of the details here, I would say that it does solve the problem at hand. When we talk about an objective morality we are talking about a morality that is normative for all rational beings, and which cannot be altered by their will.

I explained why this doesn't work in my post.

The issue in a nutshell is this:

Joe comes along, where Joe is quite unusual for whatever reasons. On moral issue m, Joe feels, and so has behaved, not-m, whereas everyone else feels and behaves m. If we want to be able to say that Joe should feel and behave differently than he does (or has), that Joe should feel or at least behave m, that Joe is somehow incorrect for feeling or behaving not-m, then we need to be able to justify that. "Every other single person alive or who has ever lived felt and behaved m" wouldn't do it. Because why should Joe feel or behave m just because everyone else does/ever did? Joe doesn't feel the same way as everyone else. Why should he?

Or, more broadly, normatives, with any sort of connotation of should/ought to them--which normatives in a philosophical sense, at least, are supposed to have--aren't supportable, certainly not in an objective sense. Suggesting that people should think, behave, etc. the same as others simply because others feel or behave however they do is the argumentum ad populum fallacy.

[Gertie]

Leontiskos

Thanks for your substantial post, Gertie. (I missed it for awhile because I didn't receive a notification that someone had replied to me. I think you have to include my name in the quote function in order for the notifications to trigger)

Just to forewarn you, I am about to disagree with much of what you say, and it may be based in some fundamental disagreements (e.g. I am not a Kantian).

Gertie wrote: ↑July 23rd, 2021, 6:09 amIs this ''the relevant ought sense'' tho? Or is it simply a linguistic blurring of 'ought'', which here means would be expected, barring error, to similarly accurately perceive reality?

No, I believe it is the relevant sense of "ought." Let me just give a quick overview of what I am claiming, which might clear some things up.

So when the brother ("Peter") claims that the fruit on the table is a tangerine, that claim is already normative before any counter-claim or introduction of error occurs. That is, it is already an "ought" claim. This is because the speaker is claiming that all rational minds ought to recognize the fruit as a tangerine (supposing they know what "tangerine" means and they have also perceived the fruit).

Gertie wrote: ↑July 23rd, 2021, 6:09 amLets say it's an apple and orange instead, then the inaccuracy is clearer.

Feel free to use "apple" and "orange" instead if you would like. I am going to continue with "tangerine" and "clementine," as those were chosen intentionally and I prefer them. My purpose is not to highlight the inaccuracy, but rather to highlight the "ought"-claims.

Gertie wrote: ↑July 23rd, 2021, 6:09 amThe sister has made an inaccurate classification based on some fault in observation, or misuse of our shared language which the brother is using.

Well someone made an error, but I didn't give any indication of who it was.

Gertie wrote: ↑July 23rd, 2021, 6:09 amYou can say we ought not make such observational errors or we ought to use our shared language accurately to avoid miscommunication, but the purpose behind that is to maintain the useful consistency of our shared objective model of the world.

Those two normative claims are surely true, but they are different from the original claim that occurred even before the counter-claim was introduced.

When the brother says, "This is a tangerine," he is also saying, "My statement is true (for everyone)." "Objective truth" is redundant, as Peter pointed out. The claim places a burden on all rational minds to see it the same way. That's why when the sister contradicts him friction will arise, because the "ought"-claims are conflicting. Each believes the other ought to--at the very least--use a different word to describe the fruit.

Sorry I still don't get it. There is a fact of the matter (per our inter-subjectively established model of the world), whereby a specific fruit is a tangerine or not. And normally functioning people will generally agree about whether that specific fruit meets the agreed criteria for being a tangerine. Sometimes it's hard to be sure, sometimes a mistake in identification happens. Just because someone says out loud ''That is a tangerine'' doesn't introduce some burden of ought as far as I can see (except along the lines I already mentioned). I'm not seeing where the oughtness lies in this scenario and what it's based in. I can guess some more but it would be helpful if you can clarify further?

Gertie wrote: ↑ July 23rd, 2021, 6:09 am And our shared objective model of the world is ultimately inter-subjective, because it's based in our shared way of experiencing the world - that is the consistency underlying the distinctions between apples and oranges, physics, everything. We linguistically…

I haven't interacted with non-realists in some time, and I am trying to avoid rabbit holes at this stage of our conversation. I certainly understand what you are saying. It seems like you're not sure whether the claim about the tangerine is objective or not. You put "objective" in square quotes, and your last 10 words seem to imply that you believe it is only pseudo-objective (based on intersubjective agreement). Is that accurate? This will presumably relate to Peter's position as well, so I'm glad you are presenting this difficulty with objectivity.

I'm saying that our shared experience-based model of the world where we share notes and agree eg that tangerines exist and categorise them, is inter-subjective. We then treat the physical observable and measurable aspects of this working model as true, as factual and falsifiable. Until we hit a problem and have to adjust the model, or our own misunderstanding of it (as in your scenario). It applies to all of us. Hopefully that's clearer. Are you disagreeing? If so, we do have a deeper issue.

Gertie wrote: ↑ July 23rd, 2021, 6:09 am Is the same thing going on when two people disagree about say capital punishment? Can we observe and measure an opinion about the rightness of capital punishment to see if it is accurate in that way in order to spot an error in the opinion? No. We can observe…

So I think the claim about the tangerine and the claim about capital punishment are qualitatively the same. In both cases we are making a claim that we consider to be objective and normative on all rational minds. We have reasons to justify our claim, and we think rational minds ought to accede to our reasons. Or to use my language from above, anyone who understands the predication ought to agree. That is, anyone who understands what "capital punishment" is and what "wrong" is will agree, just as anyone who understands what "tangerine" is ought to agree that the fruit on the table is a tangerine.

The tangerine is a physical feature of our shared physical model of the world which we treat as objectively correct and have agreed ways of checking for accuracy via observation and measurement. This is the realm of shared public knowledge about facts of the world we can all access. If I call a tangerine an apple or lamp post or clementine or symphony, I can be shown why I'm mistaken. I'm saying this is the appropriate context for thinking about 'right' and 'wrong' here in terms of accuracy - whether I have correctly identified the tangerine, or I've made an error. You can say rational people 'ought' not make such an error, but as I said before, that's a different type of ought, using the term to mean ''would be expected not to make this error in observation or categorisation''.

I am curious: why do you believe a disagreement about capital punishment is qualitatively different from a disagreement about a fruit? You used the same method, "Observe the act [...] and inter-subjectively agree on what we see..." It seems like you think the capital punishment question is non-objective, but you also think the fruit question is only "objective" or "called objective." Seems pretty similar to me.

I think we just have to accept that what we treat as objective is actually rooted in inter-subjective agreement. But the key thing is we can point to what we agree to call objective facts about the world and compare notes. They are 'out there', observable and measurable by us both, and our observations and measurements will tally unless we make an error. That is the realm we treat as objective. The realm of publically accessible knowledge we share. Where tangerines exist and have specific observable, measurable characteristics.

But subjective experience itself is not 'out there' to be pointed at, it's not public/shared, observable, measurable in that way. It is private, and qualiative. So while I can point to the hanging and ask you if you see the hanging too, to check I'm not factually mistaken, I can't point to my opinion that hanging is wrong for you to check in that way. If we compare notes on our opinion about capital punishment, there is nothing to point to 'out there' which is falsifiable in the public/shared way that pointing to the physical event of the hanging is. When I say hanging is morally wrong, I'm not talking about an objectively, publically, observable, falsifiable error in observation or categorisation.


Moral judgements only exist as expressions of the private mental experience of Subjects. Not as publically falsifiable facts.

I would say that the difference is a matter of degree. The truth about capital punishment is simply more obscure than the truth about the tangerine, so fewer people are able to recognize it. But just because fewer people recognize a truth does not make it non-objective. Or to use your language, the claim about capital punishment enjoys less intersubjective agreement than the claim about the tangerine, so it is less "objective."

Hopefully I've clarified why I disagree. What is your foundation and methodology for establishing the moral truth about hanging? Maybe you could walk me through the example of capital punishment.

I would say that according to our contemporary lexicon facts, opinions, and values are all separated by degree rather than kind/quality. (Of course, someone could employ a "value" or a "moral claim" in a merely subjective way. For example, someone might claim that they find capital punishment abhorrent or distasteful without intending to make an objective claim; without intending to make an "ought" claim. People seem to do this on some occasions.)

I think we have to think through what the lexicon represents. I make the distinction, as outlined above, between facts about the world which are observable and measurable and agreed via sharing notes on our private subjective experience vs the private qualiative subjective experience itself. The first category we call objective, the latter subjective. If a mental experience can't be checked in that public/shared way, it is still real, but it doesn't have that public authoriative stamp of objective agreement between us. When it comes to opinions, feeling of disapproval, values, a sense of guilt or moral obligation these are real, but ours might be the opposite. Like I might love chocolate ice cream and you might hate it.

Gertie wrote: ↑ July 23rd, 2021, 6:09 am That's not the same thing as someone believing capital punishment is morally wrong in principle. That belief isn't objectively accurate or inaccurate, in that it can't be falsified in the same way by observation and measurement within the context of our share…

To say that it can't be falsified in the same way, or as easily, is (on my view) just to say that it is more obscure. For example, the claim that the Earth is round is more obscure than the claim that a basketball is round, and for that reason it enjoys less intersubjective agreement. But this isn't a qualitative difference. It just means that it's easier to identify the shape of a basketball than it is to identify the shape of the Earth.

The shape of the earth is simply harder to observe and measure. But if we get our maths right, or we're both in a space rocket and observe the shape, we can agree. We can't observe or measure the correct opinion about hanging tho. The Truth Isn't Out There.

Gertie wrote: ↑July 23rd, 2021, 6:09 amWe know this difference without having to spell it out this way, which is why we have different words for fact and opinion. These are just tedious, obscuring weeds we need to clear away I think, in order to get to Is-Ought problem for morality.

I don't think there is any qualitative difference between fact and opinion. One merely enjoys more "intersubjective agreement." The opinions of yesterday are the facts of today, and the folly of tomorrow.

Again, this misses the distinction I make between observable/measurable/objective vs private/qualiative/subjective which I believe underlies a real distinction with consequences. One consequence being, moral judgements are by their nature are not accessible to public/shared verification. We might disagrees over the use of terminology, but the distinction is real.

I'm guessing you believe reason can bridge this gap, but to do so I think your first problem is to provide an objective moral foundation to reason your way from. If you're not hiding God up your sleeve, that's a tough one imo.

[Terrapin Station]

I wasn't following everything but re whether something is a tangerine (a la literally calling it by that name), there's a convention about what counts as a tangerine, but it's not objectively correct that a particular fruit is a tangerine and not something else (again, per calling it by that name). If someone wants to call that a grapefruit instead, they're not saying something objectively wrong. They're just saying something unusual. If you want other people to understand what you're talking about, there's utility in following conventions, but you don't have to care, you can try to change the conventions, etc.--you can take all sorts of other tracks, and you're not somehow incorrect for doing so.

[Terrapin Station]

The notion that it's correct to conform to anything that other people are doing, simply because that's what they're doing, and somehow incorrect not to conform to them is completely absurd, and it's been the source of a large amount of undesirable crap and significant problems--including things like wars--throughout history.

[Leontiskos]

Without trying to address all of the details here, I would say that it does solve the problem at hand. When we talk about an objective morality we are talking about a morality that is normative for all rational beings, and which cannot be altered by their will.

I explained why this doesn't work in my post.

The issue in a nutshell is this:

Joe comes along, where Joe is quite unusual for whatever reasons. On moral issue m, Joe feels, and so has behaved, not-m, whereas everyone else feels and behaves m. If we want to be able to say that Joe should feel and behave differently than he does (or has), that Joe should feel or at least behave m, that Joe is somehow incorrect for feeling or behaving not-m, then we need to be able to justify that. "Every other single person alive or who has ever lived felt and behaved m" wouldn't do it. Because why should Joe feel or behave m just because everyone else does/ever did? Joe doesn't feel the same way as everyone else. Why should he?

In your last post you said that it is either impossible or improbable for someone to be oriented towards something other than happiness. I affirmed that it is impossible. That is what a necessary property of persons means. Here you are mistaken in thinking that I believe it is improbable.

Indeed, this is the same assumption you accepted at the beginning of your last post. You said you don't think it is universal but you will assume that for the sake of discussion. I said I think it is universal, but that I too am happy to move forward on the assumption.

Maybe you want to abandon that assumption and challenge the idea that happiness is a universal, necessary property that belongs to all human beings by their very nature? Feel free to proceed in that way if you'd like, but don't assume that the desire for happiness is merely improbable. It should be clear from my last post that I don't accept that assumption.

Or, more broadly, normatives, with any sort of connotation of should/ought to them--which normatives in a philosophical sense, at least, are supposed to have--aren't supportable, certainly not in an objective sense. Suggesting that people should think, behave, etc. the same as others simply because others feel or behave however they do is the argumentum ad populum fallacy.

But I have not argued that someone ought to think or behave in a certain way simply because others think or behave in that way. Nowhere have I given such an argument.