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[Consul]

You are confusing consciousness, the mental ability of organisms with brains to be aware of and to process environmental and organic stimuli with the quality and content of a conscious state...which is the outcome of many other mind properties (reason, intelligence, pattern recognition, symbolic language and thinking, memory etc). Sure human conscious states are far more diverse, expanded and complex from a content perspective but as an ability is not special or limited to humans.
This was always the problem with "every day" philosophy. The concepts used usually have nothing to do with our scientific understanding of the phenomenon and they are the product of huge categorical mistakes.

As we all (should) know, the word "consciousness" has several meanings. For example, all animals have transitive consciousness in the sense of being perceptually conscious or aware of their own body or things/events in their environment; but perceptual consciousness doesn't entail experiential/phenomenal consciousness, because perception qua information-reception can take place without any subjective sensations.

"Consciousness research is bedeviled by terminological confusion. In fact, there are a number of different things that people mean by the word 'conscious'. Failure to distinguish them can lead to important errors, as well as to failure to see what are genuine possibilities."

(Carruthers, Peter. Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Questions Laid to Rest. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.)

[Consul]

Yes it isn't accepted....there are many competing theories. Mark's and Damasio's is the only one that makes sense based on the facts we have about the brain. BUt sure they can be wrong.
My point was that science is has left behind all those magical theories that we read in this thread.
The following article illustrates that we no longer need "magic" in our frameworks since we understand a sufficient chunk of the mechanisms involved.

Of course, scientists want their explanations of phenomenal consciousness to be naturalistic rather than supernaturalistic.

QUOTE>
"I have found that some people do not believe that a scientific account of consciousness offers much in the way of consequences. My remarks here are not specifically aimed at these doubters, but I hope they will persuade some at least to consider the contrary position. I start with a big assumption: that we have a satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness based on brain activity. What would its significance be?
First, it would clarify the relation between mental and physical events and clear up some outstanding philosophical puzzles. We would no longer have to consider dualism, panpsychism, mysterianism, and spooky forces as worth pursuing. Time would be saved, at the least. And in clarifying these issues, we would have a better view of our place in the natural order. We would be able to corroborate Darwin's view that the human mind is the outcome of natural selection and thereby complete his program."

(Edelman, Gerald M. Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. p. 9)
<QUOTE

Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8121175/
We understand that it is a mental state that enables specific behavior where the brain can be held as Necessary and Sufficient causal mechanism and explanation.

The authors endorse epiphenomenalism about phenomenal consciousness, which isn't accepted by many philosophers or scientists either.
Are you an epiphenomenalist?

QUOTE>
"Epiphenomenalism's appeal is to those who are convinced that the Materialist view of human beings is false, but regret this, regretting that the case for Materialism fails, overwhelmed by qualia. Epiphenomenalism gets as near to Materialism as is decent, so it is thought. It is a (more than) half way house: not Materialism but deeply Materialist, giving us a world of purely material causes.
The case for Epiphenomenalism is the case for Materialism, together with the case against Materialism. The case for Materialism is the Argument from Science, from a triumphant, or at least steadily triumphing Science. The case against Materialism is that there are features of our conscious experience that are not accounted for by Science. What if that case against is accepted? Then those in the grip of Science, at any rate gripped by the explanatory power of Science, its success in removing Mystery, should fall back on Epiphenomenalism, regretful, but relieved that so much of that success can be preserved. What happens, what matters, what makes a difference, has a purely material cause. Science triumphs, not totally, but profoundly."

(Hyslop, Alec. "Methodological Epiphenomenalism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76/1 (1998): 61-70. p. 61)
———
"Neuroscientists have sometimes found epiphenomenalism attractive. In studying brain function, if you accept epiphenomenalism, you can safely ignore 'phenomenal' characteristics of mental phenomena altogether, and focus exclusively on physical mechanisms and processes in the brain. If mental phenomena are epiphenomenal then they are undetectable (except, presumably, by those undergoing them), and they could make no difference to anything that transpires in the material realm. This would leave neuroscientists free to explore mysteries of the brain without having to concern themselves with the messy details of conscious experience."

(Heil, John. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. p. 44)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8121175/
We understand that it is a mental state that enables specific behavior where the brain can be held as Necessary and Sufficient causal mechanism and explanation.

The authors endorse epiphenomenalism about phenomenal consciousness, which isn't accepted by many philosophers or scientists either.
Are you an epiphenomenalist?

QUOTE>
…
"Neuroscientists have sometimes found epiphenomenalism attractive. In studying brain function, if you accept epiphenomenalism, you can safely ignore 'phenomenal' characteristics of mental phenomena altogether, and focus exclusively on physical mechanisms and processes in the brain. If mental phenomena are epiphenomenal then they are undetectable (except, presumably, by those undergoing them), and they could make no difference to anything that transpires in the material realm. This would leave neuroscientists free to explore mysteries of the brain without having to concern themselves with the messy details of conscious experience."

(Heil, John. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. p. 44)
<QUOTE

The authors of that above-linked text state that "[n]euroscience has yet to explain how subjective awareness is generated by brain systems," so (epiphenomenal) phenomenal consciousness is an issue of concern for them.

[NickGaspar]

You are confusing consciousness, the mental ability of organisms with brains to be aware of and to process environmental and organic stimuli with the quality and content of a conscious state...which is the outcome of many other mind properties (reason, intelligence, pattern recognition, symbolic language and thinking, memory etc). Sure human conscious states are far more diverse, expanded and complex from a content perspective but as an ability is not special or limited to humans.
This was always the problem with "every day" philosophy. The concepts used usually have nothing to do with our scientific understanding of the phenomenon and they are the product of huge categorical mistakes.

As we all (should) know, the word "consciousness" has several meanings. For example, all animals have transitive consciousness in the sense of being perceptually conscious or aware of their own body or things/events in their environment; but perceptual consciousness doesn't entail experiential/phenomenal consciousness, because perception qua information-reception can take place without any subjective sensations.

"Consciousness research is bedeviled by terminological confusion. In fact, there are a number of different things that people mean by the word 'conscious'. Failure to distinguish them can lead to important errors, as well as to failure to see what are genuine possibilities."

(Carruthers, Peter. Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Questions Laid to Rest. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.)

As we all know...people use qualifiers (transitive, phenomenal, perceptual etc) in their attempt to create new meanings for a word. You just did that.
Consciousness is the abstract concept of the ability to be conscious of a stimuli (environmental or organic).

-" because perception qua information-reception can take place without any subjective sensations."
Now sensations are not subjective....the way we perceive our sensations result to subjective experiences.
And again I don't know how this is relevant. AS I showed, different meanings of the word are achieved by the use of qualifiers.

-" but perceptual consciousness doesn't entail experiential/phenomenal consciousness,"
- In both cases you need to be able to be conscious....this ability is enabled by brain function....Now how you call different qualities of a conscious states is IRRELEVANT. Plus phenomenal means "perceptible by the senses or through immediate experience.".....so perception is included in both "types" of consciousness....so find this remark nonsensical.

-""Consciousness research is bedeviled by terminological confusion. In fact, there are a number of different things that people mean by the word 'conscious'. Failure to distinguish them can lead to important errors, as well as to failure to see what are genuine possibilities.""
-That is not true. In science you will always find a clear definition of the terminology before the Methodology and the Conclusions.
i.e. the following paper offers a definition of the word "consciousness" : Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self, which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/
Now if you were refering to philosophy....I wouldagree. Most philosophers don't even care to offer a precise definition...since it will undermine their pseudo philosophy.
Fortunately science isn't philosophy....well to be more precise....Science is the best way to do philosophy.

[Consul]

The authors endorse epiphenomenalism about phenomenal consciousness, which isn't accepted by many philosophers or scientists either.

Of course, truth/falsity is not reducible to majority consensus: what is believed to be true/false by all or most people can be false/true.

[Consul]

As we all (should) know, the word "consciousness" has several meanings. For example, all animals have transitive consciousness in the sense of being perceptually conscious or aware of their own body or things/events in their environment; but perceptual consciousness doesn't entail experiential/phenomenal consciousness, because perception qua information-reception can take place without any subjective sensations.

As we all know...people use qualifiers (transitive, phenomenal, perceptual etc) in their attempt to create new meanings for a word. You just did that.
Consciousness is the abstract concept of the ability to be conscious of a stimuli (environmental or organic).

Transitive consciousness (consciousness-of) versus intransitive consciousness is a conceptual standard distinction in the philosophy of mind. T-consciousness is perceptual consciousness (awareness) of something. T-consciousness doesn't entail P-consciousness, because perceptual states needn't be phenomenally conscious states.

See: Concepts of Consciousness: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cons ... ss/#ConCon

-" because perception qua information-reception can take place without any subjective sensations." – Consul
Now sensations are not subjective....the way we perceive our sensations result to subjective experiences.

I use the term "sensation" only to refer to subjective sensory experiences rather than to nonexperienced, nonconscious neurophysiological processings of sensory stimuli or sensory information.

And again I don't know how this is relevant. AS I showed, different meanings of the word are achieved by the use of qualifiers.

Yes.

-" but perceptual consciousness doesn't entail experiential/phenomenal consciousness," – Consul
- In both cases you need to be able to be conscious....this ability is enabled by brain function....Now how you call different qualities of a conscious states is IRRELEVANT. Plus phenomenal means "perceptible by the senses or through immediate experience.".....so perception is included in both "types" of consciousness....so find this remark nonsensical.

It's definitely not, because the distinction between phenomenally conscious sensory perception and phenomenally nonconscious sensory perception is meaningful and important. Phenomenally nonconscious perception is experientially contentless, empty, there being nothing it is like to be the subject of a phenomenally nonconscious perceptual state.

What exactly does "conscious" mean in "in both cases you need to be able to be conscious"?
That you need to be awake as opposed to being asleep—what is called intransitive creature consciousness (by Peter Carruthers and others)? – "It is a matter of being awake rather than asleep, or conscious as opposed to comatose." (Carruthers)

Nonconscious/nonexperiential perception takes place even during sleep, so you needn't be awake (intransitively creature-conscious) in order to be transitively conscious (perceptually conscious) of things/events.

-"Consciousness research is bedeviled by terminological confusion. In fact, there are a number of different things that people mean by the word 'conscious'. Failure to distinguish them can lead to important errors, as well as to failure to see what are genuine possibilities." – Peter Carruthers
-That is not true. In science you will always find a clear definition of the terminology before the Methodology and the Conclusions. i.e. the following paper offers a definition of the word "consciousness" : Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self, which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/
Now if you were refering to philosophy....I wouldagree. Most philosophers don't even care to offer a precise definition...since it will undermine their pseudo philosophy.
Fortunately science isn't philosophy....well to be more precise....Science is the best way to do philosophy.

We find conceptual unclarity and confusion both in philosophy and in science, but it just isn't true that "[m]ost philosophers don't even care to offer a precise definition." Those in the analytic tradition at least are well versed in conceptual analysis and conceptual clarification, and also well interested in precise definitions.

As for your example: "Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self, which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex."

This is a definition of "consciousness" plus a theory of how consciousness comes about. As for the definition alone, it equates consciousness with wakefulness (intransitive creature consciousness) or perceptual awareness (transitive creature consciousness). So it's not a definition of phenomenal consciousness (= subjective experience).

ITC-consciousness (wakefulness) and TC-consciousness (perceptual awareness) can be and often are accompanied by P-consciousness ("experienceness", to use Michael Graziano's unusual term). But P-consciousness entails neither TC-consciousness (since one can have an experience without perceiving anything through it: sensory hallucination) nor ITC-consciousness (since P-consciousness occurs during dreams too). Moreover, TC-consciousness doesn't entail P-consciousness (since perception can take place nonexperientially). Does ITC-consciousness entail P-consciousness? Can you be awake without experiencing anything subjectively? If wakefulness is defined solely in terms of neurophysiological arousal (with "arousal" referring to the global level of neurophysiological excitation or activation), then it seems an animal can be awake or aroused without experiencing anything subjectively.

QUOTE>
"arousal vs awareness. There is at present no satisfactory, universally accepted definition of consciousness. For the purposes of clinical neurosciences, consciousness consists of two basic components: arousal (i.e. wakefulness, vigilance, or level of consciousness) and awareness of environment and of self (i.e. contents of consciousness…). The interpretation of this delineation depends on the clinical, neuroscientific, or philosophical approach of the authors. Hereinafter operational definitions are proposed as they are employed in neurology. Consciousness is a multifaceted concept and the proposed neurological definitions do not necessarily overlap with those used by philosophers or basic neuroscientists elsewhere in this volume."

(Laureys, Steven. "Arousal vs. Awareness." In The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, edited by Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, and Patrick Wilken, 58-60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 58)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

Note that consciousness defined as perceptual awareness, behavioral responsiveness, wakefulness, or arousal belongs to Chalmers' "easy problems", so a scientific solution to the problem of consciousness thus defined isn't per se a solution to the "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience)! So when scientists claim to have solved the riddle of consciousness, one needs to check first what they mean by "consciousness"!

[Consul]

Note that consciousness defined as perceptual awareness, behavioral responsiveness, wakefulness, or arousal belongs to Chalmers' "easy problems", so a scientific solution to the problem of consciousness thus defined isn't per se a solution to the "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience)! So when scientists claim to have solved the riddle of consciousness, one needs to check first what they mean by "consciousness"!

If the problem of subjective experience/sentience is nothing over and above the problem of perception, cognition, or neurophysiological excitation/activation, then there is no doubt that it is scientifically tractable.

[Sy Borg]

Unlike other species, humans can comprehend the passage of time, able to recall events at will without being driven by stimuli, and they can project possible futures.

Outliers can teach us about phenomena, but I wouldn't use them as a standard with which to measure other species. An example of how judging by human standards can lead to error was dogs being given mirror tests. As you know, dogs did not fail the test because - as commonly assumed at the time - they lacked self-awareness. They just lacked human visual emphasis. Human would generally fail an equivalent sniff test too.

There are certainly differences between human cognition&consciousness and other forms of animal cognition&consciousness, but there are nonetheless evolutionary similarities between them. We aren't aliens from outer space; we are part of animal evolution on Earth and biologically related to all the other animals on this planet through common ancestry.

By the way, I recommend Joseph LeDoux's book The Deep History of Ourselves: The Four-Billion-Year Story of How We Got Conscious Brains.

All this time I have been considering the difference between:

1. a state that is on the brink of p-consciousness but, in fact, completely lacks internality

2. the weakest possible p-consciousness.

Studying a human brain to determine the above subtleties logically cannot work. Studying any brain will billions, or even millions, or neurons is ignoring potentially simpler consciousness. However, studying the human brain attracts far more research dollars than studies of the neuronally-challenged tunicate larvae, hydras and rotifers.

More likely, studies about the boundaries of consciousness will relate to AI, determining how complexification over time creates subjective experience. So the chance that p-consciousness may exist in very simple organisms appears likely to remain unexplored, left to speculation and airy dismissal.

[Atla]

The organism's sense of being and abiogenesis are soft emergences, but the material -> immaterial jmup is a hard emergence (which is probably impossible, magic).

How could a nonphysical entity naturally emerge from or be naturally produced by purely physical entities?

Why ask me, you guys are the ones believing in it.

[Consul]

How could a nonphysical entity naturally emerge from or be naturally produced by purely physical entities?

Why ask me, you guys are the ones believing in it.

I'm not one of them! I don't believe in ontological emergence.

[Faustus5]

How could a nonphysical entity naturally emerge from or be naturally produced by purely physical entities?

Why ask me, you guys are the ones believing in it.

I'm not one of them! I don't believe in ontological emergence.

Me, either. The idea that consciousness has any non-physical properties is about as dumb and evidence-free an idea as anyone has ever had in philosophy.

[Atla]

How could a nonphysical entity naturally emerge from or be naturally produced by purely physical entities?

Why ask me, you guys are the ones believing in it.

I'm not one of them! I don't believe in ontological emergence.

You do, as long as P-consciousness can't be measured.

[Atla]

How could a nonphysical entity naturally emerge from or be naturally produced by purely physical entities?

Why ask me, you guys are the ones believing in it.

I'm not one of them! I don't believe in ontological emergence.

Me, either. The idea that consciousness has any non-physical properties is about as dumb and evidence-free an idea as anyone has ever had in philosophy.

You were forced into the even worse position of both rejecting and accepting the existence of P-consciousness, while explaining it away.

[Faustus5]

You were forced into the even worse position of both rejecting and accepting the existence of P-consciousness, while explaining it away.

Nah, I just play by the normal rules of scientific investigation and explanation, but since you want consciousness to be magic, this confuses you.

Trust me, it doesn't confuse the vast majority of scientists and philosophers who are scientifically literate, for whom nothing Consul and I believe is remarkable or controversial.