Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

Sure, "So you'd basically be redefining this is behavioral terms, where you'd be leaving the mental phenomena simply not dealt with."

We do deal with it, in the only manner possible: We infer mental phenomena (in other people) from their observable behavior.

[popeye1945]

Subject and object, the physical world is objective, consciousness is subjective and both are mutually interdependent. Morality as meaning is made objective in the physical world through the manifestations of the ideas implied by what morality means, in the form of text, structures, and group thought. This process is a reaction to the necessities of a given society to maintain order and control of its subjects. Only conscious subjects can create objective morality in the outside world, from a mental model in consciousness.

[Peter Holmes]

1 To repeat, that action X is consistent with (or will achieve) goal Y doesn't entail the conclusion that, if we want goal Y, we ought to do X. It just means what it says: doing X will achieve goal Y.

Well yes, it does, if "ought" is understood in the instrumental sense I gave above.

Well, no it doesn't, even if the 'ought' is instrumental.

'If you want to bang in a nail, then you ought to use a hammer' can only mean 'then a hammer will achieve (or is the best way to achieve) that goal'. There's no obligation involved - nothing of the standard meaning of 'ought'. In this context, that's contraband - wanting to have your cake and eat it.

2 There's no deductive entailment from having a goal to acting to attain it.

That depends on the definition assumed for "goal." Per most dictionaries, it does:

"1. : the end toward which effort is directed : AIM"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/goal

"2. The object of a person's ambition or effort; an aim or desired result."

https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/goal

If no effort is directed toward something claimed to be goal, then it is not a goal.

Nope. Your gloss begs the question. It's logically possible to have a goal and do nothing about it.

I assume you know what deductive entailment means. The inference - we have a goal; therefore we ought not to pursue it - is not a contradiction, unless the inference begs the question. Having a goal doesn't entail acting to achieve it. The conclusion that it does is a matter of opinion - an assumed premise - which is subjective.

[Terrapin Station]

Sure, "So you'd basically be redefining this is behavioral terms, where you'd be leaving the mental phenomena simply not dealt with."

We do deal with it, in the only manner possible: We infer mental phenomena (in other people) from their observable behavior.

Including behavior of them telling you that you have their mental content wrong based on your assumptions about their other behavior?

[GE Morton]

'If you want to bang in a nail, then you ought to use a hammer' can only mean 'then a hammer will achieve (or is the best way to achieve) that goal'. There's no obligation involved - nothing of the standard meaning of 'ought'. In this context, that's contraband - wanting to have your cake and eat it.

That's correct. The instrumental "ought" does not imply any obligation. You're confusing that sense of the word with the "moral" sense. Obligation is a moral concept. If I say, "I watched a great movie last night. You ought to go see it," I'm not asserting you have any obligation to see it. I'm only asserting, knowing your interests and tastes, that you'd enjoy it. If I say, "You ought to use a hammer if you want to drive a nail," I'm only asserting that the hammer is the best tool for that job.

Nope. Your gloss begs the question. It's logically possible to have a goal and do nothing about it.

I assume you know what deductive entailment means. The inference - we have a goal; therefore we ought not to pursue it - is not a contradiction, unless the inference begs the question. Having a goal doesn't entail acting to achieve it. The conclusion that it does is a matter of opinion - an assumed premise - which is subjective.

Apparently we disagree about what constitutes logical impossibility. If a "goal" is defined as an object of pursuit, which it is, then "we have a goal; therefore we ought not to pursue it," certainly is a contradiction.

That (quoted) statement might make sense if qualified in certain ways, e.g., "X is our goal, but we ought not pursue it at this time," etc.

[GE Morton]

Sure, "So you'd basically be redefining this is behavioral terms, where you'd be leaving the mental phenomena simply not dealt with."

We do deal with it, in the only manner possible: We infer mental phenomena (in other people) from their observable behavior.

Including behavior of them telling you that you have their mental content wrong based on your assumptions about their other behavior?

Sure. But the only evidence for who is wrong and who is right is the subject's behavior, previous and subsequent.

[Peter Holmes]

'If you want to bang in a nail, then you ought to use a hammer' can only mean 'then a hammer will achieve (or is the best way to achieve) that goal'. There's no obligation involved - nothing of the standard meaning of 'ought'. In this context, that's contraband - wanting to have your cake and eat it.

That's correct. The instrumental "ought" does not imply any obligation. You're confusing that sense of the word with the "moral" sense. Obligation is a moral concept. If I say, "I watched a great movie last night. You ought to go see it," I'm not asserting you have any obligation to see it. I'm only asserting, knowing your interests and tastes, that you'd enjoy it. If I say, "You ought to use a hammer if you want to drive a nail," I'm only asserting that the hammer is the best tool for that job.

Erm. So you say moral 'ought' is instrumental. And there's no logical entailment from having a goal to acting consistently with it. So the claim 'if we want goal Y, then we ought to do X' is not a fact of any kind, let alone a moral fact. It's merely advisory.

Nope. Your gloss begs the question. It's logically possible to have a goal and do nothing about it.

I assume you know what deductive entailment means. The inference - we have a goal; therefore we ought not to pursue it - is not a contradiction, unless the inference begs the question. Having a goal doesn't entail acting to achieve it. The conclusion that it does is a matter of opinion - an assumed premise - which is subjective.

Apparently we disagree about what constitutes logical impossibility. If a "goal" is defined as an object of pursuit, which it is, then "we have a goal; therefore we ought not to pursue it," certainly is a contradiction.

Substituting terms makes no difference. The premise - we have an object of pursuit - still doesn't entail the conclusion - therefore we ought to pursue it. The conclusion expresses an opinion, as does any assertion using the word 'ought'. It doesn't assert a fact.

That (quoted) statement might make sense if qualified in certain ways, e.g., "X is our goal, but we ought not pursue it at this time," etc.

The conjunction is critical: 'X is our goal, AND we ought not pursue it...' is not a contradiction, with or without adverbial qualification.

[GE Morton]

That's correct. The instrumental "ought" does not imply any obligation. You're confusing that sense of the word with the "moral" sense. Obligation is a moral concept. If I say, "I watched a great movie last night. You ought to go see it," I'm not asserting you have any obligation to see it. I'm only asserting, knowing your interests and tastes, that you'd enjoy it. If I say, "You ought to use a hammer if you want to drive a nail," I'm only asserting that the hammer is the best tool for that job.

Erm. So you say moral 'ought' is instrumental.

I say that if you want a rational morality you have to understand "oughts" in the instrumental sense. The so-called "moral" sense is a mystical, unanalyzable notion that generates non-cognitive propositions for expressing attitudes and feelings.

And there's no logical entailment from having a goal to acting consistently with it.

I said the opposite.

So the claim 'if we want goal Y, then we ought to do X' is not a fact of any kind, let alone a moral fact. It's merely advisory.

You seem to have a narrow view of what counts as a "fact." A fact is any state of affairs asserted by a true proposition. And, yes, it is a fact that if you do not pursue a claimed goal, then it is not a goal (for you).

Substituting terms makes no difference. The premise - we have an object of pursuit - still doesn't entail the conclusion - therefore we ought to pursue it. The conclusion expresses an opinion, as does any assertion using the word 'ought'. It doesn't assert a fact.

Surprised you're having such a hard time with this. If P claims goal X, but does nothing to pursue X, then his claim is false. Or,

1. P has goal X.
2. P does nothing to pursue X,

is a contradiction, just as,

1. X is a triangle.
2. X has 4 sides

is a contradiction. Those propositions are contradictory because the definitions of the substantive terms require the feature denied in the #2 propositions. X cannot both be a triangle and have 4 sides.

You also like to draw a dichotomy between "opinions" and "facts." They are not mutually exclusive.

[Peter Holmes]

That's correct. The instrumental "ought" does not imply any obligation. You're confusing that sense of the word with the "moral" sense. Obligation is a moral concept. If I say, "I watched a great movie last night. You ought to go see it," I'm not asserting you have any obligation to see it. I'm only asserting, knowing your interests and tastes, that you'd enjoy it. If I say, "You ought to use a hammer if you want to drive a nail," I'm only asserting that the hammer is the best tool for that job.

Erm. So you say moral 'ought' is instrumental.

I say that if you want a rational morality you have to understand "oughts" in the instrumental sense. The so-called "moral" sense is a mystical, unanalyzable notion that generates non-cognitive propositions for expressing attitudes and feelings.

And there's no logical entailment from having a goal to acting consistently with it.

I said the opposite.

So the claim 'if we want goal Y, then we ought to do X' is not a fact of any kind, let alone a moral fact. It's merely advisory.

You seem to have a narrow view of what counts as a "fact." A fact is any state of affairs asserted by a true proposition. And, yes, it is a fact that if you do not pursue a claimed goal, then it is not a goal (for you).

Substituting terms makes no difference. The premise - we have an object of pursuit - still doesn't entail the conclusion - therefore we ought to pursue it. The conclusion expresses an opinion, as does any assertion using the word 'ought'. It doesn't assert a fact.

Surprised you're having such a hard time with this. If P claims goal X, but does nothing to pursue X, then his claim is false. Or,

1. P has goal X.
2. P does nothing to pursue X,

is a contradiction, just as,

1. X is a triangle.Sorry, but you're wrong.
2. X has 4 sides

is a contradiction. Those propositions are contradictory because the definitions of the substantive terms require the feature denied in the #2 propositions. X cannot both be a triangle and have 4 sides.

You also like to draw a dichotomy between "opinions" and "facts." They are not mutually exclusive.

Sorry, but you're wrong. Having a goal does not entail pursuing it, just as making a promise does not entail keeping it. An 'is' cannot entail an 'ought'.

And your analogy with a four-sided triangle is laughable.

Thanks for the craic, but I can see no point in continuing.

[GE Morton]

Sorry, but you're wrong. Having a goal does not entail pursuing it, just as making a promise does not entail keeping it. An 'is' cannot entail an 'ought'.

I've already answered your "is/ought" point. As for keeping promises: You're correct; a proposition cannot entail an action; it can only entail another proposition. A promise, e.g., "I promise to do X," means, "I will do X sometime in the future." If you fail to do X at any time in the future you render that statement false. "Your deeds belie your words."

And your analogy with a four-sided triangle is laughable.

Thanks for the craic, but I can see no point in continuing.

There is no point if you decline to address the arguments.

[CalebB]

Objective morality can be achieved if one's moral values ultimately lead to the wellbeing of yourself and the conscious beings in your society.

If we can scientifically determine how to promote the physical and psychological wellbeing of a person, then we can get an idea for what behaviors and values are objectively moral.

Here's an extract from a book called The Moral Landscape that I found insightful:
("
The Bad Life
You are a young widow who has lived her entire life in the midst of civil war.
Today, your seven-year-old daughter was raped and dismembered before your eyes.
Worse still, the perpetrator was your fourteen-year-old son, who was goaded to this evil
at the point of a machete by a press gang of drug-addled soldiers. You are now running
barefoot through the jungle with killers in pursuit. While this is the worst day of your life,
it is not entirely out of character with the other days of your life: since the moment you
were born, your world has been a theater of cruelty and violence. You have never learned
to read, taken a hot shower, or traveled beyond the green hell of the jungle. Even the
luckiest people you have known have experienced little more than an occasional respite
from chronic hunger, fear, apathy, and confusion. Unfortunately, you’ve been very
unlucky, even by these bleak standards. Your life has been one long emergency, and now
it is nearly over.

The Good Life
You are married to the most loving, intelligent, and charismatic person you have
ever met. Both of you have careers that are intellectually stimulating and financially
rewarding. For decades, your wealth and social connections have allowed you to devote
yourself to activities that bring you immense personal satisfaction. One of your greatest
sources of happiness has been to find creative ways to help people who have not had your
good fortune in life. In fact, you have just won a billion-dollar grant to benefit children in
the developing world. If asked, you would say that you could not imagine how your time
on earth could be better spent. Due to a combination of good genes and optimal
circumstances, you and your closest friends and family will live very long, healthy lives,
untouched by crime, sudden bereavements, and other misfortunes.

The examples I have picked, while generic, are nonetheless real—in that they
represent lives that some human beings are likely to be leading at this moment. While
there are surely ways in which this spectrum of suffering and happiness might be
extended, I think these cases indicate the general range of experience that is accessible, in
principle, to most of us. I also think it is indisputable that most of what we do with our
lives is predicated on there being nothing more important, at least for ourselves and for
those closest to us, than the difference between the Bad Life and the Good Life.
")

[Peter Holmes]

Objective morality can be achieved if one's moral values ultimately lead to the wellbeing of yourself and the conscious beings in your society.

If we can scientifically determine how to promote the physical and psychological wellbeing of a person, then we can get an idea for what behaviors and values are objectively moral.

This is to say that our moral goal should be the physical and psychological well-being of conscious beings.

But what counts as a conscious being is a matter of opinion. And what counts as well-being is a matter of opinion. And that we should have this or any other moral goal is a matter of opinion. And matters of opinion are subjective.

It seems to me that Harris and Dillahunty gloss over the choice of goal - 'if morality isn't about everyone's well-being, then what else can it be about?' - in order to move on to facts, and therefore, supposedly, moral objectivity.

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry, but you're wrong. Having a goal does not entail pursuing it, just as making a promise does not entail keeping it. An 'is' cannot entail an 'ought'.

I've already answered your "is/ought" point. As for keeping promises: You're correct; a proposition cannot entail an action; it can only entail another proposition. A promise, e.g., "I promise to do X," means, "I will do X sometime in the future." If you fail to do X at any time in the future you render that statement false. "Your deeds belie your words."

And your analogy with a four-sided triangle is laughable.

Thanks for the craic, but I can see no point in continuing.

There is no point if you decline to address the arguments.

I've explained why your argument is fallacious. You agree an 'is' can't entail an 'ought'.

And anyway, you think 'ought' is merely instrumental, denoting goal-consistency but not obligation - so that entailment is irrelevant.

And yet you claim the 'is' of having a goal entails the 'ought' of pursuing it, without begging the question.

If you formulate your argument in a syllogism, I'll show you why it's unsound - if it is. If it isn't, I'll concede.

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry, but you're wrong. Having a goal does not entail pursuing it, just as making a promise does not entail keeping it. An 'is' cannot entail an 'ought'.

I've already answered your "is/ought" point. As for keeping promises: You're correct; a proposition cannot entail an action; it can only entail another proposition. A promise, e.g., "I promise to do X," means, "I will do X sometime in the future." If you fail to do X at any time in the future you render that statement false. "Your deeds belie your words."

Okay, I'll rephrase it: making a promise doesn't mean having to keep it; and having a goal doesn't mean having to pursue it. We can choose to keep or break a promise - or to pursue or ignore a goal. If 'ought' is merely instrumental, there's no obligation is either case.

Of course, I don't think moral 'ought' is instrumental, because moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts regardless of goals. And moral objectivism can't be rescued by denying its core premise.

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry, but you're wrong. Having a goal does not entail pursuing it, just as making a promise does not entail keeping it. An 'is' cannot entail an 'ought'.

I've already answered your "is/ought" point. As for keeping promises: You're correct; a proposition cannot entail an action; it can only entail another proposition. A promise, e.g., "I promise to do X," means, "I will do X sometime in the future." If you fail to do X at any time in the future you render that statement false. "Your deeds belie your words."

Okay, I'll rephrase it: making a promise doesn't mean having to keep it; and having a goal doesn't mean having to pursue it. We can choose to keep or break a promise - or to pursue or ignore a goal. If 'ought' is merely instrumental, there's no obligation is either case.

Of course, I don't think moral 'ought' is instrumental, because moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts regardless of goals. And moral objectivism can't be rescued by denying its core premise.