Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[NickGaspar]

Reading your posts in this thread reminded me Mario Bunge's excellent points on the on going crisis in Philosophy.
He boiled the problem down to 10 main criticisms:

1.Tenure-Chasing Supplants Substantive Contributions
2.Confusion between Philosophizing & Chronicling
3.Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility
4.Obsession with Language vs. Solving Real-World Problems
5.Idealism vs. Realism and Reductionism
6.Too Many Miniproblems & Fashionable Academic Games
7.Poor Enforcement of Validity / Methodology
8.Unsystematic (vs. System Building & Worldview Coherent)
9.Detachment from Intellectual Engines of Modern Civilization
10. Ivory Tower Syndrome

One can easily identify in this thread people's Obsession with language (fancy terms that say nothing),Chronicling, poor enforcement of Validity or Soundness,the use of epistemically failed idealistic /magical principles and Total ignorance of the latest scientific epistemology (Ivory tower Syndrome).
All those characteristics turn this "intellectual endeavor" to a sad pseudo philosophical process.

https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Crisi ... 1573928437

[Consul]

My basic ontological argument against ontological emergence (which was originally devised by John Heil):

Imagine a simple (noncomposite) property Z and two distinct simple (noncomposite) material objects x and y. If Z is emergent, then it isn't had by x alone or by y alone, but by x+y collectively: Z(x+y).
Where is Z? It is neither wholly in x nor wholly in y, since it would then be a non-emergent property of x alone or y alone; and it is neither partly in x nor partly in y, since it doesn't have any spatially separable parts that can be at different places (where x is and where y is). If Z is neither wholly nor partly in x, and neither wholly nor partly in y, then it is neither wholly nor partly in x+y either, which means it isn't in x+y at all, in which case Z isn't an emergent property of x+y. There is no place for Z to be as an emergent property; and if there isn't, there can be no such emergent property as Z. This example can be generalized to any number >2 of objects said to collectively have some simple emergent property, so it's a general argument against the possibility of ontologically emergent properties.

Footnote: My argument presupposes Aristotelian immanentism about properties—as opposed to Platonic transcendentalism, according to which properties instantiated by objects in space aren't themselves anywhere in space.

Your basic ontological argument against ontological emergence collapse by a simple direct observation.
Take atoms H and O two highly combustible gas-elements,let them bind in a common molecule (H2O) and a. see what happened to their previous properties b. identify their new properties
Then try learning about ALL the amazing properties of water that can't be explained by looking at its constituent parts.(liquidity, fire extinguishing properties, reversed expanding properties , surface tension etc etc etc .)
This is what matter is does....this is what is capable of. Emergence is an essential quality of matter.

All the above " x y z " and 2000 years old philosophical failed views etc is a pseudo philosophical attempt to avoid looking directly to the facts of reality. of course ...this is only my opinion, which is supported by objective observations...

You haven't addressed my argument, you have just ignored it!
Do you have any ontologically plausible explanation of how two different simple things can collectively have one emergent simple property—i.e. one which is not reductively identifiable with a sum of properties of or/and relations between the two simple things?

Antiemergentists do not deny that there are predicates which are true of systems but not of their elements (taken individually), or that there are concepts under which complexes fall but not their components (taken individually).

The ontological question is what makes such true "holistic" predications true?
Properties of complex (composite/compound) objects, substances, or materials?
Yes, but antiemergentists argue that all properties of (mereologically) nonsimple objects, substances, or materials are complex or structural properties rather than emergent simple properties. All properties of complexes or structures such as water molecules aren't simple but complex or structural ones that are ontologically reducible to properties or/and relations between the basic constituents of complexes or structures.
All physical or chemical properties of masses of water can be reductively explained in terms of the properties of and the (spatial and causal/interactional) relations between the elementary particles of which water is composed.

[Consul]

All the above " x y z " and 2000 years old philosophical failed views etc is a pseudo philosophical attempt to avoid looking directly to the facts of reality. of course ...this is only my opinion, which is supported by objective observations...

Ontological categories and theories cannot simply be read off from observational data!
If you believe the occurrence of ontological emergence ("strong emergence") in nature is an empirically well-confirmed, established scientific fact, you're wrong!

[Consul]

My basic ontological argument against ontological emergence (which was originally devised by John Heil):

Imagine a simple (noncomposite) property Z and two distinct simple (noncomposite) material objects x and y. If Z is emergent, then it isn't had by x alone or by y alone, but by x+y collectively: Z(x+y).
Where is Z? It is neither wholly in x nor wholly in y, since it would then be a non-emergent property of x alone or y alone; and it is neither partly in x nor partly in y, since it doesn't have any spatially separable parts that can be at different places (where x is and where y is). If Z is neither wholly nor partly in x, and neither wholly nor partly in y, then it is neither wholly nor partly in x+y either, which means it isn't in x+y at all, in which case Z isn't an emergent property of x+y. There is no place for Z to be as an emergent property; and if there isn't, there can be no such emergent property as Z. This example can be generalized to any number >2 of objects said to collectively have some simple emergent property, so it's a general argument against the possibility of ontologically emergent properties.

Footnote: My argument presupposes Aristotelian immanentism about properties—as opposed to Platonic transcendentalism, according to which properties instantiated by objects in space aren't themselves anywhere in space.

Consider the following figure: There are two simple things, a and b, a relation R between a and b, and two simple properties, F and G: a has/is F, and b has/is G. Now let there also be a simple emergent property H of a+b (such that H ≠ F, H ≠ G, H≠ R, H ≠ F+G, H ≠ F+G+R): Where is H, and what has H?



QUOTE>
"Suppose that in a complex whole there are two properties, occurring simultaneously, which are linked by nomological necessity. Note that the principle of reducibility does not, so far, require a logical connection between these two properties. The connection between the two properties can be as opaque, conceptually speaking, as you please. However, if one of the two properties is said to be a property of the system as a whole, the principle poses a question: what exactly is it that has the property? By hypothesis, the whole simply is 'in the strict sense, a system of objects'; there is no whole 'over and above' the parts of which it is composed. So whatever nonrelational properties the whole has must consist of properties of, and relations between, the parts; there simply is nothing else of which they could consist. If a property of the whole is not logically grounded in the properties of the parts, then it is 'floating in mid-air', unattached to any real individual—but this is unintelligible."

(Hasker, William. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. p. 138)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

QUOTE>
"…By hypothesis, the whole simply is 'in the strict sense, a system of objects'; there is no whole 'over and above' the parts of which it is composed. So whatever nonrelational properties the whole has must consist of properties of, and relations between, the parts; there simply is nothing else of which they could consist. If a property of the whole is not logically grounded in the properties of the parts, then it is 'floating in mid-air', unattached to any real individual—but this is unintelligible."

(Hasker, William. The Emergent Self. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. p. 138)
<QUOTE

Properties are ways things are, and a way a thing is is part of it; so a (real/natural) property is where the thing is whose property it is. Properties aren't independent entities. They cannot exist without adhering to or inhering in something; but there is nothing an emergent simple property can adhere to or inhere in, so there cannot be any emergent simple properties of nonsimple objects/substances. If emergence is ontologically impossible, I know a priori that it doesn't occur anwhere in nature.

By the way, there is a relevant distinction between emergence and resultance. To say that emergent simple properties of nonsimple things are ontologically impossible is not to say that resultant nonsimple properties of nonsimple things are impossible. Resultant properties of wholes are so called because they result from a (mereological) summation or fusion of properties of or/and relations between their basic parts. For example, the mass of a nonsimple object is resultant rather than emergent, because it is identical to the sum of the masses of its basic, simple parts. All resultant properties of wholes are complex or structural properties that are ontologically reducible to properties of or/and relations between the wholes' basic, simple parts.

[Consul]

Reading your posts in this thread reminded me Mario Bunge's excellent points on the on going crisis in Philosophy.
He boiled the problem down to 10 main criticisms:

1.Tenure-Chasing Supplants Substantive Contributions

We find that in science departments too!

2.Confusion between Philosophizing & Chronicling

Is this the difference between doing philosophy and doing history of philosophy?

3.Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility

This is true of many philosophers and philosophies, but it's false of many other philosophers and philosophies.

4.Obsession with Language vs. Solving Real-World Problems

Conceptual analysis and conceptual clarification are very important, but the days when metaphysics was reduced to metalinguistics are long over. The primary subject matter of contemporary metaphysics is the real world itself and not our linguistic representations of it.

5.Idealism vs. Realism and Reductionism

What's the problem here?

6.Too Many Miniproblems & Fashionable Academic Games

Science has a lot of "miniproblems" too!
Yes, fashion plays a role in philosophy, so philosophers ought to be self-critical with regard to the danger of irrational motives for accepting or rejecting a philosophical theory. As David Armstrong says, "once fashion comes in, objectivity goes."

7.Poor Enforcement of Validity / Methodology

That's due to the nature of philosophy, because "philosophy lacks the wonderful decision procedures that are present in logic and mathematics (proofs) and the natural sciences (observation and experiment, together with mathematics). Unfortunately there seems to be no remedy for this situation, and those who thought there is a remedy, such as the logical positivists, learnt bitter lessons."

(Armstrong, D. M. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. ix)

So what? Does this mean we should stop doing philosophy, especially metaphysics and ontology? No, I don't think so!

"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars

"One of the ways in which a metaphysician can help a nonmetaphysician is to protect him from bad metaphysics."

(Chisholm, Roderick M. On Metaphysics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. p. 51)

8.Unsystematic (vs. System Building & Worldview Coherent)

Well, there are both systematic philosophies and unsystematic ones. In my understanding, "philosophy…has to do not only with unravelling conceptual muddles but also with the tentative adumbration of a world view." (Jack Smart)

9.Detachment from Intellectual Engines of Modern Civilization

Are you talking about detachment from science and technology?
Again, this is true of some philosophers and philosophers, but false of others—especially of contemporary naturalistic philosophers and philosophies.

10. Ivory Tower Syndrome

Once again, this is an overgeneral statement that is false of many contemporay philosophers and philosophies.

[NickGaspar]

You haven't addressed my argument, you have just ignored it!

-You maybe right......but I think points 3 and 4 of my next post address the actual value of metaphysical arguments that can be falsified.(premises with unknown truth value unable to be tested).
(3.Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility
4.Obsession with Language vs. Solving Real-World Problems )

Do you have any ontologically plausible explanation of how two different simple things can collectively have one emergent simple property—i.e. one which is not reductively identifiable with a sum of properties of or/and relations between the two simple things?

-Well emergence addresses just that. Two simple things can collectively spark the emergence of a property that isn't reducible to any of the lower level mechanisms of this simple system.
I just provided the excellent example of H2O and how 3 atoms can produce a new substances with properties that can't be tracked back to its constituent parts or their properties.
In short, emergence is a real world observable phenomenon that displays empirical regularity and can be observed, predicted and quantified.

Antiemergentists do not deny that there are predicates which are true of systems but not of their elements (taken individually), or that there are concepts under which complexes fall but not their components (taken individually).

-First of all I have to ask.... What is an "antiemergentist"?...someone who denies objective observations of reality? So why should we bring "antiemergentist" in a scientific-philosophical discussions? Should we also allow flat earthers, stork theorists, antivaccinists, holocaust deniers, cold sun believers to bring their opinions without objective evidence in any of the respective scientific fields?
Its a fact of nature that matter's complex structures allow the emergence of advanced properties when structure and functions (conditions) allow it. Its an empirically regular phenomenon fully observable, predictable and quantifiable.
Why we should even take such objections seriously when they have not met their burden?

The ontological question is what makes such true "holistic" predications true?Properties of complex (composite/compound) objects, substances, or materials?

- I don't know what a "holistic predication" is. What I know is that we directly observe the realization or existence of substances and their properties.
This is what limits any meaningful ontological speculation. Making up dimensions and complex entities and mechanism beyond our observations in our attempt to explain what appears mysterious to us...that is not philosophy any more...that is theology. Ontology is metaphysics on how things and phenomena that we observe come to existence or realization.....not to make invisible entities.

Yes, but antiemergentists argue that all properties of (mereologically) nonsimple objects, substances, or materials are complex or structural properties rather than emergent simple properties.

-You will need to explain why we should listen to their "arguments". Does their ideas have any epistemic or instrumental value, any objective foundation...and I am not sure that this is indeed their argument.
From what I have heard all these years, their argument is a really old one...which I label "Argument from imaginary Substances."
Most of them believe that Advanced properties in nature are the "product" of invisible substances,agents, energies, forces etc that, conveniently enough share the same properties observed at the phenomenon in question. (i.e. Combustion was caused by phlogistion/ we now know its a chemical process. Consciousness is caused by a magical mental substances or energy or whatever/ we now know its a biological process).

All properties of complexes or structures such as water molecules aren't simple but complex or structural ones that are ontologically reducible to properties or/and relations between the basic constituents of complexes or structures.
All physical or chemical properties of masses of water can be reductively explained in terms of the properties of and the (spatial and causal/interactional) relations between the elementary particles of which water is composed.

-That is a really general and vague claim since it depends on how one looks or accepts a reductive explanation. Magical thinkers(or antiemergentists ) will always insert a pseudo "why" question (why two combustive elements can produce a substance with fire extinguishing properties or why mindless matter can produce mind properties) and promote it as a serious one. In the case of the mind they will deny the data on the structure and function based on the "exotic feeling" of the mind while in the case of the water they will accept the explanation without a second thought.

The answer at the question "why matter is capable of producing so advanced and diverse properties"is...... this is what matter is capable of.
If it wasn't ...then we wouldn't exist. If we existence...then that would be a good mystery to solve.

[NickGaspar]

Reading your posts in this thread reminded me Mario Bunge's excellent points on the on going crisis in Philosophy.
He boiled the problem down to 10 main criticisms:

1.Tenure-Chasing Supplants Substantive Contributions

We find that in science departments too!

2.Confusion between Philosophizing & Chronicling

Is this the difference between doing philosophy and doing history of philosophy?

3.Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility

This is true of many philosophers and philosophies, but it's false of many other philosophers and philosophies.

4.Obsession with Language vs. Solving Real-World Problems

Conceptual analysis and conceptual clarification are very important, but the days when metaphysics was reduced to metalinguistics are long over. The primary subject matter of contemporary metaphysics is the real world itself and not our linguistic representations of it.

5.Idealism vs. Realism and Reductionism

What's the problem here?

6.Too Many Miniproblems & Fashionable Academic Games

Science has a lot of "miniproblems" too!
Yes, fashion plays a role in philosophy, so philosophers ought to be self-critical with regard to the danger of irrational motives for accepting or rejecting a philosophical theory. As David Armstrong says, "once fashion comes in, objectivity goes."

7.Poor Enforcement of Validity / Methodology

That's due to the nature of philosophy, because "philosophy lacks the wonderful decision procedures that are present in logic and mathematics (proofs) and the natural sciences (observation and experiment, together with mathematics). Unfortunately there seems to be no remedy for this situation, and those who thought there is a remedy, such as the logical positivists, learnt bitter lessons."

(Armstrong, D. M. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. ix)

So what? Does this mean we should stop doing philosophy, especially metaphysics and ontology? No, I don't think so!

"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars

"One of the ways in which a metaphysician can help a nonmetaphysician is to protect him from bad metaphysics."

(Chisholm, Roderick M. On Metaphysics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. p. 51)

8.Unsystematic (vs. System Building & Worldview Coherent)

Well, there are both systematic philosophies and unsystematic ones. In my understanding, "philosophy…has to do not only with unravelling conceptual muddles but also with the tentative adumbration of a world view." (Jack Smart)

9.Detachment from Intellectual Engines of Modern Civilization

Are you talking about detachment from science and technology?
Again, this is true of some philosophers and philosophers, but false of others—especially of contemporary naturalistic philosophers and philosophies.

10. Ivory Tower Syndrome

Once again, this is an overgeneral statement that is false of many contemporay philosophers and philosophies.

[NickGaspar]

1.Tenure-Chasing Supplants Substantive Contributions
We find that in science departments too!

-But not on the expense of the produced work.

2.Confusion between Philosophizing & Chronicling

Is this the difference between doing philosophy and doing history of philosophy?

-The problem with chronicling is that people believe that by stating old philosophical ideas their worldviews become correct, useful or relevant.
No they don't....its chronicling. It is useful, as you said, when studying the history of philosophy, but not as arguments.
Like all intellectual endeavors, Philosophy advances and evolves and many of the ideas of the past are played out and obsolete with zero epistemic contributions.

3.Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility
This is true of many philosophers and philosophies, but it's false of many other philosophers and philosophies.

-Well its true for the way Academic philosophy organizes and labels its material......this is why many tend to practice chronicling since Philosophy doesn't have any official records on failed ideas.

4.Obsession with Language vs. Solving Real-World Problems
Conceptual analysis and conceptual clarification are very important, but the days when metaphysics was reduced to metalinguistics are long over. The primary subject matter of contemporary metaphysics is the real world itself and not our linguistic representations of it.

-Unfortunately most philosophers and armchair philosophers(amateurs) sacrifice the goal of philosophy (Solving Real-World Problems through wise statements) for showing off their linguistic abilities.

5.Idealism vs. Realism and Reductionism
What's the problem here?

-Idealism doesn't offer anything in our efforts to solve Real-World Problems. It is based on unfalsifiable , epistemically useless assumptions and it demands the rejection of any type of realism, even if some type is essential for any objective evaluation or epistemic achievement.
The "Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility" has allowed pseudo philosophical views like idealism to still exists in academic circles. Chronicling is used as an argument in favor of the view....and fancy language makes deconstruction difficult.

6.Too Many Miniproblems & Fashionable Academic Games
Science has a lot of "miniproblems" too!

- Again Science has results to show and a self correcting mechanism that brushes away bad science. Philosophy uses all these games allowing 2000 yo ideologies to still be found in its lists.

7.Poor Enforcement of Validity / Methodology
That's due to the nature of philosophy...

-Well no. Natural Philosophy was philosophy and spotted the problem...Its was forced to leave the club and change its name to science. Science is the best way to do philosophy (and honest).

philosophy lacks the wonderful decision procedures that are present in logic and mathematics (proofs)

-Philosophers deny to use those procedures and standards of evaluation....rendering their efforts pseudo philosophical. They just don't admit it.

Unfortunately there seems to be no remedy for this situation, and those who thought there is a remedy, such as the logical positivists, learnt bitter lessons.

-There is one , it is call Science(Methodological Naturalism) and Philosophy on Naturalistic principles. Philosophy has to offer a great list of breakthroughs but none of them are based on non naturalistic principles!

i.e
Major general advances

Naturalism(in the domain of metaphysics)vs. Supernaturalism
Evidentialism (in the domain of epistemology)vs. mysticism, authoritarianism, dogmatism, a priori facts, faith
Consequentialism (in the domain of ethics) vs. authoritarianism / absolutism
Democracy / Human Rights(in the domain of politics)vs. fascism, aristocracy, autocracy, Athenian democracy
Aesthetic Relativism (In the domain of aesthetics) vs. cosmic aesthetics / aesthetics as morality

Major Specific advances made by modern philosophy

Game Theory
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems / Dan Willard's Solutions
Modal Logic
Bayesian Epistemology

Small but important discoveries

Connecting meaning of a statement with its truth conditions (and corresponding advances in defining "truth")
Distinction between sentences and propositions (and its significance for cognitive science and AI research)
Demarcation of qualia as fundamental attribute of consciousness
Compatibilism (proving that desirable versions of responsibility, self-determination and personal autonomy are compatible with total causal determinism)
Rigorous defenses of atheism

So what? Does this mean we should stop doing philosophy, especially metaphysics and ontology? No, I don't think so!

-No the above points argue that we should start doing Philosophy correctly by organizing the field and respect the Standards set of Logic!

8.Unsystematic (vs. System Building & Worldview Coherent)
Well, there are both systematic philosophies and unsystematic ones. In my understanding

-Academic philosophy does a lousy job in systematizing its methods and Demarcating them. This is Bunge's points all along.

9.Detachment from Intellectual Engines of Modern Civilization
Are you talking about detachment from science and technology?
Again, this is true of some philosophers and philosophers, but false of others—especially of contemporary naturalistic philosophers and philosophies.

-Yes it is a mixed back...and again , as Bunge points out this being the fault of the Academia. i.e. You won't find half biologists in labs using Evolutionary principles and half of them ID principles.
This is the whole point! The structure of the field allows this "half and half" that you also see as a real phenomenon in the academia.

10. Ivory Tower Syndrome
Once again, this is an overgeneral statement that is false of many contemporay philosophers and philosophies.

-Again the statement points out the inability of the Academic establishment to remove conflicting flawed perceptions.
People believe that any idea is protected under the label of Philosophy...because "this is Philosophy's nature"as you said.
No this syndrome is catastrophic and it should be dismissed!

[NickGaspar]

You totally missed the point in Bunge's List.
He doesn't need all the Philosophers to be "bad philosophers" for his points to be correct.
He just points out that the current system in Academic Philosophy allows good and bad philosophers and philosophies to co exist in equal terms!
This poor Demarcation within the academia enables bad philosophy in forums like this one.
In 2021 we still find idealists who really believe that their view is "philosophically" justified!
This is something that you will never find in Science...i.e. Not many science's fans are proponents of the Stork theory or Miasma.....

[Atla]

Strong emergence like that of H2O is pseudoscience for people who lack the capacity to have a holistic view of the universe.

[NickGaspar]

Strong emergence like that of H2O is pseudoscience for people who lack the capacity to have a holistic view of the universe.

This is what magical thinkers believe. The fact is that they will never spray oxygen or nitrogen at an open flame in their home....but they will through water without second thought. So deep down they understand that this phenomenon is part of the real world.

[Atla]

Strong emergence like that of H2O is pseudoscience for people who lack the capacity to have a holistic view of the universe.

This is what magical thinkers believe. The fact is that they will never spray oxygen or nitrogen at an open flame in their home....but they will through water without second thought. So deep down they understand that this phenomenon is part of the real world.

You don't seem to understand weak vs strong emergence, interactions between said atoms, interactions between said atoms and the rest of the universe. So you end up with the magical belief that the whole is more than the sum of the parts, which is pseudoscience.

[Consul]

Do you have any ontologically plausible explanation of how two different simple things can collectively have one emergent simple property—i.e. one which is not reductively identifiable with a sum of properties of or/and relations between the two simple things?

-Well emergence addresses just that. Two simple things can collectively spark the emergence of a property that isn't reducible to any of the lower level mechanisms of this simple system.
I just provided the excellent example of H2O and how 3 atoms can produce a new substances with properties that can't be tracked back to its constituent parts or their properties.
In short, emergence is a real world observable phenomenon that displays empirical regularity and can be observed, predicted and quantified.

You're begging the question by presupposing the ontological possibility of emergent properties, especially as it is not true that they have actually been observed.

Note that an emergent property of a whole or a system isn't any old property of it, but a novel simple, non-complex/non-structural property of it which is irreducibly different from any complex/structural property of it. An emergent property of a system (such as a molecule) depends on but isn't identical to any structural property of it.

Antiemergentists do not deny that there are predicates which are true of systems but not of their elements (taken individually), or that there are concepts under which complexes fall but not their components (taken individually).

-First of all I have to ask.... What is an "antiemergentist"?...someone who denies objective observations of reality? So why should we bring "antiemergentist" in a scientific-philosophical discussions? Should we also allow flat earthers, stork theorists, antivaccinists, holocaust deniers, cold sun believers to bring their opinions without objective evidence in any of the respective scientific fields?
Its a fact of nature that matter's complex structures allow the emergence of advanced properties when structure and functions (conditions) allow it. Its an empirically regular phenomenon fully observable, predictable and quantifiable.
Why we should even take such objections seriously when they have not met their burden?

By "antiemergentists" about properties I mean ontological reductionists about them; and there is nothing antiempirical about reductionism.

Have the emergentists "met their burden" and demonstrated empirically that there are nonsimple objects or substances in nature which have emergent simple properties? – No, they haven't!

The ontological question is what makes such true "holistic" predications true?Properties of complex (composite/compound) objects, substances, or materials?

- I don't know what a "holistic predication" is. What I know is that we directly observe the realization or existence of substances and their properties.
This is what limits any meaningful ontological speculation. Making up dimensions and complex entities and mechanism beyond our observations in our attempt to explain what appears mysterious to us...that is not philosophy any more...that is theology. Ontology is metaphysics on how things and phenomena that we observe come to existence or realization.....not to make invisible entities.

By "holistic predication" I mean predicating something of, or stating something about something nonsimple, i.e. a whole with (proper) parts, a complex, a structure, or a system.

Science, particularly microphysics deals with unobservable entities too! Nobody has ever seen a quark.

Anyway, even in the case of observable entities, there is always an interplay between observation and theory. Theoretical science has ontological implications and presuppositions, the critical analysis and assessment of which is the job of ontologists.

"Ontology sets out an even more abstract model of how the world is than theoretical physics, a model that has placeholders for scientific results and excluders for tempting confusions. Ontology and theoretical science can help one another along, we hope, with minimal harm."

(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 42)

Yes, but antiemergentists argue that all properties of (mereologically) nonsimple objects, substances, or materials are complex or structural properties rather than emergent simple properties.

-You will need to explain why we should listen to their "arguments". Does their ideas have any epistemic or instrumental value, any objective foundation...and I am not sure that this is indeed their argument.
From what I have heard all these years, their argument is a really old one...which I label "Argument from imaginary Substances."
Most of them believe that Advanced properties in nature are the "product" of invisible substances,agents, energies, forces etc that, conveniently enough share the same properties observed at the phenomenon in question. (i.e. Combustion was caused by phlogistion/ we now know its a chemical process. Consciousness is caused by a magical mental substances or energy or whatever/ we now know its a biological process).

You should listen to the antiemergentists/reductionists because their arguments are relevant and mustn't be ignored.

"Most of them…"—who are they?

There is absolutely nothing antinaturalistic or antiscientific about antiemergentism/reductionism (about properties). On the contrary, if something seems "magical" or "spooky", it's ontological emergence, the appearance of ontologically irreducible simple properties of nonsimple objects!

All properties of complexes or structures such as water molecules aren't simple but complex or structural ones that are ontologically reducible to properties or/and relations between the basic constituents of complexes or structures.
All physical or chemical properties of masses of water can be reductively explained in terms of the properties of and the (spatial and causal/interactional) relations between the elementary particles of which water is composed.

-That is a really general and vague claim since it depends on how one looks or accepts a reductive explanation. Magical thinkers(or antiemergentists ) will always insert a pseudo "why" question (why two combustive elements can produce a substance with fire extinguishing properties or why mindless matter can produce mind properties) and promote it as a serious one. In the case of the mind they will deny the data on the structure and function based on the "exotic feeling" of the mind while in the case of the water they will accept the explanation without a second thought.

The answer at the question "why matter is capable of producing so advanced and diverse properties"is...... this is what matter is capable of.
If it wasn't ...then we wouldn't exist. If we existence...then that would be a good mystery to solve.

Antiemergentists who are doing serious ontology are anything but "magical thinkers"!

The ontological question is not whether nonsimple objects (can) have any properties at all—they can and do—, but whether the properties they have are ontologically reducible, resultant, nonsimple (composite/complex/structural) properties or ontologically irreducible, emergent, simple (noncomposite/noncomplex/nonstructural) properties.

My (John Heil's) simple but (I think) very powerful argument against emergent properties is one against their very possibility and thereby also against their actuality, since nonpossibility entails nonactuality. I maintain that emergent properties are not coherently conceivable and comprehensible.

[Consul]

The problem with chronicling is that people believe that by stating old philosophical ideas their worldviews become correct, useful or relevant.
No they don't....its chronicling. It is useful, as you said, when studying the history of philosophy, but not as arguments.
Like all intellectual endeavors, Philosophy advances and evolves and many of the ideas of the past are played out and obsolete with zero epistemic contributions.

An argument isn't bad, unsound, or obsolete just because it's old.

-Unfortunately most philosophers and armchair philosophers(amateurs) sacrifice the goal of philosophy (Solving Real-World Problems through wise statements) for showing off their linguistic abilities.

Any examples, so that I understand who you are talking about?

-Idealism doesn't offer anything in our efforts to solve Real-World Problems. It is based on unfalsifiable , epistemically useless assumptions and it demands the rejection of any type of realism, even if some type is essential for any objective evaluation or epistemic achievement.
The "Insular Obscurity / Inaccessibility" has allowed pseudo philosophical views like idealism to still exists in academic circles. Chronicling is used as an argument in favor of the view....and fancy language makes deconstruction difficult.

I'm not a friend of idealism, which is not a pseudophilosophical but a genuinely philosophical (world-)view or group of views, there being different versions of it. See Varieties of Idealism in Chalmers' paper Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem (PDF), in which you'll even find a distinction between antirealist idealism and realist idealism!

Metaphysical idealism does give answers to the questions of the nature of ultimate reality and the relationship of mind and body. It doesn't solve any more specific "real-world problems", but it doesn't prevent scientists from solving such problems either. Berkeley was not an antiscientist! Even if the world consisted of nothing but immaterial spirits and their ideas, such that apparently physical objects are really mental objects, empirical science could go on with business as usual.

- Again Science has results to show and a self correcting mechanism that brushes away bad science. Philosophy uses all these games allowing 2000 yo ideologies to still be found in its lists.

That we don't see the same theoretical progress and consensus in philosophy that we see in science is mainly due to the following situation, from which philosophers cannot escape as long as they're doing philosophy:

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"The reader in search of knock-down arguments in favor of my theories will go away disappointed. Whether or not it would be nice to knock disagreeing philosophers down by sheer force of argument [2, it cannot be done. Philosophical theories are never refuted conclusively. (Or hardly ever. Gödel and Gettier may have done it.) The theory survives its refutation—at a price. Argle has said what we accomplish in philosophical argument: we measure the price. Perhaps that is something we can settle more or less conclusively. But when all is said and done, and all the tricky arguments and distinctions and counterexamples have been discovered, presumably we will still face the question which prices are worth paying, which theories are on balance credible, which are the unacceptably counterintuitive consequences and which are the acceptably counterintuitive consequences. On this question we may still differ. And if all is indeed said and done, there will be no hope of discovering still further arguments to settle our differences. (...)

Our 'intuitions' are simply opinions; our philosophical theories are the same. Some are commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular, some are general, some are more firmly held, some less. But they are all opinions, and a reasonable goal for a philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium. Our common task is to find out what equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or another of them. If we lose our moorings in everyday common sense, our fault is not that we ignore part of our evidence. Rather, the trouble is that we settle for a very inadequate equilibrium. If our official theories disagree with what we cannot help thinking outside the philosophy room, then no real equilibrium has been reached. Unless we are doubleplusgood doublethinkers, it will not last. And it should not last, for it is safe to say that in such a case we will believe a great deal that is false.

Once the menu of well-worked-out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion. Is this to say that there is no truth to be had? Or that the truth is of our own making, and different ones of us can make it differently? Not at all. If you say flatly that there is no god, and I say that there are countless gods but none of them are our worldmates, then it may be that neither of us is making any mistake of method. We may each be bringing our opinions to equilibrium in the most careful possible way, taking account of all the arguments, distinctions, and counterexamples. But one of us, at least, is making a mistake of fact. Which one is wrong depends on what there is.
[2 It would not be nice, of course. Robert Nozick has drawn attention to our strange way of talking about philosophical argument as if its goal were to subjugate the minds of our esteemed colleagues, and to escape their efforts to do likewise unto us.]""

(Lewis, David. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. x+xi)
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-Well no. Natural Philosophy was philosophy and spotted the problem...Its was forced to leave the club and change its name to science. Science is the best way to do philosophy (and honest).

The strictly empirical part of science consists in observations (including observations of experiments) and descriptions of observations; and when that's done, the theoretical part of science takes over. There is a continuum between theoretical science and theoretical philosophy (metaphysics/ontology). For example, are the so-called interpretations of quantum mechanics physical theories or metaphysical ones? There is no sharp boundary!

"philosophy lacks the wonderful decision procedures that are present in logic and mathematics (proofs)" – D. M. Armstrong

-Philosophers deny to use those procedures and standards of evaluation....rendering their efforts pseudo philosophical. They just don't admit it.

No, conscientious philosophers do use the standards of critical reasoning, and they do see to it that their theories are both self-consistent and consistent with empirically well-confirmed scientific theories.

"Unfortunately there seems to be no remedy for this situation, and those who thought there is a remedy, such as the logical positivists, learnt bitter lessons." - D. M. Armstrong

-There is one , it is call Science(Methodological Naturalism) and Philosophy on Naturalistic principles. Philosophy has to offer a great list of breakthroughs but none of them are based on non naturalistic principles!

Even the problems and questions of naturalistic metaphysics go beyond what is logically or empirically provable. Metaphysics is always more or less metaempirical (relating to matters beyond the range of empirical knowledge), and hence always more or less speculative.

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"Philosophy deals with two sets of questions:

First, the questions that science – physical, biological, social, behavioral – cannot answer now and perhaps may never be able to answer.

Second, the questions about why the sciences cannot answer the first lot of questions."

(Rosenberg, Alex. Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2005. pp. 3-4)
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