Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Pattern-chaser]

Can you have a computer without silicon chips? No. Can computation be performed without silicon chips? Yes.

Exactly. Computing can be carried out using DNA, for example. [Although there are other semiconductor alternatives to silicon: germanium, gallium arsenide, etc.]

Nature itself performs calculations of daunting complexity. To quote Richard Feynman:

It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?

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[Consul]

Are there any plausible scientific models of natural non-neurological or even non-biological "ersatz brains" capable of realizing cognitive minds and especially conscious minds?

Are there any neurological models of the mind that can actually produce anything even remotely like a mind?

There are open questions as to how exactly cognition and consciousness are realized in animal brains by patterns of neural activity, but it is no longer an open question whether animal brains are capable or realizing cognition and consciousness, because we know they can.

Can you have a computer without silicon chips? No. Can computation be performed without silicon ships? Yes.

Can there be non-carbon-based natural organisms?
Anyway, mere computation isn't cognition. A computer doesn't have a mind.

[Consul]

Can there be non-carbon-based natural organisms?

If there are such extraterrestrial organisms with minds, there is no reason to suppose that they lack brains, and that their minds are independent of the electrochemical processes in their brains.

[Pattern-chaser]

Are there any plausible scientific models of natural non-neurological or even non-biological "ersatz brains" capable of realizing cognitive minds and especially conscious minds?

Are there any neurological models of the mind that can actually produce anything even remotely like a mind?

There are open questions as to how exactly cognition and consciousness are realized in animal brains by patterns of neural activity, but it is no longer an open question whether animal brains are capable or realizing cognition and consciousness, because we know they can.

Agreed. And I know that this wasn't aimed at me, but haven't you completely ignored the question Sy Borg asked?

[Consul]

As I already pointed out in a previous post, absence of evidence does amount to evidence of absence in case the following condition is met:

1. If p is true, one can reasonably expect to find evidence for p on closer scientific scrutiny.
2. One doesn't find any evidence for p on closer scientific scrutiny.

Weasel words. Yes, there are some very specific and highly constrained examples where absence can be confirmed and verified. This, as we all know, is not the aim or the truth of the statement "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence", which still stands, as it must.

P.S. Reasonable expectation is insufficient; proof is required here. This is rather more formal than a casual chat, which is where "reasonable expectation" belongs.

QUOTE>
"Some slogans regarding evidence are not restricted to particular disciplines but crop up in conversation and sometimes in written discussions on a wide variety of issues. One of these comes in two incompatible forms: Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence (a statement made popular by Carl Sagan) and Absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
The first (negative) form is more common, and it is sometimes used in criticism of an argument from ignorance to the effect that one should believe a proposition because its denial has not been proved. It is doubtful whether anyone capable of being swayed by this crude argument could be helped by the slogan. But it is an interesting exercise to determine when the slogan is applicable. The answer appears to be that each version, positive and negative, applies under certain conditions. At a first approximation, we can take the absence of evidence to be evidence of absence—or more broadly and less memorably, we can take the lack of positive evidence for some hypothesis to be evidence against the hypothesis—just in case we have good reason to believe that if the hypothesis were true, we would have positive evidence. In one of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories, Sherlock Holmes finds the key to a mysterious theft in the fact that a dog did nothing in the night, from which he infers that the thief cannot have been a stranger; for if he had been a stranger, the dog would have been expected to bark during the intrusion. On the other hand, in some cases we would not expect to have positive evidence regardless of whether the hypothesis is true or false. Spontaneous proton decay, if it takes place at all, is an event so rare that our expectation of catching it happening is nearly zero. Consequently, our failure thus far to detect it does not give us much in the way of a reason to reject the theoretical possibility. One advantage of looking at the slogan in probabilistic terms is that the first approximation can be sharpened: ~E is evidence for ~H just in case P(E|H)/P(E|~H) > 1; and the stronger the inequality, the better the evidence. This formulation has the merit of drawing attention to the fact that E may be strong evidence for H, even when both P(E|H) and P(E|~H) are quite small in absolute terms, provided that their ratio is very large."

(McGrew, Timothy. "Evidence." In The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, 58-67. New York: Routledge, 2011. pp. 64-5)

"Genuine Evidence: Pr(E|H) > Pr(E|¬H), so that the evidence we’re looking for is evidence for H. It follows that Pr(¬E|¬H) > Pr(¬E|H).
...
It is a well known consequence of Bayesian confirmation theory that if Pr(E|H) > Pr(E|¬H), then E confirms H. It similarly follows that if Pr(¬E|¬H) > Pr(¬E|H), then ¬E confirms ¬H. The Genuine Evidence condition states that the antecedent of this latter conditional is true, and so in such cases we should expect that ¬E confirms ¬H. But this is just to say that the absence of evidence (¬E) is evidence of absence (¬H)."

(Stephens, Christopher. "A Bayesian Approach to Absent Evidence Reasoning." Informal Logic 31/1 (2011): 56-65. pp. 61-2)
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[Consul]

Are there any neurological models of the mind that can actually produce anything even remotely like a mind?

Yes, there are models of how mental processes are constituted or implemented by neural processes. (Brains don't "produce" minds like the liver produces bile.) See textbooks in cognitive neuroscience, for example:

* Nicole M. Gage & Bernard J. Baars: Fundamentals of Cognitive Neuroscience (2nd ed., 2018)

* Jamie Ward: The Student's Guide to Cognitive Neuroscience (4th ed., 2020)

* Model-based cognitive neuroscience: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6103531/

* A How-to-Model Guide for Neuroscience: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7031850/

[Consul]

"Connectionism is a movement in cognitive science that hopes to explain intellectual abilities using artificial neural networks (also known as “neural networks” or “neural nets”). Neural networks are simplified models of the brain composed of large numbers of units (the analogs of neurons) together with weights that measure the strength of connections between the units. These weights model the effects of the synapses that link one neuron to another. Experiments on models of this kind have demonstrated an ability to learn such skills as face recognition, reading, and the detection of simple grammatical structure.…"

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/connectionism/

[Sy Borg]

Are there any plausible scientific models of natural non-neurological or even non-biological "ersatz brains" capable of realizing cognitive minds and especially conscious minds?

Are there any neurological models of the mind that can actually produce anything even remotely like a mind?

There are open questions as to how exactly cognition and consciousness are realized in animal brains by patterns of neural activity, but it is no longer an open question whether animal brains are capable or realizing cognition and consciousness, because we know they can.

We know that brains are needed for cognition and consciousness, but we don't know if they are the exclusive generator of consciousness. In fact, we don't know for sure if the brain plays any role whatsoever in generating awareness. It may simply be filtering and refining consciousness generated by other body systems.

Most assume that brains either generate consciousness, or at least play a major role in generating consciousness in conjunction with other body systems. That is only an assumption. There are no proofs, hence out inability to create consciousness from scratch. Further, we also don't know whether we have already created new minds without knowing it. We have certainly created entities that pursue their own interests based on algorithms, that operate with interchangable human parts. Whether major companies are conscious in themselves, or will become conscious, is not known, rarely considered.

I have no problem with your views, but your total confidence in them is premature in lieu of compelling evidence. The scientific orthodoxy which you espouse may well be correct, who can say? However, I would not have such faith, given the lack of experimental evidence and effective theoretical models. Without testable theories, complete confidence in this area cannot be rationally justified.

[Sy Borg]

Are there any neurological models of the mind that can actually produce anything even remotely like a mind?

Yes, there are models of how mental processes are constituted or implemented by neural processes. (Brains don't "produce" minds like the liver produces bile.) See textbooks in cognitive neuroscience, for example:

* Nicole M. Gage & Bernard J. Baars: Fundamentals of Cognitive Neuroscience (2nd ed., 2018)

* Jamie Ward: The Student's Guide to Cognitive Neuroscience (4th ed., 2020)

* Model-based cognitive neuroscience: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6103531/

* A How-to-Model Guide for Neuroscience: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7031850/

Current orthodoxy in neuroscience is famously missing crucial elements. If those models were sufficiently comprehensive, they would have already been used by researchers to create new minds. At this stage, no new minds have been created, only facsimiles. Back to the drawing board ...

[Pattern-chaser]

I have no problem with your views, but your total confidence in them is premature in lieu of compelling evidence.

I'm going to write that down, and use it later, to make myself look impressive. So often, I have wanted to say this, succinctly, as you have done.

[Sy Borg]

I have no problem with your views, but your total confidence in them is premature in lieu of compelling evidence.

I'm going to write that down, and use it later, to make myself look impressive. So often, I have wanted to say this, succinctly, as you have done. 👍

Same here :)

Take black holes for instance. They were predicted decades earlier with Einstein's math. Belief in them at the time was not warranted, as there was no proof, but the models were solid.

As far as I know, IIT is the only mathematical model for consciousness, and it has made no equivalent predictions. It appears that consciousness is as extreme in terms of information and complexity as black holes are with mass and radiation. Thus, it's assumed that consciousness is simply a matter of highly-integrated complexity. However, it may be that brains are what's needed for expressions of consciousness that humans are capable of observing, interpreting and understanding as consciousness.

To that end, I am not convinced by the usual assumption that consciousness is indivisible. I would argue that a sense of being may appear to be seamless, but that is only an assumption. It may be that consciousness is modular, consisting of countless small reflexes and tiny urges just as the body consists of countless cells and other* microbial life.

IMO there are too many assumptions being made in this field, perhaps because it was based on that most unscientific of sciences - psychology - the only branch of medicine where it is not common practice to scan the organ being treated for anomalies in operation. Right from the start, studies regarding minds were conducted with initial assumptions - that consciousness is indivisible and is generated exclusively by brains. By contrast, if a researcher studies a field less in the public conversation - say, molybdenum or stentors- there is no mental baggage to shed in order to avoid assumptions.

Bottom line is that we do not know how to bring life or consciousness to being, but we do know how to sound as though we know.


* I also question the dogma that cells are not alive. They are much more sophisticated than individual microbes, but they are captive and dependent, not wildly unlike how humans are becoming ever more captive and dependent. Consider that mitochondria are not considered to be alive but their free-living precursor, assumed to be some kind of Alphaprotobacteria, was clearly alive.

[Pattern-chaser]

As I already pointed out in a previous post, absence of evidence does amount to evidence of absence in case the following condition is met:

1. If p is true, one can reasonably expect to find evidence for p on closer scientific scrutiny.
2. One doesn't find any evidence for p on closer scientific scrutiny.

Weasel words. Yes, there are some very specific and highly constrained examples where absence can be confirmed and verified. This, as we all know, is not the aim or the truth of the statement "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence", which still stands, as it must.

P.S. Reasonable expectation is insufficient; proof is required here. This is rather more formal than a casual chat, which is where "reasonable expectation" belongs.

OK, let's consider the testimony of your nominated expert.

"Some slogans regarding evidence are not restricted to particular disciplines but crop up in conversation and sometimes in written discussions on a wide variety of issues. One of these comes in two incompatible forms: Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence (a statement made popular by Carl Sagan) and Absence of evidence is evidence of absence.

The first (negative) form is more common, and it is sometimes used in criticism of an argument from ignorance to the effect that one should believe a proposition because its denial has not been proved.

Straw man. One should not accept ("believe") a proposition in the lack of evidence, for exactly the same reasons as one should not reject it. In the absence of evidence, no analysis can take place: there is nothing to analyse. Thus, no formal scientific investigation can take place, and therefore no conclusion can be logically drawn. The proposition should not be accepted or rejected.

It is doubtful whether anyone capable of being swayed by this crude argument could be helped by the slogan.

Ad hominem attack on those "capable" (i.e. willing to accept?) of accepting an argument that is "crude".

But it is an interesting exercise to determine when the slogan is applicable. The answer appears to be that each version, positive and negative, applies under certain conditions. At a first approximation, we can take the absence of evidence to be evidence of absence...

An unjustifiable assertion. In the absence of evidence, there is no scientific or logical justification for reaching any kind of conclusion, other than 'no conclusion can be justified or reached'.

[Pattern-chaser]

I have no problem with your views, but your total confidence in them is premature in lieu of compelling evidence.

I'm going to write that down, and use it later, to make myself look impressive. So often, I have wanted to say this, succinctly, as you have done.

Same here

Take black holes for instance. They were predicted decades earlier with Einstein's math. Belief in them at the time was not warranted, as there was no proof, but the models were solid.

Agreed. But I would like to add to what you say the thing that always bothers me about these things. As you say, "Belief in them at the time was not warranted", to which I would add 'Disbelief in them at the time was not warranted either'. We are often far too quick to jump to conclusions, even without any justification at all.

[Consul]

But it is an interesting exercise to determine when the slogan is applicable. The answer appears to be that each version, positive and negative, applies under certain conditions. At a first approximation, we can take the absence of evidence to be evidence of absence...

An unjustifiable assertion. In the absence of evidence, there is no scientific or logical justification for reaching any kind of conclusion, other than 'no conclusion can be justified or reached'.

You're wrong!
For example, negative evidence or negative testimony does matter in court. When a witness says that she didn't see the defendant at the crime scene, this does have evidential value if one can reasonably suppose that she would have seen him if he had been there.

Again, generally, if one thoroughly looks for evidence for p and one doesn't find any, then one is justified in accepting ~p if and only if it is certain or at least highly probable that one would have found evidence for p if p were true.
For example, if you thoroughly search your wallet for coins and you don't find any, you are justified in believing that there aren't any coins in it. For if there were coins in it, you would surely have seen them. Coins don't magically become invisible when you try to look at them.

[Consul]

* I also question the dogma that cells are not alive.

Who says so? Cells are clearly biological or vital things. The question is whether they have mental or experiential properties. (You know my answer.)